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ABSTRACT 
 
This research develops a bio-economic modelling framework for the assessment 
of agricultural and water policy change implications for irrigated agriculture. It aims to 
contribute towards the implementation of the Water Framework Directive within the 
European Union, particularly in regard to the principles of cost recovery of water 
services and water demand management for irrigation. 
The bio-economic framework combines local agro-ecological with socio-
economic elements, allowing for the introduction of biophysical relationships of 
irrigated agricultural production into the appraisal of policy instruments. This 
framework is used to investigate the comparative performance of water management 
policy instruments for irrigation, including volumetric pricing, flat pricing, a two-part 
tariff and water allotments. Implications of these water policy instruments are assessed 
in combination with agricultural market and policy scenarios, which are used to define 
the economic background in which water policies will operate. This operational 
framework is designed within a microeconomic context at the farm level that takes into 
account crop yield-water relationships, the revealed economic behaviour of farmers, as 
well as structural productive patterns of representative agricultural systems in two case 
study areas in the south of Portugal. 
This integrated approach provides a comprehensive understanding of the 
implications of agricultural and water policies on irrigated agriculture within the 
European Union, unravels conflicts and identifies synergies between these policies. 
Simulation of water policy instruments produced substantial differences in performance 
across farming systems, enforcement levels, and agricultural policy and market settings. 
Results suggest that water pricing, on its own, is not necessarily the most effective 
means for achieving the WFD water demand management and cost recovery objectives, 
and proposes that a policy mix combining economic with regulatory elements may be 
best designed to pursue these objectives with fewer detrimental consequences. This 
study highlights that conflicts between CAP and the WFD may result in losses of 
efficiency, policy efficacy and losses of welfare, that could be minimised by integrating 
both policy measures and objectives, in a coherent and combined approach, exploring 
synergies and coordinating efforts to overcome sources of conflict.  
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CHAPTER 1 –  INTRODUCTION 
 
Water resources of both sufficient quantity and appropriate quality have become 
increasingly scarce. Consequently, the sustainable management of water resources is 
now a critical issue in many countries and a key priority on the international political 
agenda. Within the European Union, the recently enacted Water Framework Directive 
(WFD, Directive 2000/60/EC 2000) reflects the increasing prominence of sustainable 
water management in the region.  
The agricultural sector is the dominant user of water, accounting for almost three 
quarters of the World‟s total water consumption. This pattern also holds in European 
Mediterranean countries including Portugal. In such situations, the successful 
management of water resources depends primarily on policies affecting the irrigation 
sector. Within the EU, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the WFD are the 
principal policies governing water use and the agricultural sector. Therefore, it is 
foreseeable that changes in the implementation of these policies will result in substantial 
adjustments on irrigated agriculture and on the use of natural resources. 
In spite of this, a coherent framework for water policy analysis within the 
agricultural field has not yet been developed. Overall, lack of information and effective 
measurement of water usage, allied with misrepresentation of the producer economic 
behaviour, has resulted in poor policy design and poor policy performance in irrigated 
agriculture. Analysis of water and agricultural policy objectives within irrigated 
agriculture has been consistently undermined by asymmetric information deficiencies, 
namely unobserved individual water intakes, or absent information regarding water-
yield relationships (Dinar 2000; Tsur 2000; Young 1996). There are also questionable 
classical economics paradigms, such as the producer profit maximising assumption and 
aggregation bias problems. In practice, neither the behaviour of farmers with respect to 
policy change nor the trade-offs between water inputs and crop yields are accounted for 
in most agricultural economic studies.  
This study aims to investigate the economic, social and environmental 
implications of adopting the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for the irrigated 
agriculture of Alentejo, Portugal. This research offers a novel bio-economic 
modelling approach for the assessment of differences in the performance of 
agricultural and environmental policy measures in irrigated agriculture. This new 
methodological framework combines knowledge from biological and social 
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sciences, such as agronomy, economy, and others, in a multidisciplinary approach, 
which enables overcoming the previous limitations to policy analysis in agriculture. 
The main contributions of this research improve knowledge in the fields of the 
political economy of agriculture and of natural resource economics and policy. These 
contributions are of both quantitative and qualitative nature, as this new bio-economic 
methodological framework is implemented in two case study areas. Work developed 
during this research has exceeded the objective of increasing the understanding of water 
management policy instruments in agriculture; in fact, the research was expanded to 
incorporate fine detail in agricultural policy, and evolution of agricultural markets, 
effectively embracing the first scientific assessment of the most recently adopted 
package of policy measures, within the new rural development programme for mainland 
Portugal. 
At the very central core of the research lies the bio-economic modelling code, to 
which all other research components are anchored to. Mathematically, they are not only 
anchored to the code as they determine its analytic structure, functionality, requirements 
in data, as well as the quantity and quality of the results produced. In this monograph, 
these research modules are structured in chapters, presented as self-contained as 
possible, although integrated and interacting with other modules within a coherent 
modelling framework as shown in the next figure. 
The second chapter reviews the literature in the field of water policy for irrigated 
agriculture.  The third to seventh chapters focus on structural modules that integrate the 
bio-economic framework for policy analysis in irrigation. The third chapter determines 
representative farming systems suitable for mathematical representation within the 
programming model.  The fourth estimates the yield responses with respect to irrigation 
water, as these input-output relationships are crucial for water resource allocation 
procedures and fundamental for fully understanding the implications of policy change in 
irrigated farming.  The fifth chapter explains the economic programming model, 
describing the rationale for exploring preferences of decision makers and taking into 
account multiple objectives.  The sixth chapter designs near future agricultural and 
market scenarios, establishing the economic environment in which water policy 
instruments are analysed. Chapter seven describes the agri-environmental policy 
performance indicators used for reporting and summarising the outcomes and results of 
the bio-economic model. Thus, the outputs of all these chapters come together in 
chapter eight, where the most policy relevant implications of volumetric pricing, flat 
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pricing, two-part tariffs and water allotments are discussed for four representative farm 
types, under alternative agricultural policy and market scenarios.  
 
Figure 1. The structure of the monograph 
 
Chapter two provides the background to water management. It begins by 
explaining the need of public policy in the field of water and then describes the 
historical evolution of water policy from a resource perspective. An introduction to the 
WFD builds upon these foundations to emphasise the urgency in developing research 
skills and knowledge leading to efficient conservation of natural resources and the 
environment. This is accomplished by integrating key principles in the WFD, such as 
cost recovery and demand management, with available policy instruments, in the light 
of economic theory. The remainder of the chapter addresses vicissitudes and limitations 
of policy instruments in delivering policy objectives, with a descriptive review of 
literature. This review is centred mainly on the discussion of regulatory and economic 
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instruments simulated in this research, such as water allotments, volumetric pricing, 
area pricing and two-part pricing instruments. 
Chapter three is the first structural module of the bio-economic framework. This 
chapter determines the morphologic characteristics of homogeneous representative 
farming systems, suitable for mathematical representation within the bio-economic 
modelling framework, in respect to farming structure and productive patterns. Chapter 
three begins with a description of agriculture in the irrigation schemes used as case 
studies, focusing on geographical location, soils and climate classification, as well as 
the technical-economic nature of farming in these regions. This chapter carries on as it 
endeavours to understand that nature, digging into data on all fronts to explore the 
reasons behind agricultural diversity. Modelling agriculture on a farm-by-farm basis in 
an unrealistic expectation (Kobrich et al. 2003; Young 1996), and therefore some level 
of aggregation is necessary. A concise review of the literature describes use of 
multivariate analysis tools to unravel data structure and unveil heterogeneity in farming 
in the case studies, in order to minimise aggregation bias problems. This chapter also 
highlights problems in the modelling of agriculture systems arising from neglect of, or 
failure to capture, diversity within agriculture. This chapter is concluded with a 
description of the main features of the representative agricultural systems identified. 
Chapter four and chapter five are the kernel of the research. This is where 
agricultural technical options and biological relations are embedded within the matrix of 
equations of the economic model to appraise economic policy instruments. Bio-
economic modelling is an integrated approach in which biophysical techniques and 
outcomes serve as inputs of economic models. Agronomic modelling inputs the 
understanding of how agro-ecological factors define the range of potential activities and 
regulate crop yield relationships to water stresses, while the economic modelling 
component reallocates the different combinations of possible alternatives from a socio-
economic set of factors, such as prices, policy environments, agronomic limitations, 
resource use constrains, and behavioural actions from economic agents.  
Chapter four introduces bio-economic modelling in the field of agriculture and 
estimates locally adapted crop yield responses with respect to irrigation water. 
Knowledge of these technical input-output coefficients establishes the biophysical 
relationship between irrigated agricultural production with the use of water resources. 
This knowledge allows taking into account a comprehensive set of agricultural options 
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in terms of irrigated crops, irrigated technology and use of water resources, which is 
essential to the comprehensive assessment of policy change in irrigated agriculture. 
This chapter provides a review of the advantages of using crop growth models in 
overcoming data limitations, e.g. asymmetric or absent information, which although 
paramount for optimal resource allocation procedures have systematically undermined 
classical agricultural economics research. In fact, data deficiencies are particularly 
severe in agriculture as information relating crop yields to variable input levels is scarce 
for most areas, not abundant for most crops, seldom reliable to establish bio-
econometric relations (Hanks and Hill 1980). In addition, data is time and space related 
whenever available, consequently making results site and season specific and not 
readily applicable beyond the local experimental conditions (Jones et al. 2003; Young 
1996). This chapter is concluded with the presentation and discussion of crop-water 
production function results, computed with the CropSyst model (Stockle and Nelson 
1994) specifically for the case study areas. The presentation of results, for selected 
crops, shows the potential of biophysical models in simulating inter-annual variability 
of crop yield, and the technical relationship between irrigation technology and water 
resource use, which could be a prime asset in fostering new economic research on 
climate change and technological adoption topics. 
Chapter five is devoted to the economic component of the bio-economic 
framework. It takes into account agricultural policy and market settings influencing 
production in the representative farming systems, resource use constraints, agricultural 
rotations and also the entire set of biophysical relationships between crop production 
and water use generated in the previous chapter. This section of the research is very 
focused on bringing into the bio-economic framework the modelling of the economic 
behaviour of farmers, introducing the reasoning to multiple objectives and decision 
maker preferences. That is done by explaining the well established additive multi-
attribute utility theory modelling approach (Keeney and Raiffa 1976), using weighted 
goal programming, as proposed by Sumpsi et al. (1996), as an inverse preference 
method to elicit the relative importance of each objective within the process of decision 
making. 
Models based on mathematical programming are widely applied in agricultural 
economic policy analysis (Hazell and Norton 1986; Howitt 1995; Young 1996). In spite 
of that, vulnerabilities of agricultural economic programming models often derive from 
the over-simplification of economic behavioural attitudes. In reality, decision makers 
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seek a compromise solution between several objectives (Romero and Rehman 1989). It 
is demonstrated that the results of ignoring multiple goals often bear little relation to 
farmers decisions (Hazell and Norton 1986) and lead to excessively constrained models, 
improper for policy analysis (Howitt 2005). Use of the bio-economic modelling 
approach presented here certainly contributes to minimising these problems and 
improve the ex-ante accuracy of policy analysis, as shown at the end of this chapter. 
Before that, a very useful guide is presented for practitioners of the MAUT approach, 
and the most important mathematical equations used in the model are described. 
Chapter six endeavours to define policy-consistent and market-coherent 
scenarios for two time frames in the near future. Scenario analysis is used in this 
research as a means of dealing with uncertainty in the evolution of key variables, such 
as developments in agricultural policy and markets, which define the economic 
background in which the implications of water policy instruments are simulated. In this 
process of scenario design, the main driving forces and future trends which affect 
agriculture and agricultural markets in the EU are reviewed in light of the latest 
European Commission scenario study on agriculture and the rural world (Nowicki et al. 
2007). That review is complemented and adjusted on the basis of recent reports 
published by the major international institutes which provide forecasts for agricultural 
markets, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD and FAO 2007), the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI 2007a; FAPRI 2007b) and the European 
Commission (European Commission 2007a). Having identified the main drivers of 
change and dominant policy trends, this chapter defines the extreme limits for the 
evolution of agricultural policy in Europe and provides assumptions on how those 
extremes affect agricultural markets in Portugal. Overall, three policy scenarios, 
differing substantially on the level of support provided for the agricultural sector, were 
designed to capture the effects of opposite but reasonable policy directions in the nearby 
future (Nowicki et al. 2007). These scenarios are thus used to assess the range of water 
policy change implications in different economic contexts, but they are also used as 
valuable tools in exploring synergies and conflicts between agricultural and water 
policy instruments. 
Chapter seven focuses on the use of performance indicators for assessing the 
impacts of policy change on agriculture and on the environment, and as such they are 
the last structural module to integrate the bio-economic framework. Performance 
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indicators in this research are used for capturing, reporting and summarising the model 
results and outcomes. The implications of policy change are thus estimated by a range 
of policy relevant indicators covering the economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of sustainability in irrigated farming. Most of the chapter deals with 
problems of selecting standard and consistent macro-level indicators, and their 
adjustments to a farm-level scale of analysis, against background criteria of policy 
relevance, analytical soundness, measurability, and level of aggregation. 
 Chapter eight discusses the results of these indicators for each representative 
farming system. Presentation of results aims to interpret the combined implications of 
water policy instruments both within and across agricultural policy scenarios, as well as 
the main implications of these policies when considered separately. Simulation results 
indicate that the bio-economic modelling approach developed in this research 
constitutes a powerful tool to better understand processes governing the allocation of 
natural resources within agriculture. In addition, this framework enables evaluation of 
policy performance against policy objectives and monitoring of their influences on 
agriculture and environment. 
Coping with the increasing pressures on water resources demands a well-
structured and multidisciplinary analysis, one that questions policy objectives and 
revises policy alternatives. The bio-economic integrated approach developed during this 
research has shown to provide a comprehensive understanding of the implications of 
agricultural and water policies on irrigated agriculture within the European Union, as it 
also enabled unravelling conflicts and identifying synergies between these policies. 
Simulation of water policy instruments produced substantial differences in 
performance across farming systems, enforcement levels, and agricultural policy and 
market settings. Results suggest that water pricing, on its own, is not necessarily the 
most effective means for achieving the WFD water demand management and cost 
recovery objectives, and proposes that a policy mix combining economic with 
regulatory elements may be best designed to pursue these objectives with fewer 
detrimental consequences. This research has made obvious that conflicts between CAP 
and the WFD result in losses of efficiency, policy efficacy and losses of welfare, that 
could be minimised by integrating both policy measures and objectives, in a coherent 
and combined approach, exploring synergies and coordinating efforts to overcome 
sources of conflict. In addition, this study raises important questions on the cost-
effectiveness and appropriateness of use of different water management policies. That is 
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particularly the case whenever differences on cost recovery and demand management 
between volumetric and flat pricing are slim, and even more so when the benefits of the 
latter exceed the benefits of the former, as results have suggested under specific 
circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 2 – WATER MANAGEMENT AND THE WFD 
 
The second chapter reviews the literature in the field of water policy for irrigated 
agriculture. It provides the background to water management within the European 
Union, describing the general historical evolution and role of public policy for the 
sustainable management of water resources until the adoption of the Water Framework 
Directive. The implications for irrigated agriculture of key principles in the WFD, such 
as cost recovery of water services and water demand management, are discussed in the 
light of economic theory, evaluating the effectiveness of the available policy 
instruments in delivering these goals. This review is centred mainly on the discussion of 
regulatory and economic instruments which are later simulated in this research, such as 
water allotments, volumetric pricing, area pricing and two-part pricing instruments. 
Water scarcity is fast becoming a key critical issue in several countries. For that 
reason, the sustainable management of water resources has been gaining prominence on 
both national and international political agendas. The last decades have witnessed the 
industrialisation and economic development of many countries, accompanied by a steep 
population growth and rise of their living standards, which prompted higher urban and 
industrial water use. Irrigated agriculture has often followed this tendency, expanding 
and intensifying water abstractions in the process. In more recent years, environmental 
water needs have progressively become recognised as legitimate demands, necessary for 
maintaining environmental quality. These factors have altogether contributed to an 
escalating demand (Johansson et al. 2002; OECD 1989; World Bank 1993) and 
increased pressure on scarcer water resources.  
Water resources, renewable in their nature are however limited in time. The 
availability of fresh water resources is restricted in volume by hydrological cycles, 
which determines conditions for the natural recharge rate of aquifers (World Bank 
1993). Moreover, water resources are additionally limited in space as they are unequally 
distributed with strong discrepancies across regions and seasons. Careful management 
of these resources is therefore paramount, as water is not always naturally available 
when most needed. 
Vital for supporting life, water is a very particular resource with very special and 
complex characteristics (OECD 2001b; World Bank 1993). Water resources are 
generally neither strictly private nor entirely public goods, facing an extreme 
multiplicity of interrelated uses (e.g. urban, industrial, agricultural) which are 
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interdependent on the available resources (World Bank 1993). In extreme situations, 
this may lead to competition among uses, and users, jeopardising equity considerations 
and disregarding the water needs of ecosystems (OECD 2001a). The water sector is 
therefore characterised by an abundance of externalities (Rausser 2000) and third party 
effects, which allied with asymmetric information deficiencies make governance and 
management difficult. 
Politically, countries have traditionally encouraged water use for irrigation to 
foster agricultural production and promote regional development. In fact, the social and 
economic importance of water use for irrigation has been long recognised from a 
political perspective. For this reason, among others, governments have strategically 
enhanced the water supply for irrigation, either through the allocation of capital 
subsidies to finance irrigation works or/and politically established water prices below its 
true social value and below cost recovery (Wichelns, 1998. Cit. Johansson et al. 2002). 
Societies have evolved since the early days of this development strategy, and so 
did the role of agriculture within society and economy. In this changing context, 
political priorities have necessarily to adapt and adjust. Even more so when along the 
lines of this evolution, the negative impacts of agriculture on the environment became 
more obvious, and when the relative merits of irrigation in promoting development 
begun to be questionable (Caldas 2001; Carruthers and Clark 1983). 
These and other relevant issues are discussed throughout these pages, mainly 
from a descriptive perspective, addressing the pros and cons as reported in the water 
literature. The primary aim is to provide an economic review of water policy 
implications, particularly bearing in mind the WFD cost recovery and demand 
management objectives. Attention is drawn, throughout the text, to the fact that different 
situations require individual analysis, adjusting water policy instruments to those 
specific contexts, to achieve clear and specific policy objectives. In this respect, gains in 
allocation, efficiency and productivity of water can be significantly enhanced through 
charging water with the most suited policy instruments, carefully determining its price 
in line policy objectives.  
At the moment, water resources in sufficient quantity and appropriate quality are 
increasingly scarce (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000) and increasingly constrained for 
irrigated agriculture (World Bank 2006). Coping with the growing pressures on water 
resources demands a well-structured analysis, revising policy objectives and 
reconsidering the most suited policy alternatives, in the interest of a sustainable 
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economic, social and environmental management of water resources. In this line of 
thought, it should be emphasised that the water sector demands its own coherent and 
holistic management policy, integrated with other policies, instead of being considered 
as a marginal subsidiary option of regional and rural development programmes. 
 
 
2.1 – FROM SUPPLY-DRIVEN TO INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT 
POLICIES 
 
The traditional policy approach to balance the availability of scarce and 
unevenly distributed natural water supplies, with constantly increasing water demands, 
has relied on increasing water supplies (Holden and Thobani 1996; OECD 1999d). That 
either involved building successively more expensive schemes to store water at the 
surface (Cornish et al. 2004; Mariño and Kemper 1999) or drilling deeper and deeper 
wells. Accordingly to some authors, this approach, coupled with the undervaluation of 
water resources, encouraged overuse and abuse practices and attitudes (Unver and 
Gupta 2003). 
Over the years, water management strategies have been shifting away from 
supply increasing (resource development) policies. Only a limited number of reservoirs 
can be built and rivers tapped within a catchment area, being reliable water supply 
alternatives with lowest cost largely developed in most countries (Le Moigne et al. 
1994; Unver and Gupta 2003). Tapping new water sources would therefore require 
higher and higher financial costs (Carruthers and Clark 1983; Pearce 2001; World Bank 
1993), as the marginal cost of supply increases as demand rises (Pearce 2001). From the 
above said, the predominant use of supply leading strategies alone would either not be 
environmentally acceptable, or not economically viable (Abu-Zeid 2001), hence new 
major investments in water development, particularly for irrigation, are not to be 
expected (Johansson et al. 2002; Pearce 2001). Due to these reasons, policies shifted 
towards the demand-management of water resources. 
Water demand management focuses primarily on managing demands and 
increasing use and allocative efficiencies of existing resources, rather than increasing 
the available volume (OECD 1989). Water demand management instruments are 
relatively inexpensive when compared to the supply enhancing approach (Green 2003). 
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Their use avoids enrolling in costly activities to increase water supplies that could be 
postponed or avoided (Mariño and Kemper 1999; OECD 1989). There is a wide array of 
measures for demand management with the overall aim of cutting-back demands, such 
as the implementation of reuse or storage measures, reduction of seepage and leaking, 
adoption of more efficient technologies, and water pricing policies. These policies for a 
“more per drop” approach are the object of further attention in the next chapter. 
Demand management instruments are an intermediate evolutionary step towards 
integrated management of water resources. Integrated management is a comprehensive 
approach, which takes into account suitable hydrologic management areas, such as 
catchment areas or river basins, combining both surface and groundwater resources, in 
both qualitative and quantitative terms, and considering all economic sectors involved. 
In this approach, demand management instruments do represent a strategic group of 
policy options, among others. The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) is a recent 
policy example of such integrated approach
1
. 
 
 
2.2 – THE EU WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE 
 
The European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD, Directive 
2000/60/EC 2000) was enacted in the first half of 2000, during the Portuguese 
Presidency of the EU, under Article 147 of the EU Treaty
2
. The Directive is dedicated 
to environmental protection and concerns all aspects of water use. The WFD became 
part of European Law on the date of its publication
3
 and compels all Member States to 
comply with its terms, namely to implement a water pricing policy by the year 2010.  
The WFD is a complex and wide-ranging document with diverse and transversal 
implications which covers the whole water sector in EU Member States. This law 
follows an integrated approach to water management and, although seeded on 
environmental grounds, it branches, ramifies and blossoms into other sectors of activity. 
                                                 
1
 - See World Bank (2006) for a more detailed description of the evolution of development approaches in 
agricultural water management. 
2
 - This article of the Treaty determines that the Community environmental policy will contribute to the 
preservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, rational and wise use of 
natural resources and will be based on the application of the precautionary principle, preventive action 
principle and source control and polluter-pay principles (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000; European 
Commission 2000a). 
3
 - Published in the Official Journal of the European Community of 22 December 2000. 
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So being, its analysis must not forget to consider many international, communitarian 
and national legal acts, as well as institutional structure and organization to manage 
water resources and economic activities within each country
4
.  
The European Commission WFD establishes a framework for community action 
in the field of water policy (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000). This legally recognises that 
water is not a mere commercial product but, a special resource, a heritage that must be 
protected and defended. In fact, water resources in sufficient quantity and appropriate 
quality for all purposes are increasingly scarce, requiring careful economic and 
environmental management to cope with increasing pressures (Directive 2000/60/EC 
2000; World Bank 1993). Rapid population growth and rise of living standards, 
industrialisation and economic development, as well as the expansion of irrigation have 
contributed in recent years to an escalating demand for water (OECD 1989; World Bank 
1993).  
Environmental concerns in the field of water became increasingly rooted in the 
EU since the mid 70ies. From this time onwards, the history of water management has 
been shaped by three dominant types of legal acts. The first type is marked by 
Directives intended to protect bodies of water for a particular use, such as the Water 
Quality Objective Directives (part of Environmental Quality Standards)
5
. The second 
type of legal acts is characterised by Directives stipulating maximum Emission Limit 
Values (ELV)
6. The third phase, corresponds to a “combined approach” (Boymanns 
2002), in which ELV standards are tailored to meet water quality objectives (Chave 
2001).  
These three phases, prior to the WFD, produced a “patchwork” of fragmented 
and sectoral legislation for water protection (Lanz and Scheuer 2001), which only 
covered particular environmental problems for specific economic activities (Chave 
2001). This patchwork of legislation considered diverging concepts and addressed 
obsolete objectives, in an inconsistent framework for the integrated management of 
water resources (Henriques et al. 2000). The WFD takes into account all these legal acts 
                                                 
4
 - Even though some comments may outreach to other fields and address broader issues, the following 
presentation of the WFD is only meant related to three (articles 5, 9 and 11; annexes iii and vi) of the 
twenty six articles of the Directive. These sections are the economic core of the WFD, focusing on cost 
recovery, demand management and economic analysis of water use. 
5
 - 78/659/EEC – Fresh waters Directive to support fish live; 75/440/EEC – Drinking water Directive; 
79/923/EEC – Shellfish water Directive; 76/160/EEC – Bathing water Directive; 80/778/EEC – Human 
consumption water Directive. 
6
 - 76/464/EEC – Dangerous substances Directive: and daughter Directives, 91/271/EEC – Urban waste 
water treatment Directive; 91/676/EEC – Nitrates Directive; 91/414/EEC – Plant Protection Products 
Directive. 
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directly and indirectly related to water quantity and quality, and reunites them in one 
single powerful legislative instrument for the integrated protection and management of 
water resources (Chave 2001; Lanz and Scheuer 2001; OECD 1999a). In this 
perspective, the WFD provides operational tools, backed up by law, following common 
principles of action based on a comprehensive and coherent water management 
framework for water resources in the European Union area. 
The WFD main purpose is to establish a framework for the environmental 
protection of all waters
7
, maintaining and improving the Community aquatic 
environment. This very broad aim should be reached by a set of overall objectives 
leading to sustainable use and long-term protection of the available water resources. The 
WFD aims to prevent any further deterioration of aquatic ecosystems conditions; 
protecting water bodies and improving their status; ensure the reduction of pollution 
both on surface and ground waters, progressively reducing discharges and emissions of 
hazardous substances; contribute to mitigate the effects of floods and droughts and help 
to provide sufficient good quality supply of water resources, “as needed for sustainable, 
balanced and equitable water use” (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000)8.  
To accomplish these tasks, the WFD proposes adoption of an innovative 
framework. One of these innovations is the definition of river basin districts as the 
principal water management/planning units
9
, suitable to hydrological flows. In the 
context of this document, the WFD major innovation and greatest paradigmatic change 
consists in the emphasised use of economic instruments in environmental policies 
(European Commission 2000a). Within these, water pricing and cost recovery are 
adopted to promote efficiency increases in water systems (Roth 2001), and help shifting 
from supply-lead strategies to water demand management within a comprehensive 
(integrated) approach (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000).  
                                                 
7
 - Inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and ground waters. 
8
 - Member States are exempted to comply with the requirement of preventing further deterioration or 
achieving good water status in exceptional circumstances, such as extreme “floods and droughts or, for 
reasons of overriding public interest”, as long as all practicable actions to mitigate adverse impacts are 
taken.  
9
 - Decisions affecting one part of a river basin affect activities throughout the river basin (World Bank 
1993). Upstream abstractions and use of adjacent land-based resources has effects on both water quantity 
and quality for downstream uses (OECD 1989; World Bank 1993). This justifies river basin or catchment 
areas to be the most appropriate spatial units for the comprehensive management, development and 
planning of water resources (OECD 1977; World Bank 1993). In most countries however, catchment 
areas have often little relation with administrative, political and territorial boundaries. A river basin 
management approach may be more rational for implementing a water policy and water management 
strategies, but it may require a whole new set of administrative/planning institutions, possibly with 
overlapping tasks, and generating incomparable information, in comparison with the previous institutions 
(based on OECD 1989).  
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Use of economic instruments in the WFD, water-pricing in particular, are 
expected to promote sustainable water use levels and to provide an adequate 
contribution of the different water users to the cost recovery of water services (Directive 
2000/60/EC 2000; European Commission 2000a). Water pricing is thus expected to 
contribute to the achievement of the main WFD objective, by providing economic 
incentives to use water resources efficiently (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000).  
“Adopting pricing that induces efficient use of water” is, indeed, a key element 
of water management (World Bank 1993). The use of economic pricing policies is 
aimed to achieve recovery of cost of water services, taking into account the user-pay 
principle, the polluter-pays principle, valuing environmental and resource costs 
associated with negative impacts on aquatic ecosystems (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000; 
European Commission 2000a; Lanz and Scheuer 2001)
10
. 
In the framework of the river basin management units, Member States are given 
freedom to select which particular instruments are best suited to integrate their 
programmes of measures. To achieve the environmental objectives proposed, the 
Directive stipulates that programmes of measures shall consider basic and 
supplementary measures, if necessary (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000), as shown in the 
centre and outer circle of figure 2, respectively. Basic measures are, in essence, a 
stipulation of minimum requirements involving the obligatory implementation of 
specific directives already enforced
11
, the use of controls and requirements of prior 
authorization for the abstraction of surface and groundwater, a register or water 
abstractions and impoundment of surface water (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000). Less 
specific basic requirements consider the application of measures promoting sustainable 
use of water, leading to the achievement of environmental objectives, and the 
                                                 
10
 - Cost recovery of water services is one of the main innovations of the WFD, and must be faced as a 
landmark/milestone in environmental law, however is not itself an objective of the WFD. Failure to 
implement the cost recovery principle to recover “an adequate contribution” of the costs of water 
services, in a particular economic sector, is differentiated from the achievement of the environmental 
objectives of the WFD. The non achievement of the cost recovery of water services, as long as not 
compromising the accomplishment of environmental objectives does not imply rupture to the terms of the 
Directive. 
11
 - To achieve the environmental objectives, the Annex vi of the WFD, part A, provides a list of the basic 
measures required to integrate the river basins programme of measures. This set of measures considers 
the application of Directives 76/160/EEC – Bathing Water, 79/409/EEC – Birds Directive, 98/83/EC – 
Drinking Water, 96/82/EC – Major Accidents, 85/337/EEC – Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive, 86/278/EEC – Sewage Sludge, 91/271/EEC – Urban Waste Water Treatment, 91/414/EEC – 
Plant Protection Products Directive, 91/676/EEC – Nitrates, 92/43/EEC – Habitats, 96/61/EC – Integrated 
Pollution Prevention Control, and 74/464/EEC – Dangerous Substances Directive and five daughter 
Directives. 
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implementation of measures targeted to reflect the cost recovery of water services 
(Directive 2000/60/EC 2000).  
Use of supplementary measures (in the outer circle of figure 2) is optional, non-
exclusive and regionally dependent of each country and river basin priorities and 
limitations. The WFD suggests a list of supplementary measures, with a broad range of 
management instruments that may be enforced, if necessary, to reach the WFD 
objectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. WFD basic measures and supplementary measures  
 
The WFD supplementary measures may be considered as operational 
instruments to accomplish the requirements defined under the basic measures. In some 
situations it is possible to infer that the achievement of the objectives proposed under 
the basic measures is dependent on the use of supplementary measures. For instance, 
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attaining the cost recovery of water services requires use of economic and financial 
instruments possibly in combination with other supplementary measures.  
 
 
2.2.1 – THE WFD FULL COST RECOVERY 
 
The WFD is one of the most important legislative instruments for environmental 
management to be introduced at international scale (Chave 2001). The Directive not 
only provides an holistic framework about managing an entire environmental sector, as 
it introduces various approaches, for long advocated in the field of water management, 
such as demand management and the cost recovery of water services. The latter is 
discussed throughout this section, as well as in the section “Water Management 
Instruments for Irrigated Agriculture”, which establishes the relationship between water 
pricing instruments, cost recovery and demand management  
Use of pricing instruments in the WFD is expected to contribute to reach the 
environmental objectives of the Directive. As mentioned, pricing should provide an 
incentive for efficient water use, while taking into account environmental and resource 
costs into the cost recovery of water services (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000). The full 
cost recovery (FCR) principle is a traditional economic supply pricing method which 
adds different component costs to determine the delivery price. The WFD stipulates that 
the FCR price should equal the long-run costs of providing water services, including 
opportunity costs as well as environmental and resource costs involved (Directive 
2000/60/EC 2000; OECD 1989)
12
. In the perspectives of the WFD, the application of 
FCR pricing would reflect the user-pay and polluter-pay principles (European 
Commission 2000a).  
Figure 3 shows the most important costs to consider in the determination of the 
FCR price, and Figure 4 shows how that information may be used to determine the FCR 
price and regulate the demand for water. In essence, the two main components of costs 
are economic/financial costs and resource depletion and environmental costs 
(deleterious effects on the environment) (Directive 2000/60/EC 2000; European 
                                                 
12
 - The concept of FCR differs significantly on the types of costs considered in different countries 
(OECD 1999a). The interpretation of FCR presented here is the one defined by the WFD (Directive 
2000/60/EC 2000) and in line with the Global Water Partnership (GWP 2000). 
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Commission 2000b; GWP 2000)
13
. Economic/financial costs are normally divided into 
operation and maintenance (O&M) and infrastructural capital costs (OECD 1989). The 
former component (O&M) involves costs directly related to the provision and delivery 
of water such as, abstraction, impoundment, storage, treatment and conveyance of water 
(Chave 2001), infrastructural maintenance, and management
 
and administrative costs
14
. 
Capital costs include investment costs, devaluation/ depreciation and capital 
interests/opportunity costs. 
 
 
Figure 3. Full cost recovery of water services 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Full cost recovery. 
Legend: EF – financial costs; 
O&M – Operation and 
maintenance costs; CO – 
opportunity costs, reflecting 
water scarcity and quality; 
Ext. – environmental and 
economic externalities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 - Resource depletion costs, consider both resource scarcity and quality, are normally estimated by the 
opportunity cost of the best alternative use. Environmental costs “refers to the value of water as a 
provider of environmental services, e.g. supplying water to a wetland or wildlife” (Pearce 2001) and are 
normally estimated by the costs of restoring water quality and the aquatic ecosystems (Henriques 2001). 
For a more detailed approach on externalities and opportunity costs, see Huffaker and Whittlesey  (2000). 
14
 - Issuing licences, patrolling irrigation schemes, recording meter readings (OECD 1989) and billing. 
Adapted from GWP, 2000 
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Under the FCR approach, both the user- and polluter-pay principles are taken 
into account. Applying these principles compels consumers and polluters to pay the full 
social cost of providing water and related services, including treatment and damage 
control. Efficient pricing encourages water conservation strategies among users, while 
the application of the polluter pay principle would acts as a deterrent/preventive 
measure for pollution control (OECD 1977; OECD 1989; World Bank 1993).  
FCR pricing is an economic concept to be implemented in line with the WFD 
policy objectives. Conceptually, this requires determining all costs and allocating them 
proportionally to activities using that service (Carruthers and Clark 1983). In practice, 
particularly in multi-purpose facilities, costs cannot always be directly attributable to 
specific beneficiaries or sectors, for instance costs related to flood prevention or river 
flow regulation, may be perceived as part of the governmental provision of common 
goods and faced as nonreimbursable community service obligations (Le Moigne et al. 
1994; OECD 1999a). On the “supply” side, there is rarely agreement on which costs to 
consider. 
Existing estimates of externality effects associated with water use do have a 
highly variable degree of accuracy (OECD 1999d), and estimates of environmental (e.g. 
deleterious effects on aquatic ecosystems) and resource costs (scarcity costs) vary over 
months and years (Tsur and Graham-Tomasi, 1991 and Sampath 1992. Cit. Johansson et 
al. 2002; Le Moigne et al. 1994). The application of the polluter-pays principle to 
agricultural activities is a controversial issue as diffuse pollution caused by agriculture 
is frequently generated by practices “widely considered normal production processes, 
rather than by specific waste disposal practices” (OECD 1989), in which it is 
particularly difficult to trace back pollution to the culprit.  
Capital costs which are vital for replacing infrastructural works in the end of 
their useful life are perhaps the most controversial costs in FCR pricing for irrigated 
agriculture. Apart from the foregone capital benefits linked to capital investments, the 
nature of the remaining components of the capital costs is somehow unclear. In this 
respect, it is not clear if the calculus of financial capital costs should consider the 
historic costs of infrastructures or their present day replacement values (Cornish et al. 
2004; Henriques 2001). Henriques (2001) also mentions that it is not clear how to 
account for the financing of water infrastructures (public budget, donor agencies, EU 
capital subsidies…), or how to account for the costs of over-sized and over-capacitated 
infrastructures in relation to water demand. In this respect, it is questionable whether 
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capital costs of over-sized infrastructures should be paid by users, taxpayers, or not be 
paid at all
15
. Taking into account capital subsidies involved in water infrastructures, 
from international sources, could be perceived as unfair, as that would reimburse the 
State for costs not incurred. 
In most countries irrigation schemes were developed to foster wide national 
policy goals normally outside of agriculture. For this reason, some authors claim that 
farmers are not the exclusive beneficiaries that have gained from those investments 
(Abu-Zeid 2001; Cornish et al. 2004; Perry 2001). Due to the multiplying effect of such 
investments, benefits are spread throughout society either through lower food prices for 
consumers, higher employment or more economic development, thus, it would be unfair 
to charge farmers the “full burden” (Abu-Zeid 2001; Bakker 1999; Sampath 1983; 
Sampath 1992. Cit. Cornish et al. 2004; Perry 2001). 
On the farmers side, the added value of irrigation, including capital cost 
subsidies, is often capitalised in land market prices (Cornish et al. 2004; Garrido 2001; 
Holden and Thobani 1996). In these circumstances, farmers buying land at the 
capitalised value of irrigation infrastructure do not take any advantage of historical 
capital subsidies (Garrido 2001). 
The WFD underlying philosophy is that the failure to implement FRC is a cause 
for the misallocation of water resources (OECD 1999a; OECD 1999d), “which 
seriously jeopardises future generations‟ access to water” (OECD 1999a; OECD 
1999d). According to OECD (1999d), the role reserved for water-pricing, as a primary 
way of achieving the correct conservation of this resource is, in fact, the most 
controversial component of the WFD. Controversial as it is, due to the many difficulties 
pointed out above, these cannot be systematically used to invalidate the application of 
FCR prices, as accurate as possible, for cost recovery or demand management (adapted 
from Henriques 2001). The implementation of pricing levels ensuring financial 
autonomy would certainly be a good starting point in several countries (World Bank 
1993)
16
. 
The application of the FCR principle will, in practice, be translated in higher 
irrigation water prices is most irrigation schemes. Preliminary estimates indicate that the 
application of FCR, as recommended by the WFD, would eliminate entire irrigation 
areas without severely affecting others (OECD 1999d). The water delivery price, 
                                                 
15
 - Under the last approach, additional costs of over-sized infrastructures could be regarded as sunk costs 
(Henriques 2001). 
16
 - See also world water council publications http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/publications.shtml. 
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determined by the FCR accumulation of component costs, will in essence reflect all 
efficiencies and inefficiencies involved in the provision of water services. With this 
reasoning, along with the research of alternative routes to minimise on-farm and rural 
community implications associated with water price increases, efforts should be 
directed towards tackling inefficiencies on the supply side
17
.  
 
 
2.2.2 – WFD: DEMAND MANAGEMENT AND COST RECOVERY OBJECTIVES 
 
Water policies were traditionally perceived as tools to achieve broader policy 
objectives (Speck 2000). These policies were usually considered within 
agricultural/industrial, rural/regional development programmes, to promote objectives 
normally standing outside the agricultural or water sector
18
. Most countries have, for 
that reason, historically fostered the development of irrigation (Arrojo 2001; Becker 
2001; Garrido 2001), through capital subsidies and maintaining water prices below cost 
recovery (Wichelns, 1998. Cit. Johansson et al. 2002). This strategy was used in several 
countries not only to encourage agriculture itself directly, but also with the objective of 
promoting economic development (Abu-Zeid 2001), creating higher employment rates 
(Abu-Zeid 2001) or maintaining affordable and secure food supplies (Abu-Zeid 2001; 
Cornish et al. 2004; Dinar and Subramanian 1998; Kaczrek 2000).  
The development of these sectors, with the aid of water pricing policies often 
required reaching a compromise solution to the benefit of society as a whole. That 
involved balancing multiple and diverse objectives, be they environmental, economic, 
financial or social (Çakmak et al. 2004; Boland and Whittington, 2000. Cit. Dinar 
                                                 
17
 - This includes maximising the efficiency in storage, allocation, distribution. Modernising hydraulic 
infrastructures, distributing water at off-peak electricity times, centralising pumping, installing 
automatisms, and naturally, implementing the most suited pricing instruments are, for example, strategies 
that may be equate to minimise inefficiencies at the supply level. 
18
 - Politically developing water works and fostering irrigated agriculture were expected to reach 
countless benefits. Among these benefits, the most often mentioned are the intensification, modernization 
and diversification of crop production (Nicol 2000; Popovici 2000; SEA-JHA 1971), enhancing living 
conditions; equity; contribution to citizenship; correction of demographic and land ownership 
asymmetries (SEA-JHA 1971); settling nomad populations; regional development (Carruthers and Clark 
1983; Nicol 2000) and income redistribution; obtaining returns on capital investments (Carruthers and 
Clark 1983); increasing employment opportunities (Abu-Zeid 2001; Carruthers and Clark 1983; SEA-
JHA 1971); increasing agricultural production (Kaczrek 2000; OECD 1999a; SEA-JHA 1971); 
maintaining affordable and secure food supplies (Abu-Zeid 2001; Cornish et al. 2004; Kaczrek 2000) 
economic development, hydro-electric energy generation; and flood defence and control (OECD 1999a), 
enhance national security and maintain political stability (Abu-Zeid 2001). 
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2000), in which demand management and cost recovery objectives however have 
hitherto remained at relatively low priorities levels. In fact, these two objectives have 
only recently gained prominence and priority at European and international political 
arenas
19
.  
Water demand management is conceptually different to the objective of cost 
recovery. Water use efficiency in irrigated agriculture may not necessarily affect the 
amount of water available or level scarcity at the basin scale
20
. In this line of thought, 
Cornish et al. (Cornish et al. 2004) argue that water pricing for demand management 
should relate to the amount of water effectively consumed instead of diverted, which in 
water pricing for cost recovery, water losses increase the amount of water that needs to 
be stored, diverted and managed, with associated economic costs that must be accounted 
for. Water pricing for cost recovery should relate to the amount of water being managed 
and diverted, regardless of water losses/inflows (Cornish et al. 2004). 
In terms of policy efficacy and efficiency, the selection of the most suited policy 
instruments is related to the primary policy objectives to be reached (OECD 1977). In 
respect to policy instruments, an indirect pricing instrument may be well designed to 
achieve objectives of cost recovery, while perfectly inefficient for demand management, 
and vice-versa. In fact, focusing solely on reducing water consumption or its equitably 
allocation, a regulatory system of water allocation/rationing or of tradable water rights 
may be better suited than pricing (Barker et al. 2003; Perry, 2001. Cit. Perry 2001). The 
last substantial difference is the water price level. Water prices/charges/fees can be used 
both for cost recovery, to guarantee the financial viability of water institutions, as for 
demand management, allocating scarce resources among users and improving their 
efficiency. In this respect, a charging level set to recover costs may either not be high 
enough to influence demand management/water use efficiency or it may prohibit 
irrigation altogether (World Bank 1993). Choosing the most suited charging system and 
“setting prices at the right level”, according to policy goals,  is therefore paramount for 
                                                 
19
 - The following events are landmarks of this process: The United Nations Water Conference, in Mar 
del Plata, 1977; The International Conference on Water and the Environment: Development Issues for the 
21
st
 Century, in Dublin, 1992; The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(Agenda 21), in Rio de Janeiro, 1992; The International Conference on Water and Sustainable 
Development, in 1998, Paris; The Second World Water Forum, in The Hague, 2000; The Earth Summit 
Declaration on Sustainable Development in 2002; The Third World Water Forum, in Kyoto, 2003…. 
20
 - At a basin level, the “objective is not reduction in irrigation losses, but reduction of losses to the 
system” (World Bank 2006). Physical water consumption in irrigated agriculture refers primarily to 
evapotranspiration, being the difference between water diverted and evapotranspiration therefore lost in 
conveyance and application.  These water losses do, however, remain in the basin and are eventually 
captured downstream as water inflows (Barker et al. 2003; Perry 2001). If there is a stronger reduction on 
these returns than on the demanded quantities the total water consumption will actually increase (OECD 
1999a). 
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water management (World Bank 1993), for that reason these aspects are further 
explored in the next section. 
 
 
2.3 – WATER MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS FOR IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE 
 
Agricultural water management instruments are designed to be implemented 
within particular biophysical settings and political/economic circumstances. Geography, 
geology, soil science, climatology, hydrology, as well as political conditions and 
history, form the background to the understanding of existing water management 
institutions, regulations, and policy instruments in use (Le Moigne et al. 1994; OECD 
1977; OECD 1989). The existing diversity of these instruments, in terms of price 
structures, prices (Speck 2000) and enforcement levels (OECD 1999a), reflects to a 
great extent variations in the composition of this background. As a consequence, 
pursuing the same policy objective under different background conditions, would most 
likely require tailoring the implementation of policy instruments, if not use of different 
instruments altogether (Dinar et al. 1997a). The availability of water, for instance, in 
abundance or scarcity, determines political attitudes and social/cultural/religious 
reactions about its management; while the first case may encourage a minimum cost 
use, the later may develop priority uses and constrain its consumption in ways 
compatible with cultural beliefs (OECD 1977).  
Policy instruments for water management can be classified as legislative, 
regulatory, technical, and economic instruments (OECD 1977). Water management 
measures, in a broad sense, consider use of economic pricing/subsidising structures, 
water regulatory instruments (permits, abstraction licenses), transfers of abstraction 
rights (tradable permits), educational, advisory and administrative programs to improve 
water conservation, and adoption of water saving technologies (World Bank 1993). A 
synthesis of the most widely adopted instruments in the agricultural sector is presented 
in Figure 5 and discussed throughout this section. The scope of this review is confined 
to the analysis of the implications of policy instruments for irrigated agriculture, and it 
is mainly centred on the discussion of their effectiveness for contributing towards water 
demand management and the cost recovery of water services. 
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Figure 5. Summary scheme of policy instruments for irrigation water management
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2.3.1 – REGULATORY-LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
 
Legal instruments are historically the oldest method used to regulate water use. 
Water regulations deal with the conditions for usage of water resources, ensuring that 
consumptions match the quantities available without impairing their quality  (OECD 
1977). “Any system of laws encompasses the rights of individuals and provides the 
authority for arbitration and intervention by government” (OECD 1989). This stipulates 
both a basis for governmental and private individual actions (OECD 1977; World Bank 
1993). Regulatory and legislative water management instruments are often used to 
influence the development of particular sectors of economy or to provide incentives for 
changes in economic behaviour to occur (OECD 1977). 
Legislative instruments are often specific to particular sectors and may have 
specific administrative structures controlling its application. Some examples include 
water supply (agriculture, urban and industry), water transport, flood mitigation, energy 
generation and environmental protection and conservation, etc. This multiplicity of 
sectoral and fragmented legal enactments may in fact represent a barrier, as policy 
objectives may be inconsistent with an integrated water management strategy, in light of 
sustainability and efficient use of water resources (Henriques et al. 2000; OECD 1989). 
Regulatory or legislative instruments (command-and-control type) may have an 
important role in the allocation of water within and across sectors. Available options 
may range from rationing systems (short term) or licensing water abstractions (also 
know as allocation of quotas, for the long term), to assigning priority uses (OECD 1977; 
World Bank 2006). Water rationing and ranking of priority uses are used in principle 
under severe scarcity, or drought situations (OECD 1977).  
Licences, permits or prohibition instruments are normally used in situations of 
more plentiful water resources. Abstraction permits/licenses are subject to approval by 
governing institutions, may or not be issued free of charge, and may consider further 
charges on licensed and really abstracted volumes (based on OECD 1999a; OECD 
1999d). Variants to licensing include stipulation of maximum abstraction quantities and 
terms of water use, definition of use priorities and address specifications concerning 
time of use and expiry date (OECD 1989). These instruments may also distinguish 
groundwater from surface water use (OECD 1977; OECD 1999d), in combination with 
water use priorities, define terms of abstraction according to surface variations and 
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depth at different seasons (OECD 1977). Terms of transfer, if appropriate, may be 
considered as well (OECD 1989). 
Regulatory or legislative instruments can be considered, in essence, as a form of 
public control over private use rights of water resources. Their main advantage consists 
in the possibility of managing all water bodies regardless of property rights. These 
instruments involve regulating, licensing, monitoring and controlling, hence extract 
resources from the public budget. These instruments are likely to require more 
administration costs than water pricing (OECD 1989) and thus are not considered to 
“provide management at least (social) cost of scarce resources” (OECD 1977).  
Opinions diverge when regulatory instruments are compared to water pricing. 
Some authors claim that command-and-control mechanisms have proven to be less 
effective and less efficient than water pricing for allocating water (Le Moigne et al. 
1994; Unver and Gupta 2003). Other authors argue that, quantitative regulations 
establish the means to prevent resource depletion situations (Cornish et al. 2004), and 
that abstraction licensing may be more effective to cut back demand than water prices 
(Dinar and Letley, 1996. Cit Cornish et al. 2004; Perry 2001). Regulatory instruments 
are expected to perform better than prices where the demand curve is inelastic (World 
Bank 2006). 
Water policy objectives often require a mix of policy instruments. On the one 
hand, volumetric entitlements have a high efficiency potential for the allocation of water 
between sectors (Cornish et al. 2004), but may fail to address cost recovery or demand 
management concerns. For that reason, regulatory measures are seldom implemented in 
isolation and they are usually combined with water pricing. Regulations do not 
necessarily affect the cost structure of productive processes (or change production 
decisions), while water pricing will involve income loses and may promote changes in 
economic behaviour to occur depending on the economic policy instrument. 
 
 
2.3.2 – ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS  
 
Irrigation water policies were traditionally regarded as a subsidiary component 
of more comprehensive policies, either aiming to promote food self sufficiency (OECD 
1999a) or within agricultural, rural or regional development programmes. Within these 
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programmes of measures, economic instruments for water management often involved 
tax relief, budgetary transfers and politically maintained prices below cost recovery. 
The implications of economic water management policies on the development of these 
and other areas began to be questionable both on environmental and economic grounds, 
and help contributing towards integrated water management. 
Economic instruments for water management comprise two main groups which 
are financial aids and fund-raising instruments (OECD 1977). Financial aids may 
consider tax relief, accelerated depreciation allowances, subsidising interest rates on 
specific loans, or structured as budgetary transfers (payments) to water users. Fund-
raising instruments, that is, involving charging for services, can be further classified into 
non-volumetric (indirect pricing) and volumetric methods (direct pricing) (Tsur 2000). 
Volumetric methods rely partly or fully on the volume of water, and therefore require 
metering of water (Tsur 2000)
 21
.  
Pricing water and granting incentives are important instruments to encourage 
users to adopt water use efficient practices. Granting subsidies for adopting water 
conservation technologies and management approaches, can have an important 
contribution to promote the efficient use, allocation and distribution of water (World 
Bank 1993). While financial aids consume added public resources, pricing water can be 
used at some level of cost recovery or inclusively to generate revenues.  
Pricing water resources is a set of economic instruments normally used to help 
restrain water demands, maintain sustainable levels of water use (OECD 1999a), 
allocate scarce resources between and among sectors and contribute to the cost recovery 
of water services. Unlike the financial aid approach, pricing has the additional 
advantage of contributing to the financial self-sufficiency of water institutions, fully or 
partly recovering the cost of water services. Appropriate pricing structures and levels 
for water services allow accounting for economic, environmental and equitable goals, to 
direct the social uses of water (OECD 1989) and promote for sustainable development 
(OECD 1999d).  
When compared to regulatory or legislative instruments, economic instruments 
seem to be more flexible (OECD 1977). Economic instruments have the advantage of 
allowing to relate the surplus of benefits with costs (OECD 1977). In general, economic 
and financial instruments for water management do not replace previous controls and 
                                                 
21
 - The classification diverges accordingly to the author, for instance, Johansson (2000) considers market 
based mechanisms in a group of its own.  
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legislation, being normally used as an emphasising complement to enforce controls 
(OECD 1977). In these circumstances, legislation may be defined at national levels on 
more general objectives (OECD 1977), while economic instruments allow a more 
flexible application at regional or local scales (river basins or irrigation scheme scales 
for example). Other advantages of economic instruments, include their greater 
simplicity and possibility of bringing in efficiency gains (World Bank 1993). To a large 
extent, governmental expenditure for managing water resources, with monitoring 
resources/controlling activities and enforcing regulations, is greatly minimised via 
pricing (World Bank 1993). On the other hand, added production costs associated to 
water charging will be incorporated into the food distribution chain, as higher food 
costs, which may be contradictory with the initial policy objective. As mentioned 
before, appropriate signals about water scarcity can be provided to users without using 
water pricing at all (OECD 1999a; OECD 1999d), and better water allocation may be 
reached through command and control mechanisms (Cornish et al. 2004). 
Effectiveness of economic instruments for water management depends on the 
relative value of the water (World Bank 1993). In fact, these instruments need to be 
analysed accordingly to a two-fold attribute: the first being the pricing instrument itself 
and the second the price/charge level at which that instrument is implemented. It is 
merely due to explanatory reasons that these two attributes are analysed separately. 
 
 
INDIRECT PRICING INSTRUMENTS 
 
Indirect instruments of water pricing are applied on economic activities or 
resource factors without directly relating charge to water use (OECD 1977). In these 
cases water consumption is estimated rather than being measured or metered. Indirect 
pricing is the most common form of economic instruments for charging water and 
include a considerable variety of indirect pricing possibilities. The most usual are area 
payments, also called flat rate pricing. Besides area pricing, input or output-coupled 
water pricing mechanisms are also reported in the literature (Cornish et al. 2004; 
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Johansson 2000; Tsur and Dinar 1995)
22
 (see previous diagram). In input and output 
pricing water is charged per unit of outputs produced or inputs purchased (Johansson 
2000). Area pricing includes many variants used to discriminate between different water 
requirements. Charging criteria used for this discrimination may be coupled to irrigable 
area, irrigated area, beneficiated/ameliorated area, number of irrigation periods (OECD 
1999a; World Bank 1993), crop types (Johansson 2000; OECD 1999a; OECD 1999d; 
Tsur and Dinar 1995; World Bank 1993), irrigation methods (Johansson 2000; OECD 
1999d; Tsur and Dinar 1995), land values
23
 (Johansson et al. 2002), soil quality or soil 
irrigation aptitude (Saraiva 2003), season and source of water (e.g. pumped or gravity) 
(Abu-Zeid 2001) or irrigation times (Çakmak et al. 2004). 
Indirect pricing methods are simple to implement and administer (Johansson 
2000; Johansson et al. 2002; Tsur and Dinar 1995). Area pricing does not require any 
other monitoring than the measurement of the surface to be priced (Johansson 2000; 
Tsur and Dinar 1995) or additional criteria upon which water is charged for. In cases of 
other input and output pricing, these are either readily observable (Johansson 2000) or 
possible to trace and measure (Carruthers and Clark 1983; OECD 1977).  
Adding addition criteria considerations into indirect pricing increases the 
administrative complexity and cost of the charging system. Taking into account, for 
instance, different crop types, irrigation methods, soil quality/irrigation aptitude, or 
source of water requires extra administrative procedures. The choice of these 
management criteria rests upon the defined water policy objectives. Discriminatory 
water charges according to various criteria may be used to influence cropping patterns, 
and induce changes towards more water-efficient crops, without actually implementing 
metering facilities (adapted from Abu-Zeid 2001).  
Indirect water-pricing schemes are decoupled from the volume of water 
delivered/consumed. The economic reading of this approach is that the average water 
cost decreases continuously as “free-of-charge” demand for water increases, and for that 
reason, these systems do not provide incentives to save water or increase water 
efficiency (Tsur and Dinar 1995). In practice, farmers may use additional unlimited 
units of water, regardless of the water charge, at a zero marginal cost (Perry, 2001. Cit. 
                                                 
22
 - Input and output pricing may distort input-output decisions (Tsur 2000), and are not generally 
favoured by economists (Rhodes and Sampath 1988, Cit. Cornish et al. 2004). Input and output pricing 
are not common in European schemes. 
23
 - Betterment Levy-Pricing is a tax on the increase of capital value of land, aimed to reflect land price 
increases that occur when rain fed lands are converted to irrigation (Carruthers and Clark 1983). It may 
also be used to reflect capital costs associated with the provision of irrigation water (Carruthers and Clark 
1983). 
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Çakmak et al. 2004; Popovici 2000; Tsur 2000), as long as the flat charge allows 
additional profits to be made, or abandon irrigation altogether if the fixed charge 
threatens the economic viability of farming (Perry 2001).  
Indirect pricing methods are limited as demand management instruments 
(Carruthers and Clark 1983; OECD 1977; Unver and Gupta 2003). With marginal costs 
of water delivery (to the user) set at a zero level, short term marginal productivity 
decisions at the farm level are not influenced by charging. In fact, area pricing is 
perceived as a fixed cost (Tsur 2000) which may even act as an incentive to use more 
water (Tiwari and Dinar 2001). 
There is a general consensus that, overall, indirect methods of charging irrigation 
water do not promote the most efficient use of water resources (OECD 1999a; OECD 
1999d), and that they are less effective for demand management than volumetric 
charges (Tsur 2000). Significant additional marginal costs for using water (e.g. 
application costs), however, may promote water saving behaviours and increase the 
marginal productivity of water (OECD 1999a; OECD 1999d). In these cases, the 
additional marginal costs, independent from the water charge, are responsible for 
promoting efficiency and increasing marginal productivity. In addition to that, from an 
agronomic perspective, good field water management represents substantial economic 
resource savings in fertilisers, energy and weed control (OECD 1989) which should 
provide the necessary incentive to use water rationally, even at very low water prices 
(OECD 1989). 
From an irrigation water agency self-sufficiency point of view, cost recovery is 
to some extent contradictory to demand management. The first objective may be 
implemented through irrigable/beneficiated areas at a very low cost, with the added 
advantage of stabilising financial revenues throughout the years, regardless or weather 
conditions, but without much scope of action for demand management unless other 
criteria is taken into account in the price formulation. Demand management can only 
arise from the sole use of indirect pricing when criteria of crop-type, irrigated acreages
24
 
                                                 
24
 - Theoretically, in indirect pricing, water price/charge level effects may be used under very specific 
conditions to promote technological adoption. This potential is however limited and failure to determine 
the „right price‟, or change in the initial conditions, may jeopardise the financially viability of the water 
agency. 
 54 
and on-farm irrigation methods of water application are taken into account, knowing in 
advance that doing so would relate water agencies revenues with planting decisions
25
. 
Indirect pricing methods, area pricing in particular, are much generalised and are 
the most widely used economic instruments worldwide (Cornish et al. 2004). Their poor 
performance for demand management makes these methods well suited to situations 
where water is plentiful or relatively cheap (World Bank 1993). In fact, the costs of 
implementing, operating, maintaining and billing in a volumetric system are so high, 
that area pricing can inclusively “outperform an efficient volumetric pricing” system 
(Tsur 2000) and “outweight” the efficiency gains (Smith and Tsur 1997, Cit. Johansson 
et al. 2002; Perry 2001; Tsur 2000). The costs associated with metering water may 
actually be prohibitive from a cost recovery perspective, particularly in low value 
irrigation agricultural systems (Abu-Zeid 2001; Popovici 2000).  
 
 
DIRECT PRICING INSTRUMENTS 
 
Pricing systems are called volumetric whenever water is fully or partly charged 
as a function of demanded/delivered quantities (Johansson et al. 2002). In these cases, 
water has to be metered or measured (e.g. the time of use of a known flow), as opposed 
to indirectly estimated as in indirect pricing systems. 
As in the previous situation, volumetric pricing include a number of variants 
(see previous diagram). The water price level can remain constant regardless of 
consumption or charged at varying rates to signal the costs of increasing consumption. 
These later tariffs, increasing or decreasing, are called multi-rate, block pricing or tiered 
pricing (OECD 1999d; Tsur and Dinar 1995). Variants may consider different tariffs 
according to the water source (groundwater or surface water), the season when it is 
abstracted, timing of supply (pressure systems, reflects different electricity rates) and 
uses. All water charging instruments requiring metering facilities (based on volume) are 
clustered under the label volumetric (Tsur 2000): single-rate, tiered (multirate, block 
                                                 
25
 - For this comment to hold true, the area of perennial crops must be minimal, and indirect pricing 
cannot be practiced in the form of subscription fees, that is, on the basis of 
irrigable/ameliorated/beneficiated area. 
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tariff), two-part tariff, or market-based prices (water markets, auctions, tradable water 
rights) (Tsur 2000) are examples of volumetric methods. 
Worldwide, volumetric “metering fees” are the exception rather than the rule. 
Metering devices are expensive (OECD 1999a; OECD 1999d) and hence imply 
additional costs to be considered into the water charge. The benefits of implementing 
metering systems may be difficult to recover in cases of abundant water supplies or in 
low value agricultural systems. Under these conditions, the costs of implementing and 
monitoring volumetric pricing methods may, in fact, exceed farmers willingness and 
ability to pay (Abu-Zeid 2001; Cornish et al. 2004; Smith and Tsur 1997, Cit. Johansson 
et al. 2002; Perry 2001; Popovici 2000; Tsur 2000).  
In spite of these arguments, volumetric pricing has several advantages and are 
often preferred by water economists (Abu-Zeid 2001; Unver and Gupta 2003). The 
implicit dependency between water charge and consumption, enables volumetric pricing 
methods to be used to pursue economic efficiency and encourage water conservation 
(Abu-Zeid 2001). In addition, some authors argue these systems are fair and equitable 
because users pay for what they consume (Unver and Gupta 2003). Metering water 
generates key information which is paramount for consubstantiated policy decision 
making and resource management (Speck 2000). In this respect, Tsur (2000) and Dinar 
(2000) conclude that unobserved individual water intakes (unmetered water) are among 
the most important causes of asymmetric information which affect the efficiency 
performance of water pricing methods. 
Volumetric charging may provide direct incentives leading to the reduction of 
water use (OECD 1977). Water charges attached to the volume consumption do 
encourage users to minimise the waste of water (Unver and Gupta 2003) in the same 
way pumping costs act for indirect pricing systems. Volumetric pricing allow users to 
weight the marginal costs of using water with the marginal benefits derived from its use. 
Although this is a sine qua non requirement for demand management (Svendsen 2001, 
Cit. Cornish et al. 2004), it is not the single condition, as for demand management to be 
effective, the marginal costs of using water must be higher than marginal benefits 
derived from its use.  
For a water management agency or a water user association (WUA), the sole use 
of volumetric pricing share similar disadvantages to those mentioned for indirect pricing 
methods on the basis of crop types/irrigated areas. The availability of (and demand for) 
water is highly dependent on variable climatic conditions and that, from a WUA 
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financial self-sufficiency perspective, makes water revenues to be climatically variable 
(Cornish et al. 2004). In addition, the demand for irrigation water is a derived demand, 
and therefore WUA water sales and water revenues would be further dependent on crop 
and input prices, agricultural subsidies (MPS and DP) and demand for agricultural 
produce. It is possible to infer that in cases where water charges are exclusively 
volumetric, maximising the water agency revenues and promoting water saving 
behaviour may be “inherently contradictory objectives” (Cornish et al. 2004). With this 
reasoning, increasing the water price would reduce the demand for water but bring 
down water revenues which could compromise the financial sustainability of the system 
(Cornish et al. 2004)
26
. 
 
 
Two-part tariff pricing 
 
Two-part tariff systems combine elements of both direct and indirect methods. 
Variants may consider, for instance, cropped areas and soil classes of irrigation aptitude 
(Tsur and Dinar 1995). The fixed part can be used to recover investment costs and the 
variable part set to cover operative and maintenance costs (Carruthers and Clark 1983; 
OECD 1999a) or, alternatively, the fixed part can be set to cover operative and 
maintenance costs (which are essentially known costs) and the variable part can be used 
to reflect consumption (Cornish et al. 2004). 
Combining the two charging elements solves most deficiencies associated with 
the sole use of these pricing methods. This is particularly relevant concerning the 
financial self-sustainability of water institutions. The flat component performs as a 
“subscription fee”, to face fixed costs or to reduce dependency of the variability in the 
availability and demand for water; the volumetric element can be used to cover 
operation and maintenance costs, for purposes of demand management or as a way to 
allocate water between sectors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 - Research of several irrigation case studies in Europe, in Berbel and Gutiérrez Eds. (2005) support this 
argument. 
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Block tariffs, tiered pricing, multirate pricing 
 
Block tariffs, tiered pricing and multirate pricing are synonyms. In these cases 
the water rate/tariff depends on the demanded quantities, and it can either increase or 
decrease, in blocks, as the volume increases. The main advantages of these instruments, 
when compared to the single rate system, consist in having different marginal costs 
attached to the water consumption, and in having marginal costs to the user different 
from average costs. 
The underlying justification for using decreasing block rates lies on the assertion 
that delivery costs decrease (at the margin) as the supplied quantity increases (Renzetti 
2000). Increasing block rates, on the other hand, are used to signal rising supply costs, 
to encourage water conservation (Renzetti 2000) or to promote water efficiency and 
demand management.  
Marginal cost pricing can be understood as a special case of volumetric pricing 
(Johansson et al. 2002). In this approach, water blocks are unit shaped and the water rate 
depends on the marginal cost of supplying the last unit (block) of water. The major 
limitation of marginal cost pricing consists in determining the “the correct price per 
unit” while accounting for all the marginal costs and benefits associated to water use 
(Johansson et al. 2002). One the one hand, “externalities abound in water resource 
systems” (Rausser 2000) and in irrigated agriculture; and, on the other, the opportunity 
costs of water depends on its scarcity value which is continuously changing. Due to 
these difficulties marginal pricing is very uncommon for irrigation water. 
 
 
Market based methods 
 
Market based systems are relatively rare (Hearne and Easter 1995) and 
documented experience on their functioning is still limited (Mariño and Kemper 1999), 
however, there are a significant number of water trading possibilities. Trading water 
rights may consider isolated transactions, water banks and water markets. Isolated 
transactions concern water leases or permanent sales of water rights. Water banks 
normally involve one-year leases with users in surplus or deficit (OECD 1989). 
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Transferable water rights, disconnected from land ownership, and public auctions are 
other examples of water entitlement markets (OECD 1989). In the case of transferable 
water rights, the transfer of use rights entitlements may range from a irrigation season to 
a permanent transfer (Hearne and Easter 1995). 
Market based mechanisms are often advocated as an alternative to overcome or 
minimise inefficient allocation of water, which may arise from other forms of irrigation 
water management (Dinar et al. 1997b; Holden and Thobani 1996; Johansson 2000; 
Easter et al., 1999, Cit. Johansson et al. 2002)
27
. In addition, market forces may provide 
the most real indication about the economic value of irrigation water at a given moment. 
Market based methods for irrigation water relies on the action of demand-and-
supply market forces. Water markets, in particular, require: 1) clearly established and 
well defined water property/usufruary rights to be traded (Dinar et al. 1997b; Holden 
and Thobani 1996; Johansson 2000; Johansson et al. 2002; Mariño and Kemper 1999); 
2) institutions for distributing water from sellers to buyers (Zilberman et al., 1997. Cit 
Johansson et al. 2002; Mariño and Kemper 1999) and to define and regulate the terms 
of transfer (OECD 1989); 3) the existence of appropriate infrastructure to convey and 
measure the agreed rights (Zilberman et al., 1997. Cit Johansson et al. 2002; Mariño and 
Kemper 1999); 4) knowledge of the existing resources to be traded (Mariño and 
Kemper 1999). Water use or water property rights should specify the quantity, quality 
and timing of water delivery (Hearne and Easter 1995)
28
. 
Efficiency gains are one of the most often cited advantages of water markets. 
Byers and sellers allocate and trade water rights (either usufructuary rights or property 
rights) at a given moment accordingly to its opportunity cost or highest value, therefore 
resulting in gains of efficiency as water is allocated from low to higher value uses 
(Cornish et al. 2004; Dinar and Subramanian 1998; Hearne and Easter 1995; Gardner 
and Fullerton, 1968 and Hartman and Seastone, 1970. Cit. Johansson et al. 2002; 
Mariño and Kemper 1999).  
The functioning of the market is however limited by the existence of secure 
rights and by the amount of transaction costs (and any additional regulations on the use 
of transfers). Without securely established rights, users may fear to invest in the 
                                                 
27
 - For additional information on market based mechanisms and water markets, see (Dinar et al. 1997b; 
Johansson 2000; Johansson et al. 2002). 
28
 - Holden and Thobani (Holden and Thobani 1996) review the conditions required for the functioning of 
water markets, the definition, assignment and enforcement of water rights, as well as on the different 
forms of water rights .  
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acquisition of water rights or water application technologies (Holden and Thobani 
1996). On the other hand, trade of water rights can only occur whenever transaction 
costs
29
 are lower than the difference in the value of water between two uses (the uses 
buyer and seller) (Hearne and Easter 1995).  
Water markets are not free-markets and their existence requires regulation by 
administrative institutions to prevent market failures (Dinar et al. 1997a; Holden and 
Thobani 1996; OECD 1989). Water agencies may authorise (or not) water transfers, and 
may have the power of veto or may acquire water rights (OECD 1989). Most important, 
in a river basin or a catchment scale, these institutions have the responsibility of 
accounting for return flows, third-party effects
30
, and instream uses as well as 
externalities arising from water use/transfers (Hearne and Easter 1995; Holden and 
Thobani 1996; Easter et al., 1997, Cit. Johansson et al. 2002).  
The implications of water markets on equity seem to be contradictory. If on the 
one hand, introducing the possibility of trading water rights may provide a source of 
extra income “comparable to that obtained through farming” (Cornish et al. 2004; 
Holden and Thobani 1996; Johansson et al. 2002). These gains from trade may be both 
intra- or inter-sectoral, depending on the administrative regulations, terms of transfer 
and use. On the other, that same possibility introduces the risk of water flowing 
increasingly by purchasing power rather than by the force of gravity, preventing poor 
farmers to gain access to water (Molle, 2001. Cit. Cornish et al. 2004; Holden and 
Thobani 1996; Le Moigne et al. 1994).  
 
 
2.3.3 – THE WATER PRICE EFFECT 
 
Previous sections have primarily focused on presenting the dominant water 
policy instruments, particularly pricing ones. This section includes into the discussion of 
                                                 
29
 - Transaction costs are the costs of defining, securing and exchanging rights (Holden and Thobani 
1996). These transaction costs include: the cost of physical infrastructure to measure the rights and 
convey water; costs of finding buyers and sellers and establishing a contract; validating the ownership of 
the transacted rights and acquiring permission of use from regulatory authorities (Hearne and Easter 
1995). 
30
 - Water markets may exacerbate externalities and third-party effects. The latter question of third-party 
effects arising tradable rights that impose reductions of return flows is well exemplified in (Holden and 
Thobani 1996). 
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those instruments the main effects for irrigated agriculture arising from the water price
31
 
level itself. 
The introduction of water prices in the discussion of water pricing instruments 
provides a great deal more of information than the charge of tariff level. The objective 
analysis of a comprehensive (integrated) water management strategy will disaggregate 
the water price on the relevant components to determine the structure of costs involved. 
This is particularly important when institutional efficiency performance is at stake. 
Institutional performance, measured in terms of efficiency/inefficiency is necessarily 
reflected in the water price, as well as non-price attributes, which affect the overall 
performance of the entire irrigation scheme. 
The supply of water for irrigation is a “multi-attribute” service, of which the 
water price is part of (OECD 1999a). Information on non-price attributes such as, for 
example, water quality, quantity, reliability of supply, flow and pressure, as well as 
frequency of accessibility, institutional setup and technical design are as crucial as the 
water price itself (OECD 1999a; OECD 1999d; World Bank 2006).  Absent information 
on these attributes could make water price comparisons misleading/misguiding, by 
comparing non-homogeneous attributes of actually different commodities (Young 
1996). As for the water price itself, it should be accompanied by the exact information 
on what is being priced. Having drawn this remark, the economic assumption ceteris 
paribus is implicit to hold true throughout this section. 
Water rates are a “powerful instrument of policy” (Carruthers and Clark 1983), 
regardless of the pricing instrument. The implications of the water price level, however, 
are dependent on that instrument (e.g. area pricing Vs. volumetric pricing). In indirect 
pricing instruments the scope for efficiency gains or water savings through pricing is 
severely limited. In the long-run, farmers will either use as much water while there are 
marginal benefits to be gained, or abandon irrigation at all if the fix cost is prohibitive 
(Perry 2001). For that reason, as flat pricing does not induce marginal price increases, 
this section is primarily meant to address to water pricing in volumetric systems. 
There is a generalised perception that low water prices are among the main 
explicative causes for low efficiency in agricultural water use (Arrojo 2001; Bardarska 
2000; Dalhuisen and Nijkamp 2000; Lacroix 2001; Pearce 2001; Scott 2001; Unver and 
Gupta 2003). The water price level can only contribute, however, to improve water use 
                                                 
31
 - The term water price, as used here, refers to the price associated with the provision of water services, 
rather than the resource price, unless explicitly mentioned so. 
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efficiency on the fraction of water that reaches irrigated farms (that is, the tertiary 
network and application) (Ray, 2002. Cit. Cornish et al. 2004).  
The relationship between water prices and efficiency is dependent on factors 
such as the scale of analysis, the measurement of efficiency and additional factors 
described afterwards. At a river basin (or catchment area), much of the seepage, 
percolation and spillover losses at reservoir and irrigation scheme levels, that make 
irrigation “inefficient”, are often captured and recycled as inflows downstream (Barker 
et al. 2003; Cornish et al. 2004; Perry 2001)
32
. In the perspective of these authors, it is 
the failure to account for the recycling of “wasted water” that has lead to believe 
irrigation systems are inefficient (Barker et al. 2003).  
Indirect and volumetric pricing schemes do, in fact, have several problems 
attached to low water charges. Low water charges have adverse effects on the allocation 
and distribution of water (Dinar 2000). In addition, low charges may affect the level of 
cost recovery and compromise the financial sustainability of water management 
agencies, which may force postponing investments (Mostert 2000), lead to defer 
maintenance (Unver and Gupta 2003) or to ill-maintenance regimes, water failures and 
low reliability, poor performance and low efficiency. The effects are necessarily cyclic, 
as low charges resulting in poor supply performance, will bring the willingness to pay to 
fast come down (World Bank 2006).  
Economic theory suggests that the maximum efficiency in allocating resources is 
reached when the marginal benefits derived from using one unit of resource equate the 
marginal cost of supplying that resource (Johansson et al. 2002; Tiwari and Dinar 
2001). The difference between the water price and the marginal cost of supplying that 
unit can therefore be considered as a distorting subsidy (OECD 1999d; Tiwari and 
Dinar 2001) leading to the (over)use of resources below its opportunity cost (OECD 
1999d). Charging water resources at cost recovery prices would ensure resources are 
valued at their social water value, allowing society to capture any gains derived from 
more efficient alternative uses of water (OECD 1999a). Indeed, this is the primary idea 
                                                 
32
 - With this reasoning, implementing “water-saving” practices – such as canal lining – with the purpose 
of reducing seepage and percolation, could be understood as redistributive rather than water-saving 
(Barker et al. 2003). At the farm level, water loses are inherent to the productive process as they are 
established by biological and environmental crop growth conditions; from a soil sustainability 
perspective, water applications might require taking into account salinity management problems. In 
economic terms, losses of wasted water do add to the cost of service delivery, as water has to be captured, 
stored, treated and delivered, without generating immediate accountable benefits. Relating loses with 
efficiency and the water price is therefore a very complex task. 
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subjacent to the correct guidance allocation decisions within and across water sectors 
(Saleth 2001)
33
 and should be taken into account when setting the water price. 
On the supply side, this correct guidance is dependent on the correct 
determination of the water price and on the transmission of that information to 
consumers. The first condition requires identifying and summing all the costs involved 
in the delivery of each unit of water, considering infrastructural investments, 
maintenance and conveyance costs associated supply, as well as opportunity costs 
reflecting water usage, water scarcity and environmental costs. This process should 
identify and correct possible inefficiencies to avoid their transmission into the supply 
chain. The second condition involves transmitting this information on the true cost of 
water to farmers to provide the adequate economic signal on how to use water 
efficiently (OECD 1989), and would require use of volumetric pricing systems.  
On the demand side, the demand for productive factors depends primarily on the 
marginal productivity of those factors (the net added value generated by the last unit of 
the factor applied). In the case of agricultural production factors (intermediate goods), 
such as water, the demand for irrigation water is a derived demand. The impact of water 
prices on the demand for water (the price elasticity of water demand) depends on a 
tremendously high number of factors, such as availability and price level (Cornish et al. 
2004), irrigation techniques, the added value of agricultural production (Chopin_Kuper 
et al. 2002. Cit. Çakmak et al. 2004), river basins, countries, the time scale (long-run, 
short-run) (Speck 2000), agricultural land quality (Caswell et al. 1990; Garrido 2001), 
product prices and subsidies
34
 (Garrido 2001; Massarutto 2001; OECD 1999a),  trade 
policies (World Bank 2006), the technical proficiency (Dinar and Letley, 1996. Cit. 
Cornish et al. 2004), and all the above mentioned non-price attributes of irrigation 
systems. In fact, some of these factors seem to be “at least as important as the water 
price itself” (Garrido 2001; OECD 1999a). 
Agricultural economic studies indicate that there exists some degree of demand 
elasticity for irrigation water. With these many factors affecting the agricultural demand 
for water, its response to volumetric water prices seems to be “somewhat erratic” 
                                                 
33
 - In this line of thought, the inaccurate determination of the water price (or prices) by government 
authorities may produce a misdirecting advice about social resources use.  
34
 - Some authors emphasise that incentives have an adverse effect on water resources, either specifically 
referring to agricultural output subsidies or to irrigation equipment subsidies (Gómez-Limón et al. 2002; 
OECD 1989; OECD 1999a). It is argued that granting supports on product prices promotes the intensive 
use and “relative waste” of fertilizers (OECD 1989) and that investment subsidies in irrigation equipment 
offsets the effects of increased water prices to reduce irrigation water use (OECD 1999a). 
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(Lacroix 2001). While some authors assert that variations in these factors cause the 
effects of water price levels on water demand to be of “conflicting evidence” (Garrido 
2001)
35
, others have no reservations in stating that water price levels has a “clear 
impact” (Speck 2000) on the demand for water, or that this impact “is widely shown to 
be minimal” (Cornish et al. 2004). Economic behaviour suggests that farmers react to 
water application costs (including water prices) with cutbacks in water demands above 
water price thresholds (Çakmak et al. 2004; Garrido 2001; OECD 1999a).  
The implications of water prices for demand management ultimately depend, to 
a great extent, on the number and location of these thresholds on the demand curve. 
Ceteris paribus, irrigation water demand will usually stand inelastic up to a price 
threshold is reached. The location of these turning point thresholds is dependent on the 
economic productivity of water, the set of alternative production strategies, the share of 
land devoted to permanently irrigated crops, existing irrigation technologies, and the 
size of the water allotment (OECD 1999a). Some agricultural systems might have more 
than one threshold level, while in others it might be completely absent (Pinheiro and 
Saraiva 2004a)
36
. Water price increases situated along inelastic segments have the 
possibility of increasing the contribution to the cost recovery of water services (or water 
revenues) without significantly disturbing farming activities (OECD 1999a) or water 
demand.  
Farmer responses to water price increases depend, in essence, on the demand 
function and on the price level. Adjustments to water prices may consider changing 
crop-mix patterns (Garrido 2001; OECD 1999a; Popovici 2000) towards less water 
intensive crops, or more water-efficient crops, reducing irrigated areas (Garrido 2001; 
OECD 1999a; Popovici 2000), improving water management practices and irrigation 
technologies (Garrido 2001; OECD 1999a; Popovici 2000)
37
, and abandonment of 
irrigation altogether (Arrojo 2001; Garrido 2001; OECD 1999a)
38
.  
The accurate determination of water prices is therefore the major dilemma in 
irrigation water-pricing (UNDP 1998). On the one hand, a price stimulus may be 
                                                 
35
 - The WADI Project results, using different scenarios of agricultural policy, corroborate this idea 
(Berbel and Gutiérrez 2005)  
36
 - Idem. 
37
 - Volumetric water pricing presupposes a transfer of income from farmers to a water agency. In this 
respect, it is curious to note that the bibliography suggests the possibility that farmers may switch to less 
water efficient but more cost effective irrigation technologies in response to increases in water prices 
(Popovici 2000). 
38
 - Most of these responses are well documented in WADI – The sustainability of European irrigated 
agriculture under Water Framework Directive and Agenda 2000, 2004. 
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necessary to increase use efficiency or to contribute to the cost recovery of water 
services. On the other hand, a ceiling-price may be essential to prevent the abandonment 
of agricultural irrigated activities due to lack of ability to pay the cost of water (UNDP 
1998). In between these two extreme situations there is a wide scope of action for taxing 
water services. The water charge may vary between FCT or revenue generation, which 
may inhibit irrigation (UNDP 1998) or oblige less productive farms out of production 
(Johansson et al. 2002), and a free water price that leads to the inefficient use of water 
resources (UNDP 1998).  
Water prices and irrigation water pricing policies for demand management are 
considered efficient whenever they influence the level of water consumption (Tsur and 
Dinar 1995). That is, whenever responses to prices lead to decreases in consumption or 
to increases on the water use efficiency. It is important to bear in mind that legal, 
economic and technical water management instruments form a coherent whole (OECD 
1977)
 39
 within an integrated, comprehensive, water management system. The different 
instruments have advantages, faults and varying levels of effectiveness in their 
contribution towards achieving policy objectives. A successful water policy should 
therefore take advantage of a combined approach, using all available instruments to 
achieve the pursued objectives.  
 
 
2.4 – CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provides a background analysis of public policies for the 
sustainable conservation of water resources, focusing on the recently enacted Water 
Framework Directive, with respect to the principles of cost recovery for water services 
and water demand management in irrigated agriculture. It explores use of economic and 
regulatory water policy instruments, reviewing their performance and ability of 
contributing towards achieving these principles. 
The literature review shows that the contribution of these instruments with 
respect to policy objectives is dependent on their respective enforcement levels, which 
are necessarily constrained by the surrounding biophysical environment and 
                                                 
39
 - For example, encouraging the adoption of a particular technology may include the use of financial 
aids, tax rates adjustments or controls to the use of water (OECD 1977). 
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political/economic/institutional settings. Consequently, water policy instruments are 
best suited to deliver a very narrow set of policy objectives. This provides sufficient 
evidence for the need to promote locally adequate research skills and a systematic 
review of policy environments for the correct guidance of public policy, in order to 
encourage the efficient conservation of natural resources, without jeopardising the 
sustainability of agriculture and livelihoods of people in rural areas. 
This chapter is mainly centred on the use of water policy instruments for 
implementing the Water Framework Directive in irrigated agriculture. Economic 
charging instruments are describe in greater detail as these may be designed either for 
achieving cost recovery of water services or for controlling the demand for irrigation 
water. Latter stages of this work simulate the economic, social and environmental 
implications arising from use of volumetric pricing, area pricing, two-part tariffs and 
water quotas on agricultural typologies of two case study areas in the south of Portugal. 
The next chapter describes these study areas and determines the most representative 
agricultural typologies. 
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CHAPTER 3 – MODELLING FARM DIVERSITY 
 
This chapter is the first structural module of the bio-economic framework. It 
determines the morphologic characteristics of representative farming systems, suitable 
for mathematical representation within the bio-economic modelling framework. Its 
ultimate goal is to produce homogeneous groups of farms in respect to farming structure 
and productive patterns. This categorisation of farming systems aims to minimise 
aggregation bias problems arising from heterogeneity and diversity within agriculture. 
This chapter describes use of multivariate techniques, such as Principal Component 
Analysis and Cluster Analysis, to produce homogeneous representative farming systems 
in two case study areas, taking this diversity into account. 
 
 
3.1 – CASE STUDIES 
 
Accordingly to the World Resource Institute (WRI 2004), and the FAO 
Information System on Water and Agriculture (Aquastat 2004), the total natural 
renewable water resources are of 69 km
3
, being 38km
3
 of these water resources 
generated in Portugal. FAO‟s database indicates that the main share of water 
consumption is devoted to agricultural uses (78%), followed by industrial uses (12%) 
and domestic consumption (10%).  
The irrigated area in Portugal amounts to 650000 ha (FAO 2004), corresponding 
to 16.8% of the total agricultural usable land (INE 2001b). The figure 6 shows that the 
irrigation sector is particularly well developed near the coastline and in the northern part 
of the country where water resources are more plentiful. The highest concentration of 
irrigated farms and share of irrigated areas is therefore located in Entre Douro e Minho 
and Beira Litoral regions, being the irrigated UAA of 62.2 and 53.9% of their total 
UAA, respectively. In the interior part of the country the irrigated areas range from 6.1 
% in the Alentejo region and slightly above thirteen percent in Beira Interior and Trás-
os-Montes regions. The average irrigated UAA per irrigable farm is usually very small 
in all areas, ranging from 1.3 ha/farm in Beira Litoral to 8.4 ha/farm in Alentejo. 
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The table 1 shows that maize is the most dominant irrigated crop in the country, 
accounting for more then 16% of the national irrigated area. Altogether, animal feeding 
crops such as pastures, silage and fodder crops occupy 32% of the irrigated area. The 
acreage of irrigated orchards and potatoes is also relevant at the country level, with 
5.5% and 6.1% of the total area, respectively.  
Figure 6. Irrigated areas in each agricultural region 
 
Disaggregating irrigated crop acreage per region, see table 1, shows that some 
crops are predominantly located in different parts of the country. In fact, this regional 
disaggregation of crop acreage shows that processing tomatoes and vegetable crops 
occur mainly in the Lisboa e Vale do Tejo region; that rice, sunflower and irrigated 
durum wheat are the main irrigated crops in the Alentejo region; that citrus production 
is fundamentally located in the Algarve region; and that orchards, potatoes, and animal 
feed crops are the most important irrigated crops in the northern part of the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entre Douro e Minho: 
UAA      – 215675 ha 
Irrigated UAA – 134129 ha 
    – 62.2 % 
            
 
Beira Litoral: 
UAA       – 169796 ha 
Irrigated UAA –  91471 ha 
    – 53.9 % 
            
 Lisboa e Vale do Tejo: 
UAA       – 447863 ha 
Irrigated UAA – 115880 ha 
    – 25.9 % 
            
 
Tras-os-Montes: 
UAA                – 457889 ha 
Irrigated UAA – 60959 ha 
    – 13.3 % 
            
 
Beira Interior: 
UAA       – 418972 ha 
Irrigated UAA  – 56977 ha 
– 13.6 % 
            
 Alentejo: 
UAA                – 1924044 ha 
Irrigated UAA – 118255 ha 
    – 6.1 % 
            
 Algarve: 
UAA                – 101926 ha 
Irrigated UAA – 22439 ha 
    – 22.0 % 
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Table 1. Most important irrigated crops in each agricultural region 
 (based on INE, 1999) 
 
Accordingly to the OECD (OECD 1999a), only 19-25% of the irrigated land 
falls within publicly developed irrigation projects. Most public irrigation schemes are 
located in the southern part of the country, prone to droughts and water scarcity, where 
the share of irrigated land is much inferior to other regions (Pinheiro and Saraiva 
2004a). 
The public irrigation schemes of Caia and Odivelas are located in the Alentejo 
region of Portugal (see next figure), within the Guadiana river basin. The Caia scheme 
supplies 7237ha of irrigated land in the district of Portalegre, and Odivelas covers 
6381ha of land in the districts of Beja and Setúbal (IDRHa 2002). These irrigation 
schemes are of medium size when compared to acreage covered by other irrigation 
schemes in the country, but they are among the biggest in the Alentejo region. The area 
of the Odivelas irrigation scheme is planned to increase by 115 thousand hectares until 
2020 due to the construction of the Alqueva dam. 
The climate in the Alentejo region is classified as C1B'2sa' in the Thornthwaite 
classification. This means sub-humid rainy, mesothermal, with moderate excess of 
water in the winter, and nil or low concentration of thermal efficiency. The average 
Irrigated Crops 
(regional %) 
Portugal 
Entre 
Douro 
e Minho 
Trás 
-os- 
Montes 
Beira 
Litoral 
Beira 
Interior 
Lisboa 
e Vale 
do Tejo 
Alentejo Algarve 
Durum Wheat -- -- -- -- -- -- 7.8 -- 
Hibrid Maize 16.1 16.1 -- 20.6 4.9 28.2 19.3 -- 
Regional Maize 7.9 13.6 8.8 14.9 14.0 -- -- -- 
Rice -- -- -- 7.0 -- 7.6 9.2 -- 
Silage Maize 9.2 26.1 -- 11.6 -- -- -- -- 
Fodder Maize -- -- -- -- 22.4 -- -- -- 
Other Fodder  9.5 13.9 -- 12.5 15.9 4.9 8.5 -- 
Potatoes 6.1 -- 15.4 9.9 7.7 -- -- -- 
Sunflower -- -- -- -- -- -- 10.5 -- 
Proc. Tomatoes -- -- -- -- -- 9.5 -- -- 
Vegetables -- -- -- -- -- 11.3 -- -- 
Perm. Pastures 7.8 -- 42.0 -- 8.3 -- -- -- 
Orchards 5.4 -- 10.4 -- 9.9 9.6 -- 7.0 
Citrus -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 66.9 
Vineyards (wine) -- 5.5 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Olive Groves -- -- 6.6 -- -- -- 6.5 -- 
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daily temperature amplitude ranges from 9ºC in the winter to 17ºC in the summer. The 
frost-free period lasts approximately from March to October, which is adequate to the 
growth of most spring-summer crops. Average annual rainfall is 584mm, being 85% of 
this accumulated until the end of April (Pinheiro and Saraiva 2004b). 
The predominant soil types in these irrigation schemes are classified as 
Luvissols and Fluvissols in the FAO soil unit classification. These soil types show, in 
general, medium to high aptitude to irrigation, with favorable soil texture, structure, as 
well as water capacity and depth. Small inclusions of Vertisoils have a relative 
importance, in the Odivelas irrigation scheme, as their good water storage capacity 
offers very good conditions for non-irrigated agriculture. Vertissols show limitations 
when subject to irrigation related to heavy texture and problems in internal drainage 
(Pinheiro and Saraiva 2004b). 
Farms in these case study areas can be considered to be relatively homogeneous, 
in the sense that they are subject to the same weather conditions and face the same 
institutional, political and economic settings. In spite of this, different agricultural 
systems with heterogeneous land structure exist within these schemes (see next figures). 
This heterogeneity in farm land sizes is notorious both in Caia (Figure 7a) and Odivelas 
(figure 7b) irrigation districts, showing that particularly small holdings/farms are 
concentrated in some areas while bigger farms predominantly occur in others
40
.  
This diversity is explored further in the figure 8 and figure 9 which show the 
numbers of farms, variation in the size and enterprise mix for both districts.  They relate 
the techno-economic orientation of farms in these irrigation schemes with the 
representativeness of agricultural systems in terms of usable agricultural area (UAA) 
and number of farms
41
. These figures indicate that some agricultural systems in these 
areas are in fact more representative than others, with some being very popular in terms 
of number of farms but poorly represented in acreage, and vice-versa.  In both districts, 
the majority of farms come under the rather unhelpful category of “general agriculture”. 
 
                                                 
40
 - Figures 7a and 7b represent the boundaries of agricultural holdings. Figure 7a shows circular forms as 
centre pivots are also geo-referenced in this map. 
41
 - Figures produced from individual farm data from the agricultural census of 1999 (INE 2001c) 
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Figure 7. Geographical location of case study areas in Portugal and map of agricultural 
holdings supplied by Caia and Odivelas irrigation schemes (in 2004)  
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Figure 8. Number of farms and UAA according to techno-economic orientation in Caia 
irrigation scheme 
 
Caia 
Odivelas 
a 
b 
 71 
Technical Economic Farm Types In Odivelas
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Figure 9. Number of farms and UAA according to techno-economic orientation in 
Odivelas irrigation scheme 
 
 
3.2 – THE RELEVANCE OF TYPOLOGIES TO CHARACTERISE AGRICULTURAL 
SYSTEMS 
 
Policy oriented programming models for agricultural analyses operate at 
different scale levels. These models range from national or regional scales (macro or 
meso scales), to micro scales, modelling one single farm or even one specific crop 
growing on particular conditions. Obviously, the required level of detail in data and the 
yielded accuracy of model results vary. Macro or meso scale models need to consider 
heterogeneous situations within their regions of analysis and, therefore, they require use 
of more assumptions and stronger simplifications than those at lower levels, closer to 
the real field conditions. The smaller the scale of analysis the more accurate the results 
can potentially be. 
Modelling agricultural systems at any aggregated level implies that aggregation 
bias problems will arise (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo 2004; Kostov and McErlean 2004). 
As a consequence, simulation values of explanatory variables will tend to be 
unachievable in real conditions and the farmer objective function will be upward biased 
(Hazell and Norton 1986)
43
. Indeed, because farm resource endowments and farmers 
socio-economic characteristics vary, one unique solution is thought to exist for each 
farm (Berbel and Rodriguez-Ocana 1998; Hazell and Norton 1986; Kobrich et al. 2003). 
                                                 
43
 - The aggregation bias is in an upward direction because it overstates resource mobility; the 
aggregation enables farms to combine resources in proportions that are not available to them individually 
(Hazell and Norton 1986). See this reference for a very clear example. 
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However, modelling agriculture on a farm by farm basis is an unrealistic 
expectation (Kobrich et al. 2003; Young 1996). To some extent, aggregation bias 
problems can be avoided or minimised (Kostov and McErlean 2004) if the farms 
modelled are fairly similar and fulfil strict homogeneity criteria (Gomez-Limon and 
Riesgo 2004. Cit. Day 1963; Jansen and Stoorvogel 1998)
44
. These criteria concern, 
among others, farm physical characteristics and structure – such as natural resources 
endowments – institutional proportionality, technology and managerial capacity. In 
order to minimise aggregation bias problems farms need to be fairly homogeneous and 
farmers are required to share similarities of decision-making behaviour, that is, to share 
identical objectives and values (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo 2004; Hazell and Norton 
1986). Typification methods are often applied to agricultural data with the purpose of 
reducing this aggregation bias, being Cluster analysis (CA) the method of typification 
most used (Kostov and McErlean 2004).  
Typological studies are often on the basis of policy-oriented agricultural 
programming models. Typifying farms/farmers can contribute to understand the 
existing diversity in farming systems. It also permits to further explore common 
characteristics in the homogeneous groups, such as the weight of values and attitudes in 
the objective function of farmers, or their goals orientation (Berbel and Rodriguez-
Ocana 1998; Daskalopoulou and Petrou 2002. Cit. Stanworth and Curran 198; Hobbs et 
al. 1964; Fairweather and Keating 1990; Olsson 1988; Salamon and Davis-Brown 1986; 
Gomez-Limon and Riesgo 2004; McGregor et al. 2001).  
 
 
3.2.1 – MULTI-VARIATE DATA ANALYSIS - CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
  
Cluster analysis seeks to identify homogeneous subgroups of cases or 
observations in a population. It is used to establish groups and group membership 
relations on the basis of similarity patterns between observations when the number of 
groups is a priori unknown. Cluster analysis endeavours to construct a categorisation of 
objects in such way that objects share greater similarity within their group, than with 
                                                 
44
 - Some of Day‟s very strict conditions have proven to be unnecessarily severe (Jansen and Stoorvogel 
1998) and were relaxed. Nonetheless, using quantitative and qualitative methodology approaches that 
reduce aggregation bias problems, represents an important contribution to understanding and enhancing 
the predictive accuracy of policy analysis (based on McGregor et al. 2001). 
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those of other groups (Bijnen 1973). Cluster analysis is a multivariate technique used to 
reveal the underlying structure of the data by grouping objects with a high degree of 
similarity. This means that there is usually a unifying property that characterises all 
objects in the cluster (Frank and Todeschini 1994). For clustering to be truly 
representative of the categories represented, and to minimise the aggregation bias, it 
should show a maximum heterogeneity between types while capturing the maximum 
homogeneity within types (Bijnen 1973; Everitt 1980; Hair et al. 1998; Kobrich et al. 
2003).  
Clustering results are strongly dependent on the method chosen, on the 
standardization of variables and on the measure of similarity chosen (Everitt 1980; 
Frank and Todeschini 1994; Hair et al. 1998). The clustering starts with n 
objects/variables in n separate clusters and in each step the number of clusters is 
decreased by fusing the two closest clusters. “This produces a hierarchy of partitions of 
objects such that any cluster of a partition is fully integrated in one of the clusters of the 
consecutive partition” (Frank and Todeschini 1994). The process ends with all n objects 
in one single cluster. The various methods of agglomerative hierarchical clustering 
differ in the way in which the distances between the clusters are calculated (Everitt 
1980; Frank and Todeschini 1994). 
In Ward‟s method, individual cases and/or clusters that result in the group 
minimum error sum of squares are combined (Everitt 1980; Frank and Todeschini 1994; 
Kobrich et al. 2003. Cit. Ward 1963; Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984). This allows 
generation of clusters with the smallest possible loss of information (Bijnen 1973; 
Everitt 1980). Kobrich et al. (2003) advocate that Ward‟s method generates a clearer 
solution than other hierarchical agglomerative methods. The main disadvantage of this 
method (as well of some others) is that it tends to group clusters with a small number of 
observations (as these would normally have a smaller variance) therefore being biased 
to the production of clusters of approximately the same size (based on Hair et al. 1998).  
 During the clustering process, while the number of clusters decreases, less 
similar clusters are merged together causing the heterogeneity of the clusters formed to 
increase (Hair et al. 1998). For that reason some criteria must be defined to compromise 
the desired number of clusters with the required level of homogeneity (Hair et al. 1998). 
Again, this can be simply decided on the basis of the research objectives, but some 
attention should focus on the homogeneity/heterogeneity levels associated with each 
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step of the clustering process. Steep variations of these levels normally provide a good 
indication of the number of clusters to use (Everitt 1980; Hair et al. 1998). 
Cluster analysis (CA) is however the only multivariate technique that does not 
estimate this set of unifying variables to compare objects or variables (Hair et al. 1998). 
CA is useful to compare objects, but cannot be used to select the truly representative 
grouping variables. To overcome this difficulty, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
is first performed on the data. In this approach, PCA is used with an exploratory 
perspective with the purposes of data summarisation and data reduction. The data 
summarisation inputs the understanding of which variables are important/redundant, 
and of which variables act in concert together to form factors (Hair et al. 1998). The 
insight generated by the data summation is transformed by data reduction techniques to 
create a smaller number of new variables (surrogate variables or factor scores) to use in 
cluster analysis. This process allows gain of more control over the data while avoiding 
multicollinearity problems. 
 
 
3.2.2 – MULTI-VARIATE DATA ANALYSIS - PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
 
Interviews and questionnaires are often structured in subsets of questions. 
Frequently, the variables of these subsets estimate closely related aspects, which are all 
representative of the same underlying dimension (Field 2000; Hair et al. 1998). In 
Principal Component Analysis these dimensions are called components. They are 
derived from a set of interrelated variables and transformed in uncorrelated factors or 
components.     
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a mathematical procedure used with the 
purposes of data summation and data reduction which transforms a number of possibly 
correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables called principal 
components. These principal components thus help to explain as much of the variability 
in the data as possible with a much smaller number of variables, making this technique 
particularly useful in datasets with large numbers of highly correlated or not truly 
representative variables.  
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Principal Component Analysis
45
 is a multivariate statistical technique 
particularly suitable for analysing the underlying structure of data and the 
interrelationships between variables. PCA differs from other multivariate techniques as 
there are no explicitly considered dependent or independent variables. PCA 
simultaneously considers all interrelations between variables to maximise the 
explanation of the full set (Hair et al. 1998). In fact, each variable is explained by the 
entire set of observed variables (Hair et al. 1998). 
PCA enables to discover the underlying structure of data and identify the factors 
that account for most of the variance in the data (Kobrich et al. 2003; Maseda et al. 
2004). This allows identification of which variables are redundant (Maseda et al. 2004), 
show reduced variability, are highly correlated with other variables (Kobrich et al. 
2003) or have a very reduced contribution to the results.  
The main purposes of PCA are data summarisation and data reduction. In the 
first case, PCA examines the interrelations between variables to determine if the 
information can be condensed in a smaller set of new composite dimensions with the 
minimum loss of information; in the second, it is used to identify the most 
representative variables from the original set, or it is used to evaluate how each of the 
original variables are explained by this reduced number of new components (Hair et al. 
1998).  
Data reduction normally consists of one of the following three methods. Either 
the variables with the highest factor loadings are identified and selected as the most 
representative of that dimension (these are called surrogate variables) or entirely new 
variables based on summated scales or factor scores are used. In the case of summated 
scales only the variables with high loadings are used, while factor scores account for the 
composite of all variables loading on a factor. Using the surrogate variable method is 
probably the easiest method but has the disadvantage of not properly representing all the 
other variables present on that dimension. The other methods might be more appropriate 
                                                 
45
 - Although this chapter draws exclusively on PCA, terms and concepts apply to Common Factor 
Analysis (CFA) as well. PCA and CFA are the two methods of Factor Analysis. The main difference 
between PCA and CFA is that while the first considers all the variance in the data, the later only accounts 
for the common (shared) variance among the variables. PCA was preferred over CFA because the main 
concern here is the construction of the “minimum number of factors needed to account for the maximum 
portion of variance” (Hair et al. 1998) in the data. In addition, CFA has a few problems when compared 
to PCA such as factor indeterminancy (different factor scores for the same factor model results) and the 
inability to compute the variable communalities (the amount of variance that a variance shares with all 
other variables in the analysis) (Hair et al. 1998).  
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when the objective is to represent a composite of variables present in one dimension, 
but they are also more difficult to interpret (Hair et al. 1998). 
 
 
3.2.3 – FARM TYPIFICATION: THE CHOICE OF CLUSTERING VARIABLES 
 
Farm structural characteristics and farmer socio-economic attitudes are thought 
to be decisive factors for the typifying farming systems (Berbel and Rodriguez-Ocana 
1998; Daskalopoulou and Petrou 2002; McGregor et al. 2001). Similar research studies 
have considered productive patterns as the most efficient method for classifying farm 
types (Berbel and Rodriguez-Ocana 1998) while others have identified physical and 
socio-economic criteria (farm sizes, technology, land ownership) (Kobrich et al. 2003) 
as the most adequate classification criteria. In previous clustering studies, some of the 
following variables have been identified as having explanatory power in describing the 
productive patterns and decision-making criteria of farmers (Berbel and Rodriguez-
Ocana 1998; Daskalopoulou and Petrou 2002. Cit. Just and Zilberman 1983; Goodwin 
and Schoeder 1994; Kimhi 1994; Feder 1980; Kobrich et al. 2003; Mejías et al. 2003; 
Ruben et al. 1998; Young 1996): 
 Farm structure (farm size, number of land parcels, irrigated area, location); 
 Productive resources (land ownership, soil quality, capital, machinery, irrigation 
techniques, water sources, water availability); 
 Farm labour (agricultural full- and part-time labour, non-agricultural labour, 
permanent and seasonal employment, managerial ability, age, gender, 
education); 
 Productive pattern (crops grown, farm technical-economic orientation, livestock 
species and number of animals); 
 Sources of income (farm agricultural and non-agricultural income, off farm 
income). 
 
The choice of variables to analyse should be made from the view point of the 
research objective (Hazell and Norton 1986; Kobrich et al. 2003). However, it is not 
possible to define a priori which variables should be considered, as their relative 
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importance is unknown. In addition, there is no theoretical rule for determining the 
number of variables to include in the analysis (Everitt 1980).  
Most clustering techniques have difficulties dealing with large numbers of 
variables and reducing their number is “essential” (Everitt 1980). For that reason, most 
categorisation studies only use a reduced the number of grouping variables. Although 
the variables to use naturally depend on the issues being studied, it is common to find at 
least some variables belonging to the first four bullet points mentioned above. For 
instance, the use of variables such as farm size or by land-to-labour ratios allows 
grouping farms with similar proportions of resource endowments (Hazell and Norton 
1986); separating irrigated from rain fed land, or differentiating soil classes, slope or 
elevation, provides a general idea of yield differences (Hazell and Norton 1986); and 
differentiating farms accordingly to their predominant crops gives an estimate of the 
technologies used (Hazell and Norton 1986)  
 
 
3.3 – DATA USED AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this research, clustering is used with the aim of grouping similar farms into 
homogenous groups in order to reduce aggregation bias problems.  The representative 
clusters in the case study areas identified from this process are used to simulate the 
implications of alternative water policies in those farming systems and study areas. 
The data used for clustering was provided by the National Institute of Statistics 
and collected for the last National Agricultural Census (data kindly provided by INE 
2001b). This is both a comprehensive and exhaustive data set in the sense that it 
provides individual farm/farmer information, for the entire agricultural population 
within the regions in which the case studies are located, on all variables surveyed by 
national statistics and Eurostat
46
. Data is organised in sets of variables covering land 
structure, farm productive resources, main characteristics of the producer and the 
producer family, farm employment, productive patterns and income. A selection of 
variables in the data, from the original 220, is show in Appendix I. 
                                                 
46
 - Eurostat Concepts and Definitions Database for Agriculture and Fisheries can be accessed on 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/coded/info/data/coded/en/Theme5.htm. 
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Farmers in these areas not belonging to the public irrigation schemes of Caia and 
Odivelas were removed from the data set. This has reduced the number of cases from 
948 to 272 farms in Caia and from 595 cases to 206 in Odivelas. Cases with missing 
values for relevant variables and those not practicing irrigation were also discarded. The 
final data sets comprised 251 and 87 farms in Caia and Odivelas, respectively. The data 
sets are of adequate sizes for calculating statistical correlations between variables. 
 
 
3.3.1 – PCA AND CA CLUSTERING APPROACH 
 
Several strategies were tested to find if any underlying structure within the data 
could be properly captured by PCA/CA using SPSS 13.0 for Windows (2004) and 
STATA/SE 8.1 for Windows (2003). For instance, PCA were performed using absolute 
variable values (this criterion takes into account farm sizes) and with normalised values 
(percentage per farm and per hectare allows comparing the productive patterns across 
farms of different sizes).  
The general rule of using at least “five times as many observations as there are 
variables” or even a ten to one ratio led to perform partial PCA on nested groups of 
variables (Hair et al. 1998)
 47
 to identify the most relevant variables within each of the 
above mentioned sets of variables. The knowledge of the data obtained through these 
PCA enabled to identify 22 variables (from the original 220 variables) as explaining 
most of the variance in the data. This reduction in the number of variables was only 
possible by using crop-type aggregated variables (such as grain crops, vegetable crops, 
industry crops) to express the productive pattern in the case study areas. 
One variable from each pair of highly correlated variables was discarded 
(Pearson Coefficient, R, over 0.9). Highly correlated pairs of variables means that one 
variable can be explained by the other (Kobrich et al. 2003), discarding one of these 
variables permits reducing multicollinearity problems and gaining greater control over 
the data without loosing relevant information (Hair et al. 1998).  
                                                 
47
 - An identical approach in which PCA is performed on nested groups of variables is found in Rapey 
(2001). One advantage of this last approach is that it maximizes the number of cases-per-variable, 
therefore reducing the possibility of having correlations that would appear significant in the factor 
analysis merely by chance (Field 2000). 
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The appropriateness of PCA was evaluated on the basis of the Bartlett test of 
sphericity and on the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA). 
While the Bartlett test checks for the overall existence of significant correlations within 
the data (ie., tests if the R matrix is an identity matrix), the MSA test is based on the 
partial correlations between variables. Individual variables with MSA values below 0.5 
were systematically removed from PCA. Overall, all PCA performed had a Bartlett test 
of sphericity significant at the .000 level and MSA values over 0.7. MSA values above 
0.7 are considered as appropriate (Field 2000; Hair et al. 1998). 
The number of components to extract from PCA was selected on the basis of the 
Kaiser‟s Criterion, in which only components with eigenvalues over one are selected. 
Selecting one single variable to represent each dimension was not deemed appropriate 
as several variables often share similarly high loadings. As a result, both factor scores 
and the surrogate variable methods were essayed in the clustering phase. As 
recommended for most clustering circumstances, both factor scores and surrogate 
variables were standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (Everitt 
1980). Factor scores were standardised using the Anderson-Rubin method and surrogate 
variables were normalised using z scores (standard normal distributions with a mean of 
0 and a standard deviations of 1). Correlated variables within the same component are 
expected to have similar profiles of differences across groups in other multivariate 
analysis (Hair et al. 1998). The use of factor scores usually generated more realistic 
results than the surrogate variable method in the clustering. 
Standardised variables are assigned the equal weight during clustering. Variables 
identified as unsuitable for PCA and discarded during this process are assigned a weight 
of zero in the clustering method (Everitt 1980), as these variables do not contribute to 
the similarity/dissimilarity measurement between cases. Treating variables with the 
same weight is one of the problems encountered in the use of clustering following PCA. 
The various PCA components are responsible for explaining different amounts of 
variance in the data and therefore assigning equal weight to these components does not 
take that into account. Attempts to overcome this issue included standardising cases as 
well as variables as this could allow to account for the relative importance between 
variables (Hair et al. 1998). A weighting system based on the amount of variance 
explained by each principal component was also essayed in an attempt to improve 
cluster results. 
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3.3.2 – CA CLUSTERING APPROACH 
 
The above combination of PCA and CA failed to produce homogeneous 
representative farming systems in the two case study areas (see discussion of results). 
To overcome that problem, the typification of agricultural systems was based on an 
hierarchical agglomerative clustering, using Ward‟s aggregation strategy of minimum 
variance criterion (Kobrich et al. 2003; Maseda et al. 2004). Productive pattern 
variables, as well as farm physical size, were used as clustering variables. 
 
 
3.4 – TYPIFICATION OF AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS  - RESULTS  
 
The results of clustering using the productive pattern and farm physical sizes are 
described and analysed on the next following pages. The presentation of clustering is 
carried out separately for each case study. The outcome of clustering is shown by the 
corresponding distances between the last clusters merged (figures 10 and 11, tables 2 
and 4). After that follows a brief comment on the main characteristics of each cluster. 
This chapter is concluded after presenting the cropping patterns and representativeness 
of each cluster within the irrigation districts of Caia and Odivelas. 
Figure 10 and table 2 show information produced during the later stages of 
clustering concerning a similarity measure between clusters formed. This similarity 
measure expresses the distance between clusters in the Euclidean space. The absolute 
differences of that similarity measure are also computed as clustering progresses, for 
easiness of understanding, as this enables recording consecutive increases in the 
heterogeneity of the clusters produced. Increases in the measure of similarity 
(coefficients), or in the absolute difference of its values, occur naturally during the 
clustering as more dissimilar elements are grouped together. Ultimately this provides 
guidance information on the number of clusters to form, that is, on where to cut the 
dendogram. 
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Figure 10. Index of the distance between the two clusters joined – Caia Irrigation 
District 
 
Table 2. Agglomeration stage and distance between the clusters joined 
Agglomeration 
Schedule 
Cluster Combined Distance between the 
two clusters joined 
Difference 
Cutting 
Line Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 
2 
192 193 0.000   
0.000  
2 189 192 0.000 
0.000  
3 189 191 0.000 
0.000  
... ... ... ... 
... ... 
247 13 56 2205.539 
120.283  
248 135 140 2325.821 
127.008  
249 21 139 2452.829 
141.063  
250 2 5 2593.891 
157.580  
251 1 21 2751.472 
167.245  
252 135 143 2918.717 
239.170  
253 13 107 3157.887 
378.251  
254 13 15 3536.137 
687.968 A 
255 1 13 4224.105 
1089.217 B 
256 1 2 5313.322 
3046.298 C 
257 1 135 8359.621 
  
 
As mentioned before, the decision on the number of clusters to form should take 
into account the research objectives as well the measure of homogeneity/heterogeneity 
within and across the clusters produced. In this case, however, the decision of where to 
cut the dendrogram to define how many clusters to form is not entirely straightforward. 
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The cutting line should be placed before drastic increases in the distance between 
clusters joined, to avoid increasing the heterogeneity of the clusters formed. These 
drastic changes occur either at the very end of clustering when all cases are merged to 
form one single cluster and at cutting line A (see Figure 10 and Table 2). Cutting the 
dendrogram at cutting line B, would create three clusters without any significant 
increase in heterogeneity. Analysing these clusters in higher detail shows that, although 
having similar area, they are in fact different in terms of productive pattern, irrigation 
regime and permanent crops/arable land. Stopping the clustering at the cutting line A is 
therefore translated in added homogeneity within clusters, and in added rigour and 
accuracy of the analysis. The main characteristics of these clusters are shown in table 3 
( X , Med and SD represent the average, median and standard deviation). 
 
Table 3. Statistical elements of the four clusters formed in the Caia irrigation district. 
 Caia Cluster 1 Caia Cluster 2 Caia Cluster 3 Caia Cluster 4 
 Oliviculture Extensive Farming General Farming Intensive Farming 
 X  Med SD X  Med SD X  Med SD X  Med SD 
Grain Crops 
(%) 
1 0 5 47 52 23 28 30 19 66 74 34 
Temporary 
Crops (%) 
1 0 5 63 68 24 34 34 17 88 92 14 
Set aside (%) 3 0 9 22 13 21 16 2 24 6 0 11 
Arable Land 
(%) 
5 0 11 85 94 23 50 49 19 94 100 11 
Permanent 
Crops (%) 
94 100 11 10 4 14 49 51 19 6 0 11 
UAA (ha) 7 4 10 236 188 157 20 14 17 23 16 20 
Owned Land 
(%) 
99 100 9 76 100 41 79 100 35 50 40 48 
Rented Land 
(%) 
2 0 9 24 0 41 21 0 35 50 60 48 
Number of 
Holdings 
3 3 3 3 2 9 5 4 5 2 1 1 
Irrigated Area 
(%) 
68 75 31 44 46 28 33 21 28 83 90 20 
Prod Sex
48
 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Prod Age 62 63 11 37 40 28 59 60 15 48 52 18 
Prod 
Instruction 
Level
49
 
3 3 2 5 5 3 3 3 2 4 3 2 
                                                 
48
 - 1 – Male sex; 2 – Female sex. 
49
 - 1 – Does not know how to read or write; 2 – Knows who to read and write; 3 – Basic education, first 
cycle; 4 – Basic education, second cycle; 5 – Basic education, third cycle; 6 – Secondary education, 
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 Caia Cluster 1 Caia Cluster 2 Caia Cluster 3 Caia Cluster 4 
 Oliviculture Extensive Farming General Farming Intensive Farming 
 X  Med SD X  Med SD X  Med SD X  Med SD 
Prod Ag 
Instruction
50
 
1 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Prod Ag 
Activity 
Time
51
 
3 2 2 2 2 2 4 5 2 3 4 2 
Prod 
Remunerated 
Act Ext 
Farm
52
 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
AWU 
Producer (h) 
1108 825 756 1060 825 951 1621 2063 755 1451 1925 833 
AWU 
Permanent (h) 
101 0 593 3438 2200 4049 92 0 444 187 0 833 
AWU 
Seasonal (h) 
272 0 807 2210 550 5485 413 0 951 652 0 2086 
AWU Total 
(h) 
1777 1076 1867 7730 5418 7855 3053 2263 1778 2767 2223 2617 
 
Cluster 1 of the Caia irrigation district is predominantly (94.3% of the UAA) 
oriented towards the growth of permanent crops, mainly oliviculture (89.6% of the 
UAA). Farms in this cluster are small (6.94 ha) and fragmented, on average, in 3.38 
holdings. The irrigated area is, in percentage, one of the highest in the irrigation district 
reaching 68% of the UAA. Farmers in this cluster are the oldest of all farmers in the 
irrigation district, on average with 62 years old. Most of the labour force comes from 
the producer himself (62.3%) or from the producer family (78.3%). This is the most 
labour intensive cluster, consuming on average 256h/ha. 
The second cluster is the biggest within the Caia irrigation district. Farms have 
on average 236 ha, divided in 2.7 holdings (median of 2), growing mostly cereals 
(46.7% of the UAA) and industrial crops (10.8% of the UAA). In total, the arable land 
occupies 84.5% of the UAA, being important to note that 22% of the UAA is kept under 
set aside. The largest proportion of permanent crops is occupied by olive groves 
(94.3%). Only 44% of the UAA is irrigated, being most of the irrigated area occupied 
by cereal and industrial crops (77.8%). Farmers in this cluster are the youngest (on 
                                                                                                                                               
agricultural/forestry; 7 – Secondary education, non agricultural/ non forestry; 8 – Polytechnic/University 
education, agricultural/forestry; 9 – Polytechnic/University, non agricultural/ non forestry. 
50
 - 1 – Exclusively practical; 2 – Short agricultural professional courses; 3 – Long agricultural 
professional courses; 4 – Short and long agricultural professional courses; 5 – Full agricultural education. 
51
 - 1 – Partial time, >0 <25%; 2 – Partial time, >25 <50%; 3 – Partial time, >50 <75%; 4 – Partial time, 
>75 <100%; 5 – Full time. 
52
 - 1 – No remunerated activity outside the farm; 2 – there is at least one remunerated activity outside the 
farm. 
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average with 37 years old) and the most educated of the irrigation district (which is 
basic education, third cycle). As in other clusters of this irrigation district, the 
agricultural education of most farmers is exclusively practical (median of 1). 
Agricultural labour is essentially (83.5%) assured by contacted labour (non-family). 
Cluster 3 is a mixed farming system, being land use equally divided between 
arable land crops and permanent crops (olive groves). Most of the arable land is 
occupied by cereal crops (27.6% of the UAA are wheat and maize) and under set aside 
(15.7% of the UAA). The average UAA in this cluster is 20 ha, formed by 5.4 holdings 
of 3.7 ha each. On average, only 33.1% of the UAA is irrigated, being olive groves and 
hybrid maize the dominant irrigated crops (with 46.9% and 31.8% of the irrigated area). 
Farmers in this cluster are the most dedicated to agriculture, spending on average more 
than 75% of their time on farming activities. This is corroborated by the proportion of 
labour used, on average the producer alone generates 53.1% of the labour required, and 
his relatives another 28.3%.  
The fourth cluster of this irrigation district is predominantly (65.8% of the UAA) 
oriented towards the production of cereal crops, namely maize. Industrial crops (9.0% 
of the UAA) and extensive vegetables (9.6% of the UAA) have also a significant share 
of land use. Most of the land is allocated to arable land uses (94.4% of the UAA) and 
permanent crops are not significant. The average farm size is 23ha structured in 1.7 
blocks. Half of land of the farm is owned by the farmer, while the other half is rented. 
The percentage of irrigated land in this cluster is the highest of the district, with 82.9% 
of the UAA. The most common irrigated crops are maize, sunflower and processing 
tomatoes. Most of the labour required is carried out by the producer (52.4%) and 36.0% 
of the labour is hired from outside the producer family. 
Figure 11 and table 4, below, show the same information produced by clustering 
in the Odivelas irrigation district. In the case of the Odivelas irrigation district the index 
of distances between clusters merged, provides unmistakable guidance about the 
number of clusters to produce. The first sudden, drastic, increase of the dissimilarity 
measure happens at the agglomeration stage 185 (cutting line A). Cutting the 
dendrogram before this merger, produces 3 different clusters described below. The main 
characteristics of these clusters are summarised in table 5 ( X , Med and SD represent 
the average, median and standard deviation). 
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Figure 11. Index of the distance between the two clusters joined – Odivelas Irrigation 
District 
 
Table 4. Agglomeration stage and distance between the clusters joined 
Agglomeration 
Schedule 
Cluster Combined Distance between the 
two clusters joined 
Difference 
Cutting 
Line Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 72 73 0.000   
0.000  
2 65 67 0.000 
0.000  
3 65 68 0.000 
0.000  
... ... ... ... 
... ... 
176 48 50 716.0255 
44.283  
177 4 10 760.3086 
47.325  
178 70 168 807.6336 
61.700  
179 66 70 869.3338 
66.909  
180 2 53 936.2432 
91.916  
181 2 4 1028.159 
97.056  
182 1 32 1125.215 
100.869  
183 1 2 1226.084 
109.678  
184 64 66 1335.763 
419.813 A 
185 1 64 1755.576 
941.644 B 
186 1 48 2697.22 
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Table 5. Statistical elements of the three clusters formed in the Odivelas irrigation 
district. 
 Odi Cluster A Odi Cluster B Odi Cluster C 
 Horticulture Cereal Farming Extensive Farming 
 X  Med SD X  Med SD X  Med SD 
Grain Crops 
(%) 
13 0 16 50 51 23 21 17 19 
Temporary 
Crops (%) 
76 96 34 84 88 15 41 36 27 
Set aside (%) 13 0 25 13 10 13 23 11 28 
Arable Land 
(%) 
90 100 20 97 100 9 64 67 32 
Permanent 
Crops (%) 
6 0 15 1 0 5 1 0 2 
UAA (ha) 13 8 12 31 23 27 374 283 274 
Owned Land 
(%) 
57 71 45 42 25 44 80 100 37 
Rented Land 
(%) 
43 29 45 58 75 44 20 0 37 
Number of 
Holdings 
3 3 2 4 2 4 2 1 1 
Irrigated Area 
(%) 
64 65 32 54 53 27 23 22 19 
Production 
Sex
53
 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Production 
Age 
49 46 15 53 55 16 39 42 24 
Prod 
Instruction 
Level
54
 
3 3 2 3 3 1 4 3 3 
Prod Ag 
Instruction
55
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Prod Ag 
Activity 
Time
56
 
4 5 2 3 5 2 3 5 2 
Prod 
Remunerated 
Act Ext 
Farm
57
 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
AWU 
Producer (h) 
1608 2200 820 1511 2200 853 1334 2200 1028 
                                                 
53
 - 1 – Male sex; 2 – Female sex. 
54
 - 1 – Does not know how to read or write; 2 – Knows who to read and write; 3 – Basic education, first 
cycle; 4 – Basic education, second cycle; 5 – Basic education, third cycle; 6 – Secondary education, 
agricultural/forestry; 7 – Secondary education, non agricultural/ non forestry; 8 – Polytechnic/University 
education, agricultural/forestry; 9 – Polytechnic/University, non agricultural/ non forestry. 
55
 - 1 – Exclusively practical; 2 – Short agricultural professional courses; 3 – Long agricultural 
professional courses; 4 – Short and long agricultural professional courses; 5 – Full agricultural education. 
56
 - 1 – Partial time, >0 <25%; 2 – Partial time, >25 <50%; 3 – Partial time, >50 <75%; 4 – Partial time, 
>75 <100%; 5 – Full time. 
57
 - 1 – No remunerated activity outside the farm; 2 – there is at least one remunerated activity outside the 
farm. 
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 Odi Cluster A Odi Cluster B Odi Cluster C 
 Horticulture Cereal Farming Extensive Farming 
 X  Med SD X  Med SD X  Med SD 
AWU 
Permanent (h) 
0 0 0 74 0 436 3911 2200 7010 
AWU 
Seasonal (h) 
1176 0 1717 590 0 1335 1677 0 3674 
AWU Total 
(h) 
3341 2873 2218 2770 2498 1935 7649 5342 7015 
 
Cluster A and cluster B of Odivelas irrigation district appear, at first, similar in 
some features. The percentage of the UAA devoted to arable land crops and under 
temporary crops is of 89.5% and 76.4% in cluster A, and of 97.5% and 84.5% in cluster 
B, respectively. The share of area under permanent crops is negligible in both clusters, 
and the percentage of the UAA allocated to set aside is similar, with 12.9% and 13.0% 
in cluster A and cluster B, respectively. The most significant differences arise when 
analysing the structure of temporary crops: in cluster A, 16.2% of the UAA is occupied 
by cereal and industrial crops wile in cluster B this share is significantly higher with 
74.6%; in addition, cluster A allocates a much higher area to the growth of extensive 
vegetables, with 58.5% of the UAA than cluster B with 8.7% of the UAA 
The land structure in cluster A is, on average, composed by 13.4 ha divided in 
2.9 blocks. The most important irrigated crops are processing tomatoes and melon, 
representing in total 64.1% of the irrigated UAA. Most farmers of this cluster work full 
time in their farms (median = full time), working on average between 75% and 100% of 
full time and are the most dedicated to their agricultural activity within the irrigation 
district. Approximately 62.4% of the labour requirements are assured by the producer 
(48%) and his relatives (14.2%), while the remaining labour is contracted from outside 
the farm in the form of seasonal work. This cluster is the most labour intensive in the 
irrigation district, employing 249.6 h/ha. 
Cluster B has on average 31.2ha divided in 3.6 blocks (median of 2.0). More 
than half (54.1%) of the UAA is irrigated, being maize, wheat and sunflower the most 
important irrigated crops. On average, almost three quarters of the labour needed are 
met by the producer (54.6%) and his relatives (17.8); the largest part of the remaining 
labour is acquired through contracting seasonal labour. In terms of labour intensity, this 
agricultural system consumes on average 88.7 h/ha. 
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The last cluster in the Odivelas irrigation district is the biggest, with 374 ha of 
UAA. These large farms are on average divided in 1.7 blocks, although most of them 
(median of 1) are concentrated in one single holding. The data indicates that 64.3% of 
the UAA is dedicated to arable land uses and that less than 1% is occupied by 
permanent crops. Accordingly to the data used there would be, on average, 131 ha per 
farm without any agricultural use, in spite of being classified as UAA. This peculiar 
situation was corrected at the time of determining the productive pattern, in order to 
occupy the available UAA in this cluster. Only 18.7% of the UAA is irrigated, being 
maize and wheat the irrigated crops with higher expression. Unlike in the previous 
representative farms, in this cluster the percentage of labour assured by the producer and 
his relatives is relatively small, with only 23.4%. In fact, most of the labour is 
contracted outside the farm, either in the form of permanent labour (51.1%) or seasonal 
labour (21.9%). The intensity of labour use per hectare is very low, on average of 20.4 
h/ha of UAA and of 31.8 h/ha of arable land. 
 
 
3.4.1 – CROPPING PATTERNS AND REPRESENTATIVENESS 
 
To make sure that the cropping pattern of each cluster is in fact representative of 
that agricultural system, crops with minimal or reduced expression were suppressed 
(below 5% of the UAA). In the case of the bigger clusters, clusters Caia 2 and Odivelas 
C, this threshold was reduced to 2.5% of the UAA. To respect the total area of the 
cluster, the remaining activity levels were adjusted to match the difference created by 
the elimination of the redundant crops. This process was performed maintaining 
unchanged the balance between rain fed and irrigated activities, as well as the 
proportion between permanent crops and arable land cops. These results are presented 
in tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 6. Productive pattern in the representative farms of the Caia irrigation district 
Productive Pattern (ha) 
 Caia 1 Caia 2 Caia 3 Caia 4 
 
Olivi-
culture 
Extensive 
Farming 
General 
Farming 
Intensive 
Farmng 
       
R
ai
n
 F
ed
 
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
(h
a)
 
Common Wheat  -- 17.2 2.18 -- 
Durum Wheat  -- 21.3 -- -- 
Set aside (financed)  -- 22.7 -- 1.30 
Set aside (non 
financed) 
 -- 39.5 3.60 -- 
Olive Grove  2.05 21.8 8.07 -- 
       
Ir
ri
g
at
ed
 A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
(h
a)
 
Common Wheat  -- 11.0 -- -- 
Durum Wheat  -- 21.2 -- -- 
Maize  -- 60.7 2.53 17.05 
Sunflower  -- 12.4 -- 2.14 
Proc. Tomatoes  -- -- -- 2.11 
Olive Grove  4.89 -- 3.73 -- 
Linseed/Rape  -- 8.8 -- -- 
       
Rain Fed Activities  2.05 122.6 13.85 1.30 
Irrigated Activities  4.89 114.0 6.26 21.31 
UAA  6.94 236.6 20.11 22.61 
 
Paying attention to the cropping patterns in Caia, table 6, is possible to infer the 
nature of the agriculture system practiced in each cluster and attempt to name it. In the 
case of Caia irrigation district, the only relevant activity in cluster 1 is olive production 
– or oliviculture; the dominant crops in cluster 2, are extensive cereal and industrial 
crop production with a large share of land under set aside – this cluster is therefore 
christened extensive cereal farming; the third cluster has roughly the same area under 
permanent crops, occupied by olive groves, as by arable crop uses – and it is named 
general farming; the last cluster in the Caia district is predominantly marked by the use 
of irrigation and this reason it was called intensive farming. 
In the Odivelas irrigation district (see table 7, below), the dominant crop in 
cluster A is processing tomatoes and for this reason this cluster is called horticulture; 
cluster B is named cereal farming as most of its area is essentially occupied by cereal 
crops; the last cluster in the irrigation district, cluster C, is similar to Caia cluster 2 and 
adopts the same name as it is mostly formed by cereal crops and land under set aside. 
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Table 7. Productive pattern in the representative farms in the Odivelas irrigation district 
Productive Pattern (ha) 
 Odi A Odi B Odi C 
 
Horti-
culture 
Cereal 
Farming 
Extensive 
Farming 
      
R
ai
n
 F
ed
 A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
(h
a)
 
Common Wheat  1.2 8.4 -- 
Durum Wheat  -- -- 22.2 
Ryegrass Fodder  -- -- 38.8 
Linseed/Rape  -- -- 34.9 
Set aside (financed)  -- 2.5 15.2 
Set aside (non 
financed) 
 2.3 3.2 -- 
Perm. Pasture    174.8 
Olive Grove  1.1 -- -- 
      
Ir
ri
g
at
ed
 
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
(h
a)
 Common Wheat  -- 4.1 24.9 
Maize  -- 5.4 54.9 
Sunflower  -- 5.3 -- 
Proc. Tomatoes  8.7 -- -- 
Linseed  -- 2.3 -- 
      
Rain Fed Area   4.7 14.07 289.07 
Irrigated Area  8.7 17.15 85.3 
UAA  13.4 31.22 374.37 
 
Table 8 shows that clusters with more cases are generally formed by a number of 
farms of small or medium dimension. A small number of bigger farms (17.95% in Caia 
and 8.39% in Odivelas irrigation districts) hold most of the UAA in these case studies. 
 
Table 8. Representativeness of each cluster in the irrigation district 
Representative
ness (%) 
 Caia 1 Caia 2 Caia 3 Caia 4 
 
Olivi-
culture 
Extensive 
Farming 
General 
Farming 
Intensive 
Farming 
       
Number of 
Holdings (%) 
 58.12 17.95 14.53 9.40 
UAA (%)  3.30 75.14 6.74 14.83 
 
Representativ
eness (%) 
 Odi A Odi B Odi C 
 Horticulture 
Cereal 
Farming 
Extensive 
Farming 
       
Number of 
Holdings (%) 
 23.08 68.53 8.39 
UAA (%)  3.04 27.33 69.63 
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3.5 – DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
PCA and CA are two specific multivariate techniques used to uncover the 
structure of data rather than imposing any structure at all (Frank and Todeschini 1994). 
In these techniques, there are no exclusively dependent variables explained by 
independent variables, as it happens in other multivariate techniques. PCA is generally 
used to group variables while CA is used to group observations (Hair et al. 1998). 
Clustering merges cases together accordingly to the proximity between cases or 
groups. The analyses performed indicated that the use of socio-economic variables 
together with productive pattern and farm size variables would systematically result in 
miss-clustering cases. The outcome of these clustering led to cases of different 
productive orientation and very different farm size to be clustered together. For 
instance, small vegetable units would be merged with big cereal production oriented 
farms without significant increases in the dissimilarity measure.  
The use of socio-economic criteria (e.g. age, education) as clustering variables 
increased the heterogeneity within the clusters obtained in terms of productive pattern 
and farm structure. The final results of cluster analysis considering socio-economic 
variables were less homogeneous on the other variables, because although cases were 
closer in terms of the total proximity for clustering, they would be further apart when 
considering productive pattern and farm size variables separately. This problem 
persisted after separating cases by their technical-economic orientation and carried on 
separate analysis
58
.  
Particularly in the case study of the Odivelas irrigation scheme, analyses clearly 
showed that socio-economic variables do not naturally cluster with farm structure or 
productive orientation ones. This aspect was not immediately identified as relevant on 
the Caia case study because agricultural systems and the socio-economic data of farmers 
are more homogeneous than in the Odivelas irrigation district. 
                                                 
58
 - This raises important comments on the suitability of data to use for PCA. Non-representative cases 
with predominantly non-representative variables (such as vegetable crops or livestock units), which do 
not help explain the much of variance in the data, are always excluded due to low MSA values, and can 
be statistically considered as outliers. Given that their most important characteristics are not accounted for 
in the clustering phase, these cases are grouped accordingly to some other characteristic and end up being 
miss-clustered in some other group. As a result, the clustering of these cases not only adds to the entropy 
(heterogeneity) of the group in which they are integrated as it biases the “representativeness” of the 
representative farms. 
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Perhaps the main drawback of using multivariate techniques such as PCA and 
CA is that they will almost always produce factors or clusters regardless of the 
existence of any “true” underlying structure in the data. In addition, completely different 
results are achieved by varying, for instance, the variables to include in the analysis, 
their scale of measurement, the standardisation of variables or of cases, the clustering 
method, or the similarity measure.  
The hypothesis that the socio-economic characteristics of farmers (e.g. age, sex, 
education level, remunerated activities outside the farm) together with farm physical 
characteristics (such as size or the number of parcels) have a decisive role in explaining 
the agricultural system (productive pattern, irrigation regime), cannot be corroborated 
from PCA/CA analysis carried out on these two case studies using the data collected for 
the last agricultural census. In practice, this means that some questions must always 
remain unsolved and intractable. It is quite possible that some differences do not turn up 
simply because they are not supported by the present data. Variables accounting for soil 
properties and fertility, field steepness, depth, parcel shape or weather conditions are not 
directly considered in the study and do, to great extent, determine the choice of the 
agricultural system and technology used.  
Having identified this limitation of using socio-economic variables in this study, 
clustering was performed exclusively the basis of farms productive pattern and physical 
size. The underlying reason justifying this change of strategy is intrinsically related to 
the aim of proving a general framework that can be broadly applied in a wide range of 
situations. The advantages of PCA would have been of rather limited use using a much 
smaller number of variables for categorising farming systems. For this reason cluster 
analysis alone was used to produce a useful categorization of the farming systems in the 
case study areas. 
Both PCA and CA normally end with a validation process. Clustering techniques 
are in essence descriptive techniques for multivariate data and their outcomes cannot be 
accepted as the true existent structure in the data. In general the purpose is to assess if 
the structure found is indeed valid for the general population or not. In this study the 
underlying structure is determined using the entire population rather than a sample and 
for that reason the usual validation steps do not apply
59
.  
                                                 
59
 - Although the validation of results does not apply to this particular work, it does seem particularly 
appropriate to reproduce the view of Waterman (2005, in press) on this matter: “Standard statistical tests 
of significance on the differences of group means or the ratio of inter-group and intra-group means are 
immaterial because the objective of the clustering procedure is to produce well differentiated clusters. 
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3.6 – CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has established the representative and homogeneous groups of 
farms to be used in the programming analysis that follows. It enabled identifying farm 
structural characteristics and cropping patterns, which are required for the mathematical 
representation of these farming systems in programming models, and their calibration 
according to revealed behaviour. Use of cluster analysis, used individual data from the 
last agricultural census, and focused on productive pattern and farm physical size 
variables to produce four separate clusters in the Caia irrigation scheme case study and 
three clusters in the Odivelas irrigation scheme. This grouping of farms allows 
minimising aggregation bias problems and introducing greater detail in the modelling of 
agricultural systems, such as agricultural rotations or use of irrigation technology, which 
would not be possible at higher aggregation levels and could distort the full 
understanding of policy implications in agriculture. Chapter four aims to increase this 
understanding of policy implications in irrigated agriculture by computing the technical 
relationships between crop production and use of irrigation water. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
This means that all such statistical tests will automatically be highly significant. Hence, the interpretation 
of the cluster characteristics relies on the subjectivity, intuitive reasoning and experience of the analyst 
who must judge the significance of the data by visually inspecting the cluster data”. 
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CHAPTER 4 – BIO-ECONOMIC MODELLING IN AGRICULTURE 
 
Chapter four introduces bio-economic modelling in the field of agriculture and 
estimates locally adapted crop yield responses with respect to irrigation water. It 
provides a review of the advantages of using crop growth models in overcoming data 
limitations, such as asymmetric or absent information concerning individual water 
usage or crop-water relationships, which although paramount for optimal resource 
allocation procedures have systematically undermined classical agricultural economics 
research focusing on irrigation. This knowledge establishes local biophysical 
relationships between irrigated agricultural production with the use of water resources, 
which are fitted within the mathematical models of representative farming systems 
presented in the next chapter, in order to allow taking into account a comprehensive set 
of agricultural options in terms of irrigated crops, irrigated technology and use of water 
resources, which is essential to the comprehensive assessment of policy change in 
irrigated agriculture.  
Bio-economic modelling is an integrated approach in which biophysical 
techniques and outcomes serve as inputs to economic models. In the field of agriculture, 
biophysical simulation models are process oriented models that explicitly consider 
biological and physical aspects of agricultural production (Oriade and Dillon 1997. Cit. 
Musser and Tew, 1984). Bio-economic models have often been used to identify options 
for the better targeting of policy measures (Ruben et al. 1998. Cit. van der Walle and 
Nead 1995).  
In this case, the bio-economic approach adopted combines the results of an 
agronomic crop model with an agricultural economics programming model. The 
agronomic model generates predicated yields, specific to water input use-levels, which 
are introduced into mathematical programming models as technical input-output 
coefficients (Hexem and Heady 1978). While the first model inputs the understanding 
of the relationship between crop growth and water inputs, the latter reallocates the 
different combinations of possible alternatives from a socio-economic set of factors, 
such as prices, policy environments, agronomic limitations, resource use constraints, 
and the economic behaviour of farmers. Taking these input-output relationships is 
particularly important for resource allocation, and policy analysis, as changes in price 
relationships necessarily contribute to determine input use-patterns (Hexem and Heady 
1978). This combined framework helps to identify possible trade-offs between the 
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environmental protection of water and the agricultural socio-economic implications, as 
well as to appraise the effectiveness of different water policy approaches. 
This chapter provides an up-to-dated literature review in the field of agricultural 
simulator models, particularly highlighting the advantages for policy analysis derived 
from coupling agronomic and economic models; it addresses the pros and cons from a 
general perspective, as reported in the literature. The second section of the bio-
economic model, concerning the economic component, is presented in the next chapter. 
It stresses the importance of recognising the multiple objectives that participate in the 
process of decision making, and describes a MAUT approach to include them into a 
formal analysis. Followers of this approach will find a step-by-step summary to be very 
useful in the end of the chapter. 
 
 
4.1 – AN INTRODUCTION TO BIO-ECONOMIC MODELLING IN AGRICULTURE 
 
Bio-economic modelling in agriculture establishes relationships between farm 
agro-ecological conditions and socio-economic criteria affecting agricultural 
production. Agro-ecological factors define the range of potential activities and regulate 
the input requirements and output levels, while socio-economic factors determine which 
alternatives to chose and which technology to use (Ruben et al. 1998). Combining these  
two sets of factors allows technical options and biological relations to be introduced into 
the appraisal of economic policy instruments and resource allocation procedures (based 
on Ruben et al. 1998).  
Most micro-economic analysis, such as commodity supply, demand for inputs, 
income distribution and others, are predicated, to some extent, on the knowledge of 
input-output relationships (Hexem and Heady 1978). This knowledge, which is a 
fundamental cornerstone
60
 for environmental and agricultural economics, is usually 
                                                 
60
 - The estimation of continuous functions expressing the relationship between inputs and outputs is in 
fact of paramount importance. Having established that relationship enables mathematically computing the 
most elementary micro-economics concepts (bullet points literally extracted from Hexem and Heady 
1978):  
 predicted yields corresponding to specified input-output levels; 
 marginal physical products and marginal value products for each input;  
 derived economic demand for individual inputs;  
 isoquants and isoclines for input-output relationships; 
 production elasticities and price elasticities of demand for inputs; 
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unknown, often has not yet been measured and other times it is immeasurable (Hexem 
and Heady 1978). It is however certain that the knowledge of input-output relationships 
tends to be incomplete… (Hexem and Heady 1978). 
Individual point estimates of yield-water relationships can generally be obtained 
from field surveys, provided that the quantity of inputs and corresponding outputs is 
recorded (Hexem and Heady 1978). Continuous production functions can be derived 
from a similar process if sufficient point estimates are available, however, this data is 
generally not collected or it is insufficient for estimating input-output functions (Hexem 
and Heady 1978). These data deficiencies produce severe limitations for resource 
allocation as the appropriate use-level for the input cannot be determined (Hexem and 
Heady 1978) in the absence of the input-output function
61
. 
The traditional approach to estimate crop responses to varying levels of water 
inputs was frequently based on agronomic site-specific empirical experiments (Jame 
and Cutforth 1996; Steduto 1997). Water inputs were treated as an independent variable 
(Steduto 1997) and use of statistical regression or inference analysis would relate the 
total amount of water applied in the entire season with the crop yield obtained (Steduto 
1997 Cit. Yaron and Bresler, 1983). The outcome of this approach would generate 
“macro” production functions (Steduto 1997 Cit. Yaron and Bresler, 1983) describing 
“non-physical relations between environment and yield” (Braga 2000), and “without 
referring to the underlying biological or physical principles involved” (Jame and 
Cutforth 1996)
62
. “Micro” crop-water production functions could be obtained whenever 
the optimal timing and depth of irrigation were considered. In any case, altering any of 
the parameters (cultivar, location, soil, weather, irrigation scheduling, etc.) would imply 
repeating the whole experiment (Steduto 1997). 
Deriving these “macro” production functions by traditional econometric 
procedures faces several challenges. In econometric words, it could be argued that the 
use of econometric techniques to determine production functions may include several 
disturbances (the μ symbol of econometric functions), arising from diverse sources 
(Dougherty 1992). The most frequent among these are caused by omission of 
explanatory variables
63
, variable misspecification
64
, aggregation of variables
65
, and 
                                                                                                                                               
 product supply functions for varying price relationships and input use-levels. 
61
 - Isoquants, isoclines, production elasticities, and product supply functions are not derivable from 
single-point estimates (Hexem and Heady 1978). 
62
 - Please note that in these “macro” functions the timing of irrigation events is simply disregarded. 
63
 - These errors occur when the influence of other variables is not taken into account. 
64
 - Inclusion/leaving out of regression variables that should not be included/left out.  
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measurement errors. Other sources of errors may be due to multicollinearity
66
 
(Dougherty 1992).  
When historical time-series data is used to estimate production functions, the 
deterministic nature of econometrics makes it inevitable to introduce the problem of 
technological progress measurement or of alternative technology options (Flichman 
1997; Heady and Dillon 1961; Ruben et al. 1998). In fact, inter-year comparability of 
the data decreases when time is introduced, because factors as crop varieties, 
environmental conditions and management are to be expected to change over time 
(Hexem and Heady 1978). From a slightly different perspective, Flichman and Jacquet 
(2003) and Donaldson et al. (1995a) alert to the possibility that using technical 
information estimated from past data may take into account significant price effects in 
resource allocation.  
Problems may also arise when using cross-sectional data, that is data from 
different production units, because production factors may cease to be homogenous
67
 
(Hexem and Heady 1978). Input-output estimates derived from cross-section data may 
fail to take into account “differences in soil, production techniques, and managerial 
efficiency” (Hexem and Heady 1978) or those arising from differences in the relative 
structure of prices (Flichman 1997). Indeed, it is extremely difficult to quantify the 
exact influence of each factor on crop yields considering the huge number of factors that 
intervene, such as: fertilization, irrigation, weather, soil quality, influence of previous 
crops in the rotation and the variety used (Flichman 1997). In addition to that, the 
variation in the combination of inputs in time and space may not be sufficient to 
produce more than a few point estimates (Flichman 1997; Heady and Dillon 1961).  
In the case of irrigation water, the major fault arising from “macro” production 
functions is the failure to take into account the importance of the timing of water 
application. Doing so implicitly assumes that the marginal productivity of water 
remains constant throughout the crop life cycle (Hexem and Heady 1978; Upton 1996). 
In fact, irrigation events do vary in frequency and intensity, adjusting the timing and 
quantity, to improve the adequacy to environmental conditions and crop stages (Cavero 
et al. 2000c; Upton 1996). The relations of water-yield effects are difficult to estimate, 
because the final crop yield corresponds to the cumulative effect of all stresses during 
                                                                                                                                               
65
 - These errors appear when aggregated functions are use to model individual decisions. 
66
 - This term describes problems arising due to relations between explanatory variables. This leads to 
unreliable regression estimates, frequent when dealing with time series. 
67
 - One of the assumptions required to estimate a production function is that inputs must be 
“homogeneous within the quantity applied” (Hexem and Heady 1978). 
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the crop cycle (Upton 1996). However, they must be considered in a “broader context 
than simple seasonal inputs” (Carruthers and Clark 1983). 
New data sources are needed as traditional agronomic research methods are 
laborious and expensive (Hanks and Ritchie 1991; Jones et al. 2003; Pala et al. 1996), 
particularly irrigation studies (Hexem and Heady 1978). These studies, in addition, tend 
to be time and space related, which makes results site- and season-specific (Hexem and 
Heady 1978; Jones et al. 2003; Young 1996), therefore with limited transferability 
(Hexem and Heady 1978).  
Site-specific dependable information on water consumption and on water 
productivity, is scarce and difficult to obtain experimentally (Hanks and Hill 1980; 
Hexem and Heady 1978). Reliable data to establish bio-econometric relations is not 
abundant for most areas and not available for most crops. In fact, “very few water 
production functions have been estimated over the entire world” (Hexem and Heady 
1978). 
In this context, agronomic models may be regarded as a valuable tool to take 
into account the timing effects of irrigation and rainfall. In comparison to the traditional 
agronomic research, the use of agronomic models provides environmental parameters 
associated with agricultural practices that are not easily observable, such as erosion, 
nitrogen or pesticide pollution, and that might otherwise remain intractable (Oriade and 
Dillon 1997) or impossible to investigate using conventional methods (Bouman et al. 
1996). The possibility of simulating “dated” crop water responses for economic 
analysis, while taking into account the interactions of irrigation with the remaining 
agronomic management is an advantage of agronomic models (Flichman 1997). 
Another important difference between regression analysis and model simulation is the 
time interval involved, varying from a growing season in the first case to a few days in 
the second (Jame and Cutforth 1996).  
 
 
4.1.1 – AGRONOMIC CROP GROWTH MODELS 
 
Agronomic models are a set of mathematical equations which describe complex 
physical systems (e.g. weather, soil characteristics, hydrology) and biological processes 
to simulate crop responses (crop specific parameters) (Hanks and Hill 1980; Jame and 
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Cutforth 1996; Oriade and Dillon 1997. Cit. King et al., 1993; Pala et al. 1996). These 
models predict final biomass and yield as they are capable of providing information on 
other important aspects occurring throughout the plant live cycle (e.g. nitrogen loss, 
erosion, etc.) (Jame and Cutforth 1996). Indeed, as explained above, in complex 
environments such as those existing in agricultural fields, it is difficult to explain 
mechanism interactions without an agronomic model (Brisson et al. 2003). 
Agronomic simulation models may have countless applications, provided that 
they are tested, calibrated and validated (Steduto 1997). These models may be used, for 
instance, to simulate productivity relationships with most type of input variation (such 
as fertilizer applications or irrigation timing and frequency), to study the effects of 
different management options such as sowing time, plant density  (Bouman et al. 1996), 
to compare yield of alternative cultivars, different equipments or rotational schemes 
(Donaldson et al. 1995a; Flichman 1997), to simulate the effects of climate scenarios 
(Jame and Cutforth 1996; Xevi et al. 1996), to estimate potential crop yield in a new 
location, to forecast yields before harvesting, to determine the effects of soil erosion, 
weeds or insects on crop yields (Jame and Cutforth 1996). These models can, therefore, 
be considered as “complex production function and activities generator” (Steduto 1997 
Cit. Daybe and Flichman, 1991) to explore the agricultural production potential in 
distinct situations (Bouman et al. 1996).  
The operational use of crop simulation models to support tactical decision 
making has not, however, been successful in most cases (Bouman et al. 1996. Cit. 
Seligman 1990). The complexity and spatial variability of agricultural biophysical 
conditions, with several yield limiting factors acting simultaneously (weeds, fertilizers, 
pests and diseases), escapes the validity domain of most crop growth models and does 
contribute to explain their failure (Bouman et al. 1996). In this respect, it could be 
argued that agronomic crop models to not in fact simulate real yields, but fictitious 
potential productions (Jones et al. 2001).  
The use of agronomic models to simulate crop responses to drought, irrigation 
scheduling, spatial variability of irrigation applications, and inclusively to produce 
water production functions is well reported in the literature. Quantitative studies 
focusing on the transpiration-yield relation date back from 1699 or 1850, with the work 
of Woodward or Lawes, although more systematic research studying the relationship 
between crop yield and water only started in the beginning of the last century (Steduto 
1997). The work of the “school of de Wit” (Bouman et al. 1996) has established 
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pioneering advances on modelling crop growth since 1958 by modelling precisely 
water-yield relationships (Xevi et al. 1996). 
Mapp and Eidman (1976) have studied the effect of variable duration and 
severity of soil water and atmospheric stresses during critical stages of crop 
development on farm returns (Oriade and Dillon 1997); Bernardo et al., (1987) have 
simulated crop yield responses to irrigation scheduling in a general framework of profit 
maximization under constrained water supplies (Oriade and Dillon 1997). Boggess and 
Amerling (1983) have used agronomic models to study the implications of irrigation 
investments on risk and returns to irrigation strategy using historical weather data 
records. Several other authors have recognised the use of agronomic models as valuable 
instruments for optimising the management and scheduling of irrigation water, that is, 
the water allocation between crops and distribution of water during the cropping cycle 
(Cabelguenne et al. 1997; Cabelguenne et al. 1999; Cavero et al. 2000b; Cavero et al. 
2000c. Cit. Bryant et al. 1992; Cabelguenne et al. 1995; Cabelguenne et al. 1997; 
Howell et al. 1989; Stewart et al. 1975; Wenda and Hanks, 1981; Santos et al. 2000b). 
 
 
4.1.2 – SELECTION OF THE AGRONOMIC CROP GROWTH MODEL 
 
The selection of the most adequate agronomic model to use is a difficult task 
given the multiplicity of existing models
68
. As mentioned by Jame and Cutforth (1996), 
most crop models consistently integrate the knowledge of plant growth and 
development with other sciences
69
 in a quantitative and process orientated manner. This 
allows in most situations, with more or less accuracy, to generate production functions 
relating crop yield with water use (Steduto 1997). A concise listing of the most 
important agronomic models currently in use is shown in Appendix II. 
The selection of which model to use depends primary on the model 
appropriateness for the intended purpose and on the suitability for the environment 
(Hansen 2002). The availability and quality of model input data is paramount in this 
process (Bouman et al. 1996). The first criterion considers the spatial scale (field, farm, 
                                                 
68
 - A search for agricultural models in the site http://mars.wiz.uni-kassel.de/model_db/ has originated 
111 results in the 3
rd
 of June 2004.   
69
 - The knowledge from sciences such as crop physiology, agrometeorology, agronomy and soils is 
frequently considered. 
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region) and model responsiveness to decision variables. The suitability for the 
environment regards the accuracy in which the model reproduces the relevant bio-
physical processes (e.g. limitations due to water, nutrient deficiencies, biotic stresses or 
additional constraints). Taking these factors into account significantly narrowed the 
number of possible models to use. 
Considering the suitability for the environment, the first main distinction in crop 
models is accordingly to their empirical or mechanism nature. Empirical model are 
based in experimental observation but lack the understanding of the underlying 
processes being simulated. Mechanistic models usually incorporate physiological 
understanding of plant growth aspects to explain cause-effect relations (Jame and 
Cutforth 1996).  
The functionality of the latter group of models for non specialist users is poor 
(Bouman et al. 1996). The required knowledge of the processes being simulated as well 
as the availability and quality of model input data are the major limitations to their use. 
Another inconvenient is that models specific to a few crops do not consider the dynamic 
effects of cultural rotations and cannot be applied to farm analyses (Flichman and 
Jacquet 2003).  
Empirical agronomic models can be used to simulate the interaction of multiple 
crops with soils, climate and technical practices. These models have the advantage of 
being less data demanding and simpler to use than mechanist models. Among these 
models, EPIC (Williams et al., 1984), EPIC-phase (Cabelguenne et al., 1986), CropSyst 
(Stöckle et al. 1994) and STICS (Brisson et al., 1998) are the most widely used and are 
described bellow. 
For water management in particular is useful to distinguish between crop growth 
models that simulate the main processes of crop growth (such as CERES models, EPIC, 
CropSyst, SUCROS) from those that have been developed for irrigation planning but do 
not explicitly simulate crop growth (Cavero et al. 2000c). CROPWAT (Smith 1992b) is 
worldwide know and is possibly the best example of the latter. CROPWAT is an 
empirical model, based on the crop response coefficient approach, which does not 
differentiate the water stress effects on photosynthesis or biomass production, leaf area 
growth and harvest index (Cavero et al. 2000c). The same data source suggests that the 
other mentioned models may be more universally applicable than CROPWAT and that, 
in addition, they may simulate other important processes for the efficient management 
of water resources, such as nitrate leaching. 
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Most of the crop agronomic simulation models mentioned share several 
characteristics in common. Most of them require very similar data inputs and most of 
them are able to simulate crop growth, development and yield, as well as runoff, 
leaching or erosion. All models have conceptual or practical advantages as well as 
disadvantages. The compromise chosen has selected CropSyst as the most promising for 
this study. The following paragraphs aim to compare the most widely used agronomic 
models to support this choice. 
The Cropping Systems Simulation Model (CropSyst) is a multi-year, multi-crop 
dynamic daily time step simulation model. It was initially developed as an analytical 
tool to study environmental and management effects on cropping systems productivity 
and environment. CropSyst simulates crop-soil-weather relations by modelling the soil 
water budget, soil-plant nitrogen budget, crop phenology, crop canopy and root growth, 
dry matter production and decomposition, salinity and erosion. Management 
possibilities (e.g. cultural practices and technical scheduling) are included in the form of 
cultivar selection, crop rotation and fallow periods, irrigation, nitrogen fertilization, 
tillage operations, and residue management (Donatelli et al. 1997; based on Pala et al. 
1996; Stockle et al. 1997; Stockle et al. 2003). Estimates of environmental effects of 
agricultural systems consider soil erosion by water and chemical pollution, that is, the 
fate of nitrogen and pesticides in the soil (Stockle et al. 1997).  
The Simulateur Multidisciplinaire pour les Cultures Standard (STICS) has been 
developed by INRA (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique) since 1996 to 
simulate crop growth and development as well as soil water and nitrogen balances as 
driven by climatic data. It is a dynamic daily time step crop model demanding input 
variables relating to climate, soil and cropping systems and supplying output agronomic 
variables relating to yield (quantity and quality), input consumption, and environmental 
variables such as drainage and nitrogen leaching (Brisson et al. 2003). 
The Decision Support System for Agrothechnology Tranfer (DSSAT) was 
initially developed under the International Benchmark Site Network for Agrotechnology 
Transfer Project (IBSNAT) in 1982. DSSAT was created from the fusion of the existing 
GRO and CERES families of models in a common shell. The aim of DSSAT is to 
facilitate the application of crop models in a systems approach for decision analysis 
about transferring production technology from one location to other where climate and 
soils differ (Jones et al. 2003. Cit IBSNAT 1993 and Uehara and Tsuji 1998). DSSAT is 
a dynamic daily time step, process-based model that uses a comprehensive approach to 
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crop growth and development and their environmental determinant factors and 
interactions (Braga 2000) to simulate multi-year outcomes of crop management 
strategies.  
APSIM was developed to simulate biophysical processes in farming systems of 
Northeast Australia (Carberry et al. 2002) for a broad range of applications, particularly 
to estimate crop responses to management practices (Keating et al. 2003); it can only be 
applied in situations where the appropriate biophysical modules are available (Keating 
et al. 2003) and some relevant South European crops are still missing (sugar beet and 
rice for instance). The model seems particularly well adapted to rain fed agricultural 
systems (Carberry et al. 2002). In APSIM “the key concept is the central position in the 
model of the soil rather than the crop” (McCown et al. 1995), therefore soil related 
aspects or soil-plant interactions seem to be very well considered (organic matter 
dynamics, erosion, acidification and pH, soil water, solute movement, soil nitrogen and 
phosphorus and their transformations) (see Keating et al. 2003 for a detailed 
description). 
The crop growth model EPIC (Erosion Productivity Impact Simulator, Williams 
et al. 1984) is a dynamic, deterministic, mechanistic, multi-crop and daily-step 
simulator of plant growth and productivity. Originally developed to determine erosion 
and productivity relationships, in 1986 it was modified by Cabelguenne et al. for water 
management purposes. The new version, EPIC-phase, takes into account crop water 
stress sensitivity at different (four) growth stages and adjusts irrigation frequency 
according to crop water needs and available water in the soil profile (Santos et al. 
2000b). EPIC simulates different aspects of the crop-soil-atmosphere interactions by 
using sub-models focussing on the different aspects to be simulated. The different sub-
models originally integrating EPIC were: hydrological, weather, erosion, nutrients, 
crop-growth, soil balance and management. Several other sub-models were constructed 
and incorporated into EPIC at later dates (economics, pesticides, climate changes) 
(Steduto 1997). 
The ability of simulating crop rotations is an important feature of CropSyst, 
APSIM and STICS models. Although GRO and CERES families can be used in rotation 
configurations for particular crops, their approach does not easily allow integrating 
different crop models to simulate crop rotations (Jones et al. 2003; Stockle et al. 2003. 
Cit. Jones et al. 1998). EPIC has an effective generic multi-crop simulation approach 
but crop growth and biophysical processes equations reveal some limitations associated 
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to their simplicity (Stockle et al. 1997; Stockle et al. 2003). STICS‟s main purposes are 
very similar to a large number of existing models (Brisson et al. 2003. Cit. Whisler et al. 
1986) including to those of CropSyst and APSIM.  
CropSyst was built upon the conceptual strengths of EPIC. The simulation of 
crop growth interactions with management options and environment is ameliorated 
using a more process orientated approach (Stockle et al. 2003), better described in 
CropSyst than in EPIC (Stockle et al. 1997). STICS and APSIM models do reunite very 
strong advantages, for instance concerning quality criteria based on various biochemical 
compounds. Both APSIM and STICS seem to require a high level knowledge of 
processes operations and science (Carberry et al. 2002) or to require more 
interdependence with agronomists (Flichman 1997). Using mechanistic approaches to 
describe physiological processes, DSSAT models have the advantage of including most 
crop species cultivar parameters in their code, allowing the user to define agronomic 
management parameters (day of planting, plant population, row spacing) instead of 
physiological ones. 
In DSSAT, EPIC and STICS models the crop biomass accumulation is 
dependent of photosynthetically active radiation (PAR) absorbed or intercepted by the 
crop canopy (Brisson et al. 2003; Jame and Cutforth 1996; Jones et al. 2003); in EPIC-
phase the radiation efficiency is divided in four crop stages (Cabelguenne et al. 1999); 
in CropSyst crop growth is expressed daily as the minimum biomass increase of four 
limiting factors: light, temperature, water, and nitrogen (Pala et al. 1996); DSSAT 
approach considers these factors and atmospheric carbon dioxide as well. Several 
models (DSSAT, STICS and CropSyst) consider the direct effect of water stress in leaf 
expansion (Brisson et al. 2003; Jones et al. 2003; Steduto 1997) (either production or 
senescence) and CropSyst additionally considers leaf area duration (Stockle et al. 2003). 
EPIC simulation of water stresses considers the direct impact on harvest index and 
canopy growth, but does not take in account the water stress effect on the reduction of 
leaf expansion and senescence (Cabelguenne et al. 1999; Steduto 1997). STICS model 
considers the water stress effects in photosynthesis reduction. 
Aiming to study irrigation effects, one of the most relevant aspects is the water 
balance simulation in the model. CropSyst, APSIM and DSSAT consider daily 
precipitation and irrigation levels, runoff, interception, water infiltration, redistribution 
in the soil profile and deep percolation, crop transpiration and evapotranspiration, or 
very similarly related processes (Jones et al. 2003; Keating et al. 2003; Pala et al. 1996; 
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Stockle et al. 2003). As far as water movement is concerned, these models include sub-
models of varying complexity that may be adjusted to existing soil and weather input 
data (Jones et al. 2003; Keating et al. 2003; Stockle et al. 1997). For instance, rainfall 
events are partitioned in runoff and infiltration considering soil texture, slope and tillage 
(Jones et al. 2003); the soil water movement can be simulated using a finite difference 
numerical method (Richard‟s equation) and a simple cascading method (Jones et al. 
2003; Keating et al. 2003; Stockle et al. 1997). In most cases the crop 
evapotranspiration (ET) is obtained from reference evapotranspiration (ETo) and can be 
computed using different sub-models (Jones et al. 2003; Keating et al. 2003; Stockle et 
al. 1997; Stockle et al. 2003), such as Doorenbos and Pruitt – FAO – crop coefficient 
approach  for ET evolution (for details consult Allen et al. 1998), Penman-Montheith or 
Prieste-Taylor methods, depending on the weather data (Stockle et al. 2003). This 
model flexibility represents increased simulation versatility as users may choose the 
appropriate level of detail accordingly to the available data. Most models determine 
daily irrigation requirements and allow simulating automatic applications based on the 
soil water depletion and allow manually introducing defined irrigation events 
accordingly with the crop stage or day from planting. None of the models studied is 
able, at the moment, to optimise constrained water resources, applying water in the most 
water stress sensitive or yield responsive phases – in other words, none of the models 
maximizes the water use efficiency or water resources marginal productivity. 
Figure 12 shows the general scheme of daily biomass accumulation in CropSyst. 
The figure shows that the biomass accumulation is limited by the minimum of water, 
nitrogen, temperature and PAR sub-modules. Very succinctly, CropSyst approach 
determines crop potential biomass growth based on crop potential transpiration and on 
crop intercepted photosynthetic active radiation (PAR). The actual biomass gain is then 
determined by applying corrections related to nitrogen and water stresses. At crop 
physiological maturity, the total biomass accumulated is related to crop yield by a 
harvestable yield index which accounts for crop water, nitrogen stress intensities, and 
crop sensitivity to stresses during the reproductive life cycle (Stockle et al. 2003). The 
functioning of the CropSyst model is described in greater detail in Appendix III. 
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Figure 12. Illustration of daily biomass accumulation in CropSyst (figure produced on the basis of the model description) 
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The CropSyst model only includes non-site specific relationships and therefore it 
is expected to work well in most agricultural situations (Stockle et al. 2003). Cropsyst 
has been evaluated and validated under a wide variety of conditions, from dry to fully 
irrigated, and from low soil available nitrogen to well supplied conditions (Stockle et al. 
2003). CropSyst ability to simulate crop responses in different environmental conditions 
are well reported in the literature: water treatments (Stockle et al. 1997; Stockle et al. 
1994; Stockle et al. 2003), detailed evaluation of biomass, leaf area, water and nitrogen 
uptake (Pala et al. 1996; Stockle and Debaeke 1997), water balance (Stockle et al. 2003. 
Cit. Ventrella and Rinaldi 1999), nitrogen balance (Stockle et al. 2003. Cit. Donatelli et 
al. 1996; Silvestri et al. 1999) crop rotations (Donatelli et al. 1997; Stockle et al. 2003. 
Cit. Berti et al. 2001), tillage systems (Stockle et al. 2003. Cit. Pannkuk et al. 1998), 
salinity (Ferrer-Alegre and Stockle 1999). 
 
 
4.2 – CROPSYST DATA 
 
Data for the dominant soil type in both Caia and Odivelas irrigation schemes 
(Fluvisols, in FAO soil unit classification)
70
 was collected from work carried out in the 
Caia irrigation district (Nunes 2003)
71
. When required this data was complemented by 
that published by Cardoso (1965). 
 The weather file used for this simulation covers daily parameters for a period of 
thirty four years, from 1966 to 1999, recorded at the weather station of Elvas
72
 (national 
institute of meteorology). This daily weather data includes solar radiation, maximum 
and minimum temperature and precipitation parameters. 
Agricultural management options, such as tillage operations, planting/seeding, 
harvests, and in specific cases irrigation scheduling came from individual crop budgets. 
These crop budgets were originally produced by Astrolábio (2002), Coelho et al. 
(1998), DRAAL (1989), GPPAA (2001), Noéme et al. (2004) and Rebocho (1995) and 
adjusted as described in Appendix VII. 
                                                 
70
 - Further information on FAO soil units is available at the FAO Soil Units webpage 
(http://www.fao.org/AG/agl/agll/key2soil.stm) or at the FAO/Unesco Soil Map of the World. 
71
 - Data kindly provided by the author.  
72
 - Latitude 38.883, Longitude 7.150, altitude 208.0. The coordinates of the weather station were used in 
the CropSyst location file.  
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Crop parameters are in fact the only input data that require calibration (Stockle 
et al. 2003). Typical estimates are available in Stöckle and Nelson (1994) for most crops 
and specific crop parameters for CropSyst can be additionally found in the agronomic 
literature
73
. In more than one occasion, the authors of CropSyst have provided these 
crop parameters and/or the original crop files to be used as templates for crops which 
data had not yet been published. 
 
 
4.3 – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Crop yield results were generated by CropSyst for 34 years, according to local 
weather conditions and soil data, for 15 different irrigation levels. These results are 
graphically illustrated below for the case of irrigated maize
74
, common wheat and 
sunflower. Similar information on water-yield relationships for other crops modelled is 
available, as shown in Appendixes IV and V. Crop-water production functions were not 
estimated for intensive vegetable crops, as in these cases deficit irrigation would 
compromise the quality and marketing value of the product, or permanent crops, due to 
lack of data. 
Figures 13, 14 and 15, indicate that CropSyst is able to estimate crop stresses 
related to variable input levels and translate those stresses into agricultural yield losses. 
Figures thus show that Cropsyst has successfully produced locally adjusted agronomic 
production functions relating crop yield to varying water inputs while taking into 
account the inter-annual variability on weather conditions. This inter-annual variability 
explains, in the figures below, the sudden variations in crop yield in relation to very 
similar levels of water applied.  
                                                 
73
 - The following references provided different crop parameters (Bellocchi et al. 2002; Cabelguenne et al. 
1999; Confalonieri and Bechini ; Confalonieri and Bocchi 2005; Donatelli et al. 1997; Ferrer-Alegre and 
Stockle 1999; Pala et al. 1996; Pannkuk et al. 1998; Peralta-Alba et al. 2001; Stockle et al. 1997; Stockle 
et al. 2003; Stockle and Nelson 1996; Tubiello and Ewert 2002). 
74
 - These results are part of a wider set of results on bio-economic modelling presented at the II AERNA 
Conference (Saraiva 2006) 
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Figure 13. Maize production function for irrigation water inputs (IE = 1) 
 
Figure 14. Common wheat production function for irrigation water inputs (IE = 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common Wheat Yield
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
0
1
7
.9
4
4
.7
6
7
.2
9
8
.3
1
2
5
.2
1
4
7
.5
1
7
8
.6
1
9
6
.7
2
2
9
.4
2
5
2
.0
Irrigation (mm/m)
W
h
e
a
t 
Y
ie
ld
 (
K
g
/h
a
)
Common Wheat Yield
(Kg/ha)
 110 
Sunflower Yield
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Figure 15. Sunflower production function for irrigation water inputs (IE = 1) 
 
Figures above indicate that Cropsyst is able of simulation crop-water production 
function in different crop types. Results indicate that there are substantial differences in 
the technical productivity of water resources across irrigated crops. Use of water 
resources up to 600mm/m produces significant increases in maize production, whereas 
in irrigated wheat and sunflower the plateau of crop responses is reached at a much 
lower water level. The production functions above assume an irrigation efficiency (IE) 
of 100% and show that significant variation in crop yield is due to inter-annual 
variability on weather conditions. 
Inter-annual variability is best displayed in terms of probability (see figure 16) 
as this simplifies the representation of crop yield-water relationships, as representation 
of an individual curve for each year is confusing. Use of probabilities enables 
expressing the changes of attaining a certain level of yield for a specified level of water 
applied and were calculated for irrigated maize for the 25%, 50% and 75% situations, in 
order to express the occurrence of dry, wet and normal growing seasons. These 
calculations were produced merely for illustration purposes, as shown in the following 
figure for the case of irrigated maize, to introduce the technical irrigation efficiency 
implications derived from irrigation technology on the use of water resources. 
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Figure 16. Probability of occurrence of maize yield for varying water use levels (IE = 
1) 
 
These probabilities of attaining a certain level of yield in relation to a particular 
level of water applied were not used in the economic modelling because inter-annual 
variability is required for the calculation of farm risk. This information could however 
be extremely important for agricultural economic studies or climate change analysis not 
requiring the computation of risk. The irrigation efficiency (IE – field application 
efficiency) in CropSyst was deliberately assumed to be 100%, that is, irrigation field 
application losses are zero, and all water applied is used by the crop. These losses are 
accounted for within the code of the mathematical programming models
75
 per irrigation 
technology, rather than per crop in Cropsyst, as this substantially reduces the amount of 
data to feed in the economic model. Figure 17 shows the graphical representations of 
this particular segment of code, for the case of irrigated maize using probability of 
occurrence of 50%, in order to show the implications of irrigation technology on the use 
of irrigation water resources. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75
 - The field application efficiencies for irrigation water used are provided by FAO for general guidance: 
Surface irrigation 60%; Sprinkler irrigation 75%; Drip irrigation 90% (FAO 1989). 
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Figure 17. Maize production functions for different irrigation methods (IEdrip = 0.9; 
IEsprinkler = 0.75; IEsurface= 0.6) 
 
 Figure 17, above, shows that the technical adoption of different irrigation 
technologies has significant implications on the amount of water resources required to 
produce a specified amount of crop yield. Using the guidance irrigation efficiencies 
published by FAO (1989) and a locally adjusted crop water production function, the 
figure shows that some irrigation technologies have a much higher water saving ability 
than others such as sprinkler or surface irrigation. 
In agronomic studies, crop models are validated by comparing simulation results 
to real observed data (Donatelli et al. 1997; Oriade and Dillon 1997. Cit. King et al., 
1993). The evaluation of the model predictability or the estimation of crop parameters 
require field data and field measurements for validating the model (Braga 1997). 
Validation of model predictions for other uses should, however, be oriented accordingly 
with the accuracy required to satisfy the intended goals (Braga 1997). Validation may 
thus be achieved through expert consultation, observation of the system or comparison 
of results with previous studies  (Braga 1997. Cit. Dent and Blackie 1979; Oriade and 
Dillon 1997). With this reasoning, and given that observed data from field experiments 
do not actually exist, the validation of crop model results relied on the subjective 
assessment provided by experts in the field of crop science and comparison of results 
with agricultural statistics. 
Crop yield results generated by CropSyst are usually higher than those published 
by regional and national agricultural statistics, for the 1990 to 1999 period. On the one 
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hand, as mentioned before, CropSyst model simulates fictitious potential productions 
rather than real productions, as it does not take into account the yield losses due to 
weeds,  pests and diseases (Jones et al. 2001). On the other hand, the lower results of 
statistical tables, assuming that they are indeed accurate, may be due to crop growth in 
sub-optimal conditions, namely in terms of agronomic management, poor fertility soils 
and under deficit (supplementary) irrigation regimes. In addition, real crop yields are 
influenced by economic and policy settings which are excluded from agronomic crop 
models, and therefore some difference arising from these causes is to be expected. This 
difference was more notorious in cases, such as irrigated winter cereals and sunflower, 
significantly influenced by CAP measures in this period and leading to the growth of 
these crops on marginal soils and under deficit irrigation conditions. 
 
 
4.4 – CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter focuses on the agronomic component of the bio-economic 
framework developed in this research. It reviews the literature in the field of agricultural 
crop growth models and highlights the benefits for policy analysis derived from 
coupling agronomic and economic models in an integrated approach.  
Cropsyst is used to simulate locally adjusted agronomic production functions 
relating crop yield to varying water inputs. This enabled overcoming limitations 
imposed by missing information on water consumption and water productivity, as well 
as the mentioned problems of applying historical time-series and cross-sectional data to 
estimate this information. Results of CropSyst reflect purely technical relationships 
between crop production, irrigation technology and use of water resources.  
The second section of the bio-economic model, concerning the economic 
component, takes all these biophysical relationships into account, in the modelling of 
representative farming systems determined by clustering. These biophysical 
relationships are introduced in the model as input-output crop coefficients, and 
transformed into economically meaningful information, by assigning an economic 
valuation to all resources consumed and outputs produced. Taking these input-output 
relationships is particularly important for water resource allocation decisions and for 
policy analysis focusing on irrigation. Price relationships combined with technology 
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influence input use-patterns and may affect the efficiency of policies targeting the 
natural resources required by those technologies; the mathematical representation of 
these technical and economic relationships as accurately as possible is effectively the 
main essence to bio-economic modelling in agriculture.  
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CHAPTER 5 – AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS MATHEMATICAL MODELLING 
 
Chapter five develops the economic modelling environments of the bio-
economic framework. Previous and latter chapters imbricate within these models to 
form a comprehensive and coherent structure for policy analysis in irrigated agriculture. 
Predicted yields corresponding to water use levels, input the understanding of technical 
biophysical relationships between agriculture and water use, while this chapter provides 
the economic and policy information required for optimal water resource allocation in 
the representative farms determined by clustering. This chapter is very focused on 
understanding the economic behaviour of farmers and on bringing that behaviour into 
the bio-economic framework, in order to evaluate their responses with respect to policy 
change. 
Models based on mathematical programming have been applied for agricultural 
economic analysis for the last fifty years (Hazell and Norton 1986; Howitt 1995). Since 
the pioneering works of King (1953) and Heady (1954), which first reported the use of 
Linear Programming (LP) in farm planning, mathematical programming models became 
widely used in agricultural economics (Hazell and Norton 1986), particularly for policy 
analysis (Howitt 1995).  
Since those early uses of LP, several methodological advances have been 
incorporated in the field of mathematical modelling in order to provide a “potentially 
more realistic portrayal of agricultural reality” (Hazell and Norton 1986). Some of these 
improvements particularly related to this research are the advances in the areas of 
modelling risk and risk aversion, on the role of instruments of economic policy and on 
the ability to model farm decisions (Hazell and Norton 1986).
76
 
In agricultural economics, the modelling of the producer‟s economic behaviour 
has always been a fundamental concern. In fact, “the producers‟ behavioural question is 
always present” in every model, and it has been the principal focus of applied 
agricultural modelling research (Hazell and Norton 1986). The investment of so much 
effort in the modelling of farm behaviour is explained by the fact that the implications 
                                                 
76
 - As presented in the previous section, another important contribution for “matching theory with the 
real world” (Hazell and Norton 1986) consists in modelling the relationships between productivity and 
the rate of application of inputs. In fact, in this respect, some authors (Heady and Candler 1958) claim 
that efforts directed into collecting data and obtaining accurate input-output technical coefficients are just 
as or more important than the “the sophistication of the mathematical procedure” or “refinements in the 
mathematical approach” (Heady and Candler 1958). 
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of policy actions cannot be fully evaluated until the economic behaviour of farmers is 
well understood (Hazell and Norton 1986).  
A mathematical model in agricultural economics is a system conceptualised 
through the “mathematical simplification of relevant variables and their inter-
relationships” (Gomez-Limon et al. 2002). A simplification of reality is therefore 
required for modelling agricultural systems, however, an over-simplified representation 
of these relationships in agricultural systems
77
, and of the economic behaviour of 
producers, may cause vulnerabilities conducive to a potentially misleading 
interpretation of policy effects, ill-adjusted policy design and mis-targeted policy 
implementation. 
Until recently, most agricultural economics studies considered farmers to behave 
as economic agents with a profit seeking rationale, in a profit maximising modelling 
environment. The objective function to optimise under this assumption considered one 
single objective, such as profit, gross margins or the value of sales. Unquestionably, this 
is an assumption which often does not hold true on most farms (Romero and Rehman 
1989), as numerous studies have proven that farmers behave in a risk-adverse way 
(Hazell and Norton 1986) or that are other goals to which they react to (Romero and 
Rehman 1989). In reality, the decision maker seeks a compromise between multiple, 
often conflicting objectives (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Ignizio 1976; Romero and 
Rehman 1989), such as, for example, family preferences not to become increasingly 
more indebted, to minimise dependency on certain kinds of hired labour, to maximise 
family income, leisure, or to ensure the survival of the business in a risky environment 
(Hazell and Norton 1986; Romero and Rehman 1989). 
The results of ignoring these and other goals often bear little relation to farmers 
decisions (Hazell and Norton 1986) and could lead to excessively constrained models 
that may be improper for policy analysis (Howitt 2005)
78
. The most well established 
decision theory in economics to deal with the problem of multiple objectives is expected 
utility theory, developed by von Neuman and Morgenstern in 1944 (Ballestero and 
Romero 1998; Belton and Stewart 2002; Hazell and Norton 1986; McCarl and Spreen 
1997), as it is the principal theoretical basis for choice under uncertainty (McCarl and 
Spreen 1997).  
                                                 
77
 - In extreme cases this can create an unfocused image of reality which, if explicit, is revealed in the 
form of model inconsistency problems. 
78
 - On this matter, Ignizio (Ignizio 1976) adds that attempts to solve multiple objective problems using 
single objective models, often very restricted models, “fail to yield satisfactory results” (Ignizio 1976). 
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5.1 – MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING FOR AGRICULTURAL DECISIONS 
 
Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) is a framework for evaluating 
decision options against multiple criteria (Hajkowicz and Higgins 2008). In the case 
agricultural economic studies at the farm level, MCDM allows complementing the 
modelling of the agricultural system, with the modelling of value judgements and 
preferences of decision makers (Belton and Stewart 2002). A multi-criteria formulation 
allows different perspectives on a problem to be analysed together (Goodwin and 
Wright 2004. Cit. Phillips 1989), in order to find “optimal” compromise solutions 
taking into account all relevant perspectives (Triantaphyllou 2000), as well as trade-offs 
between perspectives (Goodwin and Wright 2004). In MCDM these different 
perspectives on a problem are called criteria
79
. 
Classic single objective models do not account for trade-offs between criteria. 
This leads to the selection of alternatives on the basis of their performance on that one 
objective, disregarding their performance on all others (Goodwin and Wright 2004). 
Under these circumstances, a good performance in some objectives is not allowed to 
compensate a poor performance elsewhere (Goodwin and Wright 2004).  
To take into account the problem of multiple goals/objectives/criteria
80
 and 
decision maker preferences, the modelling approach adopted for this study is based on 
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT, (Keeney and Raiffa 1976)), within the general 
framework of MCDM. The specific MAUT approach used in this research is articulated 
within a weighted goal programming (WGP) formulation, similar to the one used by 
Sumpsi et al. (1996), to unravel farmers objectives, as their relative importance in the 
process of decision making, in representative farming systems in Caia and Odivelas 
irrigation districts. This information on the economic behavioural pattern of farmers is 
reproduced to explore the implications of policy change on these farming systems. 
The main reason for choosing the MAUT paradigm within the wide range of 
MCDM structures, is related to the MAUT ability to explicitly incorporate decision 
makers attitude to risk into the behavioural model (Goodwin and Wright 2004). In fact, 
                                                 
79
 - A comprehensive and concise review of MCDM can be found in (Hajkowicz et al. 2000, Chapter 4). 
80
 - These terms are not synonyms but can, at an introductory stage, be use inter-changeably. A glossary 
of MCDM terms is included in the end of the chapter to reunite key concepts. 
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use of utility theory is the only formalised theory for modelling uncertainty in MCDM 
environments (Belton and Stewart 2002). Not only MAUT is based on the principles of 
rationality underlying von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) expected utility theory 
(Ballestero and Romero 1998), as it is the most traditional and one of the most widely 
applied multi-criteria methods (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Belton and Stewart 2002). 
Multi-objective models with MAUT formulations have been successfully used in 
the recent past to simulate implications of water policy in irrigated agriculture (see, for 
example, (Arriaza and Gomez-Limon 2003; Arriaza et al. 2002; Gómez-Limón et al. 
2002; Sumpsi et al. 1996; Varela-Ortega et al. 1998). Methodological descriptions of 
the mathematical structure of the MAUT/WGP formulations adopted for this research 
are reported in those and other studies (see Bazzani et al. 2005; Gomez-Limon and 
Berbel 2000; Gomez-Limon and Riesgo 2004), and for that reason only a summary of 
the main characteristics of MAUT models is presented here to avoid major overlapping 
sections
81
.  
The von Neuman and Morgenstern expected utility theory, from which the 
MAUT paradigm is derived from, allows aggregating different perspectives on a 
problem into a function which is later optimised (Vincke 1992). The objective function 
to optimise is a utility (value) function that brings together potential multiple attributes 
that the farmer wishes to optimise. Under the assumption of mutual preferential 
independence required for additive MAUT functions, the collective optimisation of 
these partial utilities, each one associated to a potential attribute (objective), maximizes 
the total utility of farmers
82
.  
                                                 
81
 - The discussion of the MAUT is deliberately kept at a relatively simple stage, aiming to debate key 
concepts only, for easiness of reading and explaining. More enthusiastic readers on this subject should 
consult the original presentation of the MAUT as provided by Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
82
 - The mathematical representation and discussion of the MAUT corresponds to that of an additive 
aggregation form. Other aggregation structures are sometimes used, being multiplicative aggregation 
forms the most common alternative: 
ni
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When attributes (xi) are mutually utility-independent and weights are normalised to one, 1wi , 
0K , the utility function becomes additive. Several simulation studies have proved that, under 
conditions of mutual utility independence, the difference between additive and multiplicative aggregation 
forms were extremely small (Belton and Stewart 2002. Cit. Stewart, 2002). Additive utility functions 
have shown to yield extremely close approximations to the hypothetical true function even when utility-
independent assumptions are not met (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo 2004. Cit. Edwards, 1977; Huirne and 
Hardaker, 1998; Amador et al., 1998), however, additive aggregation is not theoretically appropriate 
when mutual preference independence between attributes does not hold (Ballestero and Romero 1998; 
Goodwin and Wright 2004), that is, when there is interaction between the scores on the attribute 
(Goodwin and Wright 2004). In the vast majority of cases, in practice, additive aggregation under 
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being n ..., 2, 1, i , if  exclusive functions of the attribute iu . 
The main questions in MCDA models are centred on the decision of the relevant 
objectives and on the weights that best express their relative importance. Directly 
enquiring/questioning decision makers to acquire this information is certainly the most 
formalised option. Decision makers often have a very subjective notion of the 
importance of each attribute, and find it difficult to elicit attributes in a scale of 
priorities (Fishburn 1964; Hobbs and Meier 2000), or to provide quantitative 
information on the trade-off between objectives (Ballestero and Romero 1998). In fact, 
answers frequently turn out to be internally inconsistent (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) and 
preferences of decision makers tend to be incompletely specified (Ballestero and 
Romero 1998). As a result of this, weights derived from direct consultation
83
 are seldom 
consistent with the trade-offs decision makers are willing to make among attributes 
(Hobbs and Meier 2000).  
To overcome these difficulties of direct questioning, an alternative strategy, 
known as the inverse preference method (as named by Hayashi 2000), was adopted to 
determine a set of objectives and their relative importance in the decision making 
process. The inverse method elicits these variables in a way compatible to revealed 
behaviour of farmers (Sumpsi et al. 1996), rather than compatible with the information 
from questionnaires and interviews. Before delving deeper into the problem of weights, 
the eliciting of objectives is first approached. 
The approach used for generating objectives is that proposed by MacCrimmon in 
1976 (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). It consists in examining the relevant literature, 
carefully analysing the input and output variables of the system being modelling, and in 
observing reality (Keeney and Raiffa 1976)
84
. Studies with similar research objectives 
often document the same set of objectives, and most of them do seem pertinent to 
                                                                                                                                               
uncertainty “is likely to be more than adequate” (Belton and Stewart 2002). The additive approach is easy 
to understand and implement and for those reasons it is the most commonly used approach 
(Triantaphyllou 2000). The weakening/relaxing of preferential independence conditions in additive 
aggregation utility forms is well reported in Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
83
 - The most common methods are rating, categorization, ranking, point allocation, ratio questioning. 
84
 - Potential objectives were selected after interviewing selected farmers in the Caia and Odivelas 
irrigation districts, in 2002, and again in 2005. 
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include in the analysis of these case studies (Keeney and Raiffa 1976)
85
. These criteria 
normally consider a measure of economic benefit, such as gross margins, income or 
profit, a measure of the variability of the former, labour and working capital or 
indebtedness.  
The selection of potential objectives defines the elements which should be 
“incorporated into a formal and systematic analysis” (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). This 
selection of objectives at this stage does not indicate which elements do, or not, 
necessarily participate in the process of decision making of farmers. Mathematically, 
disregarding an objective at this phase corresponds to attaching a zero weight to that 
objective. Considering additional objectives introduces the possibility of determining it 
a positive weight, subsequently allowing to select it as relevant (Keeney 1992). Once 
established which objectives should be included in the analysis it is possible to rewrite 
the previous equation in its simplest form as: 
 
n
i
ijij rwU
1
m ..., 1,j  ,                                                                                            [Eq.  2] 
 
where, Uj is the utility value of alternative j, wi is the weight assigned to reflect the 
importance of attribute i, and rij is the value score (utility value) reflecting alternative j„s 
performance on attribute i. 
Under the assumption of additive utility, the total value of each alternative 
corresponds to the summation of the products given by alternative j‟s performance on 
each attribute affected by the importance of each attribute (Triantaphyllou 2000). This 
provides an overall evaluation of each alternative, a value or a score
86
, which reflects 
the preferences of decision makers, in terms of criteria as the relative importance of 
criteria (Belton and Stewart 2002). In other words, this enables to produce a preference 
ordering on, or ranking of, alternatives, taking all criteria and their relative preferences 
into account (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Belton and Stewart 2002). The most 
preferred alternative is associated to the highest score (Triantaphyllou 2000. Cit. 
Fishburn, 1967) 
                                                 
85
 - Hayashi (Hayashi 2000) provides an excellent review of the objectives/goals used in MCDM 
applications for agriculture. 
86
 - This is exactly the same expression used in value measurement theory with additive aggregation and 
in the weighted sum score method. In the MAUT formulation this expression yields a  real-number 
representing the cardinal utility of each alternative (Ballestero and Romero 1998).  
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The previous formula can be used directly, in single-dimensional cases, when 
the measurement unit of all attributes is the same (Triantaphyllou 2000). Multi-
dimensional cases require criterion measures to be standardised (or scaled) into a 
commensurable value, normally a unitless score scale, in order to allow summation of 
the performance of attributes (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Belton and Stewart 2002; 
Hajkowicz and Higgins 2008; Romero 1991). The equation below describes a linear 
standardisation of the rij into a scale of value which avoids biased solutions towards 
attributes which can achieve higher values (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Romero 
1991)
87
: 
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where, 
*
if  is the ideal (best) value for that attribute, in a pay-off matrix (POM) 
computed for the attributes considered; )(xf i  the attribute value; *if  is the anti-ideal 
(worst) value in the POM for that attribute. 
The algebraic structure of the MAUT model, rearranging the previous equations 
results in: 
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in which the symbols *  and 
*  indicate the anti-ideal and ideal values of the 
corresponding objective in the POM, X

 indicates the vector of possible activities 
(Berbel and Gomez-Limon 2000; Sumpsi et al. 1996). Having discussed how attributes 
are combined in the objective function, the MAUT problem must now be focused on 
determining the weights (w) attached to each attribute. 
                                                 
87
 - There are several methods for the standardization of performance measures. The one explained 
corresponds to a linear method but there are parabolic, sigmoid, concave and convex transformation 
functions. Linear transformations are the most commonly used because they are the “easiest to handle 
conceptually” (Hajkowicz et al. 2000). Although positive attributes are monotonically increasing and 
negative ones monotonically decreasing, partial utilities do not respect any particular shape reflecting 
utility theory, i.e. diminishing marginal utility – that is perhaps the main fault of linear standardisations. 
The fact is that the exact nature of the decision maker utility form is not known (Ignizio 1976). In this 
respect, some authors indicate that specifying the exact functional form of the utility function “is rarely 
required for the individual utility functions” in MAUT formulations (Keeney 1992). See Howard (1991) 
for other common methods of linear scale transformation.  
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As mentioned before, the elicitation of actively participating objectives, and 
respective weights, in the process of decision making is tested against reality through 
the inverse preference method procedure. This reality corresponds to revealed behaviour 
of farmers, according to the observation of their chosen cropping pattern in a reference 
year (Sumpsi et al. 1996). This process was mathematically computed through a linear 
weighted goal programming model, as described below. 
 
 
Weighted Goal Programming 
 
Goal Programming (GP) is the “most widely used MCDM” method (Ballestero 
and Romero 1998). The overall purpose of GP consists in minimising the deviations 
between the achievement of goals and their established targets (Ballestero and Romero 
1998)
88
. GP is a particularly suited method to use in decision making analysis when the 
preferences of decision makers and efficient frontier are unknown (Ballestero and 
Romero 1998). 
Weighted Goal Programming (WGP) considers all goals simultaneously in a 
composite objective function formed by a sum of these deviations between goals and 
targets (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Romero 1991). These deviations are weighted 
accordingly to the relative structure of preferences of decision makers (Romero 1991). 
Most GP applications in agricultural economics aim to determine an optimum cropping 
pattern in a MCDM environment, taking into account multiple objectives (Romero 
1991) and, necessarily, their relative importance.  
A goal is expressed as a combination of an attribute, the goal deviational 
variables, and its corresponding target level (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Ignizio 1976; 
Romero 1991). In a goal, the attribute is algebraically related to its target through the 
deviational variables, which represent the amount under- or over-achieved in respect to 
the specified target (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Romero 1991). The set of goals and 
the respective WGP composite objective function define a model mathematically 
written as (Ignizio 1976): 
                                                 
88
 - GP terminology is included in the glossary of terms in end of the chapter. For a more detailed 
approach on GP please refer to any of the references provided (Ballestero and Romero 1998; Ignizio 
1976; McCarl and Spreen 1997 Chapter XI; Romero and Rehman 1989) 
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where, the Cij are coefficients associated with variable j for the i
th
 objective (POM 
values); xi is the relative preference of the i
th
 objective; (ni-pi) are (positive) deviational 
variables which allow deviations from the targets to occur, ni represents the under-
achievement of the goal, pi measures the over-achievement of the goal; and ti the set of 
targets for the set of goals (Ignizio 1976).  
 The philosophy of GP is one of satisficing multiple objectives, rather than 
maximising one single objective (Ignizio 1976). Under this philosophy, models without 
absolute objectives cannot be infeasible, or unbounded, as constraints are not binding 
(Ignizio 1976). In the previous formulation, either one or the other deviational variables 
(ni, pi) are zero, as goals cannot be under and over-achieved simultaneously, or both 
deviational variables are zero when attributes matches exactly their targets (Ballestero 
and Romero 1998)
89
. 
 In this presentation of a WGP model, the summation of deviational variables 
also requires standardisation (normalisation) to take into account multi-dimensionality 
of different of measurements units. Not performing this adjustment would lead to biased 
solutions towards a “greater achievement of those goals with higher targets”, as the 
absolute value of the different targets may be extremely different (Ballestero and 
Romero 1998). This adjustment may be implemented to take into account for multi-
dimensional cases, by transforming the minimisation of the absolute sum of the 
deviational variables (previous formulation) into the minimisation of the sum of 
percentage deviations from attributes to their targets (objective function below) 
(Ballestero and Romero 1998). The introduction of this normalising correction has been 
proven  compatible with the MAUT additive aggregation function used (Sumpsi et al. 
1996. Cit. Dyer, 1977)
90
. With this correction, the WGP objective function to optimise 
takes the form: 
 
                                                 
89
 - An objective is defined as absolute in GP when either pi, ni or both must be equal to zero; these are 
goals “that must be satisfied” (Ignizio 1976). 
90
 - Actually, the WGP formulation implicitly assumes that a MAUT function can be used to simulate the 
decision makers‟ preferences (Ballestero and Romero 1998). 
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As mentioned before, in agricultural economics GP is normally used to 
determine an optimum cropping pattern while taking multiple objectives into account. 
In this particular case, WGP is applied in a descriptive approach to provide answers to 
the inverse application. The objective consists in minimising a composite function of 
the sum of percentage deviational variables as in [Eq. 6] in which the deviational 
variables correspond to differences between objective values derived from observed 
behaviour of farmers (computed through a multi-objective simulation) and the 
respective POM values of those attributes. This formulation is described algebraic by 
either of the following expressions:  
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where, fij is the value achieved by the i
th
 objective when the j
th
 objective is optimised; 
the fi exogenous variables represent the target levels or the observed values achieved for 
the i
th
 objective. The targets are derived from farmers revealed behaviour, on the basis 
of the observation of cropping patterns in a reference year, and computed through a 
multi-objective model, following the approach developed by Sumpsi et al. (1996). In the 
formulation of [Eq. 7] or its expanded version in [Eq. 8] the calculation of weights is 
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normalised to 1, as this allows expressing the relative preference of attributes in a 
percentage scale.  
 The weights describe the relative importance that the decision maker associates 
to each goal (Ballestero and Romero 1998). These weights have a precise algebraic 
meaning as their numeric value reflects the importance associated to the minimisation of 
the deviational variables in each goal (Ignizio 1976), and for that reason they cannot be 
disconnected from the scaling factor used in their computation (Belton and Stewart 
2002). The subset of criteria with positive weights identifies the objectives which are in 
fact relevant in decision making, apart from that, the absolute value of weights cannot 
be compared and interpreted as a measure of importance of that specific attribute
91
.  
As proposed by Sumpsi (Sumpsi et al. 1996) this sub-set of “active” objectives 
and corresponding weights are tested against reality, against the cropping pattern 
observed for validation purposes. This set of objectives and weights should simulate 
“the decision-making plan as close as possible to the farmers‟ real-life decision plan” 
(Gomez-Limon and Berbel 2000)
92
.  
Strategic objectives are not likely to vary suddenly, on the contrary, they 
“should be stable over years” (Keeney 1992). For that reason, once the behavioural 
attitude of farmers is calibrated and validated, it can be reproduced for the purpose of 
prospective policy analysis. This modelling approach is considered validated when the 
simulated behaviour is sufficiently accurate in reproducing the observed behaviour. An 
absolute distance measure based on the absolute deviations between observed and 
simulated cropping pattern is used for the purpose as shown below: 
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                                                                                         [Eq.  9] 
in which, xi represents the area allocated to alternative i. 
 
 
                                                 
91
 - The weights allow comparing the value score obtained in one attribute with the others, as they  relate 
scores on one criterion to scores on all others (Belton and Stewart 2002). 
92
 - The inverse preference method used to elicit the weights suffers from a circularity flaw which has 
been reported by users and critics. On a first step, weights and corresponding active objectives are derived 
from the analysis of observed behaviour and model endogenous data. On a second step, the model is 
calibrated and validated against the reference year using the weights/objectives and endogenous data that 
was first used to compute them. 
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5.2 – SUMMARY OF THE MAUT APPROACH: OPERATIONAL APPLICATION 
 
The algorithmic representation of the MAUT/WGP framework is shown in 
figure 18
93
 and this framework is further explained in the rest of this section 
Figure 18. Simplified algorithm of the MAUT model used 
 
                                                 
93
 - (Saraiva 2003 based on Sumpsi et al. 1996)  
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 Definition of the Problem, the Decision Makers and the Scale of 
Analysis 
The research problem consists in analysing the implications of alternative water 
management policy methods in irrigated agriculture; the decision makers are farmers 
using irrigation in Caia and Odivelas public irrigation districts in the Alentejo region of 
Portugal; the scale of analysis corresponds to representative farming systems in these 
two irrigation districts identified by cluster analysis. 
 
 Definition of the potential set of separable and independent 
Objectives/Criteria/Attributes 
Criteria for defining relevant attributes is well explained in (Keeney and Raiffa 
1976). Attributes should be measurable, operational, and understandable, covering all 
the different perspectives of concern to the decision maker (completeness); it should be 
possible to assign numerical values to all attributes (operationability); attributes should 
be conceptually independent and judged independently of their performance on other 
attributes (decomposability); the set of attributes should be kept to a minimum size to 
allow meaningful analysis (minimum size)
94
; and absent of redundancy to avoid risks of 
double-counting attributes (absence of redundancy) (Keeney 1992; Keeney and Raiffa 
1976). 
As suggested by similar research studies, and interviews performed in these case 
study areas, the most likely relevant objectives are the maximization of profit, and the 
minimisation of risk, labour and working capital, as shown in the value tree below 
(figure 19). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94
 - The proliferation of attributes may introduce a bias and may cause the weighting of attributes to be 
less comprehensive (see also Hobbs and Meier 2000) 
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Figure 19. Value tree for the proposed relevant objectives 
 
 Identification of all feasible Alternatives 
Feasible alternatives in these case studies are defined by a combination of crops, 
irrigation technologies, irrigation levels and soil quality, as listed in Appendix VIII 
(Activities: Feasible Crops-Irrigation Technologies). 
 
 Express the level of Achievement for the Alternatives against Attributes 
The level of achievement is measured by the value of the alternatives on each 
attribute, profit, labour consumption, variance and working capital required (equations 
in the modelling section). 
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 Standardise Attributes 
Normalise the measurement units of the attributes to take into account multi-
dimensional objectives in the MAUT function. There are several ways of normalising 
measurement units, the standardisation of attributes used a linear method, as described 
in [Eq. 3]. 
 
 Calculate the pay-off or trade-off matrix.  
This matrix is computed by optimizing each attributes separately, measuring all 
attribute values of each solution. The elements of the main diagonal (j,j), referred to as 
anchor values, show the optimal values for each objective. The POM provides useful 
information about the degree of conflict between the objectives considered (Ballestero 
and Romero 1998).  
 
 Assign Weights to the Attributes 
This step enables to determine the relative preference of each alternative to the 
decision maker. The weights are derived by an inverse preference method procedure, 
using a weighted goal programming method with the previous pay-off matrix and 
objective values correspondent to observed behaviour in a reference year. This 
procedure is described by [Eq. 7] and [Eq. 8]. 
 
 Determine the ranking or an ordered preference of each alternative. 
The relative preference of alternatives is determined by summing the value 
scores allocated to that alternative using the MAUT formulation (Belton and Stewart 
2002; Keeney 1992). This corresponds to, combining the measures of performance of 
each attribute and the relative preference associated to that attribute of each alternative, 
as described for the general situation by [Eq. 4]. That equation is rewritten as follows, 
introducing the set of potential objectives identified.                                           [Eq.  10] 
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where, Pft, Risk, Tl, Hl and Wk, are the objectives considered; these symbols represent 
respectively, Profit (a proxy for net profit), Risk (measured by variance of the former), 
Total labour use, Hired labour and Working capital required for financing farm 
activities. As shown in the above equation, apart from profit, which is a positive 
attribute (+,+), all other attributes are negative (+,-). 
 
 Calibrate and validate the MAUT model against observed behaviour, 
revising the objectives if necessary. 
An absolute distance measure based on the absolute deviations between 
observed and simulated cropping pattern is used for the purpose, as shown in [Eq. 9]. 
 
 
5.3 – THE MODELLING 
 
The appropriateness of the MAUT framework, described above, was compared 
with Profit Maximizing (PM) models, which is the dominant framework within 
agricultural economics. Profit maximizing is the most traditional assumption in the 
modelling of the behaviour of farmers.  
These models, MAUT and PM, were built as generic templates to be used across 
different farming systems. All models use the same integrated bio-economic approach, 
combining biophysical relationships in agriculture with micro-economic theory. These 
biophysical relationships were produced using the agronomic crop simulation model 
Cropsyst (Stockle and Nelson 1994), and are specific for these case study areas, as they 
were simulated using local weather and soils data (see chapter bio-economic 
modelling). Technical-economic data were produced specifically for this research as 
described in Appendix VII. 
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All models are of static nature, as the consequences of decisions made in one 
period of time are not explicitly taken into account in following periods. The 
computation of the variance of income, used as a proxy for agricultural risk, in MAUT 
models, is performed within a multi-year static approach. The PM model follows a 
traditional normative approach, while MAUT are of a more positive type
95
. 
Accordingly, PM models are linear, while the latter requiring use of quadratic functions 
are non-linear programming models. The simulation of water and agricultural policy is 
performed either in parametric or stochastic ways, depending on the specific policy, 
being the modelling of agricultural policy options at the farm level implemented 
through discrete variables. 
These models were written in General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) 
language, using GAMS version 22.5. Computation of non-linear functions and discrete 
variables used in model formulation required a Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programming 
(MINLP) solver, having been used SBB with CONOPT.  
 
 
Main Equations used in Model Templates 
 
Simulation models based on mathematic programming applied to agriculture are 
instruments often mentioned in the literature to explore irrigation and water problems as 
well as for policy analysis. When modelling representative farms/farming systems, 
these models allow the selection of optimum activities, or optimum combinations of 
activities. Generically, this problem is located within a mathematical field known as 
constrained optimization, in which the objective function to optimize is subject to 
constraints, such as crop rotations, potential limits to land use, water or labour, and 
market or policy constraints. The main equations used within MAUT and PM models 
are mathematically described throughout this section. Specific attribute equations which 
                                                 
95
 - Economical mathematical programming models are traditionally “normative” instruments used to 
support decision-making processes on the best alternatives for allocating scarce resources (Flichman 
1997). While the normative approach is fundamentally descriptive, the positive approach is particularly 
suited to policy analysis as the main aim to provide explanations (Ruben et al. 1998). Positive modelling 
reproduces the behaviour of economic agents, by modelling the relationships of a system in a particular 
economic, policy, and institutional context, in order to simulate, as accurately as possible, the predictable 
responses to changes in that context (Abbes 2003; Flichman 1997). 
 132 
are integrated in the MAUT objective function are described first, followed by the 
description of the main constraints used
96
. 
 
Attributes 
 
Agricultural profit is defined as the difference between gross production and 
all expenses, including depreciation at the farm level. Detailed information on the 
calculation of profit is available in the chapter Indicators for Policy Scenarios under the 
heading Agricultural/Farm Net Income
97
. 
This attribute, at the farm level, is integrated within the modelling through the 
mathematical expression below. In this equation, both fixed and variable irrigation costs 
are separated from the remaining ones, and water pricing costs are separated from all 
others. In addition to that, different agricultural monthly labour costs are distinguished 
according to different labour categories (family labour, temporary labour, and 
permanent labour) and respective unit labour costs. In these equations, subindex c 
accounts for crops, itech for irrigation technologies, ilevel for irrigation levels, l for soil 
quality, year for time period(s) expressed in years, and m for periods expressed in 
months.                                                                                                                  [Eq.  11] 
 
                                                 
96
 - Agricultural rotations are in fact the only specific equations to each farming system. Knowledge of 
traditional agronomic rotations was mainly provided by interviewing farmers of different agricultural 
systems in these case study areas.  
97
 - The opportunity cost of working capital invested was considered to be three per cent per year, taking 
into account the period of time this capital was invested for. Property and income tax are also import 
components affecting the net farm income but were not subtracted to this margin. This indicator is 
calculated on the basis of crop budget information, bearing in mind that the formulation must fit a wide 
diversity of farming situations. For this reason, long-term economic machinery costs were considered to 
be variable, that is, corresponding to their respective rental value per hour; land rent was not taken in to 
account to allow the comparability of farming systems across different land ownership patterns (Coelho et 
al. 1998). 
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where, 
AV_Z is a proxy for net profit (€)  
YIELDc,ilevel,year the yield of each activity (Kg/ha) 
PRICEc,year prices of each crop (€/Kg) 
Q_STRAWc,year quantity of straw produced by each crop (Kg/ha) 
P_ STRAWyear prices of straw (€) 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l are the activity levels (ha) 
nYEAR year(s)  
CAPSUB CAP subsidies 
VARCOSTyear,c,itech,m are variable costs, except irrigation and labour (€/ha) 
VARIRR_COSTc,itech,ilevel,year,m are variable irrigation costs, except labour (€/ha) 
FIXCOSTSyear,c,itech,m are fixed costs, except irrigation and labour (€/ha) 
IRRFCOSTitech,year are fixed costs of divisible irrigation tech. (€/ha) 
Piv50FCOSTyear the fixed cost of a centre Pivot unit with 50ha (€/unit) 
Piv25FCOSTyear the fixed cost of a centre Pivot unit with 25ha (€/unit) 
Cannon10FCOSTyear the fixed cost of a sprinkler gun unit (10ha, €/unit)  
nPiv50 the number of centre Pivot units with 50ha 
nPiv25 the number of centre Pivot units with 25ha 
nCannon10 the number of sprinkler gun units (10ha) 
FAMLABm is the monthly producer and family labour 
FAMWAGEyear the family labour remuneration 
TEMPLABOURm is the monthly temporary labour hired 
TEMPWAGEyear the temporary labour remuneration 
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nPERM the number of permanent employees 
AWUnitm the monthly labour produced by a permanent employee 
PERMWAGEyear the permanent labour salary 
WUArev are total water charges (€) 
 
Risk, estimated as the variance of gross margins, is computed using different 
approaches depending on the modelling framework. In the MAUT model farm, risk is 
formulated on the basis of a variance-covariance matrix of gross margins, as follows:  
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  [Eq.  12] 
where, 
COVc,itech,ilevel,l,cp,itechp,ilevelp,lp is the entire variance-covariance matrix of gross 
margins 
 
The computation of risk considers yield variability as well as variability of input 
and of output prices, in the period of 1990 to 1999. This formulation aggregates the 
contributions of individual activities, and their interrelation, to the overall risk measure, 
according to their variance and co-variance. 
 
Labour supplies of different types are accounted for in all models. These include farm 
family labour (producer labour and producer family labour), as well as temporary labour 
and permanent labour hired from outside the farm.  
 
m mm
m m
nPERMAWUnitTEMPLABOURHIREDLAB
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.
                               [Eq.  13] 
 
Total farm labour is thus obtained by the sum of all family and hired labour 
required (equations above), or through the summation of individual activity 
requirements in labour, as shown below. 
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where,  
LABREQc,itech,market Activity labour requirements, except irrigation (h/ha) 
IRRlabourc,itech,ilevel,market Activity labour requirements, irrigation only (h/ha) 
 
Working capital is an attribute used as proxy for the objective of maximum 
indebtedness that a particular productive plan would imply at the farm level. This 
corresponds, in the following formulation, to the accumulated monthly expenses 
required for financing farming activities throughout the year subtracted of incoming 
capital due to sales
98
. As shown below, revenues of temporary crops are assumed to 
occur one month after harvest. Family labour was not taken into account in the 
calculation of working capital as these costs do not represent an outward financial 
cashflow movement.                                                                                             [Eq.  15] 
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KWKNm                                                                                                            [Eq.  17] 
where, 
WKNm Accumulated working capital needed per month to finance 
farm activities (€/ha)  
K Amount of accumulated operative capital required to finance 
farming activities (€/ha)  
WCc,itech,ilevel,m Average monthly operative capital required for each activity 
(€/ha) 
LandOcupc,m Period of time, in  month, from soil tillage to post-harvest 
operations required per crop 
 
                                                 
98
 - Revenues of activities without one defined selling moment (e.g. pastures) are assumed to occur at the 
end of the year. Water charges are assumed to be paid monthly. 
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Functional Constraints 
 
Models were built as general templates applicable to a variety of farming 
systems. Specific models for each farming system in each case study areas are obtained 
by changing/modifying the parameters and equations that characterise those farming 
systems. This is the case of land and family labour resources which are forced not to 
exceed the availability in these resources in each farming system, at any moment of 
time. This equation for land resources, below, determines that the sum of land 
requirements per activity must be lower than the available rain fed and irrigated farm 
land at any given month of the year. Similar equations were used to constrain family 
labour according to levels available.  
 
lmcc itech ilevel lilevelitechc
LANDQLTLANDOCUPX ,,,, .                                   [Eq.  18] 
where, 
LANDQLTl is the availability of land (ha)  
 
Water use for irrigation is one of the main agronomic aspects covered by the 
models. This equation uses information generated by CropSyst, such as the crop water 
requirements and number of irrigation events. These crop water requirements divided by 
the irrigation efficiency of different irrigation technologies determine the total amount 
of water to apply under an irrigation system suitable to that crop throughout the crop life 
cycle; when multiplied by the ratio of irrigation events per month to the total number of 
irrigation events will determine the amount of water to apply each month under a 
specific irrigation technology. 
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,
..
  [Eq.  19] 
where, 
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WATCONS is the farm water consumption (m
3
) 
WATREQc,ilevel,year  crop water net requirements (m
3
) 
WUEitech  water application efficiency per technology (%) 
Weventsc,itech,m  monthly number of irrigation events per crop and technology 
TotalWeventsc,itech  total number of irrigation events per crop and technology 
 
Irrigation technologies included in the modelling consider gravity, drip and 
sprinkler irrigation, being the latter technology divided in centre pivots (of 25ha and 
50ha), sprinkler guns as well as stationary sprinkler irrigation systems (for vegetables 
and for cereals). The overall sum of the area under irrigation systems in each month is 
upper constrained by land resources available for irrigation, as shown in the following 
equation. 
 
ilandl
c ilevel mcilandlilevelGravityitechc
c ilevel mcilandlilevelDripitechc
c ilevel mcilandlilevelegSprinkNetVitechc
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...
                  [Eq.  20] 
where, 
AreaPiv50 Is the area irrigated by one 50ha centre pivot unit (ha) 
AreaPiv25 the area irrigated by one 25ha centre pivot unit (ha) 
AreaCannon10 the area assumed to be irrigated by one sprinkler gun unit (ha) 
 
The previous equation distinguishes divisible irrigation systems from those 
which are non-divisible. While acreage, and fixed costs, of divisible technologies are 
allowed to grow with a linear behaviour, acreage and fixed costs of non-divisible 
technologies grow according to tiers, each tier representing one unit of that technology. 
The equation below mathematically expresses how these relationships were modelled 
for the case of centre pivots of 50ha, being similar equations used for other non-
divisible technologies. In that set of equations, the total acreage of activities using one 
non-divisible irrigation system at any given month of the year, must be lower than the 
product of the area irrigated by one unit of that technology by the number of units in 
use. 
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5050,,,50, .. nPivAreaPivLANDOCUPXc ilevel mcilandlilevelPivitechc                      [Eq.  21] 
 
 The modelling of the intensity of use of irrigation considers that variable costs in 
each irrigation technology are expressed as a function of the volume of water applied. 
Pumping costs, for instance, depend on the use and price of electricity, diesel or 
agricultural labour, and these depend on the level of water applied. 
 
Other constraints 
 
Crops activities, ruled by CMO‟s under the CAP, with maximum guaranteed 
areas and national ceilings of support were assumed to be upper bound at the level 
observed in the calibration year. This procedure was implemented in the modelling, for 
durum wheat, processing tomatoes and sugar beet, as shown in the following equation. 
 
lilevelitechcilandlilevelitechc CAPQUOTASX ,,,,,, .                                                            [Eq.  22] 
where, 
CAPQUOTASc,itech,ilevel,l are the areas of these activities with maximum guaranteed 
areas in the calibration year (ha) 
 
Fodder crops 
 
Agricultural systems with significant shares of fodder crops were modelled 
through a nutritive value (energy) balance equation. In those cases, the total energy of 
the main harvestable fodder component is forced to be higher than that generated at the 
farm level during the calibration year. Nutritive values used in this equation were those 
published by CIHEAM for Mediterranean conditions (CIHEAM 1990).            [Eq.  23] 
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where, 
McalKgdmc Nutritive value of the main harvestable fodder component 
(Mcal/dm) 
dmc Dry matter of the main harvestable fodder component (%) 
CropAllocationc,itech,ilevel,l Observed cropping pattern in the calibration year (ha) 
 
Permanent crops 
 
Land allocated to permanent crops, such as olive orchards, is allowed to be 
converted into arable land in all representative farming systems. Positive transfer 
variables are used to mathematically model this conversion. The upper ceiling of these 
variables is bounded by the area occupied by permanent crops, and an associated 
negative contribution towards farm income corresponding to the cost of deforestation. 
 
 
5.3.1 – MAUT MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATION 
 
The MAUT framework described above requires estimation of parameters, such 
as anchor/nadir attribute values and the weights attached to each attribute. Anchor and 
nadir attribute values are determined through the computation of pay-off matrices. POM 
matrices register information about the trade-offs between objectives and, in this sense, 
they can also be interpreted as a measurement of the rates of transformation or 
substitution between objectives, as they provide information on the amounts of 
achievement of one objective that must be sacrificed to gain a unitary increase in 
another objective (Ballestero and Romero 1998). POM summarises the fundamental 
concept underlying MCDM theory, in which the achieving some objectives often means 
having to sacrifice others. The POM matrices and attribute weights for the farming 
systems in the case study areas are shown in Appendix VI.  
 
 
 
 140 
5.3.2 – MAUT MODEL VALIDATION 
 
Validation methods aim to ascertain or establish if a model achieves an 
acceptable level of accuracy for the required purpose. Validation usually involves a 
comparison between mathematical programming model outputs and those observed in 
reality. In order to ensure that a meaningful comparison is in fact performed, the whole 
economic and policy relevant environment must be mathematically represented within 
the model during the calibration period. That provides insight on the model ability, or 
operational performance in either predicting or reproducing observed behaviour. In 
what regards the model validity, it is important to mention that the general framework 
of the MAUT models used in this research was built on a MAUT model template 
scientifically proven in widespread use. Logical improvements to this template, such as 
those concerning land qualities, the modelling of irrigation technologies, the addition of 
the crop-water production functions, or variable costs of irrigation dependent on water 
use or the addition of CAP policy options (e.g. set aside) are in fact incremental as they 
allow for a more realistic modelling of irrigated agricultural systems, and therefore do 
not in any way undermine the general validity already proven under previous research
99
. 
A measure of distance based on the absolute deviations between observed and 
simulated cropping pattern is used for the purpose of model validation (see [Eq. 9]). 
This measure of distance provides a mathematical criterion to evaluate if model 
behaviour is sufficiently accurate in reproducing the observed reality or if it requires 
further calibration. This validation procedure is shown in table 9 to table 15 for results 
simulated by MAUT models as well as for the results obtained within a profit 
maximizing rationale. Mathematical programming models are usually considered as 
validated when the accumulated absolute deviation between observed and simulated 
cropping patters is inferior to 25 to 30%. For the purpose of prospective policy analysis, 
the sole use of this criterion shows however potential limitations. These limitations 
derive from trade-offs between imposing further constraints to the models in order to 
lower this deviation measure, and actual model flexibility and predictive capacity in 
estimating the implications of policy change under different contexts.  
 
 
                                                 
99
 - See, for instance, Sumpsi et al. (1996), Arriaza and Gomez-Limon (2003) or Berbel and Gutiérrez 
(2005) 
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Table 9. MAUT model validation in Cluster 1, Caia irrigation district 
Crops Land 
Obs. 
Area 
Caia CL1 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Accumulated  
ABS Deviation (ha) 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Olive grove Rain Fed 2.05 2.05 2.05 0.00 0.00 
Olive grove Irrigated 4.89 4.89 4.89 0.00 0.00 
Accumulated ABS Deviation (%) 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Table 10. MAUT model validation in Cluster 2, Caia irrigation district 
Crops Land 
Obs. 
Area 
Caia CL2 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Accumulated  
ABS Deviation (ha) 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Common Wheat Rain Fed 17.22 12.30 12.30 4.93 4.93 
Common Wheat Irrigated 10.96 28.83 28.83 22.80 22.80 
Durum Wheat Rain Fed 21.32 21.32 21.32 22.80 22.80 
Durum Wheat Irrigated 21.22 21.22 21.22 22.80 22.80 
Maize Irrigated 60.67 62.57 62.57 24.69 24.69 
Olive grove Rain Fed 21.83 21.83 21.83 24.69 24.69 
Vol. Set-aside Rain Fed 7.31 18.68 18.68 36.06 36.06 
Comp. Set-aside Rain Fed 4.30 3.74 3.74 36.62 36.62 
Comp. Set-aside Irrigated 11.13 12.51 12.51 38.01 38.01 
Sunflower Irrigated 12.37   50.38 50.38 
Rapeseed Irrigated 8.78   59.16 59.16 
Ag. Set-aside Rain Fed 39.49 33.62 33.62 65.03 65.03 
Accumulated ABS Deviation (%) 27.49 27.49 
 
 
Table 11. MAUT model validation in Cluster 3, Caia irrigation district 
Crops Land 
Obs. 
Area 
Caia CL3 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Accumulated  
ABS Deviation (ha) 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Common Wheat Irrigated 2.18  2.47 2.18 0.29 
Maize Irrigated 2.53 4.15 2.31 3.80 0.51 
Olive grove Rain Fed 8.07 8.07 8.07 3.80 0.51 
Olive grove Irrigated 3.73 3.73 3.73 3.81 0.51 
Ag. Set-aside Irrigated 3.60 4.15 3.54 4.36 0.57 
Accumulated ABS Deviation (%) 21.68 2.84 
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Table 12. MAUT model validation in Cluster 4, Caia irrigation district 
Crops Land 
Obs. 
Area 
Caia CL4 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Accumulated  
ABS Deviation (ha) 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Common Wheat Irrigated  1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
Maize Irrigated 17.05 13.15 16.11 4.96 2.00 
Comp. Set-aside Irrigated 1.30 1.70 2.02 5.36 2.72 
Sunflower Irrigated 2.14 1.06 1.06 6.44 3.81 
Tomato Proc. Irrigated 2.11 2.11 2.11 6.44 3.81 
Melon Irrigated  3.54 0.25 9.98 4.05 
Accumulated ABS Deviation (%) 44.16 17.94 
 
 
Table 13. MAUT model validation in Cluster 1, Odivelas irrigation district 
Crops Land 
Obs. 
Area 
Odivelas 
CL1 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Accumulated  
ABS Deviation (ha) 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Common Wheat Irrigated 1.19 1.55 1.17 0.36 0.02 
Olive grove Irrigated 1.14  1.14 1.50 0.02 
Tomato Proc. Irrigated 8.72 8.72 8.72 1.50 0.02 
Ag. Set-aside Irrigated 2.33 1.55 1.17 2.28 1.17 
Melon Irrigated  1.55 1.17 3.83 2.35 
Accumulated ABS Deviation (%) 28.65 17.54 
 
 
Table 14. MAUT model validation in Cluster 2, Odivelas irrigation district 
Crops Land 
Obs. 
Area 
Odivelas 
CL2 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Accumulated  
ABS Deviation (ha) 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Common Wheat Irrigated 12.48 11.47 10.41 1.01 2.07 
Maize Irrigated 5.37 5.73 5.20 1.38 2.24 
Comp. Set-aside Irrigated 2.49 2.55 2.60 1.43 2.35 
Sunflower Irrigated 5.32 5.73 5.20 1.85 2.47 
Rapeseed Irrigated 2.33  2.60 4.18 2.74 
Ag. Set-aside Irrigated 3.23 5.73 5.20 6.68 4.71 
Accumulated ABS Deviation (%) 21.41 15.10 
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Table 15. MAUT model validation in Cluster 3, Odivelas irrigation district 
Crops Land 
Obs. 
Area 
Odivelas 
CL3 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Accumulated  
ABS Deviation (ha) 
Pmax  
Model 
MAUT 
Model 
Common Wheat Irrigated 24.88 26.59 26.59 1.71 1.71 
Common Wheat Rain Fed  34.95 18.26 36.66 19.97 
Durum Wheat Rain Fed 22.18 22.18 22.18 36.66 19.97 
Maize Irrigated 54.89 53.18 53.18 38.37 21.68 
Perm. Pasture Rain Fed 174.82 174.82 174.82 38.37 21.68 
RyegrassFodder Rain Fed 38.81 38.81 38.81 38.37 21.68 
Comp. Set-aside Rain Fed 6.35 6.35 6.35 38.38 21.68 
Comp. Set-aside Irrigated 8.86 8.86 8.86 38.38 21.69 
Rapeseed Irrigated 34.95  16.69 73.33 39.94 
Accumulated ABS Deviation (%) 20.05 10.92 
 
The validation measure used to evaluate the models predictive accuracy is 
particularly severe and unfavourable to the models, as it distinguishes irrigated from 
non-irrigated crops, and second, because its an absolute measure of distance. That 
particularly strict formulation ensures that the models constructed for this research are 
mathematically well-structured, with an extremely high internal consistency, and that 
both policy and economic settings are just as well represented as agricultural technology 
- otherwise, these models would fail to meet the performance criteria. In addition, this 
validation procedure establishes the credibility of these models, as they are also 
compared with the traditional and well accepted profit maximising framework. That 
framework may thus be understood as representing the traditional performance standard 
which is either matched or exceed by these MAUT models
100
.  
This validation step demonstrates that the MAUT models produced are a reliable 
representation of the farming units identified by clustering. That validation process 
shows that the understanding of the economic behaviour of farmers, and that taking 
those preferences into account, improves performance of mathematical programming 
models. In other words, it is concluded that MAUT models usually provide a better 
operational representation of agricultural reality than the traditional profit maximising 
assumption framework.  
                                                 
100
 - Although not displayed in this monograph, MAUT models were also compared with expected 
income-risk models. These later models usually ranked in between MAUT and PM models. 
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These tables above clearly show that the MAUT approach has a higher 
predictive capability than the traditional profit maximizing assumption, as MAUT 
results often yield lower deviations to the observed productive plan. In other words, 
with the same functional constraints MAUT models were, in general, able to simulate 
more accurately the behaviour of farmers than profit maximising models. The multi-
criteria approach was therefore chosen as a more appropriate framework for the purpose 
of policy analysis.  
 
 
5.4 – CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provides the economic structure used within the bio-economic 
framework. It developed mathematical representations of the farming systems 
determined by clustering and taking into account the biophysical relationships between 
irrigated agricultural production and water use. That enabled adding an economic 
valuation of all production factors used and outputs produced, reproducing market 
prices and agricultural policies influencing agriculture in the two case study areas, in 
order to determine the economic behaviour of farmers in each representative 
agricultural system.  
This chapter concludes that the economic behaviour of farmers is usually best 
captured by MAUT models rather then by models governed by traditional profit 
maximising assumption. A validation procedure presented at the end of this chapter 
demonstrates that the MAUT models allow a better description of the farming systems 
identified by clustering. That validation process shows that the understanding of the 
economic behaviour of farmers, and that taking those preferences into account, provides 
a better operational representation of agricultural reality and improves performance of 
mathematical programming models for policy analysis. For that reason, MAUT models 
were chosen as the most appropriate to simulate the outcomes of agricultural and water 
policy instruments.  
The next chapter deals with the design of near future agricultural policy 
scenarios. These scenarios define a range of agricultural policies and agricultural market 
conditions, in which water policy instruments for implementing the Water Framework 
Directive are simulated. 
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CHAPTER 6 – COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY SCENARIOS FOR 2010/2015 
 
Previous chapters focus on specific structural modules of the bio-economic 
framework. This chapter provides the operational context, with regard to agricultural 
policies and market settings, in which this framework is used to simulate the 
implications of water policy instruments. It designs these operational contexts, or 
scenarios, for two near term assessment time frames, in 2010 and in 2015, by projecting 
the evolution of main factors affecting agriculture within the EU into the future. Two 
additional scenarios are designed around that projection in order to take into account 
uncertainty in the evolution of key policy and market variables. 
This chapter identifies the main driving forces and future trends which affect 
agriculture and agricultural markets in the EU, for the short/middle and middle/long 
term horizons (2010 and 2015)
101
. It builds on Scenar 2020 analysis (Nowicki et al. 
2007) for identifying scenarios and uses its general storyline structure. Specific 
components of scenarios are complemented and adjusted on the basis of the latest 
reports published by the major international institutes which provide forecasts for 
agricultural markets, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) and the European Commission.
102
 
The general framework used for building scenarios is similar to that used in the 
DPSIR framework approach (Driving Forces, Pressures, States, Impacts, and 
Responses)
103
. This framework enable to identify and analyse the main historical trends 
and long-term driving forces responsible for the present situation of agriculture and 
agricultural markets, in order to help understand how these trends influence the 
direction of agriculture and markets during the time horizons considered. This 
procedure resulted in the construction of a reference scenario which reflects these 
driving forces, trends and impacts on agriculture (Nowicki et al. 2007) in 2010 
(short/middle term horizon) and 2015 (middle/long term horizon). A second parallel 
                                                 
101
 - According to the Water Framework Directive timetable, EU Member States are to implement a water 
pricing policy until the year 2010. Until the year 2012 they should have implemented additional 
programmes of measures. Having these dates in mind, the two assessment points considered in this 
analysis (2010 and 2015) should provide a reasonably good understanding of the combined implications 
of the WFD and CAP on irrigated agriculture. 
102
 - The European Commission does not publish agricultural market projections as such; the reference 
refers to comparative studies and research reports ordered by the Commission. 
103
 - Produced by the Dutch Institute of Public Health and Environment for the European Environmental 
Agency (EEA) and widely adopted since (Cit. Kristensen 2004). 
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analysis of driving forces and pressures is integrated within the reference scenario 
storyline to provide detailed information on agricultural markets and their respective 
price evolution.  
 
 
6.1 – MAIN DRIVING FORCES AND TRENDS 
 
Scenar 2020 (Nowicki et al. 2007) distinguishes drivers which are independent 
of policy influence from those which are predominantly policy related. The same 
structure has been adopted here, as shown in figure 20, merely for presentation 
purposes. The first set of drivers include, for instance, population and macro-economic 
growth, consumer preferences, agri-technology, environmental conditions and 
developments in world markets (Nowicki et al. 2007). The set of policy related drivers 
in the European Union context are mainly European (and national) policies such as EU 
agricultural and environmental policies, enlargement decisions and implementation, as 
well as WTO and other international agreements (Nowicki et al. 2007). 
From (Nowicki et al. 2007) 
Figure 20. Identification of trends affecting agricultural policy and agricultural markets  
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6.1.1 – EXOGENOUS DRIVERS TO THE EU POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM 
 
Analysis of recent historical records enables the identification of numerous 
drivers affecting both the agricultural and the rural world. On a macro-economic level, 
population and economic growth are normally considered the most important. Others, 
such as consumer preferences or water availability, for instance, certainly have no less 
importance on smaller scales or more disaggregated analysis, but appear relatively 
weakened in the overall search for trends at EU and global scales. Climate change 
implications on agriculture were not forgotten, but not accounted for as the magnitude 
of its effects is still uncertain (Nowicki et al. 2007) and dependent on additional factors 
such as crop type, region and water availability. 
 
 DEMOGRAPHY TRENDS 
 
Population growth is one of the key drivers in demand for agricultural products 
(OECD and FAO 2007). In recent years, sharp world population growth has been one of 
the main reasons for the majority of the increases in the demand for agricultural 
commodities. Declines in fertility/birth rates are expected to slow down world 
population growth roughly by 1% in the next decade (Nowicki et al. 2007). Low and 
middle income countries are expected to account for almost all the world annual 
population growth in this period (Nowicki et al. 2007). 
Total population growth in the EU area has been declining since the year 2000, 
as death rates exceed birth rates. Negative rates of reproduction have been registered in 
rural, intermediate rural and in the total EU area (Nowicki et al. 2007). Negative 
population growth in the EU contributes to the decline in the European share of world 
population in the next coming years (Nowicki et al. 2007). 
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 GDP TRENDS 
 
Income growth is the other key driver in the demand for agricultural products 
(OECD and FAO 2007). In fact, over the next decade, population growth and income 
growth walk hand-in-hand; regions with the highest income growth (Africa, Asia and 
Latin America) experience population growth rates close to or exceeding 4% on average 
(OECD and FAO 2007). During this period, increases in GDP per capita will show 
higher responsiveness to increased demand for food than population growth (Nowicki et 
al. 2007; OECD and FAO 2007). In addition, because developing countries are actively 
catching up, increases of consumption are expected to maintain demand for food at high 
levels (OECD and FAO 2007).  
 Despite high crude-oil prices above USD $50 per barrel (FAPRI 2007a), overall 
global economic growth is projected to continue solid in the next ten years, above 3.3% 
per year (FAPRI 2007a) and slightly below 5.5% (excluding the EU) (European 
Commission 2007b). Projections for the Brent price per barrel are U shaped, with a 
decline to USD $55 over the next five years, followed by a gradual USD $5/barrel rise 
in the subsequent five year period (OECD and FAO 2007).  
In the OECD area, near-term prospects are also optimistic with projections 
forecasting the continuation of vigorous economic growth (OECD and FAO 2007). 
GDP growth is expected to decline from 3.2% in 2006 to 2.5% throughout the next 
decade, but GDP per capita should be “the strongest in recent times” as a result of 
declining population growth (OECD and FAO 2007). In coming years, economic 
growth is either expected to increase followed by a slight decline towards the end of the 
next decade (OECD and FAO 2007), or to remain at around 2.6% throughout the next 
ten years (European Commission 2007b).  
EU agricultural exports are to slim down as the Euro continues to appreciate 
against the USD (FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007) and as a result of CAP reform. 
The European Commission assumes the strengthening of the US Dollar against the Euro 
over the medium term and expects Europe “to benefit from a world growing demand” 
(European Commission 2007b). In OECD countries, inflation is assumed to remain at 
low levels, falling from 2.4% in 2006 to below 2% by 2010 (OECD and FAO 2007). 
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YIELD PRODUCTIVITY GAINS 
 
Productivity gains in cereal yields in Europe have slowed down from 1.6% in 
the 1980-1992 period to 0.8% in the 1992-2004 period (Nowicki et al. 2007). Oilseeds 
showed the opposite trend, increasing from 0.2% to 2.8% in the same periods of time 
(Nowicki et al. 2007).  
Yield growth in the EU-15 has been slowing down over the past decade. On the 
one hand, this slow down indicates that technical efficiency in cereal crops is closer to 
the technological frontier (European Commission 2007b). On the other hand, higher 
production standards as well as increasing constraints on resource use also contribute to 
this tendency. Yield productivity growth is likely to slow down in the EU for most 
commodities. Higher environmental protection and the decoupling of direct payments 
should contribute significantly to lower yield growth in the coming decade (European 
Commission 2007b).  
 
 
6.1.2 – ENDOGENOUS DRIVERS TO THE EU POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM 
 
There are several EU policies directly or indirectly affecting agriculture, 
agricultural markets and the rural world. Some policy measures, such as those within 
the CAP and WTO agreements, have direct effects as they specifically target each of 
these areas. At the same time, non-agricultural transversal policies, such as energy, 
environment and regional/rural development policies, or those regarding monetary and 
tax policies, labour/social reforms and enlargement decisions, have deep implications 
on the agricultural sector. Being outside the scope of this work to analyse all these 
factors, only the most relevant ones are reviewed. According to the European 
commission (2007b), the most important drivers governing the evolution of agriculture, 
are agricultural and trade policies, as well as world agricultural commodity markets and 
macro-economic conditions
104
. 
 
                                                 
104
 - Macro-economic conditions were analysed in the previous heading, the remaining drivers are 
analysed in this section. 
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 COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
 
This section presents a very concise evolution of the CAP. It is an evolution 
worthwhile reviewing when seeking to identify the main tendencies in the direction and 
lines of evolution of agricultural policy in the EU. 
The EU Common Agricultural Policy has changed radically since it was first 
created, due to the several reforms it has been subject to
105
. The dominant trend in these 
reforms consists in an increasing decoupling of subsidies from production to the 
producer. The support provided in the form of market support instruments (coupled) has 
been reduced and shifted towards agricultural income support, through direct 
compensatory payments on an area basis (decoupled). Along this evolutionary line, 
farmers were stimulated to implement environmentally friendly production systems, and 
rewarded for providing positive externalities – such as landscape/environmental 
protection/conservation – associated with the multifunctional character of EU 
agriculture. Later on these two aspects became, to some extent, a sine qua non condition 
for receiving CAP direct payments (DP). Simultaneously, the CAP became increasingly 
rural. The following paragraphs expand on the CAP historical evolution, focusing on 
the milestones that shaped it to the present day: the 1992, the 1999 and the 2003/04 
reforms.  
The actual CAP roots date back to the Treaties of Rome
106
, in 1957 (EEC 1957), 
which makes the CAP the first and the oldest EU common policy. In a fast changing 
Europe Sicco Mansholt soon recognised that the CAP had to evolve
107
. The first real 
inflexion on the CAP direction happens twenty five years after the Mansholt plan, with 
                                                 
105
 - The reader less familiar with European Union Agricultural Policies is invited to consult the CAP 
leaflet (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capleaflet/cap_en.htm) (European Commission 2004a) or the 
CAP explained presentation at (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf) (European 
Commission 2004b) as a first introduction to the theme. A more advanced but recent and comprehensive 
review of the CAP can be found in Garzon (2006). Garzon actually joins this debate, analysing the drivers 
behind CAP reforms.  
106
 - Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community. 
107
 - The first references in this respect are due to Sicco Mansholt, with the well known Memorandum on 
the reform of agriculture in the European Economic Community (European Commission 1968). The 
memorandum addresses the issues of farm sizes and marginal farms, labour productivity, technological 
progress and scale economies, agricultural surpluses, high internal prices and difficulties in international 
exports, and others. It is curious to understand from this reading how CAP policies were believed to be 
misadjusted from the European Agricultural structural reality since these early days. On the same line of 
thought it is interesting to read in this text, dated from 1968, that “at the present, both price and support 
policies clearly rest in the main on social considerations, and will no doubt continue to do so as long as 
these structural deficiencies last” (European Commission 1968). After only a few years since the 
implementation of the CAP, Sicco Mansholt already had anticipated fundamental changes to the guiding 
objectives as laid on the Treaty of Rome, highlighting social considerations from the remaining ones. 
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the McSharry reform in 1992. The main CAP instruments had remained virtually 
unchanged since its foundation and still relied essentially on market and price support 
mechanisms. At the time, both budgetary and environmental factors were combined 
with GATT agreement pressures to force the Commission to adopt “a genuine reform of 
the CAP” (European Parliament 2001a) 108. The new course set in 1992 shifted market 
support towards direct payments dependent on area or factor usage
109
. Decreasing 
internal market prices, and hence intervention prices at lower levels, enabled reducing 
export restitutions and market distortion at the same time. A new set of measures, 
known as the agri-environmental measures, were integrated into the CAP to improve the 
environmental conditions in the agricultural sector, and the set-aside scheme was 
introduced with the aim of controlling agricultural surpluses. 
Five years later, in 1997, similar pressures urged a similar reform. At this time, 
support granted to agriculture drained over fifty percent of the total EU budget, and the 
costs of a new EU enlargement without a CAP reform renewed the financial and 
budgetary pressure on the CAP. The kick-off of the GATT-WTO Millennium Round 
required further decreases on EU agricultural support and market distortion, while non-
structural funding had actually increased after the 1992 reform. EU-commissioner 
Fischler followed the same direction as his predecessor had done, shifting from market 
support to direct payments
110
. These price cuts were only partly offset by increases in 
compensatory payments (European Commission 2000d), thus avoiding to 
overcompensate farmers (European Parliament 2001b) while reducing the overall 
agricultural funding. The main novelty in the Agenda 2000 is, perhaps, the introduction 
of a comprehensive rural development policy (the second pillar of the CAP) which 
recognised the multifunctional dimension and specificity of European agriculture 
(European Commission 2000d). Member States were allowed to optionally implement 
modulation to reallocate funds from pillar 1 to Pillar 2, and make CMOs payments 
conditional on compliance with environmental requirements (European Commission 
2000d). The last novelty in the Agenda 2000 consisted in a financial discipline that 
                                                 
108
 - Some authors actually consider that “the escalating budget expenditures for market interventions 
were the main driving force” (Henrichsmeyer and Witzke 2000) behind the CAP reform of 1992.  
109
 - Cereal intervention prices were reduced by 30%, beef prices by 15% and dairy product prices by 5% 
(Policy Secretariat 2003). 
110
 - Market support prices were reduced by 15% for cereals and dairy products and by 20% for beef 
(European Commission 2000d; European Commission 2000e). In the case of cereals, for instance, the 
increase in direct payments represented a 50% compensation of the price cuts (European Commission 
2000e). Additional information on this CAP period is condensed in European Commission (2005a). 
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imposed annual ceilings on CAP budget, thus reassuring tax payers that spending on 
agriculture would not escalate uncontrollably (European Commission 2000d)
111
. 
The CAP began to be restructured, once again, in 2003. This new reform entirely 
detaches itself from the Agenda 2000, to impose a significant turn in the European 
support for agriculture (European Commission 2004c). A stricter financial discipline 
(for Pillar 1 only) ensures that the agricultural budget is not exceeded (European 
Commission 2004c). Modulation and cross-compliance (hitherto optional) are 
compulsory in this reform, in order to transfer additional funds for the second pillar 
without increasing total budgetary costs. The most notorious innovation, partly due to 
progress at the WTO (Nowicki et al. 2007), is the introduction of the Single Farm 
Payment (SFP). The SFP replaces most of the existing premia under the different CMOs 
on the basis of historical payments to farmers (European Commission 2003b). The SFP 
represents a further step towards decoupling  direct payments from agricultural 
production (European Commission 2003c), and „coupling‟ them to public goals such as 
environment/landscape management. In fact, SFP payments are conditional on 
maintaining land in good agricultural and environmental conditions, and on cross-
compliance requirements on the areas of environment; animal welfare; occupational 
safety, as well as public, animal and plant health conditions (European Commission 
2003a; European Commission 2003b; OECD 2004). 
The McSharry reform, the Agenda 2000 and the recent 2003/2004 reform 
exhibit the same evolutionary pattern. In sensu lato, they transferred support from 
amber to blue and green boxes (e.g. uncoupled payments, agri-environmental 
measures), and from blue to green boxes, shifting from market/product support to 
income and environmental/landscape support.  
The reformed CAP continues to provide for direct income support with a view to 
ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community (the last remaining 
objective of the Treaties of Rome in the actual CAP). In the actual CAP, the shift from 
production support to income support has almost been complete, while stricter 
environmental protection values in agriculture have been reinforced. The last reform of 
                                                 
111
 - Compensatory payments are conceptually transitory. Direct payments were determined in reference 
to high prices, kept above world prices by market policies, and aim to compensate farmers for cuts in 
these prices. In this respect, some authors argue that “politically determined prices of a past period” 
cannot provide a reference for fix payments ad eternum (Henrichsmeyer and Witzke 2000). The agenda 
2000 has therefore rephrased the political justification and transformed compensatory payments into 
permanent remunerations for the provision of environmental services (Henrichsmeyer and Witzke 2000). 
That had not been the case, one would rightfully wonder about the rational of these payments in periods 
of high world market prices, as it is the case at the moment. 
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the CAP seeks to promote a more market-oriented agricultural sector compatible with 
stronger environment protection within the EU area. 
The new CAP of today is almost unrecognisable in the light of the Treaty which 
gave it birth. Calls for further reforming it (see, for instance, HM Treasury and DEFRA 
2005) will eventually break the few links remaining. 
 
EU AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND THE WTO  
 
The EU CAP considerably directed European agriculture and so fiercely 
protected the internal market that the effects of this policy extended beyond its borders, 
distorting world markets and inverting trade flows. Internally, the CAP is the most 
distorting policy in the EU (HM Treasury and DEFRA 2005)
112
; internationally, the 
CAP is the EU major source of economic distortion on world markets (HM Treasury 
and DEFRA 2005). Internal prices of agricultural commodities in the EU were kept 
artificially higher than those at international markets, particularly before the CAP 
reform of 1992, when agricultural markets were heavily protected by a number of 
market policy mechanisms which created severe distortions to trade (HM Treasury and 
DEFRA 2005)
113
. 
 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
 
In recent years, the EU and the WTO have taken steps to mitigate this distortion. 
Commitments taken within the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA, in 
1994), determined market access concessions (minimum access for imports), 
established annual limits (in volume and value) for subsidised exports (European 
Commission 2007b; OECD and FAO 2007), and reduced domestic support (Nowicki et 
al. 2007; OECD and FAO 2007).  
                                                 
112
 - OECD‟s estimates that only 10% of market price support actually benefits farmers in their condition 
as farmers; the remaining 90% are capitalised into land prices and benefits suppliers of other inputs such 
as machinery, pesticides and fertilisers; a similar value applies for direct payments (HM Treasury and 
DEFRA 2005). 
113
 - . This market protection relied extensively on policy measures such as, variable import levies and 
tariffs, intervention purchases (prices and stocks), export restitutions, production controls, direct 
subsidies, non-tariff barriers and other price support measures. 
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The CAP reform of 1992 initiated the decoupling process and brought internal 
intervention prices closer to world market prices. In the URAA perspective, this enabled 
to reduce simultaneously import tariffs (market access area) and export restitutions 
(export competition area), while support was transferred from the amber to the blue box 
and associated with production control mechanisms (domestic support area). In 
addition, variable levies were replaced by fixed levies and tariff rate quotas (Nowicki et 
al. 2007) (TRQs or TQs) were implemented. 
 
Doha Development Round  
  
Reform of the Agenda 2000 was partly due to progress at the WTO (Nowicki et 
al. 2007). In fact, the introduction of the SFP and progressive decoupling of direct 
payments strengthened the EU position within the WTO.  
 It is foreseeable that further liberalisation on the areas of market access, export 
competition and internal support will continue in the Doha Development Round agenda. 
If and when agreements are reached, they will result in an overall less distortion to 
world markets (OECD and FAO 2007), either due to improvements in the first area or 
due to reductions on the latter two areas. In practice, liberalisation of trade leads to a 
better distribution of production on the basis of comparative advantages, increased trade 
and generally higher world prices for agricultural commodities (OECD and FAO 2007). 
As far as domestic support is concerned, trends indicate a reduction of support; if not on 
the level of support, at least on the level of distortion inflicted on markets (Nowicki et 
al. 2007). On the area of export competition, the aim appears to be the complete 
dismantlement of export subsidies (Nowicki et al. 2007)
114
. Market access is likely to be 
improved  either by further reducing tariffs or by extending the TRQs volume (OECD 
and FAO 2007). 
Trade-wise both the 1992 reform and the Agenda 2000 reforms reduced market 
distortion. The reform of 2003/2004 reduced market support and shifted direct 
„coupled‟ payments into „uncoupled‟ green box worthy support (European Commission 
2003b), such as the SFP and rural development measures. Farmers in the new SFP 
regime are not compelled to produce any particular crop, which allows them to take 
advantage of existing comparative advantages and adopt a more market-based farming. 
                                                 
114
 - The EU has agreed to progressively phase out export restitutions (Nowicki et al. 2007). 
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The eventual outcomes of the Doha Development Round agenda will result in further 
liberalisation on the areas of market access, export competition and internal support. 
 
 
 EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
The first concerns to establish a Community environmental framework date back 
to 1970s. The two initial Environmental Action Plans (EPA) (1973 – 1982) 
fundamentally defined environmental quality objectives, product and quality norms 
(Hey 2005).  
The third (1982-1987) and the fourth (1987-1992) EPAs changed their direction 
and somehow reflect progress in European cohesion. During this period a clear linkage 
is established between environmental policies and markets. The European Single Act 
(1987), in the middle of this period, represents a turning point in terms of environmental 
policy strategy emphasising this link. The environmental policy focus is redirected from 
a quality approach to an emission orientated approach. This change in policy aimed to 
harmonise product regulations and avoid distortions to industry competitiveness in the 
internal market (Hey 2005). In the fourth EPA the limitations of quality and emissions 
approaches are recognised, and a more integrated sectoral approach for environmental 
protection is proposed considering the use of economic instruments, particularly indirect 
instruments (Hey 2005).  
The fifth EPA continues along the lines of the previous two. It continues to 
promote the use of economic instruments (fiscal incentives and voluntary instruments), 
and to set medium- and long-term environmental objectives in a more comprehensive 
and holistic framework – partly strengthening emission oriented policies. National 
emissions ceilings were set and additional emphasis is placed on the use of economic 
instruments to internalise costs (Hey 2005).  
Particularly related to European agriculture is the EU increasingly 
comprehensive strategy for promoting biodiversity. The most well know cases affecting 
agriculture are agri-environmental measures, Birds (Directive 79/409/EEC 1979) and 
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Habitats (Directive 92/43/EEC 1992) Directives. In this context, a new development of 
this strategy recently begun focusing on soil biodiversity (Nowicki et al. 2007)
115
. 
Across the history of EPAs, one can identify a gradual shift on environmental 
policy strategy from hot-spot management towards a more holistic and integrated 
approach (Hey 2005). The last decades have witnessed a growing penetration of the 
environment into policy making as well as population awareness and concern. Trends in 
recent EU environmental frameworks (such as the WFD) seem to point out towards the 
strengthening of national responsibilities in setting environmental targets and in 
proposing instruments to achieve them. Developments in environmental quality, may 
consider stricter and more restrictive emission standards or enacting additional binding 
regulation on natural resource use through economic instruments. 
 
 
6.2 – OUTLOOK FOR WORLD AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 
 
This section describes a storyline for the evolution of world agricultural markets. 
It is mainly built upon the latest reports published by the most important international 
institutes which provide forecasts for agricultural markets. The last outlooks provided 
by FAPRI and OECD-FAO use similar storylines and assumptions, but use slightly 
different regional and commodity aggregation levels. In spite of this they provide a 
coherent and consistent assessment of agricultural commodity markets for the period 
2007-2016, covering key groups of agricultural commodities, such as, cereals, oil crops, 
sugar, livestock and dairy. In addition, these outlooks include for the first time explicit 
assumptions on biofuel crops. 
Market projections are established on the basis of a specific set of assumptions 
regarding the evolution of long-term trends and drivers
116
. Consequently, the outlooks 
present a likely reference scenario for the evolution of agricultural markets over the next 
decade, resulting from their own underlying assumptions. In turn, the reference scenario 
provides a useful yardstick for the analysis of market outcomes resulting from 
                                                 
115
 - For further information, see COM(2002)179final, Towards a Thematic Strategy for Soil Protection. 
116
 - Agricultural and trade policies, implementation of CAP reforms, TRQ‟s and subsidies, macro-
economic conditions, EU enlargement decisions, weather patterns. Conjectures on policy change arising 
from possible outcomes of the Doha Development Round are not included in any of the Outlook 
projections. Consequently, the URAA agreements are assumed to remain unchanged through out the 
projection period (2007-2016) 
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alternative assumptions (OECD and FAO 2007). This section provides a narrative of the 
storyline for the evolution of agricultural markets. Detailed estimates for agricultural 
markets are reported in the Appendix to this outlook (Appendix IX) for the main 
aggregates and their most import products, such as cereals, wheat, rice, coarse grains, 
sugar, oilseeds, oilmeals and vegetable oils, biofuels, livestock, poultry and dairy 
products. 
World markets in the coming decade are expected to be driven by a steady 
economic growth, overall low inflation, slowing population growth, and continued 
demand from the biofuel industry (FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007). Developing 
countries are to experience a much faster economic and population growth, with a much 
stronger demand for agricultural products than developed nations (OECD and FAO 
2007). This strong demand for agricultural commodities is to be met through the 
expansion of imports and, in a second step, essentially through the development of 
domestic production capacity (OECD and FAO 2007). OECD countries are projected to 
have lower production and consumption growth rates and, as a whole, are expected to 
lose export shares in most agricultural commodities to non-OECD countries during the 
next ten years (OECD and FAO 2007). 
A sharp increase in the demand for agricultural products, from the biofuel 
industry, is one of the main drivers for keeping international commodity prices at a high 
level throughout the next ten years (FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007). 
 
 
6.2.1 – MAIN TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY PRICES 
 
 Current world prices are higher than previously anticipated for most 
commodities as several factors have contributed to strengthen commodity prices. 
Adverse weather has affected cereal production in several producing countries causing 
shortfalls over 50%, in a context of already low global cereal stocks and stronger than 
expected demand for cereals for biofuel, which inevitably underpinned world cereal 
prices (OECD and FAO 2007). Increasing cereal prices relative to those for oilseeds 
caused significant land relocation towards cereals and tightened supplies for oilseeds, 
which together with rising demands for biodiesel strengthened oilseed prices (OECD 
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and FAO 2007). In turn, high cereal and oilseed prices have increased feed costs and 
increased meat and dairy prices (OECD and FAO 2007). 
 The above may be explained by short-term production shocks and resulting 
supply/demand imbalances, but long-term policy influence may be also at work (OECD 
and FAO 2007). Policy support for renewable energies and biofuel production may have 
helped raising cereal and oilseed prices, and WTO and bilateral agreements leading to 
lower use of export subsidies may have lifted prices for several commodities (OECD 
and FAO 2007). If, in fact, long term influences are at work, world market prices in the 
medium term are likely to remain at high levels. In the next ten years, population and 
income growth, allied with biofuel forecasted developments, should create an additional 
demand which is expected to lead to higher prices than in the past decade, on average, 
for field crops, dairy and meat products  
 In the last two years, world cereal prices have escalated due to a combination of 
adverse weather, low stocks and high demand. Cereal prices should remain high, 
declining slightly towards the end of the next decade, but substantially higher than those 
observed over the past decade (OECD and FAO 2007) (see figure 21)
118
. The main 
drivers underpinning cereal prices are expanding food demand in developing countries 
and demand for cereals for ethanol production (OECD and FAO 2007). 
Figure 21. Past developments and outlook for cereal commodity markets. 
  
                                                 
118
 - FAPRI and OECD-FAO Outlooks were published in 2007 and use real information on prices up to 
2006. Data from FAPRI (2007a), Gulf FOB prices, except Rice which is 100% Grade B, Bangkok price. 
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 As mentioned before, high cereal prices have tightened supply for oilseeds due 
to relocation of land towards cereal production. On the other hand, strong demand for 
oilseeds for feedstocks for the biodiesel industry helped to push the price as well. Prices 
will tend to increase during the next few years and progressively decline towards the 
end of the projection period, as shown in figure 22. Oilseed prices on the next decade 
are to remain on average above those in the previous decade. 
 
Figure 22. Past developments and outlook for oilseeds commodity markets. 
 
World sugar prices are increasingly linked to fossil fuels. Ethanol uses of sugar 
cane can produce a viable alternative to oil, and for that reason sugar prices will tend to 
follow developments in the oil sector (European Commission 2007a). In addition to 
that, sugar markets will face an added pressure due to EU reform in the sugar CMO as a 
substantial amount of “sugar is pulled from world markets” (OECD and FAO 2007). 
Figure 23 shows the evolution of sugar prices up to 2006 and sugar price estimates for 
the 2007-2016 period. 
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Figure 23. Past developments and outlook for sugar commodity markets 
 
Recent animal disease outbreaks have severely affected world meat markets. 
Figure 24 shows that, in the next years, market prices should recover as per capita 
consumption is expected to increase. Strong demand allied with high feed costs should 
keep meat prices at high levels during the next decade.  
Figure 24. Past developments and outlook for meat commodity markets. 
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6.3 – SCENARIOS 
 
The most important drivers governing the development of the economic, social 
and environmental conditions of European agriculture and agricultural markets were 
reviewed in the previous section. This identified the main historical trends and long-
term driving forces explaining the present situation of agriculture, and how they may 
influence its future evolution. Projecting these trends and driving forces forward to the 
time horizons considered enables construction of a reference (baseline) scenario 
reflecting these driving forces and most likely trends (Nowicki et al. 2007). The years 
2010 (short/middle term horizon) and 2015 (middle/long term horizon) are the two time 
frames considered for this projection. 
The projection of long-term tendencies/trends/driving forces underlying the 
reference scenario is deterministic, in the sense that it characterises one particular 
market environment ruled by a set of specific assumptions on exogenous variables 
(OECD and FAO 2007). Deterministic projections have inevitably uncertainty errors 
associated to that environment and that set of assumptions; in particular those regarding 
weather, macroeconomic conditions, policy objectives and direction are impossible to 
predict accurately (OECD and FAO 2007)
 119
.  
Prospective policy scenarios allow estimating the possible implications on the 
results arising from variations of these unknown variable values. Uncertainty in the 
pathway of evolution of key contradictory forces shaping the baseline scenario, led to 
design two alternative scenarios following opposite but reasonable policy directions in 
the nearby future (Nowicki et al. 2007). The first of these directions consists in the 
liberalisation of agricultural markets, and the second in the adoption of rural 
development policy measures.  
These scenarios are characterised by different policy objectives and different 
drivers, hence they differ substantially on the support provided for the agricultural 
sector (Nowicki et al. 2007). The liberalisation scenario follows the trend of reducing 
support to agricultural commodities and agricultural markets, in fact, this scenario 
anticipates the complete erosion of CAP Pillar 1, and seeks to capture the implications 
                                                 
119
 An alternative for taking uncertainty into account in economic studies consists in performing a 
sensitivity analysis on the parameter values subject to uncertainty. However, sensitivity analysis must be 
restricted to a reduced number of parameters, as the analysis it self is performed on a parameter by 
parameter basis. When uncertainty affects several parameter values, scenario analysis is likely to be more 
manageable and more informative than sensitivity analysis. 
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associated to its complete dismantlement. The rural development scenario explores the 
opposite direction by increasing the overall support to the agricultural sector and 
protection to environmental conditions. Roughly in between these extremes lies the 
reference scenario, characterised by the set of the CAP Pillar 1 measures as defined at 
end of 2007. 
Drivers predominantly policy related were distinguished from those which are 
mainly independent from policy making. Exogenous drivers are not directly and 
immediately influenced by EU policies and their influence on agriculture remains 
largely independent of EU policy. For that reason, in order to highlight the impact of 
EU policy change (CAP and WFD) all assumptions concerning drivers exogenous to the 
EU policy making are kept constant across policy scenarios (Nowicki et al. 2007). The 
general assumptions underlying each scenario are shown on the following tables (tables 
15 and 16) and described in further detail in the following sections. 
 
 
Table 16. Scenario assumptions based on non-policy drivers 
Assumptions Demographics 
Macro-
economic 
growth 
Consumer 
preferences 
Agri-
technology 
Word 
Markets 
All scenarios 
Major 
population 
trends as 
observed in the 
past. 
Moderate 
growth as 
seen in the 
trends; 
Increasing 
trend for 
labour market 
liberalisation. 
More 
demand for 
value added 
and 
increasing 
absolute 
spending per 
capita. 
Crop 
productivity 
is kept 
constant; 
Technology 
efficiency 
remains as 
observed in 
the past. 
Price trends 
in agri-
markets (see 
Appendix IX 
– Outlook for 
World 
Agricultural 
Markets). 
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Table 17. Scenario assumptions based on policy-related drivers 
Assumptions 
CAP 
Biofuels 
WTO and other 
international 
agreements 
Environmental 
policies impact 
on agriculture 
Market Policies Direct payments Rural development 
Reference 
Scenario 
Existing CAP as defined 
at 2007/2008 
Adoption of SFP; 
Dynamic modulation; 
Quality based premia. 
Structural funding 
only. 
Continuation of EU 
Biofuels Strategy 
URAA 
Continuation/ 
Reinforcement of 
existing 
environmental 
legislation 
Rural 
Development 
Scenario 
Adoption of SFP; 
Dynamic modulation; 
Quality based premia; 
Funding of all rural 
development axes; 
CP support for 
Objective 1 Areas; 
Agri-environment 
support. 
URAA 
Liberalization 
Scenario 
No internal support 
policies; 
EU agricultural border 
prices apply  
Direct payments are 
fully eroded. 
Structural funding 
only. 
Full withdrawal of 
support for energy 
crops. 
Import tariffs 
and export 
subsidies are 
dismantled. 
Partial 
withdrawal of 
environmental 
legislation (set 
aside). 
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6.3.1 – REFERENCE SCENARIO 
 
This scenario, also called single farm payment scenario (SFPS), provides a 
coherent framework for analysing current EU agricultural policies. To the extent 
possible at a farm-level analysis, it was made compatible with both WTO and EU 
bilateral agreements. This reference scenario aims to reproduce as accurately as possible 
CAP Pillar 1 measures as established for the Portuguese agriculture by the CAP reform 
of 2003/04 (European Commission 2003a) and daughter regulations. As regards WTO 
aspects, payments to farmers granted under the reformed CAP Pillar 1, through the SFP, 
are green box compatible (European Commission 2003b). In Portugal, implementation 
of the SFP scheme is based on an individual payment entitlement basis, in which an 
historical record of DP per farm is used to determine the maximum amount of support 
that can be allocated to each farmer under the SFP. 
This reform replaces all previously existing support granted by DP, and 
supplementary payments, under the different CMOs by one single payment know as the 
single farm payment (SFP). In this CAP reform, Portugal has adopted a full decoupling 
strategy for all sectors of crop production (except cotton and tobacco), and either 
full/partial decoupling approaches for different animal CMO and specific policy 
measures. While these last two crops and CMO have minimal expression in the case 
studies of Caia and Odivelas, the CMOs of cereals, oilseeds, dry fodder, fruits and 
processed vegetables are far more important
120
. 
CAP support under the SFP is paid in respect of payment entitlements, provided 
that they accompanied by an equal number of eligible hectares (see [Eq. 24]). In this 
scenario, eligible hectares mean any agricultural area of the holding taken up by arable 
crop uses and permanent crops, with the exception of fruit and vegetable areas as well 
as permanent pastures. Payment entitlements are calculated as the average number of 
hectares which gave right to DPs during Agenda 2000, in the reference period of 2000, 
2001 and 2002
121
. Compulsory set aside payment entitlements and reference amounts 
are calculated separately from other activities, being voluntary set aside values 
                                                 
120
 - Sugar beet and the sugar CMO have been important in the agriculture of these public irrigated 
schemes until this growing season. The recent restructuring of the sugar CMO, along with EU agreements 
with developing countries, as well as the phasing out of subsidies and the end of the specific support to 
Portuguese sugar producers has put an end to this crop in Portugal, as the factory will cease to transform 
sugar beet. 
121
 - Payment entitlements in each representative farming system were calculated using the bio-economic 
framework proposed in this research.  
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excluded. It is worth noting, in the following formulation, that under or 
overachievements of eligible areas in relation to payment entitlements are not funded 
for. 
 
eSFPelibiblX
SENTITLESX
lilevelitechc
hac itech ilevel l lilevelitechc
,,,
21,,, ,
                                        [Eq.  24] 
in which, 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l Activity levels eligible for funding under the SFP 
ENTITLEha Payment entitlements calculated for the reference period 
S1 (Slack) underachievement of eligible area in relation to 
payment entitlements – not funded 
S2 (Slack) overachievement of eligible area in relation to 
payment entitlements – not funded 
 
The reference amount of support is calculated for the reference period according 
to an adjusted average record of direct payments allocated to each farm. These 
adjustments occur in the monetary value of DPs and supplement to DPs as shown the 
following table (in the column SFP Support). In the Portuguese case, other adjustments 
to reference amount values include the built of a national reserve, retention of payments, 
modulation and additional amount of aid as described afterwards. 
 
Table 18. Historical Payments to Farmers for selected Years  
CAP Support 00/01 01/02 02/03 
SFP 
Support 
Units 
      
Olive Orchards      
Olive Oil 132.25 132.25 132.25 132.25 
€/100 
Kg 
      
Processed Fruits and Vegetables      
Processed Tomatoes 34.50 34.50 34.50 34.50 €/ton 
      
Dry Fodder Crops      
Sun dried Fodder 38.64 38.64 38.64 38.64 €/ton 
      
Direct Payments to Arable Land Crops (in the CAP general regime) 
Cereals 58.67 63.00 63.00 66.00 €/tonRY 
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CAP Support 00/01 01/02 02/03 
SFP 
Support 
Units 
      
Oleaginous Crops 81.74 72.37 63.00 66.00 €/tonRY 
Protein Crops 72.50 72.70 72.50 66.00 €/tonRY 
Non-textil Linseed 88.26 75.63 63.00 66.00 €/tonRY 
Compulsory Set-aside 68.31 72.64 66.41 66.00 €/tonRY 
Voluntary Set-aside 58.67 63.00 63.00 66.00 €/tonRY 
      
Supplements to COP Direct Payments 
Supp. to Durum Wheat (trad.) 344.50 344.50 344.50 285.00 €/ha 
      
Specific Support to Portuguese Producers 
Common Wheat 41.13 41.13 15.27  €/ton 
Maize 18.72 18.72 6.23  €/ton 
Barley, Rye and Triticale 23.69 23.69 7.90  €/ton 
Sorghum 16.25 16.25 5.42  €/ton 
Sugar Beet 4.04 3.06 2.88  €/ton 
 
Before the CAP reform which gave birth to the SFP, DP were paid according to 
regional historical reference yields (tonRY)
123
 rather than actual quantity produced. 
Other aid measures are either paid on a crop area basis (€/ha) or quantity produced 
(€/ton, €/100Kg). Specific national support schemes to Portuguese producers although 
targeting the same crops are not considered DP, in fact they had a different nature to 
DP, and are therefore excluded from the calculation of the reference amount
124
. The 
calculation of the reference amount is shown in equation [Eq. 25] below. 
 
[Eq.  25] 
 
                                                 
123
 - Historical reference yields are those established by agricultural regionalization plans under CE 
Regulation 1251/1999 (European Commission 1999) as defined for the Portuguese agriculture by (DR 
2001). 
124
 - Although DPs to farmers are now granted through the SFP, CMO were not abolished and still 
represent a safety net for European agriculture. For instance, intervention prices, maximum guaranteed 
areas and national ceiling “envelopes”, export subsidies and TRQ‟s are still ruled by existing CMO. 
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in which, 
REFAMOUNT Reference amount  
Xc,itech,ilevel,l Activity levels 
DPc,itech,year Direct payments based on historical yields 
HistYieldc,itech Regional historical reference yields 
YIELDc,itech,ilevel,l Yields per activity level 
DPyieldc,year Direct payments based on quantity produced 
DPyieldha Direct payments based activity levels 
nYEAR Reference period 
 
In addition to the above mentioned, this scenario considers a 3% reduction 
applicable to all DPs calculated in the reference amounts ([Eq. 26]). This reduction aims 
to build a national reserve of entitlements which is to be allocated to farmers without an 
historical record or in other “special situations”. For the Portuguese case, further 
reductions to the reference amounts of 1% and 10% apply to arable land sector 
payments and the olive sector, respectively ([Eq. 27]). These last reductions, foreseen in 
the new CAP reform (European Commission 2003a) and known as retention of 
payments, finance the optional implementation for specific types of farming and quality 
production
125
 which in the Portuguese case has created two specific payment measures, 
rewarding quality of durum wheat, in the first case, and quality of olive oil, in the 
second. In this scenario, the amount of support allocated through these measures is of 
40€/ha for durum wheat and 60€/ton for olive oil. The computation of reductions to the 
reference amount associated to the built of a national reserve and retention of payments 
is straightforward, as follows. 
 
)Re1( serveNatREFAMOUNTREFNATRES CMOCMO                         [Eq.  26] 
in which, 
REFNATRESCMO Reference amount of each CMO after subtraction of 
national reserve percentage  
REFAMOUNTCMO Reference amount of each CMO calculated for the 
reference period 
                                                 
125
 - Article 69 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 (European Commission 2003a) 
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NatReserve Percentage reduction applicable 
 
)Re1( CMOCMOCMO tentionREFNATRESONREFRETENTI                              [Eq.  27] 
in which, 
REFRETENTIONCMO Reference amount of each CMO after subtraction of 
national reserve and retention percentages 
REFNATRESCMO Reference amount of each CMO after subtraction of 
national reserve percentage  
RetentionCMO Percentage reduction applicable for that CMO 
 
 
The amount to pay at any given year, resulting from the combination of the 
number of payment entitlements with changes to the reference amount, is summarised 
in the following mathematical expression ([Eq. 28]): 
 
eSFPelibiblX
ENTITLE
ONREFRETENTI
SXemiaHa
emiaYIELDXCAPSUBSFP
lilevelitechc
ha
CMO CMO
c itech ilevel l lilevelitechcc
c clilevelitechcitech ilevel l lilevelitechc
,,,
2,,,
,,,,,,
,
.)Pr
Pr..(
 [Eq.  28] 
in which, 
CAPSUPSFP Maximum amount of SFP payments 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l Activity levels eligible for funding under the SFP 
YIELDc,itech,ilevel,l Yields per activity level 
Premiac Quality premia based on yield 
PremiaHac Quality premia based on activity levels 
S2 (Slack) overachievement of eligible area in relation to 
payment entitlements – not funded 
REFRETENTIONCMO Reference amount of each CMO after subtraction of 
national reserve and retention percentages 
ENTITLEha Payment entitlements calculated for the reference period 
 
As mentioned before, set aside calculations occur separately from these ones. Set 
aside calculations use the same procedures applicable to other activities and are not 
displayed to avoid repetition, however it is worth mentioning that, the voluntary set 
aside policy option ceases to exist under the reformed CAP, and that the compulsory set 
aside exemption policy option was taken into account while determining the reference 
amounts. The set aside exemption option was included in modelling through use of the 
formulations shown in [Eq. 29] to [Eq. 32]: 
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      [Eq.  29] 
COPsetasideX
eSETNegativSETexemptHistYieldX
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              [Eq.  30] 
COPsetasideX
SETexempteSETPosivivHistYieldX
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               [Eq.  31] 
1eSETPositiveSETNegativ                                                                               [Eq.  32] 
in which, 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l Activity levels 
HistYieldc,itech Regional historical reference yields 
SETPositive Binary variable 
SETNegative Binary variable 
SETexempt Cereal yield equivalent quantity exempted from set aside 
SasideL Compulsory set aside percentage for COP activities 
 
In these equations ([Eq. 29] to [Eq. 32], above), the area of compulsory set aside 
must be equal a percentage defined in function of the area under COP crops (cereals, 
oilseeds and protein crops, including the set aside area). That applies only if production 
of COP crops, measured according to the regional reference yields applicable to that 
area, exceeds the ceiling exempting farmers from compulsory set aside obligations. 
Percentages applicable for set aside obligations are the usual ten percent if the 
accumulated regional reference yields of COP crops surpasses that ceiling, and zero if 
they do not. 
The use of dynamic modulation is made compulsory in the CAP reform of 
2003/04 and, hence, it had to be included in this scenario to complete the SFP 
calculations. Dynamic modulation is a mechanism which enables to transfer funds from 
CAP Pillar 1 into Pillar 2, at variable and progressive rates depending on the year (up to 
5% from 2007 on), without increasing the overall budgetary cost of the CAP. All CMO 
direct payments considered in the calculation of the reference amount are thus further 
reduced by 5% due to the application of modulation. The first five thousand Euro of DP 
(or less, depending on the reference amount) are however exempt from this reduction 
and are refunded to farmers as additional amount of aid. This mechanism is 
mathematically formulated as shown below, in [Eq. 33] to [Eq. 37]; the last equation 
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computes the amount of aid allocated to farmers after the application of modulation and 
refunds via additional amount of aid, while the first three illustrate the approach used to 
calculate these refunds to farmers. 
 
MODexemptMODBINNegCAPSUBSFP.                                                            [Eq.  33] 
MODBINPosMODexemptCAPSUBSFP .                                                            [Eq.  34] 
1MODBINPosMODBINNeg                                                                           [Eq.  35] 
ADDSupport
MODBINPosMODexemptMODBINNegCAPSUBSFPModulation )...(
             [Eq.  36] 
CAPSUBADDSupportModulationCAPSUBSFP 1.                                     [Eq.  37] 
in which, 
CAPSUPSFP Maximum amount of SFP payments 
MODBINNeg Binary variable 
MODBINPos Binary variable 
MODexempt Support exempt from modulation 
Modulation Modulation rate 
ADDSupport Additional support to farmers 
 
In the formulation above, the additional amount of aid refunded to farmers is 
limited to the ceiling exempt from modulation times the modulation rate whenever the 
amount of SFP (before modulation) is greater than that ceiling. For that to happen, the 
binary variables MODBINNeg and MODBINPos must equal one and zero, respectively. 
When the amount of SFP is lower than this ceiling, the binary variables take the 
opposite values forcing the additional amount of aid to be calculated by multiplying the 
SFP value (before modulation) by the modulation rate, that is, refunding the entire 
modulation amount in the form of additional aid. 
Rural development measures in this scenario consider funding for structural 
agricultural investments only. This measure is defined under the EAFRD regulation 
(European Commission 2005b)
126
 and the conditions for its application in Portugal are 
laid down by law (DR 2008b), establishing the Rural Development Programme for 
mainland Portugal (PRODER), within the National Strategy Plan for the 2007-13 
                                                 
126
 - under axis 1 – Improving the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry by supporting restructuring, 
development and innovation. 
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period. The rate of funding for structural investments applicable to these case study 
areas, the same as in the CAP Agenda 2000 situation, covers 50% of those investments. 
 
DATA REQUIREMENTS 
 
Agricultural commodity prices in this scenario were based on projections for the 
evolution of world agricultural markets described above (see also Appendix IX – 
Outlook for World Agricultural Markets). Estimates are not available for all agricultural 
products and therefore assumptions had to be adopted to derive missing values. Missing 
agricultural product price estimates are assumed to grow at the average pace of other 
commodities for which estimates have been published, except fruits and vegetables 
which are assumed to grow at a faster rate. Exchange rates used for converting price 
trends from USD to Euro are those published by OECD/FAO (OECD and FAO 2007). 
Estimates for the evolution of agricultural production costs were calculated on 
the basis of the last six years for which national data has been published. Nominal price 
indexes were calculated for agricultural factors at a highly disaggregated level (see 
Appendix X – Agricultural Factor Costs), and the evolution of their prices throughout 
the next decade is assumed to be kept steady at the average price growth recorded in 
these last six years. Price data used to calculate these indexes were extracted from 
various agricultural statistics published by the national institute of statistics (INE 2001a; 
INE 2002; INE 2003; INE 2004; INE 2005; INE 2006; INE 2007; INE 2008). Other 
production factors for which data were not available are assumed to grow at the rate of 
the closest aggregate; agricultural factors not fitting into any of these aggregates are 
assumed to grow at the average rate of the entire agricultural production factor 
aggregate. The only exceptions to this are agricultural diesel, in which the trend of 
evolution for the world crude oil price is that estimated by OECD/FAO (OECD and 
FAO 2007), and agricultural labour which is assumed to grow at the average rate of 
growth in the national minimum wage recorded during the last six years. 
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6.3.2 – RURAL DEVELOPMENT SCENARIO 
 
The rural development scenario (RDS) elaborates on the reference scenario by 
considering the integration of one policy measure of Axis 2 of EAFRD regulation 
(European Commission 2005b)
127
 with the application of the SFP in CAP Pillar 1. This 
measure concerns the use of incentive-based farm-level management for improving 
environmental conditions in agriculture, that is, the agri-environmental measures. The 
conditions for the application of this policy in Portugal, are laid down under the law 
(DR 2008a) within the rural development National Strategy Plan for the 2007-2013 
period (PRODER). These new agri-environment policy measures (PRODI) were 
defined in March 2008 and their implications have therefore not yet been fully assessed 
due to their novelty. 
Agri-environment measures evaluated in this scenario encourage farmers to 
convert their farming units from conventional farming into integrated farming through 
an incentive-based approach. Integrated farming is an agricultural production method 
compatible with the protection and improvement of the environment, landscape and 
natural resources (2007). This new group of agri-environmental measures is for that 
reason compliant with conditions imposed by WTO, as payments fit within the green 
box, that is, with no, or minimal, trade-distorting effects on production. 
Compensation to farmers under PRODI is applicable to most crops. The amount 
of aid provided for the conversion into integrated farming varies according to crop type, 
acreage and use of irrigation criteria (Tables 18 and 19). The last criterion was indeed 
responsible for this scenario, as „coupling‟ per area payments on the use of irrigation 
may compromise the performance of water policies for irrigated agriculture.  
 
Table 19. Selected crop types eligible for funding under PRODI policy options 
Crop Eligibility 
PRODI Support 
(€/ha) 
Reference Area 
(ha) 
Permanent crops Olive grove 
Irrigated 260 10 
Rain fed 164 20 
Temporary Arable 
land crops 
Irrigated 194 20 
Rain fed 40 30 
                                                 
127
 - under axis 2 – agri-environmental payments. 
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Horticulture 567 5 
Permanent Pastures 106 30 
 
 
 
Table 20. Modulation of support under PRODI policy options according to acreage 
Tiers Eligible Area Modulation of Support 
First ] 0,ref area ] 100% 
Second ] ref area, 2.ref area ] 80% 
Third ] 2.ref area, 5.ref area ] 50% 
Fourth ] 5.ref area, +∞ ] 20% 
 
 This policy is mathematical expressed as shown in equations 38 to 41, for an 
application to vegetable crops, as the product of the area of crops eligible for funding 
under each policy option by the amount of support granted for each tier under that 
policy option. 
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14321 NPRODIvegBINPRODIvegBINPRODIvegBINPRODIvegBI          [Eq.  41] 
in which, 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l Activity levels eligible for funding in the respective 
PRODI policy option (vegetables in this example) 
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PRODIvegBIN1 Binary variable for the first tier 
PRODIvegBIN2 Binary variable for the second tier 
PRODIvegBIN3 Binary variable for the third tier 
PRODIvegBIN4 Binary variable for the fourth tier 
PRIDIrefarea1 Reference area applicable to the respective PRODI 
policy option (vegetables in this example) 
PRODIaid1 Level of support to the respective PRODI policy option 
PRODImod1 Modulation of support for the first tier 
PRODImod2 Modulation of support for the second tier 
PRODImod3 Modulation of support for the third tier 
PRODImod4 Modulation of support for the fourth tier 
PRODIpayVeg Farm support resulting from this policy option 
 
In the above mathematical representation of this policy, the first two equations 
([Eq. 38] and [Eq. 39]) situate the sum of activities eligible under each policy option on 
one of the four tiers defined for that option. The third equation ([Eq. 40]) quantifies the 
amount of support granted under this policy option by multiplying the sum of eligible 
activity levels by the amount of support affected by the correspondent modulation rate 
applicable to that tier. The last equation [Eq. 41]) prevents production from occurring in 
more than one tier at the time. 
 Equations above mathematically describe the PRODI policy option of 
horticulture. The mathematical formulation of other options is obtained by changing the 
parameters that characterise that option, such as reference area, support, and activities 
eligible for funding under the respective policy options.  
 These options coexist in both time and space, that is, in a given year and at the 
farm level. Their “coupled” nature according to the criteria mentioned is much likely to 
influence the relative marginal utility of each activity, particularly in those cases for 
which support granted is higher than costs incurred, and benefits forgone, converting 
agricultural systems into integrated protection, such as it may be the case of permanent 
pastures, for instance. Stricter cross-compliance requirements do apply under PRODI 
concerning the use of soil and water resources, land management and fitopathology than 
in the previous scenario
128
. 
 
 
 
                                                 
128
 - No specific assumptions were taken into account in the mathematical model to reflect these aspects. 
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DATA REQUIREMENTS 
 
This scenario is based on the reference scenario and uses the same general 
assumptions concerning trends governing the evolution of agricultural commodity 
markets. Some specific assumptions were adjusted in this scenario concerning 
agricultural input, for instance, in order to reflect higher costs of agricultural pesticides 
suitable to integrated protection, as well as higher costs of petroleum based products 
beyond estimates produced by OECD/FAO for the evolution of crude oil prices (OECD 
and FAO 2007). These adjustments are summarised in table 21. Apart from these price 
adjustments, the only additional requirements in data are those concerning the PRODI 
policy measure described above. 
 
Table 21. Agricultural factor prices for 2010 and 2015 (base = reference scenario) 
Agricultural input 
Agricultural price indices 
for 2010 and 2015 (%) 
Agricultural diesel and lubricants 115 
Other petroleum-based products 115 
Freights/transport of cargo 115 
Electricity 105 
Agricultural labour 110 
Agricultural plants and seeds 110 
Agricultural fertilisers and soil correctives 115 
Agricultural pesticides 115 
 
 
6.3.3 – LIBERALISATION SCENARIO 
 
 The main assumption underlying the Liberalisation/World Market (WMS) 
scenario is that European agriculture will progressively head towards more liberalised 
open markets at world level in recent years to come. In this scenario, the current market-
based CAP direction is strengthened by the complete dismantlement of all forms of 
support under Pillar 1, CMO‟s are abolished to remove market and trade distortions, and 
restrictions to market access cease to exist. Policy intervention if the field of 
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environment in agriculture is partly withdrawn (e.g. set aside obligations) as the CAP 
scope of action is restricted to infrastructural support (as described in the reference 
scenario). 
 Removal of import tariffs and export restitutions would progressively align 
agricultural commodity prices in the European market with those in the international 
market. Trade is expected to increase both in internal and international markets, 
contributing to homogenise commodity prices, while production is rearranged according 
to comparative advantages. Removal of maximum guaranteed areas also contributes to 
rearrange production. 
In this scenario, collapse of the CAP is expected to produce adjustments to 
agricultural commodity prices in the internal market. The direction of these adjustments 
depends on specific agriculture sectors/commodities and their respective prices at the 
international level. Commodities with internal prices below world prices would 
experience price increase, and vice-versa; for instance, most grain cereals (except 
maize) fall in the first category while animal products fall in the second. The price of 
vegetables activities is slightly reduced as cheaper products have full access into the EU 
area. Prices in this scenario were derived as described in the following paragraphs. 
 
DATA REQUIREMENTS 
 
Support for agriculture and agricultural commodity prices in this scenario differ 
substantially from that/those assumed in previous scenarios. Support for the agricultural 
sector is restricted to structural funding as described in the reference scenario; all other 
policy measures described are deactivated, therefore requiring no data. The main 
difficulty in this scenario consists in deriving commodity prices that would apply to the 
EU market in the absence of all CAP distortion.  
Agricultural commodity prices used in this scenario were based on the OECD 
Database 1986-2007
129
 (OECD 2007). Reference prices (fob prices) of the agricultural 
commodities represented within the database were taken as representative of their 
                                                 
129
 - The database used was kindly provided by the OECD. This is the database used for producing the 
Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries series and calculation of the PSE and CSE indexes and 
considers commodities such as common wheat, durum wheat, maize, barley, oats, rice, soyabean, 
rapeseed, sunflower, sugar, milk, beef and veal, pigmeat, poultry meat, sheep meat and egg. This database 
can be partly accessed online at the OECD website 
http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3343,en_2649_33773_39551355_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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respective world price at the EU border, and subtracted of handling costs and quality 
adjustments costs to calculate the equivalent reference price at the farm level. These 
prices were then subject to the evolution in agricultural commodity prices described in 
the Outlook for World Agricultural Markets (and Appendix IX) for the next decade, to 
estimate prices suitable for the two time frames considered in this study. It is worth 
noting that the market price differential for the oilseed sector crops is nil in the OECD 
commodity database. 
Adjustments to commodity prices and the reorganisation of production are also 
likely to influence agricultural factor markets; however, no assumptions on this matter 
were taken into account, as that influence is uncertain. Agricultural factor costs in this 
scenario are those used for the reference scenario. 
 
 
6.3.4 – WATER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (WATER POLICY SCENARIOS) 
 
 This research uses the bio-economic framework, presented in previous chapters 
to simulate the implications of water policy instruments for irrigated agriculture. The 
implications of water policy instruments such as volumetric pricing, area pricing on the 
basis of irrigated land and water allotments (quotas) are fully parameterised in order to 
capture the entire response pattern in response to policy change, that is from full 
irrigation at zero water price or unconstrained supply of water, up to the moment 
irrigation ceases in each representative farming system.  
The present two-part tariff is simulated in combination with the above scenarios 
of agricultural policy for a specific enforcement level in each case study area. The 
components of the two part tariff are forecasted into the 2010 and 2015 time frames, 
assuming that they suffer an annual inflation of 1.7% from their present values in 
2007/2008
130
. The mathematical formulation of these water management policies is 
shown in the next chapter. 
                                                 
130
 - OECD-FAO PCE deflator forecast for the 2007-2016 period used in the Outlook for agricultural 
markets. 
2010 2015 2010 2015
Volumetric Component (€/m
3
) 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.021
Area Component (€/Irr ha) 47.623 52.066 25.821 28.091
Caia Irrigation Scheme Odivelas Irrigation Scheme
Two-Part Tarif 
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6.4 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter designs policy-consistent and market-coherent scenarios under two 
time horizons in the near future, for understanding the implications of agricultural and 
water policy change on the irrigation sector. These scenarios define the operational 
backgrounds, with regard to all economic and agricultural policy assumptions, in which 
the implications of water policy instruments are evaluated. Ultimately, this chapter 
designs the future economic and policy environment required to run the bio-economic 
framework. 
The main historical trends and long-term driving forces governing the 
development of agriculture and agricultural markets in the EU are reviewed in this 
chapter. That review enabled producing a deterministic projection of these variables into 
the future, establishing a baseline/reference scenario for the analysis of agricultural and 
water policies. Uncertainty in the pathway of evolution of some of these key variables, 
namely agricultural policy and agricultural markets, led to design two additional 
scenarios following opposite but reasonable trends, and differing substantially on the 
level of support provided for the agricultural sector. These scenarios are thus used to 
assess the range of water policy change implications in different economic contexts, but 
they are also used as valuable tools in exploring synergies and conflicts between 
agricultural and water policy instruments. 
The implications of water policy instruments for irrigated agriculture simulated 
in this research include volumetric pricing, flat pricing, a two-part tariff and water 
allotments. These water policy instruments are assessed in combination with 
agricultural market and policy scenarios defined in this chapter under two different time 
frames. The mathematical formulation of water policy instruments is presented in the 
next chapter, together with other indicators used for reporting policy relevant results and 
outcomes of the bio-economic modelling approach. 
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CHAPTER 7 – POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS FOR 2010/2015 
 
Chapter seven focuses on the use of performance indicators for assessing the 
impacts of policy change on agriculture and on the environment, and as such they are 
the last structural module to integrate the bio-economic framework. Performance 
indicators in this research are used for capturing, reporting and summarising the results 
and outcomes of the bio-economic model in each agricultural system. Use of indicators 
in mathematical models enables producing readily available information for policy 
analysis, when compared to raw, untreated, model outputs, which are often of limited 
use and may convey less policy-relevant information. 
The implications of policy change are thus estimated by a range of policy 
relevant indicators covering the economic, social and environmental dimensions of 
sustainability in irrigated farming. These indicators aim to identify the causes, the 
quantity and extent of agricultural and environmental policy implications with respect to 
both the harmful and beneficial impacts on the environmental, the use of natural 
resources, and the viability of rural communities. Indicators were selected to address 
primary policy relevant issues in each of these dimensions of agriculture, establishing 
easy to interpret relationship between agricultural activities, agricultural practices, and 
policy related concerns. Most of the chapter deals with problems of selecting standard 
and consistent macro-level indicators, and their adjustments to a farm-level scale of 
analysis, against background criteria of policy relevance, analytical soundness, 
measurability, and level of aggregation. 
Globally, agriculture is the dominant land-use activity (OECD 2001a). For that 
reason, agricultural and environment policies which affect agricultural land use, have a 
key influential effect with respect to both harmful and beneficial environmental impacts, 
the use of natural resources, the viability of rural communities, the preservation of 
biodiversity and landscape quality (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001b). In order to identify 
the causes, the quantity and extent of these impacts, the OECD, World Bank, Eurostat 
and EEA
131
, among other organisations, have been fostering the development of agri-
environmental indicators. These indicators aim to assist policy makers to better 
understand the linkages between the causes and impacts of agricultural and 
environmental policy measures on the conditions of the environment in agriculture 
                                                 
131
 - Most of these indicators have been adapted or extended from those developed by the OECD 
(European Commission 2000c; European Commission 2001). 
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(OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). In addition, these indicators help in the monitoring, 
evaluation and forecasting of the effectiveness of alternative policy measures addressing 
agri-environmental concerns (Baldock 1999; OECD 1999b; OECD 1999c; OECD 
2001a). Indicators are therefore, a particularly valuable decision support tool in the 
development (and targeting) of coherent agricultural and environmental policies for the 
sustainable use and management of natural resources (European Commission 2000c; 
OECD 1999b; OECD 1999c).
132
  
The OECD, in particular, has produced extensive work on the development of 
indicators to assess the environmental performance of agriculture (OECD 2001a). In 
order to establish the linkages between agriculture and environment, OECD indicators 
were developed within the Pressure State Response (PSR) framework
133
. The PSR 
framework enables to highlight linkages between causes, effects and responses as it 
interconnects the diverse components that affect pressures, states, responses, and 
establishes relationships among them. The PSR framework considers that human and 
economic activities exert pressures on the environment; that lead to changes in the 
quality and quantity of natural recourses – that is, affect the state of the environment; 
and may stimulate societies responses and behaviour changes through environmental, 
economic and sectoral policy actions (OECD 2001c) to change the pressures and state 
of the environment (OECD 1999b). 
By using the PSR framework, agriculture may be viewed in the broad context of 
sustainable development (OECD 2001a) and the relationships between the economic, 
social and environmental dimensions within agriculture may thus be accounted for 
(Baldock 1999; OECD 1999b). This methodology has been proven to be a conceptually 
solid basis for policy change analysis, and development of policy relevant indicators 
(Thomassin 1999), as it integrates economic, social and environmental aspects (such as, 
macroeconomic forces, the viability of rural areas, biophysical processes, land use 
changes, and farm financial resources) (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). 
Most of the work on agri-environmental indicators for policy analysis has been 
structured within the context of the PSR framework or variants of the PSR (OECD 
1999b). The PSR ensures that indicators are not developed in isolation, but that they 
                                                 
132
 - The economic modelling of the linkages and environmental outcomes in agriculture has, in fact, been 
a main application of OECD‟s agri-environmental indicators (OECD 2008b). 
133
 - For more information on the PSR see, for example, OECD (1999b). Other institutions often built on 
OECD‟s work on indicators either using the PSR framework or used some variation of the framework, in 
which indicators were then developed (OECD 1999b), such as the EEA‟s Drivers Pressure State Impact 
Response framework. 
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relate to others (EEA 2005; OECD 1999b). For that reason, and in order to identify 
synergies and trade-offs between indicators, indicators should be interpreted in clusters 
within the overall context of assessment (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a).  
Definitions and concepts of indicators for policy analysis are broadly 
internationally harmonised (OECD 2001a; OECD 2001c) and standard and consistent 
methods of calculation are now available for a large number of agri-environmental 
indicators (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a; OECD 2001c). These indicators cover a wide 
range of policy relevant areas for assessing the impacts of agriculture and policy change 
on the environment, and most of them are relatively practical to estimate, considering 
the data available (OECD 1999b)
134
.  
In this study, the operational set of indicators chosen to evaluate the impacts of 
policy change on agriculture and on the environment, was selected having in mind the 
following criteria: policy relevance; analytical soundness; measurability; and the 
appropriate level of aggregation (OECD 1999b). Indicators were selected to address 
primary policy relevant issues on the economic, social and environmental dimensions of 
agriculture, and establish easy to interpret relationship between agricultural activities (or 
agricultural practices) and policy related concerns. These indicators are applicable to 
and measurable at a wide set of farming systems and are able to show trends over time 
and across alternative policy measures, taking into consideration the appropriate level of 
aggregation (OECD 1999b). In this analysis, the appropriate level of aggregation was 
considered to be the farm level as it enables to discriminate results accordingly to the 
different farming systems. 
Policy relevant issues in agriculture, within the PSR framework, depend on the 
pressures on the environment and on the natural endowments and natural assets of the 
country being studied (OECD 1999b). All the above considerations on the choice of 
indicators, enabled to select the indicators shown in figure 25 to assess the economic, 
social and environmental impacts of water policy change in agriculture. 
 
 
 
                                                 
134
 - In spite of the above mentioned, data deficiencies are, in fact, a major impediment to indicator 
development (EEA 2005; OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). Problems of data definitions, poor quality data 
and lack of systematic and regular data collection still offer untransposable resistance for calculating 
some indicators (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). 
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Figure 25. Agricultural sustainability indicators for policy analysis   
 
Most of the indicators used by the OECD, World Bank, Eurostat and EEA are 
primarily focused at a national scale level and are designed to be used at national, 
international and global decision making contexts (OECD 2001c). Accordingly, most of 
the data required for their calculation is only available for highly aggregated levels, 
which therefore creates some measurability problems for farm-level analysis. In order to 
prevent misinterpretations regarding the meaning of the indicators used, it is necessary 
to mention that overcoming these data/scale limitations required adapting definitions 
and concepts of some indicators and adjusting measurement methods of others. Changes 
to the calculation of the original indicators are explained where appropriate. 
Comparative analysis of indicators, in differing climatic and environmental 
conditions, requires additional careful interpretation, especially if absolute levels of 
indicators are to be compared (OECD 1999b).  In some cases the comparison of 
absolute levels is necessary and significant (OECD 2001a), but very often is most 
appropriate to compare the trends and ranges in indicators over time (OECD 1999b; 
OECD 2001a) or over different policy measures, as the direction of change in the 
indicators evolution (increase/decrease) provides an unambiguous indication of 
agriculture and policy change impacts (OECD 2001a). 
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The remainder of this section provides an introduction to each indicator 
presented in the above figure. It describes the particular policy relevant issue addressed 
by each indicator and offers some operational guidance for their calculation, regarding 
scale and measurability concerns. Particular emphasis has been devoted on the 
integration of indicators within the mathematical structure of the modelling approach. In 
order to facilitate the explanation and interpretation of the indicators, some intermediate 
calculations were omitting from the presentation of the mathematical calculation 
procedure. 
 
 
7.1 – AGRICULTURAL/FARM ECONOMIC INDICATORS  
 
7.1.1 – AGRICULTURAL/FARM NET INCOME 
 
The net farm income indicator measures the profitability of agriculture. This is a 
key indicator as it reflects both the short-term economic viability or the long-term 
economic sustainability of agriculture, depending on the time horizon for which it is 
estimated (OECD 1999c; OECD 2001a). 
This indicator applied for the long-term, is defined as the difference between 
gross output and all expenses, including depreciation at the farm level (OECD 2001a). 
Gross output consists of market returns on agricultural production such as, sales of 
crops and livestock products, including transfers from consumers associated to market 
price support policies, receipts from other agricultural activities, transfers from 
taxpayers through government budgetary support due to agricultural policies (e.g. direct 
payments, agri-environment payments) (OECD 2001a). Expenses include expenditure 
on intermediate consumption (seeds, agro-chemicals, agricultural goods and services 
consumed during the productive process), employment wages and salaries, interest and 
depreciation of fixed capital and land rent (OECD 2001a). The mathematical 
formulation of this indicator is expressed in ([Eq. 11]). 
One must bear in mind that the net farm income from agricultural activities 
represents only a share of the total farm household income (OECD 2001a). A 
significant share of income is actually generated from both on- and off-farm non-
 184 
agricultural activities (OECD 2001a). Examples of these sources of income include, for 
instance, rural tourism, wages from non-agricultural employment of household 
members, capital income and social transfers. It is also important to note that the 
calculation of this indicator does not take into account externalities associated to 
agriculture, such as the degradation to the quality of natural resources (OECD 2001a). 
 
 
7.1.2 – AGRICULTURAL/FARM CONTRIBUTION TO GDP  
 
The farming contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) provides a 
contextual indication of the weight of the agricultural sector within the overall economy 
of the country being studied. The OECD defines and calculates this indicator as the 
share of agriculture in total GDP, either in percentage or relating the change of the 
contribution of agriculture to the change in population over the same period (OECD 
2001c). 
Bazzani et al. (2005) suggest adjusting this indicator, for farm-level analysis, to 
assess the farm contribution to the economic wealth. This indicator would thus be 
calculated as the difference between the market returns on agricultural production and 
agricultural services (from sales of crops and livestock products and expenditure on 
intermediate consumption (seeds, agro-chemicals, agricultural goods and services 
consumed during the productive process), excluding transfers from consumers 
associated to market price support policies). In order to facilitate comparability across 
farming systems this indicator is reported in €/ha. 
In the calculation of this indicator, transfers from taxpayers and consumers 
towards farmers are not considered as they do not actually contribute to social wealth, 
but they are rather transfers of wealth within society. Depreciation of equipments is not 
subtracted from this margin as the purpose is the calculation of GDP instead of the Net 
Domestic Product (Bazzani et al. 2005). 
GDP contribution is determined in the mathematical programming models 
through a similar formulation to that used for the net farm income, excluding the non 
intervenient components, such as agricultural support and depreciation. 
 
 185 
 
7.1.3 – FARM SUPPORT  
 
The agricultural producer support indicator provides an estimate of the overall 
support granted to agriculture from consumers and taxpayers arising from any policy 
measures. This indicator is important from several policy perspectives as it measures the 
total expenditure towards agriculture and the overall support on equity grounds. The net 
agricultural support is generally measured at national or international levels by the 
OECD PSE (Producer Support Estimate).
135
  
In this case farm support is calculated taking into account budgetary transfers to 
farmers only
136
 The latter includes (depending on the agricultural policy scenario) CAP 
Pillar 1 SFP, as well as CAP Pillar 2 measures targeting farm income (Objective 1 
areas) and environmentally friendly agricultural systems (agri-environmental measures). 
This indicator is reported in €/ha to facilitate comparability across farming systems. 
The mathematical computation of farm support indicators depends on the 
scenarios of agricultural policy described in the previous chapter. 
 
 
7.1.4 – AGRICULTURAL WATER PAYMENT – WUA REVENUES 
 
Several institutions often mention the water price for agriculture from the point 
of view of providing contextual information. Most commonly this point of view relates 
to government commitments to develop irrigated agriculture through low water prices 
(within the policy scope of equity transfers). In this perspective, the agricultural water 
price provides a crude yardstick measurement for comparisons across sectors or regions.  
The second perspective on these transfers addresses the issue of water user 
association (WUA) revenues, which simultaneously reflects the overall cost of water for 
irrigation. This is seldom discussed but just as crucial in terms of policy relevance as 
                                                 
135
 - Further information on the OECD support estimates in relation to agriculture (PSE, MPS, CSE and 
TSE) is available in any of the producer and consumer support estimates user‟s guide 
http://www.oecd.org/  
136
 - Gross transfers to agricultural producers arising from policy measures creating distortions on 
domestic prices from international prices were not taken into account. 
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agricultural water payments, water taxes and fees, are the major source of income for 
most WUA. This indicator may be interpreted as monitoring the effects of policy 
change on WUA revenues, providing some crucial insight on their financial 
sustainability.  
The mathematical formulation of the indicator depends on the water 
management policy being simulated at the time (pricing methods, taxes, etc), as shown 
in ([Eq. 42]). Water pricing policies studied in this work, are volumetric pricing (a 
direct charging method in which the water price is related to water quantity), area based 
pricing in function of irrigated areas (an indirect charging method applicable to actually 
irrigated area, IRR), and a two-part tariff involving both volumetric and flat components 
applied to the entire farming area. 
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               [Eq.  42] 
where, 
WATCONS is the farm water consumption (m
3
) 
WRATE the volumetric water rate (vol. price simulation, €/m3)  
Xc,itech,ilevel,l are the activity levels 
FLATPRICE the flat area charge (flat price simulation, €/ha)  
nYEAR is the year or years for which the model is run 
WTAXyear the vol. water rate component (two-part tariff policy) 
FLAT_TAXyear the flat area pricing component (two-part tariff policy)  
 
This indicator is particularly related to other water management indicators, such 
as water use intensity, water use efficiency, and irrigation delivery systems indicators. 
In terms of land use indicators, this indicator is either directly or indirectly related to the 
share of agricultural land used for irrigation, depending on the water policy.  
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7.2 – AGRICULTURAL/FARM EMPLOYMENT  
 
Within agriculture there are a number of socio-cultural issues which fall under 
the broad context of sustainable development (OECD 1999b). An area of growing 
interest is that of the maintenance of rural communities (OECD 2001a). The creation 
and diversification of rural employment opportunities, within and outside agriculture, is 
an integral component to insure both the viability of rural communities and, in the long 
term, the sustainability of agriculture within the rural world. 
The social dimension of sustainable development with relation to agriculture and 
the viability of rural communities is of considerable policy relevance (OECD 2001a; 
OECD 2001c). Although the role of the agricultural sector within the overall economy 
has been declining, it still accounts for, either directly or indirectly, the major share of 
employment in rural areas (OECD 2001a).  
OECD (2001a) defines this indicator as the share of agriculture within the total 
civilian employment population and uses it as a „proxy‟ to assess the farming 
contribution in rural communities.
137
 The OECD proposes the use of this indicator as it 
describes fundamental contextual information on the role of agricultural sector in 
providing employment in the context of the national/regional economy.  
At farm level analysis this indicator requires some adjustment. The measurement 
of the employment arising from agriculture can be interpreted as the amount of labour 
required by the farm (Bazzani et al. 2005). This indicator is reported either in hours or 
AWU, per year and per hectare, to facilitate comparisons across farming systems.  
In mathematical modelling this indicator is computed by the product of activity 
levels by the technical coefficients reflecting labour requirements attached to those 
activities.
138
 The formulation used to aggregate farm labour requirements is provided in 
the modelling section. The equations below, (see [Eq. 43] and [Eq. 44]) calculate the 
total labour required at the farm level, in hours per hectare, and quantify the shares of 
family and hired labour used, respectively. In the first equation, labour used for 
irrigation is distinguished from that used for other agricultural practices. 
                                                 
137
 - This is one of the main indicators for monitoring the social relevance of agriculture, however, it 
accounts only for the share of employment directly involved in farming. 
138
 - This information is generally available in crop budgets. 
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in which, 
LABOUR is the farm total agricultural labour required (h/ha) 
LABREQc,itech,m is the labour required per activity, except irrigation 
IRRlabourc,itech,ilevel,m is the labour required per activity, for irrigation only 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l are the activity levels 
FAMLABm are the producer and family monthly labour required 
FAMWAGEyear the family labour remuneration 
TEMPLABOURm the temporary labour hired monthly 
nPERM the number of permanent employees 
AWUnitm the monthly labour made available by a permanent 
employee 
 
 
7.3 – AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL FARM MANAGEMENT INDICATORS 
 
Due to their influence on the use of inputs and natural resources, agricultural 
practices such as fertiliser, pesticide, water and land use management have a direct 
impact on the conservation/degradation of the environment, both on and off the farm 
(OECD 1999b; OECD 1999c; OECD 2001a) 
Farm management indicators can be interpreted as pressure, state or response 
indicators
139
. They are particularly useful for policy analysis as they help understand the 
linkages and trade-offs (OECD 2001a) between management practices, farm 
profitability and environmental impacts. Management indicators can, for instance, be 
                                                 
139
 - The classification of indicators is not always straightforward. Indicators can shift their role within the 
DPSIR-PSR framework, depending on the agri-environmental context (EEA 2005).  
 189 
used to track trends in the use of inputs (e.g. irrigation water) and monitor changes in 
management practices (e.g. irrigation technology)
140
.  
In this work the indicators selected for reporting farm management use of 
resources and their implication on the environment, relate mainly to the intensity of use 
of fertilisers, pesticide risk, as well as water and land. 
 
 
7.3.1 – AGRICULTURAL WATER USE - IRRIGATION WATER MANAGEMENT  
 
Freshwater resources are of major economic and environmental importance 
(OECD 2001c). In fact, water resources are becoming increasingly scarce and face 
increasing pressures from agricultural, urban and industrial water demands (OECD 
2001a). In addition, environmental water needs are increasingly recognised as legitimate 
demands, therefore effectively competing directly with the other sectors for scarce 
resources (OECD 2001a). Avoiding the overexploitation of water resources and 
preventing the degradation of environmental quality may thus require reducing the 
pressure from other sectors, particularly agriculture, by reducing the overall water use 
and increasing the efficiency of its use.  
The protection and preservation of freshwater resources is explicitly considered 
a major policy concern for most countries, particularly those suffering from scare water 
resources. The availability of water resources, of adequate quality and sufficient 
quantity, and the management of those resources within and across sectors are integral 
components of sustainable development. 
Indicators commonly used to address agricultural water use concerns include 
both water use intensity and efficiency indicators
141
. The OECD defines the water use 
intensity as the proportion of water resources subject to diversion (abstraction) for 
agricultural use, in relation to the total use (OECD 1999c; OECD 2001a)
142
. Water use 
efficiency indicators, technical and economic, provide a measurement of water 
                                                 
140
 - Very often these indicators describe potential environmental pressures rather than actual pressures or 
environmental impacts. (OECD 2001c) 
141
 - Regional/sectoral comparisons require extreme careful as delivery conditions and quality aspects 
vary greatly. 
142
 - Other sources relate this to the total available water resources (OECD 1999c; OECD 2001c). Water 
use intensity indicators at regional/national levels may be calculated to provide information on the 
pressures on water resources and on the competition between sectors; in this context, abstractions should 
be related to the total available renewable water resources. 
 190 
productivity in agriculture from physical (tonnes/m
3
) and economic (€/m3) perspectives 
(OECD 1999c). While the water use technical efficiency indicator has to be applied for 
selected crops only, the water use economic efficiency may be applied to all irrigated 
crops (OECD 1999c; OECD 2001a)
143
. 
The water use intensity indicator reveals the importance of the agricultural sector 
in total water use (OECD 2001a). This indicator provides an estimate of the pressures 
on water resources caused by agriculture, and it is thus a measure of water consumption 
related to agriculture. A similar measurement, at the farm level, consists in the irrigation 
water use total
144
. The computation of this indicator is shown in ([Eq. 45]), in terms of 
mathematical modelling, requires technical coefficients (per hectare) on crop water 
requirements attached to each activity and different irrigation efficiencies attached to 
each irrigation technology
145
. Parameterisation of water prices and water quantities 
enables to express this indicator in the form of farm water demand curves, for this 
reason, the indicator is embedded with important economic information such as the 
water demand and the marginal utility value of irrigation water. In order to facilitate the 
comparability of results across farming systems, and farms of different size, this 
indicator is reported in cubic meters per hectare.  
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in which, 
WATCONS is the farm total water consumption 
WATREQc,ilevel,m,year the labour required per activity, except irrigation 
WUEitech the water application efficiency of irrigation systems 
nYEAR the year or years for which the model is run 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l are the activity levels 
 
The irrigation water use technical efficiency indicator assesses the performance 
of agricultural water use in terms of food production. It relates, for selected irrigated 
crops, the physical production of agriculture with the volume of water utilised (OECD 
                                                 
143
 - In OECD definition (OECD 1999c; OECD 2001a) return flows should be subtracted from the 
amount of irrigation water applied, as they are not actually consumed in the productive process. 
144
 - In fact, due to absence of data, the OECD (OECD 2001a) proposes to use this indicator as a proxy for 
water use intensity. This indicator is similar to EEA IRENA 2 (EEA 2005). 
145
 - The formulation used is slightly more complex than described as it also enables variable irrigation 
levels – using crop water functions – to be modelled in each irrigated crop and technology. 
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2001a), or volume consumed (OECD 1999c)
146
. The calculation of this indicator in 
([Eq. 46]) requires technical coefficients on physical production to be attached to each 
irrigated activity (crop, irrigation technology and irrigation levels). The formulation 
below is expressed for individual crops, in kilograms of output per cubic meter of water 
applied per hectare. 
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     [Eq.  46] 
in which, 
techWUEc.l is the technical water use efficiency 
WATREQc,ilevel,m,year the water required per activity 
WUEitech the water application efficiency of irrigation systems 
nYEAR the year or years for which the model is run 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l are the activity levels 
YIELDc,ilevel,year is the yield of each activity 
 
The OECD describes the irrigation water use economic efficiency indicator as 
the monetary value of agricultural production
147
 per unit volume of irrigation water 
utilised/consumed (OECD 2001a). This monitors how well water is managed in 
agriculture from an economic perspective. Without compromising this purpose, this 
indicator was modified to a simpler formulation (see [Eq. 47]), relating the indicators of 
net farm income with irrigation water demand. This establishes a direct and easy to 
understand relationship between the economic and environment dimensions of water 
management at the farm level. 
 
WATCONS
ZAV
econWUE
_
                                                                                      [Eq.  47] 
in which, 
econWUE is the economic water use efficiency 
                                                 
146
 - As mentioned, in OECD definition (OECD 1999c; OECD 2001a), the volume of return flows should 
be subtracted from the volume diverted for irrigation and applied to that crop.  
147
 - In this definition (OECD 1999c; OECD 2001a) the monetary value of production corresponds “to the 
difference between the gross margin of irrigated production and the gross margin of alternative rain-fed 
agricultural production” (OECD 2001a). In this original formulation the indicator would represent the 
gross added benefit of irrigation water use in agriculture, which therefore does not take into account the 
existence of significant fixed costs associated to irrigation equipment. 
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AV_Z a proxy for net income  
WATCONS the farm total water consumption 
 
These indicators are strongly connected with other aspects of farm management, 
in particular irrigation technology (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). This link expresses 
the extent to which different forms of irrigation technology affect irrigation water 
efficiency (OECD 2001a).  
The irrigation delivery systems indicator represents a measurement of the 
efficiency of water management and distribution, through the evaluation and monitoring 
of the technological status of irrigation (Bazzani et al. 2002). In this perspective, the 
indicator may be used as an estimate on the role of technological adoption/development 
in irrigation management to relieve pressures on water resources (OECD 1999c)
148
. 
This indicator on irrigation water management assesses the share of irrigation water 
applied by each irrigation delivery system in relation to the total quantity of water used 
for irrigation (OECD 2001a)
149
, as [Eq. 48] shows.  
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             [Eq.  48] 
in which, 
IRRtechitech is the share of each irrigation tech. (except rain fed) 
WATCONS the farm total water consumption 
WATREQc,ilevel,m,year the water required per activity 
WUEitech is the water application efficiency of irrigation systems 
nYEAR the year or years for which the model is run 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l are the activity levels 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
148
 - This information is however extremely limited (OECD 2001a). 
149
 - This indicator may also be defined as the share of irrigated agricultural area under different irrigation 
systems (OECD 1999c). This method of calculating the indicator does not, however, take into 
consideration the different irrigation water requirements of different crops, as it does not take into account 
the variable irrigation levels modelled in this work. Using the share of water applied provides a more 
precise estimate of water use efficiency (Bazzani et al. 2002). 
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7.3.2 – AGRICULTURAL NUTRIENT USE  
 
An adequate supply of nutrients is essential to crop growth and fundamental for 
raising agricultural productivity (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). Excessive loss of 
nutrients to the environment, however, contribute to environmental problems, such as 
water pollution, eutrophication, soil acidification and climatic change (OECD 1999b; 
OECD 2001a; OECD 2001c)
150
. Whilst not replenishing nutrient losses may decrease 
soil fertility and contribute to the “soil mining” of nutrients (OECD 2001a).  
To assess these impacts on the environment, particularly on the pollution of 
surface and groundwater by nutrients, the OECD proposes the use of nutrient balance 
approaches (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a; OECD 2001c). Nutrient balance indicators 
establish a relationship between nutrient use, environmental quality conditions and 
sustainable use of soil resources (OECD 2001a). However, these balances have various 
limitations (OECD 1999b); either in surplus or deficit, they can only show the potential 
risk for environmental damage or unsustainable use of soil resources, not actual 
pollution or resource depletion (OECD 2001a; OECD 2008a). For that reason, they 
cannot be interpreted as environmental impact indicators (OECD 1999b; OECD 
2001a)
151
. 
The intensity of fertiliser use in agriculture is another indicator used to monitor 
agricultural nutrient use (OECD 2001c). This indicator describes pressures as it also 
addresses potential impacts on the environment rather than effective pollution (OECD 
2001c). Although it “provides little information” of the relationships between 
agriculture and the environment (OECD 1999b), it is of assistance in economic 
modelling as it represents potential pressures with fewer data requirements. This 
indicator is mathematically computed using technical coefficients attached to each 
                                                 
150
 - Apart from the environmental externality perspective, these losses may also represent a possible 
cause of economic inefficiency (OECD 2008a). 
151
 - Soil type, hydro-gealogical and climate conditions and factors (OECD 1999b), such as the amount of 
rainfall and intensity, soil conditions (e.g. type, slope, land cover), amount and timing of nutrient 
applications as well as the nutrient chemical form, crop type and nutrient needs, among other factors, are 
required to provide a preferential indication of the pollution pathways. In addition, data – for example for 
nitrogen – on nutrient inputs, (through chemical fertilizers, livestock manure, atmospheric fixation and 
deposition and contained in seeds/plants) and nutrient losses (through run-off, leaching, erosion, 
volatilisation and net-uptake by crops) (OECD 2001a) may not be readily available for site-specific 
conditions. 
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activity reflecting the consumption of nutrients in terms of active ingredients per 
hectare
152
.  
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in which, 
Nitrogenc,ilevel Nitrogen applied per activity 
Phosphorusc Phosphorus applied per crop 
Potassiumc Potassium applied per crop 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l Activity levels 
 
 
7.3.3 – AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDE LOAD INDEX  
 
Pesticides are widely used in agriculture to help maintain and improve farm 
productivity, as well as food product quality (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). Pesticides 
help to prevent losses of agricultural production but they represent potential threats to 
human health and the environment (OECD 2001a). Once released into the environment 
pesticides may impair water quality, contribute to ozone depletion, bioaccumulate and 
biomagnify
153
 therefore harming human and wild life (OECD 1999b). The impacts of 
agricultural pesticides on the environment are a primary policy concern. 
The potential harmful effects of agricultural pesticides depend greatly on the 
inherent toxicity of the pesticide, on its mobility and persistence in the environment  
(exposure) (OECD 2001a). Pesticide use indicators (see OECD 2001a) calculated as the 
quantity of pesticide applied (in terms of active ingredients), similarly to that used for 
fertilisers, describe potential pressures on the environment rather than actual damage on 
the environment (OECD 2001c)
154
. Pesticide risk indicators, on the other hand, show 
                                                 
152
 - The original OECD indicator is expressed in tonnes of active ingredient per square kilometre of 
agricultural land. This indicator corresponds to EEA IRENA 8 indicator (EEA 2005). Fertiliser inputs 
were extracted from crop budgets, which do not take into account variable water use levels. In the case of 
nitrogen applied, the quantity of nitrogen applied per crop was transformed in quantity applied per 
activity using the relationship between yield and water use, in order to reflect decreasing nutrient 
requirements with lower yields obtained by reductions in water use.  
153
 - The accumulation of a pesticide within and across trophic levels. 
154
 - Different pesticides pose different types and levels of environmental risks (OECD 2001a) which are 
not recognised by this indicator (OECD 2001c). In fact, increases in pesticide use may coincide with 
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trends in environmental risks by combining information on pesticide chemistry with 
information on pesticide use (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). Several methods exist for 
calculating pesticide risks and they all follow a similar general formulation and use 
similar data on pesticide chemistry (OECD 2001a)
155
. The pesticide risk indicator 
chosen is the Danish „Index of Load‟. This indicator provides a relative measure of load 
concerning a specific type of toxicity or fate data and it expresses potential acute effects 
on human health or the environment (OECD 2001a). 
The Danish Index of Load is used for all pesticides applied at the farm level. 
Exposure depends on the quantity of pesticide applied (that is, on the frequency and 
concentration) and it is expressed in Kg of active substance (Kg of commercial 
formulation times concentration of active substance). The lethal dose (LD50)
156
 index for 
mammals, a measure on the total acute toxicity, was used as a toxicity parameter. The 
LD50 is expressed in mg of active substance per kilogram of a population of organisms 
exposed
157
. The resulting overall index is calculated by adding the contributions of the 
different pesticides applied. The total Index of Load is measured in Kg of killed 
organisms/Kg of active substance per hectare. 
The Danish Index of Load is easily computable in mathematical models through 
a counter equation shown below ([Eq. 50]). It requires technical coefficients on 
pesticide application (concentration, Concpest,c, and frequency, Freqpest,c) attached to 
each activity and parameters reflecting pesticide toxicity such as the DL50 (DL50Pest). 
This data on exposure was extracted from crop budgets while toxicity data were made 
available by agrochemical manufacturer companies (see Bonet et al (2001) for a 
comprehensive list). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
reductions of environmental damage and vice versa (EEA 2005; OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a; OECD 
2001c). Pesticide use indicators, as described in this paragraph, correspond to EEA‟s IRENA 9 indicator 
(EEA 2005). 
155
 - These methods differ in terms of complexity and data requirements (OECD 2001a).  
156
 - Lack of data still represents the main obstacle to calculating pesticide risk indicators (OECD 2008a). 
Data on the toxicity and environmental health variables is generally available (OECD 2008a) and fairly 
complete, especially for mammals (OECD 2001a). The lethal dose (LD50) for mammals is for that reason 
the chosen parameter of toxicity. The LD50 is defined as the quantity of pesticide needed to kill 50% of a 
given population of organisms exposed. 
157
 - This calculation does not take into account the diffusion and persistence of pesticides in the 
environment. In addition, the toxicity index is that for mammals and therefore the indicator does not take 
into account other kind of organisms (or assumes a similar impact) (Bazzani et al. 2002). Moreover, 
pesticide use patterns, such as, volumes applied, application period and method, type of crop treated and 
type of soil,  are not taken into account (European Commission 2001) 
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in which, 
Concpest,c is the concentration of active matter in the pesticide 
formulation 
Freqpest,c is the frequency of pesticide pest application  
LD50Pest the lethal dose for mammals 
Xc,itech,ilevel,l are the activity levels 
 
 
7.3.4 – AGRICULTURAL LAND USE, LANDSCAPE AND BIODIVERSITY  
 
Agriculture occupies the major part of the total land area use in most countries 
(OECD 2001a; OECD 2008a). Agricultural activities are, due to its biophysical nature, 
developed within natural ecosystems and have indissoluble relationships with 
environmental processes (European Commission 2000c; OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). 
Agricultural land use patterns and agricultural practices have, therefore, a significant 
influence on natural resources, biodiversity, wildlife habitats and landscapes, all of 
which are highly dependent on land use (European Commission 2001; OECD 1999b; 
OECD 2001a; OECD 2001b). Agricultural, trade, environmental and macro-policies 
affecting agriculture will necessarily, directly or indirectly, influence the environment. 
Agriculture may both contribute to enhance or to degrade the environment. 
Agricultural agro-ecosystems provide key habitats for wildlife, and can serve to 
maintain and to enhance biodiversity (OECD 1999b; OECD 2001a). On the other hand, 
abandonment, expansion of agriculture, and intensification of input use, may threaten 
biodiversity (OECD 2001a).  
The understanding and measurement of the impacts of agriculture on the areas of 
biodiversity, habitats and landscape is still at an early stage of development (OECD 
2001a). In spite of considerable efforts to develop these indicators, at both conceptual 
and empirical levels, the available indicators and data are not easily addressed through 
agricultural economic mathematical models, specially when confronted against the 
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criteria of policy relevance, analytical soundness and measurability (OECD 1999b)
158
. 
Agricultural land use patterns and related indicators may help by providing a proxy 
measure in exploring the possible pressures on these environmental areas.  
Land use changes are “the integrating element between the economic, social and 
environmental influences on agriculture” (OECD 2001a). Land use indicators, allied 
with knowledge on agricultural systems and agriculture practices, may provide a useful 
representation of the possible pressures on the level, type and intensity of agriculture 
land use (OECD 2001a). The OECD proposes the use of intensively farmed agricultural 
habitats indicator to monitor wild life habitats (see OECD 2001a). This indicator is 
defined as the share of each crop in the total agricultural area (OECD 2001a) and may 
be interpreted as an indication of the risks associated with the 
homogenisation/specialisation and intensification/extensification of farming systems 
(OECD 1999b)
159
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where Xc,itech,ilevel,l are the activity levels. 
 
 
7.4 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter concludes the presentation of the bio-economic modelling approach 
proposed in this research. It focuses on the mathematical formulation and description of 
the main outputs generated by this modelling approach. These outputs are expressed as 
indicators which cover the main policy relevant implications of agricultural and 
environmental policy change on the environment, the use of natural resources, and the 
viability of rural communities. 
                                                 
158
 - The quantification and monitoring of these aspects is costly (OECD 2001a), complex (OECD 1999b) 
and difficult to capture in indicators (EEA 2005). Bearing in mind that the behaviour of agri-
environmental indicators should be well established before they are used in modelling exercises to predict 
the environmental implications of policy options (Baldock 1999), extreme caution is required in choosing 
indicators to address these issues. 
159
 - This indicator corresponds to EEA‟s IRENA 13, IRENA 15 and IRENA 35 indicators. 
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These indicators were developed within the OECD pressure-state-response 
framework. This allows policy implications on agriculture to be analysed within the 
context of sustainable development, establishing relationships between the economic, 
social and environmental dimensions of agriculture, in order to evaluate both positive 
and negative trade-offs between indicators, in an integrated and coherent approach.  
The next chapter presents and discusses the results of water policy instruments 
for implementing the WFD in combination with the economic and policy settings 
designed in the previous chapter. These results are produced with the bio-economic 
modelling approach, taking into account crop yield-water relationships, the economic 
behaviour of farmers and the structural characteristics of representative farming systems 
of two irrigation districts in the south of Portugal. Results are expressed by the policy 
performance indicators defined in this chapter. 
 
 199 
CHAPTER 8 – MODEL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The implications of different water policy instruments on irrigated farming 
systems were assessed using the bio-economic model under the agricultural policy 
scenarios described previously. The main environmental, economic and social 
implications of policy change are recorded, at the farm level, using policy change 
indicators defined for the purposes of this analysis for the 2010 and 2015 time frames. 
Water policy effects under these agricultural scenarios were generated parametrically in 
the simulation of volumetric prices, flat prices (on the basis of irrigated area) and water 
allotments (water quotas), and determined stochastically in the simulation of the present 
two-part water pricing policy (called status quo in the following figures) in the case 
study areas. The acronyms SFP, SFP+RD and WM represent the three scenarios of 
agricultural policy, single farm payment, rural development, and world liberalised 
markets, respectively.  
Results are presented for each farming system and water pricing policy 
separately, allowing the direct comparison of the possible scope of results under 
different agricultural policy scenarios. In this respect it is worthwhile mentioning that 
the comparison of the effects of different water policy measures is not entirely possible, 
due to the nature of the policies being simulated. As the different water management 
policies simulated regulate water use accordingly to different criteria (eg. €/m3, €/ha, 
m
3
/ha, or a combination of these) there is not a common base to perform the comparison 
of results. In order to allow some degree of comparability across water policy measures, 
results for the most import indicators were transformed into a €/m3 scale. In the case of 
flat pricing and two-part pricing, this transformation used information concerning total 
water cost and water use, while marginal utility values were transformed into shadow 
prices for water resources in the case of water allotments. It is however important to 
realise, in order to avoid misinterpreting of the results, that this transformation into a 
common measurement scale in terms of units affects what is actually being measured. 
Results refer to marginal or average prices in the case of volumetric prices, to average 
prices in the cases of flat pricing and two-part tariff, and to the shadow price of water 
resources in the case of water quotas. Results are reported per unit of area, on a hectare 
basis, unless stated otherwise. This representation of results, using a scale in €/m3, does 
not enable showing results of flat pricing and water quotas as soon as water 
consumption ceases. 
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Due to length constraints, only the most important results for the typologies in 
the Caia irrigation district are discussed in this chapter. This discussion is centred on the 
demand for irrigation water, farm income, farm support, water payments and demand 
for agricultural labour, analysing the relationships between these indicators and water 
charges, or water supply, and water consumption. Supplementary results of agricultural 
typologies in Caia are shown in Appendix XI; all the results for the typologies in the 
Odivelas irrigation district are presented in the Appendix XII. Discussion of results 
obtained for Caia cluster 1 – oliviculture – are presented at the end of this chapter 
because the cropping patterns in this typology produces particularly inelastic responses 
to policy change. 
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8.1 – CLUSTER 2 – ARABLE CROPS - CAIA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
This farming system consists mainly of arable land crops such as cereals and 
oilseed crops. Approximately half of the land is irrigable in this typology, being maize 
the most important irrigated crop. Farms in this typology are the biggest in the irrigation 
district, accounting for 75% of all the area and for 18% of the number of farms. The 
average farm size in this typology is 236.6ha, and almost 53% of the land is irrigable. 
 
 
8.1.1 – WATER DEMAND 
 
Figure 26. Demand for irrigation water in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by 
water policy 
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Water demand curves in this agricultural system are in general more responsive 
to water pricing than those in the first typology of Caia irrigation scheme. Figure 26 
reveals a succession of elastic and inelastic segments, expressing the relative 
attractiveness of agricultural activities at each water price. Accordingly to model results, 
farmers in this agricultural system would constantly adjust not only which crops and 
how much of these crops to produce, as well as the most suited level of irrigation to 
practice in response to increasing water prices or reducing water supplies. In general, 
agricultural scenarios with higher levels of support for farming reveal either an 
increased demand for irrigation water or higher ability to resist to price increases. 
Exceptions do occur at very low water prices in the world market scenario (less than 
0.03€/m3 in the case of volumetric pricing, figure 26a, and less than 75€/irrigated 
hectare in the case of flat pricing, figure 26c, in 2010; and only at zero prices for 2015, 
figure 26b and d) as lack of compliance with environmental protection (e.g. set aside 
requirements) enables increasing irrigated area and therefore demand for water. Apart 
from that, the existence of tiers with differentiated levels of support per tier in the rural 
development scenario, limiting the area of irrigated arable crops under its full potential, 
explains the lower demand for water in this scenario. 
Model results for this agricultural system indicate that volumetric water price 
increases (figure 26a and b) do directly stimulate increases in the marginal utility of 
water, contributing to relocate this resource to higher marginal utility uses. This process 
occurs since very early stages of the water price simulation, as use of more and more 
expensive water is readjusted to higher marginal productivity levels with increasing 
irrigation deficits, that is, either by reducing the irrigation intensity or ending irrigation 
altogether for a particular crop. Apart from these adjustments, results indicate that 
changes in water demand curves motivated by water prices may additionally arise from 
the adoption of irrigation technologies with greater irrigation efficiencies. Overall, water 
demand curves are particularly elastic to initial increases in the water price, which are in 
fact responsible for major cut-backs in the demand for water, as shown above. 
Simulation of water pricing using flat tariffs based on irrigated areas, figure 26c 
and d, indicates that agricultural production adjusts differently to increasing water 
prices. Rather than increasing the marginal utility of water, this pricing instrument 
stimulates increases in the marginal utility of irrigated land. Accordingly, adjustments 
consist fundamentally in reductions of the irrigated area, as movements along crop-
water production functions towards lower irrigation levels were not observed.  
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Both water pricing instruments, and simulation of water allotment sizes, indicate 
that more efficient irrigation technologies, such as drip irrigation, are the last to be 
eroded from the productive plan. It was not however assessed if this technological shift 
is most likely to be motivated by water saving potentials or explained by cheaper total 
average costs.  
 Water consumption and allocation at the farm level in the water quota situation 
(figure 26e and f) is similar to that described for the volumetric pricing situation. It is 
nevertheless worth mentioning that total water consumption is constrained by the 
simulation procedure and that its usage is free of charge.  
Figure 27. Demand for irrigation water in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by 
agricultural policy 
 
 The analysis of water consumption in this typology (figure 26 and 27) suggests 
that both water management policies and agricultural policies and market settings have 
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effects on the demand for irrigation water. For the same time frame and agricultural 
policy scenario, parametrisation of water management instruments usually show similar 
patterns of evolution in their respective water demand curves. As shown in the figure 
27, use of flat pricing often leads to lower average consumption of water per hectare 
than volumetric pricing for similar average water costs per unit of volume. Although 
this relationship between water cost and water consumption is best presented per 
average unit of land, figure 27, above, provides an early insight on the ability of area 
pricing in outperforming volumetric instruments. The sudden decreases in the marginal 
willingness to pay for water resources, in the simulation of water quota sizes, in the 
rural development scenarios (figure 27c and d), takes place at a transition between tiers 
of agricultural policy. When production is relocated to a new tier of rural development 
policy, the total water consumption which maximizes utility is lower than the water 
allotment, and therefore is not valued at the margin. 
 
8.1.2 – AGRICULTURAL NUTRIENT USE  
 
Results indicate that intensity of use of agricultural fertilisers in this typology is 
negatively related to water pricing and directly related to shortening of water allotments. 
In other words, policies leading to reductions of irrigated area may be expected to 
contribute alleviating negative environment effects of pollution by agricultural 
nutrients. Parameterisation of water pricing and water allotment sizes across policy 
scenarios shows a trend of reduction in the application of agricultural nutrients related 
to both irrigated area and water use. For that reason, pricing levels associated to elastic 
segments in the demand for water are also responsible for major changes in the intensity 
of use of fertilisers. 
In the case of nitrogen applications in this agricultural system, this trend is not 
particularly pronounced. In fact, the additional average amount of nitrogen units applied 
between unlimited free water for irrigation and rain fed agricultural is of 10 Kg/ha, 
being the maximum difference recorded in the average amount of nitrogen units applied 
throughout all simulations of, approximately, 20 Kg/ha.  
Trends in the reduction of phosphorus and potassium units are more evident as 
application of these nutrients seems to have a wider gap between rain fed and irrigated 
agriculture. This difference is of approximately 30 fertilising units in the case of 
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phosphorus and 40 units for potassium, being the pattern of evolution in the intensity of 
use of these fertilisers similar to the demand for irrigation water or share of irrigated 
land in their respective scenarios of agricultural policy. 
 
 
8.1.3 – FARM INCOME   
 
Figure 28. Farm income in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by water policy 
 
 Figure 28 reveals very similar evolutions in the patterns of farm income across 
different policy scenarios in relation to water pricing and varying water allotments. 
Agricultural policy scenarios consider differences both in agricultural support as in 
commodity and factor prices, which often prevent establishing causal relationships 
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between scenarios. In spite of that, results indicate that farm income levels arising from 
the sfp and sfp+rd scenarios are usually very similar and much higher than those arising 
from a free market situation. Differences between farm income curves with farm 
support and those in the world market policy scenario are on average lower than farm 
support in those scenarios – which may be indicative of actual losses in terms of 
contribution towards national wealth. Computation of average costs per cubic metre of 
pricing instruments involving flat tariffs and calculation of “shadow prices” of water 
resources in the case of water allotment sizes enabled producing the figure 29, below.  
 
Figure 29. Farm income in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by agricultural policy 
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This representation of results shows that, for the same agricultural policy 
scenario and time frame, volumetric pricing and flat pricing curves overlap to a great 
extent, being recorded only very limited differences in farm income results (of less than 
15€/ha). Farm income values derived from simulation of water quotas do not have any 
attached payments and for that reason exhibit systematically higher values of income for 
the same internal valuation of water resources.  
 
Figure 30. Farm income in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by agricultural policy 
 
 Figure 30, relates farm income and water consumption, for the same agricultural 
policy scenario, allowing evaluation of the impacts of water demand management 
policies on farming economic benefits. This figure enables clarifying that identical farm 
income may be obtained through different combinations of activities, with different 
requirements of irrigation water, depending on the water management policy simulated. 
In this agricultural system of the Caia irrigation scheme, this is more notorious at low 
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water prices, further away from the origin, in which, for identical income, volumetric 
pricing would require a higher demand for irrigation water than flat pricing on the basis 
of irrigated area. In 2010 (figure 30a, c and e), this statement holds true up to volumetric 
water prices of 0.07€/m3 in the single farm payment and rural development scenarios 
and until 0.03€/m3 in the world market scenario, and flat charges of, respectively, 550 
€/ha and 575€/ha and 225€/ha. The explanation for this occurrence lies on the 
combination of activities in the different productive plans; on the one hand, increasingly 
higher costs of water per hectare led to the reduction of marginal utility values of crops 
where supplementary irrigation is practiced (both cereals and oilseeds) causing their 
removal from the productive plan; on the other hand, increasingly higher costs of water 
per volume have a far greater impact on the farm income of fully irrigated crops such as 
maize without necessarily affecting total water consumption much. These strategic 
pathways of response to water pricing policies affect not only farm income and support 
to agricultural activities but also water use and water payments as shown shortly after.  
Figures 28, 29 and 30, above, indicate that the steepest decreases of farm income 
occur during the initial increases of water price in volumetric pricing and area pricing 
situations. In the simulation of water allotment sizes, the steepest decreases of farm 
income occur towards the end of the simulation, during the last decreases of water 
supply. In this respect, results show that use of water allotments could effectively be 
used as a demand management instrument, regulating water consumption without 
imposing additional subtractions on income of economic activities. 
 
 
8.1.4 – FARM SUPPORT 
  
 Representation of farm subsidies against water pricing and water use allows 
comparing the relationships between these policies and their implications on the 
demand for irrigation water. As shown in the figures 31, 32 and 33, the amount of farm 
support granted to this farming system by the CAP SFP measure remains constant 
throughout the parameterisation of water prices or varying water allotments. In this 
typology, allocation of the SFP support is fully uncoupled from the crops produced and 
use of irrigation, and for that reason it is totally disconnected from the pattern of water 
use. All crops selected to integrate the productive pattern qualify for receiving the SFP 
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support and for that reason the level of support remains unchanged, as shown by either 
fully vertical (figures 31 and 32) or horizontal lines (figure 33) in the figures below, 
with the value of 258.9€/ha. In spite of that, it is worth noting that the dependency on 
farm subsidies increases as water prices are raised or water supply made scarcer. 
Expressing this dependency by the contribution of the SFP to farm income suggests 
that, in 2010, this ratio would increase from 35.7% at zero water prices and 
unconstrained water supplies, to 51% as soon as irrigation ceases to be practiced. 
Similar values were registered for 2015, although starting slightly higher at 39%.  
 Figures 31, 32 and 33, show that, in the rural development scenario, simulation 
of rural development measures, in addition to the SFP, increases in water prices or 
reductions to the water supply to the farm, led to decreases in the total farm support 
while increasing the contribution of this support to farm income. Farm support granted 
by the rural development measures simulated in this study is partly related to the share 
of irrigated land and therefore it is indirectly related to water consumption (figure 33). 
This “coupling” of support promotes the adoption of different strategies when facing 
alternative water management policies. Adjustments in farming practices recorded 
during the simulation of water allotment sizes and volumetric water pricing suggest that 
one strategy consists in maintaining irrigated area, while reducing water demand, in 
order to claim support allocated to irrigated crops. This strategy thus rewards increases 
in the marginal utility of water and it is implemented both by downwards adjustments 
along the crop-water production functions and replacement of high water intensive 
crops by others less water demanding.  
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Figure 31. Farm support in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by water policy 
 
In the case of area pricing on the basis of irrigated areas, results indicate that 
these adjustments simply do not exist. In fact, adjustments in this case are limited to the 
reduction of irrigated areas, whenever the benefits derived from irrigation are lower 
than the costs of irrigating, including those imposed by the increasing area tariff. 
According to model results, increases in the water charge per irrigated area stimulate the 
withdrawal of irrigated crops with lower utility per unit of area (e.g. less profitable) 
from the crop mix, but without any effect on the marginal utility value of water 
resources. As shown in figure 32, use of irrigated area pricing in this farming system 
leads to a reduced capacity of exploring combinations in the crop mix and water use, 
which is responsible for lower levels of support for the same average water price/cost. 
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Figure 32. Farm support in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by agricultural policy 
 
Figure 33. Farm support in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by agricultural policy 
 
 The maximum support per hectare in the rural development scenario is 317.6€ 
under zero water prices and unconstrained water supplies, for both time frames. The 
lowest level of support is 290.7€/ha in 2010 and 276.6€/ha in 2015, when irrigation 
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ceases to be practiced. Although it has been mentioned above that rural development 
subsidies may have an influence on water consumption this is not particularly obvious 
in the figure 33, above, due to this narrow range of values of farm support throughout 
the simulation of water management policies. 
 
 
8.1.5 – WATER PAYMENTS 
 
 Figure 34. Water payments in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by water policy 
  
Information on water payments expresses the aptitude of water management 
instruments in achieving cost recovery objectives, as well as pressure on farm income 
arising from these policy instruments. The horizontal axis related to water payments in 
figure 34 and 35 (vertical axis in figure 36) refers to the average water cost per unit of 
land across the farm typology. Figure 34, above, indicates that the highest level of 
revenue for a water agency is likely to be reached before the major elastic segment in 
the water demand curves. Accordingly, water payment curves above capture that in this 
agricultural typology this segment is located at different price levels, depending on the 
water management policy and agricultural scenario.  
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Maximum water payments per hectare, under volumetric and flat pricing in 2010 
(figure 34a and c, respectively), are located in the 150€/ha to 160€/ha range, for both the 
single farm payment and rural development scenarios, while they are almost 50€/ha 
lower in the world market scenario. These peaks of water payments in the simulation of 
volumetric prices (figure 34a) occur at the water prices of 0.07€/m3 in the single farm 
payment and rural development scenarios and 0.05€/m3 in the world market scenario, 
with associated reductions in the water consumption of 15%, 10% and 23% 
respectively. In the simulation of flat pricing (figure 34c), maximum water payments 
occur at 600€/ha, 575€/ha and 425€/ha for the same agricultural policy scenarios, with 
reductions in the demand for water of 20%, 15% and 22%, respectively. Model results 
thus indicate that reductions in the demand for water are not only higher, as they occur 
at lower water charges, in the absence of farm support measures. In fact, at the water 
charges mentioned, water savings are lower in the rural development scenario than in 
other policy scenarios. 
Analysis of water pricing instruments, for the same agricultural policy scenario, 
indicate that water payments may cease at lower average water prices in the flat pricing 
simulation than in the volumetric pricing. This aspect is particularly obvious in the rural 
development policy scenario, in the figure 35c and d, below; this results from a more 
efficient allocation of water which increases the marginal utility of water resources in 
the case in the case of volumetric pricing. The intensity of irrigation water use per 
irrigated hectare during this phase is in fact among the lowest allowed in the modelling. 
The last figure on water payments (figure 36) provides a direct comparison of 
volumetric and irrigated area pricing in terms of cost recovery versus demand 
management. Figure 36 suggests that irrigated area pricing may often outperform 
volumetric pricing, as results have recorded that water consumption per hectare is often 
lower in the flat pricing simulation for the same level of average water payments per 
hectare and same scenario of agricultural policy. These aspects are explained by the 
different strategies of farming adjustments to higher water prices described above. 
Results indicate that, in 2010, water savings of up to 7.3%, 13.7% and 20.9% could be 
made in the single farm payment, rural development and world market scenarios, 
respectively, if irrigated area pricing were used in detriment of volumetric pricing. 
 
 214 
Water Payments Caia CL2 2010 SFP Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 50 100 150 200
Water Payment (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Water Payments Caia CL2 2010 RD Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 50 100 150 200
Water Payment (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Water Payments Caia CL2 2015 SFP Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 50 100 150 200
Water Payment (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Water Payments Caia CL2 2015 RD Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 50 100 150 200
Water Payment (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Water Payments Caia CL2 2010 WM Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 50 100 150 200
Water Payment (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
Water Payments Caia CL2 2015 WM Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 50 100 150 200
Water Payment (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
a b 
c d 
e f 
 
Figure 35. Water payments in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
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Figure 36. Water payments in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 
8.1.6 – FARM DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL LABOUR  
 
 Figures 37 and 38 show that the extensive nature of crops grown in this farming 
system creates very thin differences in the intensity of labour requirements between 
irrigated and rain fed regimes. In both the single farm payment and rural development 
scenarios, average labour requirements per hectare are always close to 12h/ha 
throughout the simulation of water management policies, being the maximum distance 
between extreme ends of simulations of 1.3h/ha. The world market scenario shows a 
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higher average demand for labour per hectare, as land under set aside in previous 
agricultural scenarios is now occupied by activities requiring labour. 
 In figure 38,  no significant differences can be attributable to water management 
measures when plotting results per scenario of agricultural policy, due to the very 
narrow difference in the demand for labour from irrigated and non-irrigated crops. 
Figure 37. Demand for agricultural labour in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by 
water policy 
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Figure 38. Demand for agricultural labour in Caia cluster 2 - arable crops - grouped by 
agricultural policy 
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8.2 – CLUSTER 3 - MIXED FARMING - CAIA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
Farms in this typology are relatively small. On average of slightly over twenty 
hectares, they account for 6.7% of the area in the Caia irrigation scheme and for 14.5% 
of the total number of farms. More than half of the area is allocated to olive orchards, 
being the remaining area occupied by arable crops, such as cereals or oilseed crops. The 
irrigable area amounts to 60% of the UAA. 
 
 
8.2.1 – WATER DEMAND 
 
Figure 39. Demand for irrigation water in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by 
water policy 
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 Water demand curves in this agricultural typology (figures 39 and 40) reveal 
behaviour of water use unseen in previous typologies. Model results in this typology 
indicate that adjustments to higher volumetric water prices (figure 39a and b), or 
reduced volumes of water allotments (figure 39e and f), create water demand curves 
similar to those seen in the previous farming system. Simulation of flat pricing on the 
basis of irrigated area (figure 39c and d) shows that adjustments to higher prices may 
led to increases in the demand for irrigation water. While some of these increases are 
recorded in the average water demand per hectare, as shown, increases do also occur in 
the total demand for water at the farm level.  
 In the case of volumetric pricing (figure 39a and b), these curves exhibit the 
sequence between elastic and inelastic segments typical of irrigation water demand. In 
spite of significant differences in market prices and agricultural support assumed in 
these agricultural policy scenarios, demand curves are very consistent across these 
scenarios. Policy scenarios with less support for farming activities are more reactive to 
water pricing, but differences in the average water consumption per hectare do not 
usually exceed the 0.04€/m3 for most of the simulation. Adjustments to higher water 
prices per volume are very similar in these scenarios of agricultural policy, consisting 
fundamentally in allocation of water to higher marginal utility uses. This happens either 
by left and downwards movements along the crop water production function (increasing 
the irrigation deficit), or ceasing of irrigation altogether in a particular crop. 
 Simulation of volumetric pricing (figure 39a and b) indicates that the main 
elastic segment of demand curves is located above the 0.05€/m3 threshold in both time 
frames analysed. The only exception occurs in the world market scenario, in 2015, in 
which average water consumption at this price is already of 47% of the initial demand. 
Water savings at this price threshold are much inferior in all other agricultural policy 
scenarios, ranging in between 0.3% and 9.5%. The most significant reductions in the 
demand for irrigation water are located within this and the 0.1€/m3 interval as it can be 
seen in the figures above. 
 Simulation of irrigated area pricing (figure 39c and d) shows that agricultural 
policy and market settings have significant implication on water consumption. After the 
initial inelastic segments in which irrigated activities resist to increases in the water 
price, the average water consumption decreases, following the decrease of the irrigated 
area. Beyond this water price, variable depending on the agricultural policy scenario, 
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results indicate that the water demand per unit of irrigated area increases due to right 
and upward movements along crop water production functions. As the intensity of 
demand per irrigated area increases, while irrigated area remaining constant, both total 
demand for irrigation water at the farm level and average demand per hectare increase. 
Afterwards, in spite of high intensity of water use per irrigated area, the average demand 
for irrigation water falls as the irrigated area decreases.  
 
 
Figure 40. Demand for irrigation water in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by 
agricultural policy 
 
 Figure 40, above, shows differences in water use associated to the water 
management policies simulated when all water prices are transformed per unit of 
volume used. Water use patterns produced by volumetric pricing are similar to those in 
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the parameterisation of water allotment sizes, in the three scenarios of agricultural 
policy and both time frames analysed.  
Simulation of area pricing on the basis of irrigated area in this typology shows a 
long elastic segment in which water use is more responsive to water average costs, that 
is, leading to higher water savings at lower cost. These segments with lower average 
water costs in the flat pricing system are explained by lower levels of both irrigated 
areas and water consumption than under volumetric prices for the same average water 
cost per hectare, suggesting that irrigation is able of resisting to higher volumetric water 
charges than to irrigated area charges (see water payments). According to model results 
these initial water savings occurring in the simulation of flat pricing in relation to other 
water policy measures, are explained by the removal of irrigated crops with low average 
utility per unit of area from the productive plan, as these are the most affected by rising 
water charges per hectare. In addition to that, these curves however also capture that 
rising water charges, on the basis of irrigated areas, may encourage increases in the 
average demand for water as use of irrigation is intensified, as mentioned.  
 
 
8.2.2 – AGRICULTURAL NUTRIENT USE  
 
 Figures of agro-chemical use provide information on the potential of agricultural 
and water policy in alleviating pressures on the environment associated to agricultural 
practices, such as use of fertilisers and pesticides.  
 Model results show that significant differences in the intensity of use of 
agricultural nutrients are produced under the different scenarios of agricultural policy 
and water management policies. Indicators of nutrient use capture variations in the 
composition of the productive pattern and for that reason their evolution follows, in 
most simulations, the same general trend of water use. As such, the main variations in 
the intensity of nutrient use are located on the elastic segments of water demand. 
 Results of the simulation of water management policies indicate very similar 
evolutions in the average nitrogen application per hectare in both the single farm 
payment and rural development scenarios. Parameterisation of water management 
policies in these agricultural policy scenarios show a maximum reduction of 
approximately 10 nitrogen units per hectare, being most of this reduction located during 
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the initial increases in the water price or final reduction in the size of the water 
allotment. Modifications in the crop mix, including those occurring in the intensity of 
use of irrigation water per crop, have very little repercussion in the intensity of use of 
nitrogen in this farming system under these agricultural policy scenarios. Maximum 
amplitude in average applications of potassium and phosphorus per hectare is 
approximately 20 units in these agricultural policy scenarios. While applications of the 
first decrease throughout the simulation the latter tends to increase, being in this respect 
important to note that the combination of differentiated support for irrigated activities in 
the rural development scenario with water management policies such as volumetric 
pricing and water allotments may produce higher applications of these nutrients than 
other policy scenarios analysed or use of flat tariffs. 
In the case of the world market agricultural policy scenario, increasing the water 
cost (either per volume or per irrigated area) or reducing the water allotment size 
ultimately results in the replacement of irrigated grain crops by rain fed fodder crops, 
requiring less nitrogen fertilisations. Average nitrogen applications per hectare are more 
than halved when irrigation ceases to be practiced. The pattern of evolution in the 
intensity of use of phosphorus and potassium is similar to that of nitrogen, for the same 
price levels or sizes in water allotments, but with total reductions less than halved in 
these cases. 
 
 
8.2.3 – FARM INCOME   
 
Figures of farm income improve the understanding of the implications of 
agricultural policy and water management instruments on the economic benefits derived 
from farming, at the farm level. The figure 41 shows how farm income in this 
agricultural typology of Caia irrigation district is affected by the water management 
policies studied, under different agricultural policy scenarios. The figure shows that 
both the agricultural policy/markets and water policy implements are paramount in 
determining farm income.  
Much of the difference between curves is explained by agricultural support in 
the respective policy scenarios, although market price assumptions are also in action. 
Accordingly, agricultural policy scenarios with higher support for agricultural activities 
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achieve higher levels of income for all water management policy instruments. In this 
respect, it is worthwhile mentioning that average farm sizes in this typology enable 
locating production on the first tier of rural development policy measures, thereby 
allowing granting of substantially higher support per hectare than similar farming 
systems with bigger farm sizes. With these tiers of policy playing reduced or no 
influence in production decisions, the action of water policies show similar behaviour of 
farm income across scenarios of agricultural policy, particularly at low water prices. In 
spite of the above said, higher support for irrigated activities in the rural development 
scenario explains the maintenance of irrigation at much higher volumetric water charges 
and, for that reason, the corresponding decreases in farm income recorded in this policy 
scenario.  
 
Figure 41. Farm income in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by water policy 
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  Both area pricing on the basis of irrigated areas (figure 41c and d) and 
volumetric pricing (figure 41a and b) presuppose subtractions to farm income while 
water is being used. Figure above shows that farm income is more affected, with steeper 
reductions, during the initial increases of water charges. In this respect, figures show 
that the points of inflection in the evolution of farm income are located at higher water 
charges in agricultural policy scenarios granting support for agricultural activities. In 
these policy scenarios, this could indicate greater viability of irrigation against higher 
water charges, either through the maintenance of water use or irrigated areas. 
The figure 42, below, is produced by computing the average cost of water per 
unit of volume in the case of flat pricing, and transforming marginal utility values of 
water resources into shadow prices. Figure shows that farm income curves obtained 
from parameterisation of flat prices and volumetric prices overlap in most agricultural 
policy scenarios, in both time frames. The only noticeable exception to this occurs in 
the rural development scenario, in 2010, (figure 42c) in which for water prices above 
0.05€/m3 the farm income curve simulated from flat pricing is located to the left of that 
generated by volumetric pricing. In other words, the benefits derived from irrigation 
under flat charges are lower than those obtained from the implementation of volumetric 
charges, for the same average water cost per unit of volume. Under this circumstance, 
results suggest that water allocation would thus be more efficient under volumetric 
pricing than irrigated area pricing.   
 The farm income curve generated from parameterisation of water allotment sizes 
shows positive valuation of water resources as soon as the size of the water allotment is 
actually constraining. This valuation increases, at the margin, as available water 
resources become scarcer and farm income is reduced. Additionally, comparison of 
these values with those generated by simulation of volumetric prices provides a rough 
estimate of benefits foregone due to water payments. 
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Figure 42. Farm income in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 The figure 43 shows information of farm income plotted against average water 
consumption, allowing evaluation of policy implications on both demand management 
and farming economic benefits. Model results indicate that farm income is much less 
affected along the elastic segments of water demand, in which water savings are 
effectively recorded, than on the inelastic ones. Since the sequence and extent of these 
segments depends both on the water charging regime and on the agricultural policy 
scenario, so does the relationship between farm income and water consumption.  
 Results indicate that increases in water charges produce substantially different 
water savings depending on the agricultural policy scenario. Setting water charges to 
0.02€/m3-0.03€/m3 or 100€/ha-125€/ha, in 2010 and 2015 respectively, in the single 
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farm payment policy scenario (figure 43a and b), would bring to water saving of 
approximately 9% and reduction in farm income of less than that. Similar water charges 
in rural development (figure 43b and c) and world market scenarios (figure 43d and e) 
would produce either similar or higher reductions in farm income with less or no effect 
on the demand for water. 
 For the same agricultural policy scenario, figure 43 also shows that the 
relationship between farm income and water consumption as simulated by 
parameterisation of the two water pricing instruments is a complex one. In fact, this 
figure clearly indicates that these two curves often cross throughout the 
parameterisation, inverting the order of attractiveness of these water policies regarding 
the trade-offs between farm income and demand for irrigation water. That is, for the 
same average water consumption per hectare, farm income obtained from agricultural 
activities is dependent on the water price (the level of policy implementation), which 
may prevent advocating one policy instrument over the other.  
The evolution of these trade-offs between farm income and water demand, may 
be best understood analysing these two indicators simultaneously. While farm income 
curves in this typology exhibit a C shape pattern, water demand curves are characterised 
by a transition of vertical (inelastic) and horizontal (elastic) segments, with drastic 
decreases of water consumption. Ultimately, the location of these segments depends 
both on the water policy instruments as on water price, and for that reason the trade-offs 
between farm income and water consumption are modified to different extents 
according to these two factors. 
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Figure 43. Farm income in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 
8.2.4 – FARM SUPPORT 
 
The figures 44, 45 and 46, below, show the evolution of average public funding 
for farming activities under the different water management instruments, with the aim 
of revealing synergies and conflicts between agricultural and environment policy. This 
information on average farm support per hectare is plotted against water charges or the 
size of the water allotment (figure 44), average cost or marginal resource valuation 
(figure 45), and against average water consumption per hectare (figure 46). 
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Simulations of the single farm payment policy (best shown in figure 45a and b) 
show that this support measures are independent and uncoupled from water use. For that 
reason, the amount of support remains constant, at the average value of 139€/ha, 
regardless of the water management policy instrument simulated or use of water. This is 
represented either by completely vertical or horizontal lines in the following figures. 
Rural development measures simulated indicate that added support for irrigated 
activities may not only grant some additional protection against increases in water 
charges, as that may influence area under irrigation, and indirectly water use. In fact, the 
pattern of evolution of support in this agricultural policy scenario closely follows that 
shown by the share of irrigated land indicator (see Appendix XI).  
 
Figure 44. Farm support in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by water policy 
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Figure 45. Farm support in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
Figure 46. Farm support in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 As mentioned before, evolution of farm support is similar to that of share of 
irrigated land. Model results indicate that price increases in the simulation of area 
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pricing produce systematic downturn adjustments in irrigated areas in both time frames. 
Simulation of volumetric prices and water allotments suggests that irrigated areas, in 
2015, may actually increase, when water prices are raised or supply made scarcer, in 
order to claim additional rural development support for irrigated lands. This course of 
action has negligible effect on farm income or water consumption, and apart from 
representing a higher dependency on public support with depletion of public funds, this 
is fundamentally a transfer of funds from taxpayers towards water agencies (see water 
payments). 
 
 
8.2.5 – WATER PAYMENTS 
 
Figure 47. Water payments in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by water policy 
 
 The figure 47, above, shows that agricultural policy and market settings may 
have a pronounced effect on the ability to generate water payments. For volumetric 
water prices up to 0.05€/m3 and 0.04€/m3, in 2010 and 2015, respectively (figure 47a 
and b), or up to 175€/ha in the case of area pricing (figure 47c and d), average water 
payments per hectare are similar in all agricultural policy scenarios. As shown in the 
figure, higher water prices led to opposite directions with increasing/decreasing water 
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payments in the different agricultural policy scenarios, depending on water consumption 
in the case of volumetric pricing and on irrigated areas in the case of area pricing. 
Usually, for the same water price, scenarios with higher support for agricultural 
activities enable resisting to higher water charges and produce higher average water 
payments, but that is not always the case as the figure 47 shows curves with overlapping 
sections on several occasions. This figure also clearly shows that use of a volumetric 
pricing policy (figure 47a and b) would enable collecting more revenues per hectare for 
a water agency than the sole use of a flat pricing policy on the basis of irrigated areas 
(figure 47b and c). In addition to that, all curves above indicate that very similar water 
payments may be reached at very different water charges, with profound consequences 
on income and water use as seen before. 
 
Figure 48. Water payments in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
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 Figure 48, above, displays information on water payments against the average 
water costs per unit of volume. This figure shows that under volumetric pricing, 
reducing the intensity of water use per irrigated hectare, while there are marginal 
benefits to be gained, enables not only resisting to higher water charges in most policy 
scenarios but also generating more water payments than irrigated area pricing. While 
the previous statement holds true during the peaks of volumetric water payments, it 
should also be noted that, for the same average water costs per unit of volume, the 
demand for water can be lower in the simulation of flat pricing. 
 
Figure 49. Water payments in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 The trade-off between water demand management and cost recovery, that is, 
average water consumption versus average water payments, is shown in the figure 49. 
All curves show that initial increases of volumetric and flat charges have little potential 
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in producing water savings as demand for water remains almost unchanged. Their scope 
for cost recovery is in fact much greater as average payments per hectare increase 
during this stage. Immediately after, results indicate that volumetric pricing may led to 
higher water payments than area pricing, but this is actually a trade-off between water 
payments and farm income. In other words, this illustrates a transfer of benefits; in 
which additional water payment in volumetric pricing occur with the sacrifice of farm 
income, as shown by the very similar differences in value found on the respective farm 
income curves.  
 Increase of water charges, usually led to improvements being recorded either for 
demand management or cost recovery, that is, in the form of water savings, higher water 
payments, or both. Use of irrigated area pricing shows that this pricing policy may 
actually lead to worse-off situations, with increases in the demand for water occurring 
without any gains in water payments. This situation occurs across all policy scenarios 
and on both time frames. 
 Stochastic simulation of the two-part tariff, in the status quo scenario, indicates 
that this measure has advantages in generating revenues for cost recovery purposes but 
that it is out-performed either by volumetric or flat pricing in terms of demand 
management. While both components of the two-part tariff contribute to generate 
revenues, only the volumetric component is able of influencing the demand for water. 
The trade-off between cost recovery and demand management in a particular 
agricultural policy environment is thus determined by the proportion of each component 
in the tariff. 
 
 
8.2.6 – FARM DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL LABOUR  
 
 The implications of water management policies on the demand for agricultural 
labour are shown in the figures 50 and 51 for each scenario of agricultural policy 
simulated. Model results indicate that in this agricultural typology increasing water 
charges or reducing the size of water allotments would release some labour force from 
agricultural activities. The maximum reduction of labour requirements recorded by 
results is of 1.5h/ha, equivalent to a reduction of less than 5% in the demand for labour.  
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 The extensive nature of crops grown in this farming system, both irrigated and 
rain fed, have in fact very similar requirements of labour. Changes in the farm 
productive pattern due to agricultural policy/market settings or those due to water policy 
produce only slim variations in the demand for labour without allowing recording any 
substantial differences when comparing policy effects.  
 
Figure 50. Demand for agricultural labour in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped 
by water policy 
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Figure 51. Demand for agricultural labour in Caia cluster 3 - mixed farming - grouped 
by agricultural policy 
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8.3 – CLUSTER 4 - INTENSIVE FARMING - CAIA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
The average farm size in this typology is 22.6ha, mostly occupied by arable land 
crops, being maize the predominant crop. Far less representative in acreage, but as 
import from other perspectives, is the area allocated to vegetable or processing 
vegetable crops, being melon or processing tomatoes the most important. Farms in this 
typology account for almost 15% of the area in the Caia irrigation scheme and for 10% 
of the total number of farms. On average all the land is irrigable in these farms. 
 
 
8.3.1 – WATER DEMAND 
 
Figure 52. Demand for irrigation water in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped 
by water policy 
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 The figure 52 shows information on average water consumption per hectare, 
under different agricultural policy scenarios and water management policies. Water 
demand curves in this typology are characterised by one initial inelastic segment of 
variable length (shorter in the world market scenario and longer in the rural 
development scenario) followed by a long elastic segment, responsible for most water 
savings. Irrigated crops remaining beyond the end of this segment are particularly 
resistant to water charges, causing water savings to slow down considerably but at a 
progressive pace. The main elastic segment is explained by the disappearance of 
irrigation in cereal crops (such as maize and wheat) while additional water savings 
encounter resistance due to high value vegetable and processing vegetable activities. 
 Accordingly to model results, irrigation in this typology is more resistant to 
water charges in policy scenarios granting support for agricultural activities. This is 
particularly true in the case of the rural development scenario, which grants more 
support for irrigated activities than for rain fed ones. Figure 52 also shows that 
withdrawal of set aside obligations may result in additional pressures on the use of 
natural resources. The total use of water resources in the world market scenario is 
higher than in other agricultural policy scenarios at water charges below 0.04 and 0.03 
Euro per cubic metre (figure 52a and b), or 300 and 150 Euro per irrigated hectare in 
2010 and 2015, respectively (figure 52c and d). Simulation of water allotments (figure 
52e and f) also indicates greater demand for irrigation in the world market scenario than 
in others.  
 The implications of these water policy instruments for demand management are 
also shown in the figure 53, below.  Curves simulated by parameterisation of volumetric 
water prices and size of water allotments overlap in all agricultural policy scenarios and 
both time frames, while curves simulated for irrigated area pricing are located to the 
right of or above the former ones. These segments located to the right indicate that for 
the same valuation of water resources per unit of volume, use of flat pricing on the basis 
of irrigated areas would have a greater demand for water per hectare. The segments 
locate above indicate that, on average, a higher charge per hectare would be required to 
bring the demand for water to the level of volumetric pricing.  
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Figure 53. Demand for irrigation water in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped 
by agricultural policy 
 
Agricultural adjustments to higher water charges and reductions to the volume of 
water supply are similar to those observed in previous typologies. Simulation of 
volumetric pricing and water allotments shows that these adjustments include reducing 
the average water use per crop and per hectare, with downward movements along the 
crop-water production functions, and allocation of water resources to crops with higher 
marginal utility values. In the case of flat pricing, results show that water resources are 
first allocated to crops with higher average utility per unit of irrigated land, regardless of 
their water requirements. In addition to that, movements on crop water production 
functions are also recorded in this case, but in the opposite direction, decreasing the 
marginal productivity of water resources and increasing the intensity of water use per 
crop.  
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8.3.2 – AGRICULTURAL NUTRIENT USE  
 
Results show that the intensity of use of agricultural nutrient use follows a 
similar pattern to the indicator share of irrigated land. Results show that variations in the 
average rate of application of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium per hectare, are 
dependent on the agricultural policy scenario, as well as on the water policy instrument 
and level of implementation, that is, the water charge or size of the water allotment. 
These differences tend to be relatively reduced when water policy instruments are 
compared under the same agricultural policy scenario, with nutrient curves exhibiting 
similar evolution. Results thus suggest that agricultural policy and market assumptions 
may have greater influence on nutrient use in this agricultural typology than the 
simulated water policy instruments, for a particular level of implementation. This 
influence is particularly notorious on the resistance to support increases in water 
charges, which determines the share of irrigated area, and thus ultimately the entire 
pattern of nutrient use. 
Nutrient use is highest under zero water charges and unconstrained water 
supplies. Highest average application rates of nitrogen and potassium range from 
152Kg/ha in the single farm payment scenario, to 170Kg/ha in the world market 
scenario. Highest intensity of phosphorus fertilisations is slightly lower, ranging from 
134Kg/ha to 150Kg/ha in these policy scenarios, respectively, for both time frames. As 
mentioned before, reductions in the intensity of use of nutrients are registered at 
different water charges and with variable extent, depending on the agricultural policy 
scenario, and at a progressive pace when the size of water allotments is reduced, 
following the decreases in the share of irrigated land. Simulation of water allotment 
sizes shows that reductions in the intensity of use of nitrogen and potassium range, on 
average, from 1.20 Kg/ha to 1.23 Kg/ha for every 1000m
3
 of water. Phosphorus 
applications are, on average, decreased by 1.07 Kg/ha to 1.08 Kg/ha for reductions of 
1000m
3
 to the water supply. 
The absence of set aside requirements, in the world market policy scenario, 
explains the higher average values obtained at low water charges and unlimited water 
supplies. In this situation, lack of support for productive activities, together with 
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assumptions on world commodity prices, forces the area of irrigated crops to be reduced 
at lower water charges than in other agricultural policy scenarios, and therefore earlier 
reduction in the intensity of use of agricultural nutrients are observed.  
 
 
8.3.3 – FARM INCOME   
 
Figure 54. Farm income in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by water policy 
 
 The figure 54 shows the influence of water management policies on the 
evolution of farm income in this agricultural typology under three different agricultural 
policy scenarios. Parameterisation of water charges indicates that farm income is most 
affected during the initial increases of either volumetric (figure 54a and b) or irrigated 
area charges (figure 54c and d), while parameterisation of water allotment sizes (figure 
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54e and f) show that farm income is most reduced during the later stages of the 
simulation when supply of water becomes much scarcer. This figure also reveals that 
assumptions in agricultural policy scenarios, concerning support for agricultural 
activities and market prices, result in substantial differences in farm income. Extremes 
of farm income differ by a maximum of almost 900€/ha in 2010, and more than that in 
2015, being these values explained predominantly by the allocation of the single farm 
payment support but also rural development measures as shown shortly after.  
 
Figure 55. Farm income in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by water policy 
 
 The figure 55 shows information on the evolution of farm income plotted against 
the average cost of water or the shadow price of water resources, in water pricing 
situations and simulation of water quotas, respectively. As in many previous typologies, 
this representation of results displays farm income curves produced by simulation of 
irrigated area pricing to the left or under the curves simulated by volumetric water 
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pricing, suggesting that higher average water charges per volume would be required to 
bring demand to similar levels of volumetric pricing. In the figure 56, below, flat 
pricing curves are shown to be located to the right and under the volumetric pricing 
curves, which again provides indication that for the same level of farm income, more 
water would be consumed if water were charged on an area basis. According to model 
results, use of water charging instruments in this agricultural typology would initially 
produce, in percentage, higher losses of income than water savings. This information 
was in fact presented above as it is implicit on the pattern of water demand curves. The 
figure 56 not only clarifies this aspect as it helps revealing that it would be more 
pronounced under the flat pricing instruments than under volumetric pricing. 
Both figures 55 and 56, show that increases in the allocative efficiency of water 
resources are possible from regulating the water supply at the farm level, without 
significantly disturbing income. While the figure 55 indicates that tightening water 
supplies would promote a higher marginal willingness to pay for water resources, the 
figure 56 quantifies the amount of water savings for that level of income. In 2010, for 
instance, reducing the water allotment at the farm level in order to produce a shadow 
price for water of 0.1€/m3, would affect farm income by less than 9% and 2.5% in the 
single farm payment and rural development policy scenarios, with water savings (in the 
volume of supplies actually constraining production) of 34% and 14% respectively. 
This shadow price for water resources produces a much greater effect on farm income in 
the absence of support for agricultural activities, however it is important to note that, in 
percentage, water savings would still exceed losses in farm income. 
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Figure 56. Farm income in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 
8.3.4 – FARM SUPPORT 
 
Figures 57, 58 and 59, indicate that farm support allocated by the single farm 
payment regime, in the absence of rural development measures, remains constant 
throughout the simulation of water management instruments. This is represented on the 
figures by either fully vertical or horizontal lines with the amount of 540€/ha. Whether 
this policy measure influences production decisions or water use remains however 
unclear in this agricultural typology. Although model results do suggest that single farm 
payment measures may have some influence on the demand for water in this typology, 
that behaviour is hidden under the constant amount of support in this scenario. Careful 
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analysis of the productive pattern at each stage of the simulation unveils that exclusion 
of vegetable crops from the calculation of the eligible area for claiming payment 
entitlements supports production of eligible irrigated crops at extraordinarily high water 
charges, in detriment of rain fed vegetable alternatives which are not eligible. Use of 
irrigation could thus be distorted by agricultural policy as the marginal utility of crops 
eligible for the single farm payment is greater than more economically sustainable but 
less viable rain fed vegetable crops. 
 
Figure 57. Farm support in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by water policy 
 
Simulation of water management policies in the rural development scenario 
supports this suggestion. Results from this agricultural policy scenario (see figure 57) 
indicate that the existence of specific rural development support for vegetable crops is, 
to some extent, in conflict with the single farm payment measure. Albeit this specific 
support is lower than the single farm payment entitlement value for this agricultural 
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typology, it does eventually enable reducing the number of entitlements used (ha) and 
increasing the area occupied by vegetable crops. 
 All figures of farm support for the rural development policy scenario show that 
specific rural development measures, with differentiated support according to type of 
agricultural production and use of irrigation, influence productive decisions. This 
influence is reflected on the attractiveness of alternative crops at each water charge (or 
size of the allotment), therefore affecting both use of water and irrigated areas. The 
figure 57 shows how total average farm support is affected by parameterisation of water 
charges and size of water allotments, while figures 58 and 59 aim to explain differences 
in that support arising from use of water management policies, and establish 
relationships between rural development measures and water consumption. 
 All figures show that increasing water charges, or tightening water supplies, may 
produce changes in the amount of farm support, if the area under irrigation is affected. 
In this case, the major changes occur when area occupied by irrigated cereals is shifted 
to rain fed cereals with lower support. Comparison of results in rural development and 
single farm payment scenarios suggests that this differential in marginal utilities, caused 
by different support levels between irrigated and rain fed activities, contributes to 
support area under irrigation and thus, indirectly, use of water, up to higher water 
charges (that in spite of the assumption of higher agricultural factor costs in the rural 
development scenario). 
 The figure 58 shows that different water management policies may led to slight 
differences in the support granted by rural development measures. Analysis of average 
water consumption and share of irrigated land curves in this agricultural policy scenario 
show that initial increases of volumetric water prices and reductions to the volume of 
supply (until marginal prices of 0.08€/m3 in 2010 and 0.04€/m3 in 2015), produce 
reductions in the water consumption that allow more land to be irrigated than use of 
irrigated area pricing at similar charges. These differences in terms of irrigated areas 
yield lower support in the case of irrigated area pricing. During the next pricing interval, 
curves for area pricing are above those of other water management instruments, because 
lower water charges per hectare are required to produce the same average charge per 
unit of volume.  
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Figure 58. Farm support in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 These relationships between irrigated land, water consumption and farm support, 
described above, produce almost identical curves in this agricultural typology. The 
influence of water management instruments on the relationship between farm income 
and water consumption is in fact minimal and not observable in the figure 59.  
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Figure 59. Farm support in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 
8.3.5 – WATER PAYMENTS 
 
Figure 60. Water payments in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by water 
policy 
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 The figure 60 shows the relationship between water charges and average water 
payments per hectare under each agricultural policy scenario. Model results in this 
agricultural typology indicate that, for the same agricultural policy scenario, similar 
water payments may be obtained at different water charges, depending on the evolution 
of irrigated areas in the case of flat tariffs or water consumption in the case of 
volumetric pricing.  
Maximum water payments per hectare are usually reached at the end of the 
initial inelastic segment of water demand curves. An exception to this occurs in the 
world market scenario (best shown in figure 60), as the overall more responsive water 
demand curves obtained in this scenario, in particular the shorter lengths of inelastic 
segments, force water payments to be much reduced than in other agricultural policy 
scenarios. The single farm payment (figure 61a and b) and rural development (figure 
61c and d) scenarios show similar evolution of water payments. In this respect it is 
worth noting that specific farm support for irrigated activities, in the latter scenario, is 
capable of producing higher water payments than simulation of the single farm payment 
policy measure alone.  
Figure above also reveals differences in the evolution of water payments due to 
water policy. In 2010, peaks of average water payments in the single farm payment and 
rural development scenarios are, respectively, 429.2€/ha (0.09€/m3) and 517.0€/ha 
(0.11€/m3) in the simulation of volumetric water prices (Figure 60a), and 482.9€/ha 
(600€/ha charge) and 592.2€/ha (800€/ha charge) in the flat pricing simulation (Figure 
60c). During the main elastic segments, in figure 60a, increases in volumetric prices to 
0.13€/m3 and 0.15€/m3 would successively reduced average water payments to 142€/ha 
and 141€/ha, respectively, while use of irrigated area pricing (Figure 60c) would yield 
average water payments of 212.5€/ha and 231.0€/ha at water charges of 850€/ha and 
1000€/ha, respectively. Model results in this typology suggest that use of irrigated area 
pricing would enable generating higher water payments per hectare than use of 
volumetric pricing, as more water intensive crops are most affected by volumetrically 
charging water rather than by area charges. Having said that, additional research with 
smaller charging intervals might, perhaps, improve the understanding of agricultural 
responses to water charging instruments in this typology. 
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Figure 61. Water payments in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by 
agricultural policy 
 
 Figure 61, above, shows the evolution of average water payments per hectare 
against average water cost per unit of volume. This representation of water payments, 
according to each scenario of agricultural policy, enables comparison of water 
management instruments mainly in terms of their cost recovery potential. This figure 
indicates that use of flat pricing in this typology would enable implementing higher 
levels of cost recovery than volumetric pricing. In fact, according to the model results 
shown on the previous figures, the highest average water payments are consistently 
obtained under the simulation of area pricing on the basis of irrigated areas. During 
most of the simulation, average water payment curves for area pricing are located to the 
right of volumetric pricing ones, and further away from the origin, indicating that 
similar average costs per unit of volume lead to higher water payments per hectare in 
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the case of area pricing than of volumetric pricing. Although located further away from 
the origin, flat pricing curves in this typology are, depending on the water cost, located 
above or under volumetric pricing ones. This has implications both on cost recovery and 
on demand management which are explored on the next paragraphs and figure 62. 
 Explanations to this behaviour lie on the agricultural adjustments produced in 
response to these charging instruments, namely those concerning cropping patterns, 
irrigated area, as well as the intensity of use of water resources in this area. The figure 
61 shows that, until the peaks of water payments under volumetric pricing curves, the 
average costs per unit of volume are lower in the flat tariff instrument than in the case of 
volumetric pricing. During this pricing interval, irrigated areas of are either equal (in 
SFP and WM policy scenarios) or greater (RD policy scenario) in volumetric than in 
area pricing, although the average intensity of water use is invariably higher under flat 
pricing (see figure 62), therefore bringing down the average water cost in this water 
policy instrument. The relationship between cost recovery and water demand 
management, shown below, is due to these reasons more favourable to use of 
volumetric pricing as less water is used for the same level of average water payments. 
After this phase, the figure 61, above, shows that, for the same level of average 
water payments per hectare, the average water costs per unit of volume are higher in the 
flat pricing instrument than in volumetric pricing. This results from much higher values 
in the average water consumption and share of irrigated area in volumetric pricing than 
in flat pricing, although the intensity of water use is greater in the latter. In other words, 
during this pricing interval, for the same irrigated area and average water use, average 
water payments per hectare as well as the average water cost per unit of volume, are 
higher in flat pricing than in volumetric pricing. In terms of the relationship between 
cost recovery and water demand management the figure below shows that the 
preference would now be reversed, as use of flat pricing on the basis of irrigated areas 
would be more suitable than volumetric pricing. 
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Figure 62. Water payments in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - grouped by 
agricultural policy 
 
 
8.3.6 – FARM DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL LABOUR  
 
 The figures 63 and 64 show the implications on the demand for labour arising 
from simulation of water management policy instruments under three scenarios of 
agricultural policy. While in general these curves are characterised by a decrease in the 
demand for agricultural labour due to increase in water charges, or reduction of water 
supplies, model results have also recorded exceptions to this trend.  
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Figure 63. Demand for agricultural labour in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - 
grouped by water policy 
 
 According to model results, water policy instruments produce similar effects on 
the demand for labour across agricultural policy scenarios (see figure 63). The extent of 
this influence is however recorded at different water charges and sizes of water 
allotments depending on the agricultural policy scenario. Simulation of volumetric 
water pricing (figure 63a and b) shows that the amplitude of the demand for labour 
between agricultural policy scenarios is less than 13.8 h/ha, in 2010, and 20.4h/ha, in  
2015, being these values determined for the same water price. The influence of water 
pricing on the average demand for labour produces variations of 32.2h/ha to 49.6h/ha, 
in the RD and SFP scenarios in 2010, and of 38.2h/ha and 51.8h/ha in the same 
scenarios in 2015, being the strongest reductions in the demand for labour recorded 
during reductions of the share of irrigated land. Similar values to those mentioned above 
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were also recorded under simulation of flat pricing (figure 63c and d). It is worth noting 
that while extreme values in the demand for labour under unlimited and zero water 
supplies are in the same order of magnitude to those mentioned, the overall difference 
between agricultural policy scenarios (for the same volume of supply) is smaller when 
water allotment sizes are simulated (13.8 h/ha and 14.5h/ha, in 2010 and 2015, 
respectively). 
 The figure 64 shows the implications of water management instruments on the 
demand for labour. The vertical axis corresponds to the average cost of water in the 
cases of water pricing, and shadow prices of water resources in the simulation of water 
allotment sizes. This representation of results does not add much to the comments 
above, as no significant differences in the demand for labour are revealed. It does 
however make trends clearer than previous figures and enables better location of 
segments in which the demand for labour is most affected. 
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Figure 64. Demand for agricultural labour in Caia cluster 4 - intensive farming - 
grouped by agricultural policy 
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8.4 – CLUSTER 1 – OLIVE ORCHARDS – CAIA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
This typology represents a farming system of small farms exclusively based on 
traditional olive groves. The average farm size in this typology is 6.94ha, representing 
3.30% of the agricultural land in the Caia irrigation scheme. This typology accounts for 
58.12% of the number of holdings within the irrigation district. Approximately 75% of 
the land is irrigable. 
 
 
8.4.1 – WATER DEMAND 
 
Figure 65. Demand for irrigation water in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by 
water policy 
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Water demand curves summarise the volume of water required by a chosen crop 
mix at each level of water price or water allotment size. In this typology all the 
agricultural area is occupied by olive orchards and therefore average water consumption 
is directly related to the area irrigated. The patterns of water demand shown in figure 65 
is typical of farming systems based on permanent crops, and it is unique to this typology 
as it is not seen in other typologies analysed in this study. Water demand in this cluster 
remains perfectly inelastic while the benefits to the farmer of irrigated olive orchards 
exceed those of rain fed olive orchards. Beyond this point, the productive plan is 
exclusively based on rain fed olive orchards.  
The figure 65, above, shows similar evolution of average water consumption in 
both volumetric pricing and irrigated area pricing situations. In these cases, model 
results indicate that the length of the inelastic interval, where irrigation is practiced, 
depends greatly on the agricultural policy scenario and market assumptions. Results 
indicate that in the absence of agricultural commodity support, water use in this 
typology would cease, in 2010, at the volumetric price of 0.012€/m3 and of 46€ per 
irrigated hectare under flat pricing, and at a third of these prices in 2015. Model results 
in 2015 indicate that the competitiveness of olive orchards may be diminished, as 
agricultural factor prices grow faster than the price of outputs.  
Model results suggest that no fundamental differences concerning water use are 
to be expected from implementing the CAP SFP policy reform in this typology. In fact, 
average water consumption curves in these scenarios differs only due to market 
assumptions in product and factor prices, as results show that the implementation of the 
SFP in this farming system does not distort production decisions (the olive oil CMO is 
included in the SFP measure). Agricultural support for irrigated olive orchards allocated 
through rural development policy measures is higher than that for rain fed alternatives, 
and for that reason it maintains irrigation viable until much higher prices than previous 
scenarios. In this agricultural policy scenario, water price threshold values for 2010 and 
2015 are of 0.036€/m3 and 0.027€/m3 under volumetric pricing, and of 134€/ha and 
104€/ha, respectively, under flat pricing on the basis of irrigated areas. 
Simulation of water allotment sizes (quotas), the lower graphs in the figure 65, 
reveals a progressive change towards rain fed agriculture. This change is motivated by a 
degressive supply of water to the farm, rather than a reaction to increasing prices, in 
which the decrease of irrigation follows the decrease in the water supply. The decrease 
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of competitiveness of agricultural production is not shown in simulation of water 
quotas, as these were assumed to be free of charge. The endogenous valuation of water 
resources however decreases in 2015, as shown in the next figure, indicating that the 
marginal benefits derived from water use may fall in 2015.  
 
    
Figure 66. Demand for irrigation water in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by 
agricultural policy 
 
 The figure 66 displays results on average water consumption in this typology 
rearranged according to the scenarios of agricultural policy. Although this presentation 
of results suffers from the limitations mentioned in the beginning of this section, the 
figure indicates that water demand in this agricultural system is likely to be more 
influenced by agricultural policy and market settings than by water policy instruments. 
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 Results suggest, for both time frames analysed, that use of a two-part tariff as simulated 
in the status quo scenario, would put an end to the demand for water if rural 
development measures were absent. Figure 66 represents average water costs, in order 
to allow some comparability of results under different water policy instruments; in these 
scenarios of agricultural policy, irrigation is not practiced and therefore water use is 
zero, as illustrated by the points in the origin.   
 
 
8.4.2 – AGRICULTURAL NUTRIENT USE  
 
 Agricultural nutrient use was assed for nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. 
Technical coefficients extracted from crop budgets regarding fertilization of olive 
orchard activities are the same for rain fed and irrigated regimes. Due to this limitation 
in the data it was not possible to quantify any change in the use of fertilizers in response 
to water management instruments or agricultural policy scenarios. Figures of nutrient 
use would thus show vertical lines, constant throughout the simulation of water pricing 
or water allotments and across policy scenarios.  
 
 
8.4.3 – FARM INCOME   
 
 The figure 67 shows the effects on farm income arising from different water 
policy measures. The evolution of farm income in this typology is directly related to the 
above water demand curves, which is similar in both volumetric (figures 67a and b) and 
flat pricing situations (figures 67c and d). In these situations, farm income decreases 
progressively along the inelastic segments of water demand, (from 367 down to 280 in 
figure 67a, in the case of the rural development scenario) until the price thresholds that 
determine the end of irrigation. From this price thresholds upwards, farm income arising 
from rain fed agriculture remains constant, with income levels depending only on the 
agricultural scenario and time frame.  
 Representation of farm income results against water costs per unit of volume, in 
figure 68, shows exactly the same evolution of farm income under volumetric and 
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irrigated area pricing instruments. These exactly overlapping curves are explained on 
the one hand by the absence of a crop water production function for olive orchards, and 
on the other by the costs of transforming land under permanent crops into arable land 
which makes all feasible productive alternatives economically unviable. These two 
aspects combined led to equal marginal and average costs of water resources in these 
pricing situations. 
Parameterising the size of water allotments indicates that model endogenous 
valuation of water resources is kept at zero levels while water supply to the farm does 
not constrain productive decisions. With binding water supplies, the shadow price is 
placed at a plateau during which income is effectively affected by scarcer water 
supplies.  
 
Figure 67. Farm income in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by water policy 
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Figure 68. Farm income in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
The figure 68, above, shows the effects on farm income associated with a two-
part tariff, in which the charging criteria for the flat component is based on the whole 
farm area. Use of this pricing policy indicates that the volumetric price setting of this 
tariff prevents benefits from being made from irrigation in the world market and in SFP 
scenarios (figure 68e and f; figure 68a and b). In these situations farmers do still incur 
the costs of the flat component without using water, being farm income much reduced 
in comparison to other water policy measures simulated. The effect of the two-part tariff 
on farm income is less pronounced in the rural development scenario (figures 68c and d) 
than in previous cases, as irrigation remains viable at that volumetric price. Farm 
income under the two-part tariff in this scenario is also lower than under alternative 
water policies regardless of the water charge or supply of water. This aspect is 
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explained by the proportion of volumetric and flat costs in the tariff and water use, 
which raises total and average water cost, per hectare and per volume, above other water 
policy instruments.  
 
Figure 69. Farm income in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
 Figure 69 establishes a direct relationship between farm income and water 
consumption, enabling assessing the implications of water demand management on the 
economic viability of farming systems. Simulation of water quotas shows that as water 
for irrigation becomes scarcer the percentage of irrigated area is progressively reduced 
and, consequentially, so is farm income. Results indicate that use of pricing instruments 
would significantly lower farm income and would not yield savings in water 
consumption while irrigation is practiced.  
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 These figures also alert to a possible economically unsustainable situation in the 
absence of farm support policies, as this indicator of farm income systematically records 
negative values in the world market scenario. In fact, results indicate that farm income 
in this agricultural system is very low. This is particularly alarming when bearing in 
mind that land rent and entrepreneurial remuneration are not excluded from the 
calculation of this indicator. In this respect, it is worth noting the role of agricultural 
policy in maintaining not only irrigated farming but farming altogether, in agricultural 
systems growing olive orchards.  
 
 
8.4.4 – FARM SUPPORT 
 
Figure 70. Farm support in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by water policy 
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 Results indicate, in figures 70, 71 and 72, that allocation of farm support within 
the new CAP reform, through the SFP, does not distort farming decisions in this 
typology. The area of agricultural activities eligible for direct payments prior to the SFP 
equals the area eligible for support under the SFP measures, for all water management 
policies simulated and regardless of the use of irrigation. Additionally, the amount of 
support is not affected by modulation in this typology as the modulation ceiling is not 
exceeded. The amount of funding through the SFP remains constant across all 
simulations, with the value 146.25 €/ha.  
The recently adopted rural development plan for mainland Portugal, on the other 
hand, foresees differentiated support depending on the type of agricultural activities and 
use of irrigation. The higher support for irrigated activities allocated by this policy is 
responsible for maintaining irrigation until higher prices; that, in spite of more 
pessimistic assumptions concerning agricultural factor costs. Allocation of the SFP in 
this policy scenario remains unchanged while the extra support granted by CAP pillar 2 
varies from 381.6€/ha to 309.9€/ha, depending on the area irrigated (see figure 71c and 
d). In fact, comparison of farm income and farm support figures reveals that differences 
in farm income are fundamentally explained by farm support policies. 
 
Figure 71. Farm support in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
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Figure 72. Farm support in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
 
The figure 72 analyses the relationship between the allocation of public funding 
for agriculture and water resources management, helping to explore conflicts arising 
from agricultural and environmental policies. The figure 72 shows that support 
allocated via the SFP remains constant and independent from water use, while support 
granted by rural development measures indirectly depends and affects the demand for 
water. Model results do not reveal any differences in the relationship between farm 
support and water use due water policies.  
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8.4.5 – WATER PAYMENTS 
 
Figure 73. Water payments in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by water policy 
 
 Figure 73, above, shows that water payments of both volumetric (figure 73a and 
b) and flat pricing (figure 73c and d) are closely related to the pattern of water demand 
curves. In this typology, water payments increase along the inelastic interval of water 
demand and cease when the productive pattern is exclusively rain fed. The ability to 
resist to higher water prices is greatly dependent on agricultural market and policy 
assumptions, as shown above, being recorded differences of up to 63.6€/ha across 
policy scenarios. In the world market policy scenario (best shown in figure 74e) the 
maximum revenue for a water institution generated from sales of water to this farming 
system would be 29.2€/ha (41.4 Euro per irrigated hectare) at the water price of 0.011 
€/m3 in 2010, and about a third of these at a water price of 0.004€/m3 in 2015 (figure 
74f). Figures 73b and c, show that use of a flat tariff instrument based on irrigated area 
would yield similar levels of revenue, with a maximum of 31€/ha in 2010, and 9.9€/ha 
in 2015 (44 and 14 Euro per irrigated hectare, respectively). Maximum water payments 
to a water managing institution are higher in the rural development scenario (see figure 
73), as some support is partially “coupled” to irrigated area, with water payments up to 
92.8 €/ha, or 131.7€/irrigated ha, at the water price of 0.035€/m3 in 2010 (figure 73a), 
and 71.6 €/ha, or 101.6€/irrigated ha, at the water price of 0.027€/m3 in 2015 (figure 
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73b). These levels of charging are comparable to those obtained from flat tariff o the 
basis of irrigated area, with tariffs of 172€/irrigated ha in 2010 (figure 73c), and 
102€/irrigated ha in 2015 (figure 73d). Water payments in the SFP scenario are slightly 
higher than those in the world market scenario, reflecting differences in market prices 
only.     
 Figure 74 shows water payment results per scenario of agricultural policy. Due 
to the reasons mentioned before, water payments under the two-part tariff yields 
systematically higher than in other water policies simulated. Results show that the flat 
component of the two-part tariff is able of generating revenues without distorting 
farming decisions, even when the volumetric component does not, such as in the single 
farm payment and world market scenarios. On the other hand, this produces the 
negative effects on farm income and contribution to GDP mentioned above. 
 
Figure 74. Water payments in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
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 Figure 75, below, relating water payments with water use, enables comparing 
the potential for cost recovery of different water management instruments. In this 
typology, model results indicate that water pricing instruments have an important role in 
generating revenues from water sales, being the combination of volumetric and flat 
pricing (two-part tariff) the method that generates higher revenues, but also show very 
limited effect in curbing water demand in this typology. As mentioned before, this is 
related to the lack of viable alternatives in replacing olive orchards. 
 
Figure 75. Water payments in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped by agricultural 
policy 
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8.4.6 – FARM DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL LABOUR  
 
Figures 76 and 77, below, show that this agricultural system requires, on 
average, 48h/ha of agricultural labour when irrigation is practiced. The transition to rain 
fed olive orchards, at the charging levels commented above, would release on average 
6.5h/ha of labour as this rain fed crop is less labour intensive than when irrigated. 
Model results indicate that all labour requirements in this typology are meet by family 
labour. The simulation of water allotment sizes (figures 76e and f) shows that 2.5h of 
labour (corresponding to 0.35h/ha) would be released from farming activities in this 
typology for every 1000m
3
 reduction in the water allotment. 
 
Figure 76. Demand for agricultural labour in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped 
by water policy 
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Figure 77. Demand for agricultural labour in Caia cluster 1 - olive orchards - grouped 
by agricultural policy 
 
 Figure 77, above, shows the same information on the demand for agricultural 
labour rearranged by policy scenario. This figure suggests that the effects of agricultural 
policy and market prices in this typology are potentially greater than those arising from 
water management instruments.  
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CHAPTER 9 – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study aims to investigate the economic, social and environmental 
implications of adopting the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for the irrigated 
agriculture of Alentejo, Portugal. This research increases knowledge mainly in the field 
of water policy, as it evaluates alternative water management policies for environmental 
protection and their implications for irrigated agriculture in Portugal. In addition, this 
study also helps increase the understanding on the implications of agricultural policies 
on irrigated agriculture, provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationships, 
conflicts and synergies, between agricultural and water policies, and help improve water 
resource allocation decisions.  
A novel bio-economic modelling framework is developed during this research 
for the assessment of differences in the performance of agricultural and water policy 
measures in irrigated agriculture. Water policy implications are analysed by simulating 
a direct pricing policy, an indirect pricing policy, a two-part tariff and parameterisation 
of a water allotment system. These water policy instruments are evaluated in 
combination with three different agricultural policy scenarios, which enable predicting 
the likely evolution of agricultural policy and market environments within the EU. 
That framework allows investigating the impacts of policy change within a 
microeconomic context, at the farm level, taking into account crop yield-water 
relationships, the revealed economic behaviour of farmers, as well as structural and 
productive characteristics of representative agricultural systems in two case study areas. 
This combined approach enables overcoming previous limitations to policy analysis in 
irrigated agriculture derived from asymmetric information deficiencies, such as 
unobserved individual water intakes, or absent information regarding water-yield 
relationships, while taking into account the economic behavioural attitudes of farmers in 
respect to policy change. 
This chapter completes the analysis carried out during this research and 
describes its main conclusions. The most important findings of specific elements of this 
research are summarised on a chapter by chapter basis following the structure of this 
monograph. Conclusions of agricultural and water policy implications on irrigated 
farming are discussed in greater detail at the end of this section. 
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Chapter 2 – Water Management and the WFD  
 
This chapter describes the role of public policy for the sustainable management 
of water resources. It begins by commenting recent evolutions in water management 
priorities, discussing how that evolution was shaped by influences of a changing society 
with stronger environmental concerns and overall scarcer water resources. This topic is 
first approached by describing the general economic rationale for fostering the adoption 
of integrated water management policies and, shortly after, by focusing on the main 
phases that have characterised that process within the European Union, until it has 
recently culminated in the implementation of the Water Framework Directive. 
At the very summit of policy restructuring in the EU water sector, the WFD 
establishes a comprehensive and coherent framework for the environmental protection 
of all waters. Within this monograph, the presentation of this policy is narrowed down 
and tailored to fit the discussion of key principles within the WFD, such as cost 
recovery and water demand management in irrigated agriculture. That discussion takes 
off exploring the conceptual differences between these key elements and reviewing the 
contribution of the most import water management policy instruments in delivering 
these goals. Later it is suggested that the wide array of existing policy instruments for 
irrigation water management reflects, on the one hand, the various stages of policy 
priorities situated along the evolution of development approaches towards integrated 
management and, on the other hand, the diversity of bio-physical, social and political 
environments in which these instruments operate.  
The use of economic pricing instruments is perhaps evaluated into deeper depths 
as these instruments may be designed to pursue both cost recovery and/or demand 
management. In this respect, use of water prices, per se, is initially contextualised as but 
one element alongside a multitude of non-price attributes determining the performance 
of irrigation water supply. That explained, the chapter elaborates on the effects of these 
and other factors, such as water pricing instruments and agricultural policy, on the 
elasticity of water demand, with a strong focus on the effects produced by the water 
price itself. 
Under the circumstances, the attitudes of experts towards the appropriateness of 
policy instruments in delivering policy goals seldom converge. That is mainly explained 
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by an overwhelming diversity of factors affecting the performance of water 
management policy instruments. That alone effectively provides sufficient emphasis in 
stressing the urgency in promoting locally adequate research skills and a systematic 
review of policy environments for the correct guidance of public policy – one that may 
encourage the efficient conservation of natural resources, without jeopardising the 
sustainability of agriculture and livelihoods of people in rural areas. 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Modelling Farm Diversity 
 
This chapter is the first structural module of the bio-economic framework. The 
ultimate goal of this chapter is to produce homogeneous representative farming systems, 
suitable for mathematical representation within the bio-economic modelling, in respect 
to cropping patterns, agricultural rotations, socio-economic features and structural 
characteristics of these representative farms. 
The chapter Modelling Farm Diversity provides a concise characterisation of the 
two irrigation schemes (Caia and Odivelas) within the national and regional contexts, 
focusing on the description of local climate, soils, and the technical-economic nature of 
farming in these regions. That superficial analysis reveals agricultural heterogeneity as 
it exposes that a number of agricultural systems do co-exist side-by-side within these 
irrigation schemes. Failure to take that diversity into account produces severe 
limitations and distortions for policy analysis usually known as aggregation bias 
problems. 
This chapter endeavours to understand the reasons behind that agricultural 
diversity, in order to minimise aggregation bias. Principal Component Analysis and 
Cluster Analysis were used to explore the socio-economic structure of agricultural 
production using individual farm data collected during the last exhaustive agricultural 
census. PCA and CA are two specific multivariate techniques used to uncover the 
structure of data, variables and observations, respectively. In these techniques there are 
no exclusively dependent variables explained by independent variables, and therefore 
they will almost always produce factors or clusters regardless of the existence of any 
“true” underlying structure in the data. Extensive use of these techniques has, in fact, 
generated more questions on the appropriateness of use of these techniques and 
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suitability of data, than provided answers useful for a socio-economic understanding of 
agricultural structure in these areas. 
PCA followed by CA were thoroughly tested to attack data from all possible 
angles; and all possible angles have failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for 
agricultural heterogeneity taking into account socio-economic criteria. PCA were 
performed on the data using either absolute variable values or using normalised values. 
Further PCA were essayed on these approaches, testing both the relevance of 
statistically selected variables, as well as the usefulness of PCA when performed 
separately on nested groups of variables. In addition, components extracted from PCA 
were tested for clustering using factor scores and using surrogate variable methods, 
before and after the implementation of standardisation procedures. A weighting system 
based on the amount of variance explained by each principal component was also 
essayed in attempt to improve cluster results.  
Use of these procedures combined clearly showed that variables do not naturally 
cluster. In particular, it showed that socio-economic variables do not cluster with farm 
structure or productive orientation ones, as all attempts to include these criteria 
systematically resulted in failure to materialise a socio-economic categorisation of farms 
without severe miss-clustering of cases. Use of socio-economic criteria for clustering 
variables resulted in increased heterogeneity within clusters (of observations) in terms 
of productive pattern and farm structure. Analysis within clusters revealed that, 
although cases were closer in terms of the total proximity for clustering, they would be 
less homogeneous considering productive pattern and farm size variables. Such 
problems persisted on all PCA followed by clustering analyses. The hypothesis that the 
socio-economic characteristics of farmers together with farm physical characteristics, 
have a decisive role in explaining the agricultural system, could not be corroborated 
from PCA/CA analysis carried out on these two case studies using data collected for the 
last agricultural census.  
For that reason, cluster analysis alone was used to produce a useful 
categorization of the farming systems in the case study areas. This clustering was 
performed exclusively against productive pattern and farm physical size criteria. This 
simple but effective clustering, allied with use of very conservative cutting rules, 
enabled producing well differentiated and homogenous clusters on the case study areas; 
four clusters within the Caia irrigation district and three within the Odivelas irrigation 
district.  
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Individual and exclusive characteristics of each cluster are introduced within the 
mathematical programming models, described in chapter five. Structural and productive 
characteristics are decisive elements in the simulation of the economic behaviour of 
farmers in each of these agricultural typologies. Both aspects are later used to 
investigate the implications of agricultural and environmental policy change in these 
representative farming systems. 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Bio-Economic Modelling in Agriculture  
 
The main focus of this chapter is on presenting the main advantages of bio-
economic modelling in agriculture to support policy analysis and improve resource 
allocation decisions. In order to do that, attention is also given to shortcomings of 
traditional agronomic research and statistical analysis in overcoming incomplete or 
absent knowledge of input-output relationships. The backbone of this chapter deals 
primarily with approaches to develop crop-water production functions – the building 
blocks of all microeconomic studies focusing on irrigation. 
Most micro-economic analyses require knowledge of input-output relationships. 
Input-output relationships are a crucial element of any resource allocation analyses, as 
the appropriate use-level for inputs cannot be accurately determined in the absence of 
input-output functions. This knowledge is in fact a fundamental cornerstone, and 
paramount for sound environmental and agricultural economic policy, however it is 
usually unknown, not measured, immeasurable and, at best, incomplete or very 
inappropriate. These data deficiencies undermine the whole agricultural sector, and are 
actually magnified and exacerbated in the irrigated agricultural sector, producing severe 
limitations for agricultural and environment policy analyses, water resources in 
particular. This chapter shows how bio-economic modelling can be of help in 
overcoming these limitations. 
Bio-economic modelling is an integrated approach in which biophysical 
techniques and outcomes serve as inputs to economic models. Bio-economic modelling 
in agriculture establishes relationships between farm agro-ecological conditions and 
socio-economic criteria affecting agricultural production. This approach provides a 
coherent framework that allows agricultural technical options and biological relations to 
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be introduced into the appraisal of economic policy instruments. In this research, an 
agronomic model explicitly considers biological and physical aspects of agricultural 
production to simulate crop yields, specific to water input use-levels.  
Most of the remainder of this chapter deals with reviewing the conceptual 
strengths of the most widely used crop growth models and presenting selected results. 
That review has selected the CropSyst model (Stockle and Nelson 1994), to integrate 
the bio-physical component of this research, against criteria of appropriateness for the 
intended purpose and suitability for environmental conditions. CropSyst results are 
shown as a graphical representation of crop-water production functions for the cases of 
irrigated maize, common wheat and sunflower, describing the crop yield expected from 
application of a particular water use level. Results of relationships between crop yield 
and water input are shown to capture accurately inter-annual environmental effects on 
crop yield, as well as crop yield responses to variable water input levels. In addition, 
these results show how use of irrigation technology affects that bio-physical 
relationship
160
.  
Results indicate that CropSyst predicted with reasonable accuracy crop stresses 
related to variable water input levels, as well as agricultural yield losses arising from 
those stresses. Cropsyst has successfully produced locally adjusted agronomic 
production functions relating crop yield to varying water inputs.  
As mentioned earlier, knowledge of input-output relationships is crucial for most 
micro-economic studies, and a fundamental cornerstone for sound environmental and 
agricultural economic policy. CropsSyst has fruitful and effectively produced that 
information and enabled overcoming asymmetric/private data limitations. These input-
output relationships are introduced into mathematical programming models as technical 
input-output crop coefficients concerning both irrigated crops and irrigation 
equipments, in order to allow taking into account a wide range of realistic technological 
production options. Both aspects combined do significantly enhance endogenous 
choices in the economic modelling of agricultural systems, therefore help improving 
policy analysis and contributing towards better resource allocation decisions. 
 
 
                                                 
160
 - Results shown in this chapter are part of a wider set of results, focusing on the economic implications 
of that bio-physical relationship in the structure of costs and profit under different irrigation technologies 
(Saraiva 2006). 
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Chapter 5 – Agricultural Economics Mathematical Modelling 
 
Chapter five delves into the economic component of the bio-economic 
modelling approach. This is where previous and latter modules (chapters) actually fit 
together to form a comprehensive and coherent structure. Predicted yields 
corresponding to water use levels provide the technical information required for optimal 
water resource allocation in the representative farms determined in chapter three. This 
chapter is about the other side of the coin, as it focuses on economic aspects influencing 
agricultural production and resource use and, most important, it focuses on 
understanding the economic behaviour of farmers in order to evaluate their responses in 
respect to policy change. 
The chapter begins by introducing the rationale for exploring the preferences of 
decision makers and taking into account their economic behaviour. The multi-criteria 
decision making rationale is described by presenting an additive multi-attribute utility 
theory function (Keeney and Raiffa 1976), that uses weighted goal programming, as 
proposed by Sumpsi et al. (1996), to elicit the relative importance of attributes within 
the process of decision making. The methodological presentation of the MAUT 
formulation is complemented with a detailed and very useful guide for practitioners, in 
which an operational application to the present research situation is provided. 
This chapter is concluded once determined the economic behaviour of farmers. 
For that purpose, a validation procedure demonstrates that the MAUT models produced 
are a reliable mathematical representation of the farming systems identified by 
clustering. That validation process shows that the understanding of the economic 
behaviour of farmers, and that taking those preferences into account, improves 
performance of mathematical programming models. In other words, it is concluded that 
MAUT models usually provide a better operational representation of agricultural reality 
than the traditional profit maximising assumption framework. For that reason, MAUT 
models were chosen as the most appropriate to simulate the outcomes of agricultural 
and water policy instruments. 
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Chapter 6 – Common Agricultural Policy Scenarios for 2010/2015 
 
Scenario analysis is a means of dealing with uncertainty of key variable values. 
In the context of this research, scenario analysis is particularly useful as it enables 
questioning assumptions on the evolution of those variable, such as commodity and 
factor prices or even policy assumptions. Scenarios are thus used as prospective 
statements used for exploring uncertainty around a deterministic prediction in the near 
future. Agricultural policy and agricultural markets, in particular, are paramount factors 
determining the performance of irrigated agriculture; any changes affecting agricultural 
markets and policy are thus likely to influence the use of water resources in agriculture. 
Hence, these matters are thoroughly examined, defining most likely and extreme 
boundaries in their evolution, in order to understand the type and extent of those 
implications on irrigation. Assumptions on these scenarios imbricate within the MAUT 
modelling environment for each agricultural typology, taking into account the input-
output coefficients computed by CropSyst. Ultimately, this chapter designs a near future 
background context, in respect to agricultural policy and market environments, in which 
water policies will operate. 
Chapter six defines policy-consistent and market-coherent scenarios, for 
understanding the implications of agricultural and water policy change on the irrigation 
sector. It provides a systematic review of the main historical trends and long-term 
driving forces which affect agriculture and agricultural markets in the EU, in order to 
understand how developments in these variables may influence the future of agriculture. 
That review enabled producing a deterministic projection of these variables into the 
future, establishing a baseline/reference scenario for the analysis of agricultural and 
water policies. Uncertainty in the pathway of evolution of some of these key variables, 
namely agricultural policy and agricultural markets, led to design two additional 
scenarios following opposite but reasonable trends. Overall, the three agricultural policy 
scenarios are characterised by different policy objectives, and hence they differ 
substantially on the support provided for the agricultural sector and consider different 
market assumptions, coherent with those policy objectives. These scenarios contribute 
to the assessment of the recent reform of the CAP and implementation of the single 
farm payment; the novel package of rural development policy measures recently 
approved for the Portuguese agriculture (PRODI); and the dismantlement of all non-
structural support within the CAP provided for farming.  
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It is expected that the real evolution of agriculture should be comprised within 
the boundaries defined by the extreme scenarios. Accordingly, these scenarios provide 
not only three different assessment points for evaluating water policies as, perhaps most 
important, they define a reasonable interval, a range of possible values for 
understanding policy results under different environments. The assessment of water 
policy implications is evaluated for all agricultural policy scenarios, by parameterisation 
of a volumetric pricing policy instrument, a flat pricing policy instrument based on 
irrigated areas, variable water allotment sizes, and stochastic simulation of a two part 
tariff considering a volumetric component and a flat pricing component based on 
farming area.  
A significant part of this chapter focuses on the presentation of specific policy 
assumptions in each scenario, as well as their mathematical formulation and integration 
within the modelling. Policy and market assumptions are particularly important as they 
help orchestrate model results. For that reason, the reader whishing to find detailed 
information on those assumptions is also invited to explore annexes IX and X. 
 
 
Chapter 7 – Policy Change Indicators for 2010/2015  
 
Policy performance indicators provide a means for reporting and summarising 
model results and outputs of water and agricultural policy scenarios, and therefore they 
are the last structural module to integrate the bio-economic framework. Use of 
indicators in mathematical models enables producing readily available information for 
policy analysis, when compared to raw, untreated, model outputs, which are often of 
limited use and may convey less policy-relevant information. In addition, the 
mathematical calculation of indicators within the modelling environment avoids or 
minimises risks inherent to data handling by analysts foreign to that environment, it 
enables identification of miss-specifications, ill-structuring, and awareness of 
limitations imposed by available data. Moreover, if they are not mathematically 
specified as valuable outputs within the model code, they risk remaining hidden and 
never know to the analyst or to decision maker. 
Agri-environmental indicators used in this research were developed within the 
Pressure State Response (PSR) framework. The PSR framework enables highlighting 
 279 
synergies and trade-offs between indicators, as linkages between the economic, social 
and environmental dimensions within agriculture are accounted for. These indicators 
aim to identify the causes, the quantity and extent of agricultural and environmental 
policy implications with respect to both the harmful and beneficial impacts on the 
environmental, the use of natural resources, and the viability of rural communities. 
Indicators were selected to address primary policy relevant issues in each of these 
dimensions of agriculture, establishing easy to interpret relationship between 
agricultural activities, agricultural practices, and policy related concerns. 
This chapter also deals with problems of adjusting available agri-environmental 
indicators suitable for highly aggregated macro-analysis to farm-level studies. During 
this process, special attention is given to policy relevance, data required, as well as to 
the mathematical formulation used for integrating these indicators within the bio-
economic model code. 
 
 
Chapter 8 – Model Results and Discussion  
 
The results presented in this chapter are, ultimately, the product of all previous 
sections. This analysis of agricultural and water policy is individually produced for each 
agricultural system identified by clustering, taking into account the crop-water 
production functions computed by Cropsyst, the economic behaviour of farmers as 
determined by the MAUT models, expressing results with the agri-environment policy 
performance indicators, for economic environments projected into the future for two 
time frames according to the agricultural policy and market assumptions of each 
scenario. 
This chapter presents the most import implications of agricultural and water 
policy change on agricultural typologies identified in the Caia irrigation district. Many 
interesting results have been placed in Annexes to help focus on the most policy 
relevant indicators and due to length constraints in the writing of this monograph. It is 
also for this reason that results of agricultural typologies in the Odivelas irrigation 
district are not discussed. Enthusiastic readers will find these results in the annexes. It is 
worthwhile mentioning that the adjustments produced within the Odivelas irrigated 
agriculture sector in response to both agricultural and water policy instruments, do 
 280 
corroborate those predicted and discussed for similar typologies in the Caia irrigation 
district. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The bio-economic methodological framework proposed in this research has 
produced results that massively exceeded the initial expectations. Aggregation of farms 
in representative agricultural systems was satisfactory dealt with by a simple clustering 
procedure. Use of CropSyst, an agricultural crop growth model, successfully generated 
input-output coefficients that enabled taking into account crop water production 
functions within the bio-economic model. That is, in fact, a fundamental milestone of 
this research, as it allowed bringing into the modelling the entire production frontier of 
these farming systems and enabled a comprehensive understanding of the pathways of 
response to different water policy instruments. The modelling of the economic 
behaviour of farmers proved to be most reliably identified and reproduced by MAUT 
models, rather than by those governed by the traditional profit maximising paradigm. 
Agricultural policy scenarios were designed to reflect coherence between agricultural 
policy and agricultural markets; overall, assumptions in these scenarios establish the 
extreme interval for policy and market developments most likely to contain the real 
evolution of farming within the EU. Policy performance agri-environmental indicators 
were successfully selected and adjusted to farm-level analysis, to express results of 
agricultural and water policy implications with respect to both the negative and positive 
impacts of policy change.  
The above framework was used to simulate the environmental, social and 
economic implications of agricultural and water management policies. Agricultural 
policy was simulated using three different scenarios, with considerable differences in 
the support provided for agriculture, and water management policies included 
parametric simulation of volumetric pricing, area pricing on the basis of irrigated land, 
and implementation of a water allotment policy measure. In addition to that, 
extrapolation into the future of the present two-part tariff was simulated in order to 
provide a yardstick for comparing results. Agricultural adjustments to policy change 
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were captured by two response curves for each policy indicator, one for the short term 
(2010) and one for the long term (2015).  
Two sets of conclusions emerge from this research. The first is centred on the 
comparative analysis of water management policy instruments for irrigation. The 
second focuses on the effects of agricultural policy on irrigated farming. In the interface 
of these matters, this work also unravels conflicts and synergies between agricultural 
and water policy. Crops respond in different ways to the implementation of CAP 
measures and alternative water management policy instruments. While some of those 
responses may be mainly explained by the effect of agricultural policies and market 
assumptions, some others are mostly attributable to the water policy instrument itself, 
but it is very often the combined effect of these policies that fully explains agricultural 
responses. These responses are as far as possible dealt with separately for easiness of 
presentation. 
This study demonstrates that farmers produce a number of adjustments in their 
cropping patterns and use of irrigating technology when subject to changes in water 
policies. Adjustments in farming strategies include adoption of less water intensive 
crops, deliberately under or over-watering, reduction or increases of irrigated areas, 
adoption of more efficient or cheaper irrigation technologies. The reasoning behind 
these farming responses depends on the water management policy and on its 
enforcement level, as well as on the set of agricultural policy measures in force. 
Simulation of water management policies on irrigated olive orchards indicates 
that these agricultural systems are not particularly flexible to water pricing. In fact, they 
appear to be as fragile as they are rigid systems. The implications of water pricing 
policies on this agricultural activity are characterised by a totally inelastic demand for 
water until the water charge threshold that forces the abandonment of irrigation 
altogether, which may therefore compromise the economic and social viability of that 
agricultural system. Agricultural systems based on arable land crops, such as cereals and 
oilseed crops, have shown to be more diverse, flexible and capable of producing 
adjustments to water price increases or simulation of water allotments. Most irrigated 
vegetable crops are particularly rigid, as their usually high profitability implies that they 
are often capable of supporting higher increases in water prices while remaining 
economically viable. 
Farmers respond to volumetric price increases only if prices are located within 
the elastic segments in the water demand curve. That is effectively a sine qua non 
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condition for agricultural adjustments to occur. These responses were recorded through 
changes in the farm strategy in order to promote reductions in the total water 
consumption. This may arise from under-watering crops, reductions or increases in the 
irrigated area, relocation towards less water-intensive crops or adoption of more 
efficient irrigation technologies. These responses are not disconnected from agricultural 
policy, and support towards farming may actually increase. Results show that 
agricultural policy, such as the simulated set of rural development policy measures, may 
act as deterrent, preventing these adjustments from taking place. 
From an economic standpoint, under-watering crops appears to be one the most 
rational attitudes in response to volumetric price increases, and particularly so when 
agricultural support is uncoupled from production. The previous statement holds true 
whenever crop response functions exhibit diminishing marginal returns, which will 
direct agricultural production towards points with higher marginal utility and therefore 
enhance the allocation of scarcer or more expensive water resources. 
Simulation of flat pricing on the basis of irrigated areas has enabled recording a 
different underlying reasoning to explain agricultural adjustments. In the absence of 
scarce and constraining water supplies, the adjustments to this water policy instrument 
were mainly limited to reductions in the irrigated area. During this process, the usual 
trend in the demand for water follows that of irrigated land, however, increases in the 
total demand for water and increases in the intensity of water use per irrigated hectare 
were registered. On the one hand, results corroborate that use of flat pricing on the basis 
of irrigated area, without any further differentiating charging criteria, imposes a fix 
charge on irrigated land which is very effective in constraining production of irrigated 
crops with lower average utility per unit of irrigated land – and that per se may 
indirectly, but not necessarily, contribute towards improving the allocation of water 
resources. On the other hand, this form of flat pricing is incapable of influencing the 
marginal utility of water resources, and therefore irrigated crops removed from 
production are those least competitive, the most affected by unfavourable agricultural 
policy and market environments, rather than those most water-intensive. In general 
terms, under-watering crops is not the most rational attitude to produce water savings, 
but this charging method is most likely to produce less “biased distortions” to the 
allocation of agricultural public support than volumetric pricing. In addition to that, 
results show that both flat and volumetric pricing have often comparable effects on their 
ability to contribute to the cost recovery of water services. 
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This research shows that economic pricing instruments for water demand 
management may be used to achieve the desired environmental and budgetary benefits 
as foreseen in the WFD. Evidences of the work carried out indicate that these two 
objectives will hardly be achieved together by the action of a sole water pricing 
instrument, as the endogenous nature of the adjustments, mentioned above, explains 
significant differences in the ability of satisfying demand management and cost 
recovery objectives. Results of most agricultural typologies suggest that the ability to 
produce the highest water payments is usually concentrated during the inelastic (rigid) 
segments of the water demand, that is, when the action of water pricing policies is 
particularly ineffective, or with little effect in reducing the consumption of water.  
The usefulness of economic instruments in curbing the demand for irrigation 
water and contribute to the cost recovery of water services depends ultimately on the 
elasticity of the demand for water. For that reason, significant differences have been 
recorded in the performance of volumetric pricing and flat pricing, across farming 
systems, enforcement levels of those pricing instruments, as well as agricultural policy 
and market settings simulated. In this regard, research results indicate that both direct 
and indirect water pricing instruments, on their own, if designed to achieve cost 
recovery objectives, would not necessarily produce the most effective means for 
restraining the demand of water for irrigation.  
Regardless of the ability in promoting more efficient uses of water resources, 
these pricing instruments have systematically proven to cause negative impacts on the 
income of farmers, while positively contributing to satisfy budgetary concerns related to 
the provision of water services. In spite of that, benefits to the environment, such as 
alleviating pressures associated to diffuse pollution caused by agricultural fertilisers and 
pesticides, may be expected provided that the enforcement level of these instruments 
induces changes in the use of water resources, cropping patterns or agricultural 
practices. While these environmental benefits are recorded, the general trend in the 
demand for labour is often diminished, as irrigated activities are usually the more labour 
demanding ones. 
Implementation of adequately designed water allotment mechanisms may be 
used to pursue these environment effects with less negative consequences on farm 
income than water pricing. These allotment mechanisms were simulated by full 
parameterisation of water quotas constraining the allocation of water resources to the 
representative farming systems. Results show that the endogenous behaviour of the 
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models, as well as the agricultural adjustments produced, is similar to that observed in 
the simulation of volumetric pricing, in which the ultimate pathway of response consists 
in increasing the marginal utility of the available water resources. Simulations of water 
quotas assumed that the provision of water resources is made available free of charge, 
and therefore its implementation would not only extract financial resources from the 
public budget, as it would prevent contributing towards the cost recovery of water 
services. Results indicate that this assumption grants a hidden support towards irrigated 
farming, which enhances competitiveness of irrigated crops and protection of the rural 
world, while regulating the consumption of water resources to sustainable levels and 
contributing to relieve pressures caused by diffuse pollution of agricultural origin.  
Results substantiate that agricultural policies, product and factor prices are at 
least as crucial factors influencing irrigation water use and irrigation technologies as 
water prices and water management policies. As mentioned before, changes in 
agricultural policy have a significant effect on the demand for irrigation water. Results 
show that, even at very low water prices, uncoupled support to farmers creates 
substantial water savings which may, on their own, effectively suffice in meeting the 
environmental objectives proposed by the WFD. In some agricultural typologies of 
these case studies the total withdrawal of support has produced similar effects 
(depending on water prices), without having to enforce water management policies at 
stricter levels. One of the main objectives in the WFD consists in solving conflicts 
arising from excessive water use and their negative effects on the environment; 
however, in the case of irrigated farming changes in agricultural policy and markets 
may suffice, or at least contribute significantly towards solving that conflict. 
 Some CAP measures have been shown to create effects contradictory to the 
objectives defined in the WFD. Results indicate that the existence of differentiated 
support for irrigated crops within the novel package of rural development policy 
measures (PRODI), promotes use of irrigation and higher demand for water. This 
conflict is particularly aggravated by the newly created tiers for the modulation of that 
support, especially whenever decreases in irrigated areas require relocation of rain fed 
production to tiers of lower support. Results have shown that this bias is significantly 
magnified in the larger agricultural typologies as the gap between levels of support 
increases, therefore preventing adjustments due to water policies from taking place. 
Results also indicate that no or little consequences are to be expected on the smaller 
farms due to this modulation of support. In general lines, the single farm payment and 
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set aside policy measures, on the other hand, have shown to be effective measures in 
mitigating water demand for agriculture. Results suggest that the exclusion of vegetable 
crops and permanent fruit crops from eligibility criteria established for claiming 
payments creates similar distortions to those observed under the rural development set 
of PRODI measures. 
 These conflicts between CAP measures and water policy instruments ultimately 
results in losses of efficiency, policy efficacy and losses of welfare. These conflicts 
have shown to be most severe in the case of flat pricing on the basis of irrigated areas, 
but have also been recorded to a lesser extent in volumetric pricing and simulation of 
water allotments. In the most detrimental situations of conflict, water price increases 
have shown to yield no water savings or other environmental benefits, the additional 
contribution towards the cost recovery of water services in fully funded by tax-payers 
via transfers of agricultural support, competitiveness of farming is diminished and direct 
contributions from farming to national wealth are also impoverished in the same degree.  
All the results of this work led to believe that agricultural policies and 
agricultural markets are decisive elements affecting irrigation water use, very often 
more decisive than the effect caused by water prices or alternative water management 
instruments. While some agricultural policy measures have little effect on the demand 
for water, others have shown to produce synergies or inclusively to be in conflict with 
water policy objectives. The understanding of these conflicts between CAP and WFD 
objectives suggests that the way forward will have to reach a harmonised consensus in 
the best interest of the rural world, agriculture and the environment. Water policy 
objectives affecting irrigation, such as water demand management, may be enhanced by 
the appropriate implementation of agricultural policy instruments; while the negative 
effect of others, such as cost recovery, may be best supported by uncoupled support for 
farmers without compromising environmental objectives.  
This research is conducted at the farm-level scale and it assesses the implications 
of policy change from the demand side of water for irrigation. These assessments were 
thus guided by notions of policy efficacy and efficiency, but excluding the costs of 
policy implementation necessarily constrains the analysis. Although efforts have not 
explicitly focused on the analysis of the supply side of the provision of water services, 
this study raises important questions on the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of 
use of different water management policies. That is particularly the case whenever 
differences on cost recovery and demand management between volumetric and flat 
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pricing are slim, and even more so when the benefits of the latter exceed the benefits of 
the former, as results have suggested under specific circumstances. Research efforts 
should also be directed towards the supply side of the provision of water resources to 
irrigation, in order to make them cheaper, more efficient and, above all, more cost-
effective. The supply side of cost recovery is, in fact, a fundamental matter which 
should be dealt with the greatest attention, as implications of infra-structural and 
managerial inefficiencies escape the validity domain of policy analysis using demand 
approaches but do, necessarily, affect performance of the entire system and build up 
cost recovery prices. 
Results suggest that water management policies may change the trade-off 
between the environmental, social and economic dimensions of sustainability in 
agriculture. Use of water policy instruments to alleviate environmental pressures on the 
use of water resources and diffuse pollution created by irrigated farming, water pricing 
in particular, may thus come at the expense of farm income and may impose additional 
pressures on the demand for agricultural labour. Caution is therefore required to ensure 
that reductions in the on-farm demand for agricultural inputs (labour, chemicals and 
machinery), in parallel with lower agricultural output to be processed, do not jeopardise 
the viability of the irrigated farming sector, as well as the viability of the wider rural 
communities depending on the provision of these services to irrigation. Simulation of 
water quotas suggests that some the negative consequences on farm income and the 
rural world arising from water pricing may, to some extent, be minimised by non-
pricing instruments.  
Overall, these analyses indicate that adoption of water management policies may 
led to the contraction of the irrigated agriculture sector, and results do point out that the 
implementation of the cost recovery principle, as suggested by the WFD, may endanger 
the competitiveness of fragile irrigated agricultural systems. On the other hand, these 
results intrinsically demonstrate there are sufficient reasons for further investigating the 
implications of additional water management instruments, for exploring the advantages 
of coupling pricing with non-pricing water policy instruments. Perhaps most important, 
this research has made obvious that there are gains in efficiency to be made by 
integrating CAP and WFD policy measures and objectives, in a coherent and combined 
approach that explores synergies and coordinates efforts to overcome sources of 
conflict. Only then will policy making improve environmental protection and the 
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efficient use of natural resources, in a cost-effective way, without compromising the 
viability of rural communities or the role of irrigated agriculture in the rural world. 
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APPENDIX I – LIST OF VARIABLES IN THE AGRICULTURAL CENSUS DATA SET 
 
Table 22. The INE list of variables in the agricultural census data set 
Set Variables 
Measurement 
Scale 
Land Structure: 
Location 
Municipality 
 
Nominal 
District Nominal 
Usable Agricultural Area Scale 
Arable Land Scale 
Permanent Crops Area Scale 
Temporary Crops Area Scale 
Number of Holdings Scale 
Irrigated Area  Scale 
Water Sources 
Principal Nominal 
Secondary Nominal 
Productive 
Resources 
Land Ownership 
Owned Land Scale 
Fixed Rent Scale 
Seasonal Rent Scale 
Partnership Rent Scale 
Other Forms 
Ownership 
Scale 
Rent value 
Fixed Rent Scale 
Seasonal Rent Scale 
Irrigation System Nominal 
Tractors 
Owned Scale 
Rented Nominal 
Drillers 
Owned Scale 
Rented Nominal 
Balers 
Owned Scale 
Rented Nominal 
Grain Harvesters 
Owned Scale 
Rented Nominal 
Tomato Harvesters 
Owned Scale 
Rented Nominal 
Machinery Rent Rented Nominal 
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Set Variables 
Measurement 
Scale 
Main 
Characteristics 
of the Producer 
and Producer 
Partner 
Farm Manager Nominal 
Age Scale 
Sex Nominal 
Instruction Level Nominal 
Agricultural Instruction Level Ordinal 
Agricultural activity time Ordinal 
Remunerated activities outside 
the farm 
Principal Ordinal 
Secondary Ordinal 
Main 
Characteristics 
of the other 
Producer 
Relatives 
Farm Manager Nominal 
Age Scale 
Sex Nominal 
Instruction Level Nominal 
Agricultural Instruction Level Ordinal 
Agricultural activity time Ordinal 
Principal Remunerated activities outside the farm Ordinal 
Agricultural 
Employment 
Family 
Population 
Producer AWU
161
 Scale 
Producer Partner AWU Scale 
Producer Other Relatives AWU Scale 
Permanent 
Workers: 
N. of 
Permanent 
Workers 
< 25% Full Time Scale 
>25 <50 Full Time Scale 
>50 <75 Full Time Scale 
>75 <100 Full Time Scale 
Full Time Scale 
Permanent Workers AWU Scale 
Permanent Management AWU Scale 
Permanent Workers Total AWU Scale 
Agricultural 
Seasonal 
Workers: 
Number of Female Working days Scale 
Number of Male Working days Scale 
Number of Working days Scale 
Seasonal Workers AWU Scale 
                                                 
161
 - AWU – The acronym represents Annual Working Units, which are defined as full-time equivalent 
employment in agriculture. One AWU corresponds to the labour input generated by one permanent 
employee during 275 days, working eight hours per day. 
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Set Variables 
Measurement 
Scale 
Total AWU Scale 
Productive 
Pattern: 
Technical-Economic Orientation Nominal 
Animal Breeding 
Species and N.  Scale 
LSU
162
 Scale 
Main Permanent 
Crops 
Fresh Fruits Species and Area Scale 
Citrus Crops and Area Scale 
Dry Fruits Crops and Area Scale 
Olive Grove 
Table Scale 
Olive Oil Scale 
Vineyards 
Wine Scale 
Grapes Scale 
Main 
Temporary 
Crops 
Grain Cereals Crops/Area Scale 
Grain  Legumes Crops/Area Scale 
Temp pastures/fodder Crops/Area Scale 
Industrial Crops Crops/Area Scale 
Vegetable Crops Crops/Area Scale 
Set-a-side Scale 
Irrigated Crops Irrigated Crops Crops/Area Scale 
Income 
Farm Agricultural Gross Income Scale 
Producer Family Source of Income Nominal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
162
 - LSU – Livestock Units allows comparisons across livestock of different species and age. 
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APPENDIX II – LIST OF CROP SIMULATION MODELS AND APPLICATIONS  
 
Table 23. List of crop simulation models, applications and references 
Simulation Model Description Examples of Application 
AGNPS (Young et 
al., 1989) 
Agricultural Non-Point Source 
pollution model. Water quality 
model for analysing non-point source 
pollution in agricultural watersheds  
Kozloff et al., 1992; Sugiharto et al., 
1994 ; Rode and Frede, 1997. 
CEEPES (Bouzaher 
et al., 1995) 
Comprehensive Environmental 
Economic Policy Evaluation System. 
Integrated system for evaluating 
trade-offs from alternative agro-
environmental policies 
Bouzaher et al., 1995. 
CROPWAT (Smith 
1992a) 
Irrigation planning and management (Cavero et al. 2000a). Cropwat home 
page 
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGL/AGLW/
cropwat.stm  
SWAT (Arnold et al., 
1993) 
Soil and Water Assessment Tool. 
Aims to predict the effects of 
management (climate and vegetative 
changes, reservoir management, 
groundwater withdrawals, water 
transfer) on water sediment and 
chemical yields on large river basins 
Arnold and Allen, 1996; Brown and 
Hollis, 1996. For more details, 
software, documentation and 
references visit 
http://www.brc.tamus.edu/swat/  
SWRRB (Williams et 
al., 1985) 
Simulator for Water Resources 
Quality in Rural Basins 
Arnold and Williams, 1987; Singer et 
al., 1998; Savabi et al., 1998. 
GOSSYM (Baker et 
al., 1986) 
Cotton growth model and expert 
system. A model for simulating the 
growth of cotton 
Misra and Spurlock, 1991. 
SORGF (Maas and 
Arkin, 1978) 
A biophysical simulation model for 
sorghum 
Harris and Mapp, 1986; Dillon et al., 
1989. 
DSSAT (Jones et al. 
1998) (CERES 
Maize, Jones and 
Kinirty 1986; CERES 
Wheat Ritchie and 
Otter 1985 ; 
CROPGRO, Boote et 
Decision Support System for 
Agrotechnology Transfer (v3.5 for 
maize, wheat, soybean, peanut, rice, 
potato, tomato, drybean, sorghum, 
millet, pasture, chickpea, cowpea, 
velvetbean, brachiaria grass and faba 
Some DSSAT applications in Europe, 
based on Jones et al. 2003. Hunkár 
1994; Pfeil et al. 1992 ; Ruiz-
Nogueria et al. 2001 ; Sau et al. 
1999 ; Zalud et al. 2000, 2001; 
Gabrielle and Kengni 1996; Gabrielle 
et al. 1998; Ben Nouna et al. 2000 ; 
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al. 1998 ; SOYGRO, 
Wilkirson et al. 1983; 
PNUTGRO, Boote et 
al. 1986) 
bean + bare fallow) Castrignano et al. 1997, 1998; Gerdes 
et al. 1994 ; Brisson et al. 1989 ; 
Colson et al. 1995 ; Hoffman and 
Ritchie 1993. Landau et al. 1998. 
DSSAT home page 
http://www.icasa.net/dssat/index.html 
See (Jones et al. 2003) for model 
applications in other Continents. 
CORNF (Stapper and 
Arkin, 1980) 
A biophysical simulation model for 
maize 
Dillon et al., 1989. 
COTTAM (Jackson 
et al., 1988) 
A qualitative simulation model for 
cotton growth and development 
Dillon et al., 1989. 
TAMW (Maas and 
Arkin, 1980) 
A biophysical simulation model for 
wheat 
Dillon et al., 1989. 
EPIC (Williams et 
al., 1983) 
Erosion-Productivity Impact 
Calculator. simulation model used to 
examine long-term effects of various 
components of soil erosion on crop 
production 
Foltz et al., 1993; Hughes et al., 
1995 ; Sabbagh et al., 
1992.(Cabelguenne et al. 1997; 
Cabelguenne et al. 1999; Donaldson 
et al. 1995b; Flichman 1997). EPIC 
home page 
http://www.brc.tamus.edu/epic/  
EPIC-Phase 
(Cabelguenne et al., 
1986) 
EPIC-Phase model is a modified 
version of EPIC model adapted to 
water management. 
(Cabelguenne et al. 1997; 
Cabelguenne et al. 1999; Cavero et 
al. 2000a; Flichman and Jacquet 
2003; Santos et al. 2000a) 
CROPSYST (Stöckle 
et al. 1994) 
Cropping systems simulation model (Donatelli et al. 1997; Ferrer-Alegre 
and Stockle 1999; Pala et al. 1996; 
Pannkuk et al. 1998; Stockle et al. 
1997; Stockle et al. 2003). Based on 
Stockle et al. 2003. Jara and Stockle 
1997; Stockle et al. 1994; Stockle and 
Debaeke 1997; Berti et al. 2001; 
Diaz-Ambrona et al. 2001; Bocchi et 
al. 2001; Ventrella and Rinaldi 1999; 
Silvestri et al. 1999; Confalonieri et 
al. 2001; Belhouchette et al. 2001. 
For details, software, documentation 
and references visit 
http://www.bsyse.wsu.edu/cropsyst/ 
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http://www.sipeaa.it/ASP/ASP2/Crop
Syst.asp  
APSIM (McCown et 
al. 1995) 
Agricultural production system 
simulator 
Cit. Keating et al 1999. Inman-
Bamber and Muchow 2001; Keating 
et al. 1997, 1999; Muchow and 
Keating 1997; Robertson et al. 2000, 
2001; Asseng et al. 2001; Dunin et al. 
1999; Ringrose-Voarse et al. 1999; 
Snow et al. 1999; Verburg et al. 
2001; Cheeroo-Nayamuth et al. 2000; 
Hammer et al. 1996; Keating and 
Meink 1997; Meink and Hammer 
1995; Reyenga et al. 1999; Carberry 
et al 1996. For more details and 
references visit 
http://www.apsru.gov.au  
STICS (Brisson et al., 
1998) 
Multidisciplinary simulation model 
for standard crops. 
(Brisson et al. 2002; Brisson et al. 
2003; Gabrielle et al. 2002). For 
more details, software, 
documentation and references visit 
http://147.100.0.5/stics/ 
Built upon Oriade and Dillon 1997; Stockle et al. 2003; Jones et al. 2003; Keating et al 1999 
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APPENDIX III - THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CROPSYST MODEL 
 
The next figure shows a general scheme of the daily biomass accumulation in 
CropSyst as dependent of water balance and nitrogen balance systems. Very succinctly, 
the CropSyst approach determines crop potential biomass growth based on crop 
potential transpiration and on crop intercepted photosynthetic active radiation (PAR). 
The actual biomass gain is then determined by applying corrections related to nitrogen 
and water stresses. At crop physiological maturity, the total biomass accumulated is 
related to crop yield by a harvestable yield index which accounts for crop water and 
nitrogen stress intensities, and to crop sensitivity to stresses during the reproductive life 
cycle (Stockle et al. 2003). These processes are described in more detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
CropSyst considers the direct effect of water stress in leaf expansion  (either 
production or senescence) and considers leaf area duration as well (Stockle et al. 2003). 
Aiming to study irrigation effects, one of the most relevant aspects is the water balance 
simulation in the model. CropSyst considers the daily precipitation and irrigation levels, 
runoff, interception, water infiltration, redistribution in the soil profile and deep 
percolation, crop transpiration and evapotranspiration, or very similarly related 
processes (Pala et al. 1996; Stockle et al. 2003). As far as water movement is concerned 
the model includes sub-models of varying complexity that may be adjusted to existing 
soil and weather input data (Stockle et al. 1997). For instances, rainfall events are 
partitioned in runoff and infiltration considering soil texture, slope and tillage (Jones et 
al. 2003) and the soil water movement in the soil profile can be simulated using a finite 
difference numerical method (Richard‟s equation) and a simple cascading method 
(Jones et al. 2003; Keating et al. 2003; Stockle et al. 1997). In most cases the crop 
evapotranspiration (ET) is obtained from reference ET (ETo) and can be computed using 
different sub-models (Stockle et al. 1997; Stockle et al. 2003), such as Doorenbos and 
Pruitt – FAO – crop coefficient approach  for ET evolution (for details consult Allen et 
al. 1998), Penman-Montheith or Prieste-Taylor methods, depending on the weather data 
(Stockle et al. 2003). This model flexibility represents increased simulation versatility 
as users may choose the appropriate level of detail accordingly to the available data. 
Most models determine daily irrigation requirements and, allow simulation of automatic 
applications based on the soil water depletion or to introduce defined irrigation events 
according to the crop stage or day from planting. None of the models studied at this 
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point is able to optimise constrained water resources, applying water in the most crop 
water stress sensitive phases or yield responsive phases – in other words, none of the 
models maximizes the water use efficiency or water resources marginal productivity.  
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Figure 78. Illustration of daily biomass accumulation in CropSyst (diagram produced on the basis of the model description) 
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APPENDIX IV – CROP WATER REQUIREMENTS AT EACH IRRIGATION LEVEL 
 
WATREQ mm/m 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 - 2015 
Rice L1 783.2 783.6 781.9 783.4 786.1 781.6 785.6 785.2 783.7 783.9 783.8 
Rice L2 866.3 867.2 863.7 866.8 872.1 863.2 871.3 870.3 867.3 867.8 867.6 
Rice L3 949.5 950.8 945.6 950.2 958.2 944.8 956.9 955.5 951.0 951.8 951.4 
Rice L4 1032.6 1034.4 1027.5 1033.6 1044.2 1026.4 1042.5 1040.6 1034.6 1035.7 1035.2 
Rice L5 1115.8 1118.0 1109.3 1116.9 1130.3 1108.0 1128.2 1125.8 1118.3 1119.6 1119.0 
Rice L6 1199.0 1201.7 1191.2 1200.3 1216.4 1189.6 1213.8 1210.9 1201.9 1203.5 1202.8 
Rice L7 1282.1 1285.3 1273.1 1283.7 1302.4 1271.2 1299.4 1296.1 1285.6 1287.5 1286.6 
Rice L8 1365.3 1368.9 1355.0 1367.1 1388.5 1352.8 1385.1 1381.2 1369.2 1371.4 1370.4 
Rice L9 1448.4 1452.5 1436.8 1450.5 1474.6 1434.5 1470.7 1466.4 1452.9 1455.3 1454.2 
Rice L10 1531.6 1536.1 1518.7 1533.9 1560.6 1516.1 1556.3 1551.5 1536.5 1539.2 1538.1 
Rice L11 1614.7 1619.7 1600.6 1617.3 1646.7 1597.7 1642.0 1636.7 1620.2 1623.1 1621.9 
Rice L12 1697.9 1703.3 1682.4 1700.7 1732.7 1679.3 1727.6 1721.9 1703.9 1707.1 1705.7 
Rice L13 1781.1 1786.9 1764.3 1784.0 1818.8 1760.9 1813.2 1807.0 1787.5 1791.0 1789.5 
Rice L14 1864.2 1870.5 1846.2 1867.4 1904.9 1842.5 1898.8 1892.2 1871.2 1874.9 1873.3 
Rice L15 1947.4 1954.1 1928.0 1950.8 1990.9 1924.1 1984.5 1977.3 1954.8 1958.8 1957.1 
Potato L1 17.6 18.0 18.8 17.6 15.5 13.3 17.3 11.8 14.8 18.6 16.3 
Potato L2 35.2 36.1 37.6 35.2 31.0 26.7 34.6 23.6 29.6 37.3 32.7 
Potato L3 52.8 54.1 56.4 52.9 46.5 40.1 52.0 35.4 44.4 55.9 49.0 
Potato L4 70.5 72.2 75.2 70.5 63.7 53.5 69.3 47.2 59.3 74.6 65.6 
Potato L5 88.1 90.3 94.0 88.1 79.6 66.8 86.6 59.0 74.1 91.9 81.9 
Potato L6 105.9 108.5 112.9 107.3 95.7 80.4 104.1 70.9 91.9 110.5 98.8 
Potato L7 124.0 127.0 132.3 127.3 112.2 94.3 122.0 88.6 107.7 134.8 117.0 
Potato L8 146.5 146.2 152.1 148.4 129.1 108.7 140.4 102.2 124.0 159.1 135.7 
Potato L9 165.6 165.2 171.9 167.6 146.0 123.0 158.6 115.7 140.2 183.7 153.7 
Potato L10 185.6 190.5 202.9 187.9 168.8 153.4 178.0 130.3 157.5 208.0 176.3 
Potato L11 204.2 209.5 223.1 206.7 185.7 168.7 195.7 143.3 173.2 228.8 193.9 
Potato L12 222.8 228.5 243.4 225.5 202.6 184.1 213.5 156.3 189.0 249.6 211.5 
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WATREQ mm/m 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 - 2015 
Potato L13 241.3 247.6 263.7 244.3 219.5 199.4 231.3 169.4 204.7 270.4 229.2 
Potato L14 259.9 266.6 284.0 263.1 236.3 214.7 249.1 182.4 220.5 291.2 246.8 
Potato L15 278.5 285.7 304.3 281.9 253.2 230.1 266.9 195.4 236.2 312.0 264.4 
SugarSpring L1 48.3 48.3 45.5 48.6 45.3 43.8 45.3 39.3 43.8 50.6 45.9 
SugarSpring L2 96.6 96.6 91.0 97.2 90.6 87.6 90.6 78.6 87.6 101.3 91.8 
SugarSpring L3 144.9 144.9 136.5 145.9 135.9 131.4 135.9 117.9 131.4 151.9 137.6 
SugarSpring L4 193.2 193.2 182.1 194.5 181.2 175.2 181.2 157.2 175.2 202.5 183.5 
SugarSpring L5 241.5 241.5 227.6 243.1 226.5 219.0 226.5 196.5 219.0 253.1 229.4 
SugarSpring L6 289.8 289.8 273.1 291.7 271.8 262.8 271.8 235.8 262.8 303.8 275.3 
SugarSpring L7 338.1 338.1 318.6 340.3 317.1 306.6 317.1 275.1 306.6 354.4 321.2 
SugarSpring L8 386.4 386.4 364.1 389.0 362.4 350.4 362.4 314.4 350.4 405.0 367.1 
SugarSpring L9 434.7 434.7 409.6 437.6 407.7 394.2 407.7 353.7 394.2 455.6 412.9 
SugarSpring L10 483.0 483.0 455.2 486.2 453.0 438.0 453.0 393.0 438.0 506.3 458.8 
SugarSpring L11 531.3 531.3 500.7 534.8 498.3 481.8 498.3 432.3 481.8 556.9 504.7 
SugarSpring L12 579.5 579.5 546.2 583.4 543.5 525.5 543.5 471.5 525.5 607.5 550.6 
SugarSpring L13 627.8 627.8 591.7 632.1 588.8 569.3 588.8 510.8 569.3 658.1 596.5 
SugarSpring L14 676.1 676.1 637.2 680.7 634.1 613.1 634.1 550.1 613.1 708.8 642.4 
SugarSpring L15 724.4 724.4 682.7 729.3 679.4 656.9 679.4 589.4 656.9 759.4 688.2 
SugarWinter L1 31.2 43.2 42.0 39.8 40.9 39.1 31.7 37.9 30.6 43.3 38.0 
SugarWinter L2 62.3 86.3 84.0 79.6 81.7 78.3 63.5 75.8 61.2 86.7 75.9 
SugarWinter L3 93.5 129.5 126.0 119.3 122.6 117.4 95.2 113.7 91.9 130.0 113.9 
SugarWinter L4 124.6 172.7 168.0 159.1 163.4 156.6 127.0 151.6 122.5 173.3 151.9 
SugarWinter L5 155.8 215.8 210.0 198.9 204.3 195.7 158.7 189.5 153.1 216.7 189.9 
SugarWinter L6 186.9 259.0 252.0 238.7 245.2 234.8 190.5 227.4 183.7 260.0 227.8 
SugarWinter L7 218.1 302.2 294.1 278.5 286.0 274.0 222.2 265.3 214.4 303.3 265.8 
SugarWinter L8 249.2 345.3 336.1 318.2 326.9 313.1 254.0 303.2 245.0 346.6 303.8 
SugarWinter L9 280.4 388.5 378.1 358.0 367.8 352.2 285.7 341.1 275.6 390.0 341.7 
SugarWinter L10 311.5 431.7 420.1 397.8 408.6 391.4 317.4 379.0 306.2 433.3 379.7 
SugarWinter L11 342.7 474.8 462.1 437.6 449.5 430.5 349.2 416.9 336.9 476.6 417.7 
SugarWinter L12 373.8 518.0 504.1 477.3 490.3 469.7 380.9 454.8 367.5 520.0 455.6 
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WATREQ mm/m 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 - 2015 
SugarWinter L13 405.0 561.2 546.1 517.1 531.2 508.8 412.7 492.7 398.1 563.3 493.6 
SugarWinter L14 436.1 604.3 588.1 556.9 572.1 547.9 444.4 530.6 428.7 606.6 531.6 
SugarWinter L15 467.3 647.5 630.1 596.7 612.9 587.1 476.2 568.5 459.3 650.0 569.6 
Sunflower L1 18.7 18.7 25.4 28.8 20.7 23.4 22.7 18.7 20.7 27.0 22.5 
Sunflower L2 37.4 37.4 50.8 57.7 41.4 46.8 45.4 37.4 41.4 54.1 45.0 
Sunflower L3 56.1 56.1 76.1 86.5 62.1 70.2 68.1 56.1 62.1 81.1 67.5 
Sunflower L4 74.8 74.8 101.5 115.4 82.8 93.6 90.8 74.8 82.8 108.2 89.9 
Sunflower L5 93.5 93.5 126.9 144.2 103.5 117.0 113.5 93.5 103.5 135.2 112.4 
Sunflower L6 112.2 112.2 152.3 173.1 124.2 140.3 136.2 112.2 124.2 162.2 134.9 
Sunflower L7 130.9 130.9 177.7 201.9 144.9 163.7 158.9 130.9 144.9 189.3 157.4 
Sunflower L8 149.6 149.6 203.1 230.8 165.6 187.1 181.6 149.6 165.6 216.3 179.9 
Sunflower L9 168.3 168.3 228.4 259.6 186.3 210.5 204.3 168.3 186.3 243.3 202.4 
Sunflower L10 187.0 187.0 253.8 288.5 207.0 233.9 227.0 187.0 207.0 270.4 224.9 
Sunflower L11 205.7 205.7 279.2 317.3 227.7 257.3 249.7 205.7 227.7 297.4 247.4 
Sunflower L12 224.4 224.4 304.6 346.2 248.4 280.7 272.4 224.4 248.4 324.5 269.8 
Sunflower L13 243.1 243.1 330.0 375.0 269.1 304.1 295.1 243.1 269.1 351.5 292.3 
Sunflower L14 261.8 261.8 355.4 403.9 289.8 327.5 317.8 261.8 289.8 378.5 314.8 
Sunflower L15 280.5 280.5 380.7 432.7 310.5 350.9 340.5 280.5 310.5 405.6 337.3 
Maize L1 64.5 64.2 52.1 56.5 61.6 58.7 61.8 56.0 57.5 61.8 59.5 
Maize L2 129.0 128.4 104.2 112.9 123.2 117.4 123.6 112.0 115.0 123.5 118.9 
Maize L3 193.5 192.6 156.4 169.4 184.8 176.1 185.3 168.1 172.5 185.3 178.4 
Maize L4 258.0 256.8 208.5 225.8 246.4 234.8 247.1 224.1 230.0 247.0 237.9 
Maize L5 322.6 321.0 260.6 282.3 308.0 293.5 308.9 280.1 287.5 308.8 297.3 
Maize L6 387.1 385.2 312.7 338.7 369.6 352.2 370.7 336.1 345.0 370.5 356.8 
Maize L7 451.6 449.4 364.8 395.2 431.2 410.9 432.5 392.2 402.5 432.3 416.3 
Maize L8 516.1 513.6 417.0 451.7 492.8 469.6 494.3 448.2 460.1 494.0 475.7 
Maize L9 580.6 577.8 469.1 508.1 554.4 528.3 556.0 504.2 517.6 555.8 535.2 
Maize L10 645.1 642.0 521.2 564.6 616.0 587.0 617.8 560.2 575.1 617.6 594.7 
Maize L11 709.6 706.2 573.3 621.0 677.6 645.7 679.6 616.2 632.6 679.3 654.1 
Maize L12 774.1 770.4 625.4 677.5 739.2 704.4 741.4 672.3 690.1 741.1 713.6 
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Maize L13 838.7 834.6 677.6 734.0 800.8 763.1 803.2 728.3 747.6 802.8 773.0 
Maize L14 903.2 898.8 729.7 790.4 862.4 821.8 864.9 784.3 805.1 864.6 832.5 
Maize L15 967.7 963.0 781.8 846.9 923.9 880.4 926.7 840.3 862.6 926.3 892.0 
FreshPepper L1 42.9 45.2 39.9 43.9 41.2 35.7 45.1 40.0 41.0 43.9 41.9 
FreshPepper L2 85.8 90.3 79.7 87.7 82.4 71.4 90.2 80.0 82.1 87.8 83.7 
FreshPepper L3 128.6 135.5 119.6 131.6 123.6 107.1 135.3 120.0 123.1 131.7 125.6 
FreshPepper L4 171.5 180.7 159.4 175.5 164.7 142.8 180.3 160.0 164.2 175.5 167.5 
FreshPepper L5 214.4 225.8 199.3 219.4 205.9 178.5 225.4 200.0 205.2 219.4 209.3 
FreshPepper L6 257.3 271.0 239.2 263.2 247.1 214.2 270.5 240.0 246.3 263.3 251.2 
FreshPepper L7 300.1 316.2 279.0 307.1 288.3 249.9 315.6 280.0 287.3 307.2 293.1 
FreshPepper L8 343.7 362.0 319.5 374.0 330.1 286.3 361.3 320.6 329.1 351.7 337.8 
FreshPepper L9 388.6 409.3 361.5 422.7 389.6 350.4 408.5 362.7 372.2 397.7 386.3 
FreshPepper L10 432.1 455.0 402.0 470.0 443.6 389.6 454.2 403.3 413.8 442.2 430.6 
FreshPepper L11 475.3 500.5 442.2 517.0 488.0 428.6 499.6 443.6 455.2 486.4 473.6 
FreshPepper L12 518.6 546.1 482.3 564.0 532.3 467.5 545.1 484.0 496.6 530.6 516.7 
FreshPepper L13 561.8 591.6 522.5 611.0 576.7 506.5 590.5 524.3 538.0 574.8 559.8 
FreshPepper L14 605.0 637.1 562.7 658.0 621.1 545.4 635.9 564.6 579.4 619.1 602.8 
FreshPepper L15 648.2 682.6 602.9 705.0 665.4 584.4 681.3 605.0 620.8 663.3 645.9 
ProcPepper L1 42.9 45.2 39.9 43.9 41.2 35.7 45.1 40.0 41.0 43.9 41.9 
ProcPepper L2 85.8 90.3 79.7 87.7 82.4 71.4 90.2 80.0 82.1 87.8 83.7 
ProcPepper L3 128.6 135.5 119.6 131.6 123.6 107.1 135.3 120.0 123.1 131.7 125.6 
ProcPepper L4 171.5 180.7 159.4 175.5 164.7 142.8 180.3 160.0 164.2 175.5 167.5 
ProcPepper L5 214.4 225.8 199.3 219.4 205.9 178.5 225.4 200.0 205.2 219.4 209.3 
ProcPepper L6 257.3 271.0 239.2 263.2 247.1 214.2 270.5 240.0 246.3 263.3 251.2 
ProcPepper L7 300.1 316.2 279.0 307.1 288.3 249.9 315.6 280.0 287.3 307.2 293.1 
ProcPepper L8 343.7 362.0 319.5 374.0 330.1 286.3 361.3 320.6 329.1 351.7 337.8 
ProcPepper L9 388.6 409.3 361.5 422.7 389.6 350.4 408.5 362.7 372.2 397.7 386.3 
ProcPepper L10 432.1 455.0 402.0 470.0 443.6 389.6 454.2 403.3 413.8 442.2 430.6 
ProcPepper L11 475.3 500.5 442.2 517.0 488.0 428.6 499.6 443.6 455.2 486.4 473.6 
ProcPepper L12 518.6 546.1 482.3 564.0 532.3 467.5 545.1 484.0 496.6 530.6 516.7 
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ProcPepper L13 561.8 591.6 522.5 611.0 576.7 506.5 590.5 524.3 538.0 574.8 559.8 
ProcPepper L14 605.0 637.1 562.7 658.0 621.1 545.4 635.9 564.6 579.4 619.1 602.8 
ProcPepper L15 648.2 682.6 602.9 705.0 665.4 584.4 681.3 605.0 620.8 663.3 645.9 
TomatoFresh L1 41.7 44.0 36.1 42.1 39.8 35.1 44.2 38.4 39.8 41.3 40.2 
TomatoFresh L2 83.3 87.9 72.3 84.2 79.5 70.1 88.3 76.7 79.7 82.6 80.5 
TomatoFresh L3 125.0 131.9 108.4 126.4 119.3 105.2 132.5 115.1 119.5 124.0 120.7 
TomatoFresh L4 166.6 175.9 144.6 168.5 159.1 140.2 176.7 153.5 159.3 165.3 161.0 
TomatoFresh L5 208.3 219.8 180.7 210.6 198.9 175.3 220.8 191.9 199.2 206.6 201.2 
TomatoFresh L6 249.9 263.8 216.9 252.7 238.6 210.3 265.0 230.2 239.0 247.9 241.4 
TomatoFresh L7 291.6 307.8 253.0 294.9 278.4 245.4 309.2 268.6 278.8 289.2 281.7 
TomatoFresh L8 333.7 352.2 289.6 337.4 318.6 280.8 353.8 307.4 319.1 345.4 323.8 
TomatoFresh L9 376.1 396.9 326.5 380.3 375.4 316.7 398.7 346.6 359.7 398.4 367.5 
TomatoFresh L10 418.8 441.9 363.6 423.4 428.1 352.7 443.9 385.9 400.5 443.5 410.2 
TomatoFresh L11 460.6 486.0 400.0 465.8 471.0 388.0 488.3 424.5 440.5 487.9 451.3 
TomatoFresh L12 502.5 530.2 436.4 508.1 513.8 423.2 532.7 463.1 480.6 532.2 492.3 
TomatoFresh L13 544.4 574.4 472.7 550.4 556.6 458.5 577.0 501.7 520.6 576.6 533.3 
TomatoFresh L14 586.3 618.6 509.1 592.8 599.4 493.8 621.4 540.3 560.7 620.9 574.3 
TomatoFresh L15 628.1 662.8 545.5 635.1 642.2 529.1 665.8 578.9 600.7 665.3 615.3 
TomProcMec L1 42.9 45.2 39.9 43.9 41.2 35.7 45.1 40.0 41.0 43.9 41.9 
TomProcMec L2 85.8 90.3 79.7 87.7 82.4 71.4 90.2 80.0 82.1 87.8 83.7 
TomProcMec L3 128.6 135.5 119.6 131.6 123.6 107.1 135.3 120.0 123.1 131.7 125.6 
TomProcMec L4 171.5 180.7 159.4 175.5 164.7 142.8 180.3 160.0 164.2 175.5 167.5 
TomProcMec L5 214.4 225.8 199.3 219.4 205.9 178.5 225.4 200.0 205.2 219.4 209.3 
TomProcMec L6 257.3 271.0 239.2 263.2 247.1 214.2 270.5 240.0 246.3 263.3 251.2 
TomProcMec L7 300.1 316.2 279.0 307.1 288.3 249.9 315.6 280.0 287.3 307.2 293.1 
TomProcMec L8 343.7 362.0 319.5 374.0 330.1 286.3 361.3 320.6 329.1 351.7 337.8 
TomProcMec L9 388.6 409.3 361.5 422.7 389.6 350.4 408.5 362.7 372.2 397.7 386.3 
TomProcMec L10 432.1 455.0 402.0 470.0 443.6 389.6 454.2 403.3 413.8 442.2 430.6 
TomProcMec L11 475.3 500.5 442.2 517.0 488.0 428.6 499.6 443.6 455.2 486.4 473.6 
TomProcMec L12 518.6 546.1 482.3 564.0 532.3 467.5 545.1 484.0 496.6 530.6 516.7 
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TomProcMec L13 561.8 591.6 522.5 611.0 576.7 506.5 590.5 524.3 538.0 574.8 559.8 
TomProcMec L14 605.0 637.1 562.7 658.0 621.1 545.4 635.9 564.6 579.4 619.1 602.8 
TomProcMec L15 648.2 682.6 602.9 705.0 665.4 584.4 681.3 605.0 620.8 663.3 645.9 
TomProcManual L1 42.9 45.2 39.9 43.9 41.2 35.7 45.1 40.0 41.0 43.9 41.9 
TomProcManual L2 85.8 90.3 79.7 87.7 82.4 71.4 90.2 80.0 82.1 87.8 83.7 
TomProcManual L3 128.6 135.5 119.6 131.6 123.6 107.1 135.3 120.0 123.1 131.7 125.6 
TomProcManual L4 171.5 180.7 159.4 175.5 164.7 142.8 180.3 160.0 164.2 175.5 167.5 
TomProcManual L5 214.4 225.8 199.3 219.4 205.9 178.5 225.4 200.0 205.2 219.4 209.3 
TomProcManual L6 257.3 271.0 239.2 263.2 247.1 214.2 270.5 240.0 246.3 263.3 251.2 
TomProcManual L7 300.1 316.2 279.0 307.1 288.3 249.9 315.6 280.0 287.3 307.2 293.1 
TomProcManual L8 343.7 362.0 319.5 374.0 330.1 286.3 361.3 320.6 329.1 351.7 337.8 
TomProcManual L9 388.6 409.3 361.5 422.7 389.6 350.4 408.5 362.7 372.2 397.7 386.3 
TomProcManual L10 432.1 455.0 402.0 470.0 443.6 389.6 454.2 403.3 413.8 442.2 430.6 
TomProcManual L11 475.3 500.5 442.2 517.0 488.0 428.6 499.6 443.6 455.2 486.4 473.6 
TomProcManual L12 518.6 546.1 482.3 564.0 532.3 467.5 545.1 484.0 496.6 530.6 516.7 
TomProcManual L13 561.8 591.6 522.5 611.0 576.7 506.5 590.5 524.3 538.0 574.8 559.8 
TomProcManual L14 605.0 637.1 562.7 658.0 621.1 545.4 635.9 564.6 579.4 619.1 602.8 
TomProcManual L15 648.2 682.6 602.9 705.0 665.4 584.4 681.3 605.0 620.8 663.3 645.9 
DurumWheat L1 16.5 19.5 21.0 16.5 18.0 19.5 16.5 19.5 16.5 18.0 18.1 
DurumWheat L2 40.7 31.7 34.7 37.7 31.7 37.7 31.7 34.7 16.7 35.9 33.3 
DurumWheat L3 49.4 58.4 62.9 49.4 53.9 58.4 49.4 58.4 49.4 53.9 54.3 
DurumWheat L4 65.8 77.8 83.8 65.8 71.8 77.8 65.8 77.8 65.8 71.8 72.4 
DurumWheat L5 82.3 97.3 104.8 82.3 89.8 97.3 82.3 97.3 82.3 89.8 90.5 
DurumWheat L6 98.7 116.7 125.7 98.7 107.7 116.7 98.7 116.7 98.7 107.7 108.6 
DurumWheat L7 115.2 136.2 146.7 115.2 125.7 136.2 115.2 136.2 115.2 125.7 126.7 
DurumWheat L8 131.6 155.6 167.6 131.6 143.6 155.6 131.6 155.6 131.6 143.6 144.8 
DurumWheat L9 148.1 175.1 188.6 148.1 161.6 175.1 148.1 175.1 148.1 161.6 162.9 
DurumWheat L10 164.5 194.5 209.5 164.5 179.5 194.5 164.5 194.5 164.5 179.5 181.0 
DurumWheat L11 181.0 214.0 230.5 181.0 197.5 214.0 181.0 214.0 181.0 197.5 199.2 
DurumWheat L12 197.5 233.5 251.5 197.5 215.5 233.5 197.5 233.5 197.5 215.5 217.3 
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DurumWheat L13 213.9 252.9 272.4 213.9 233.4 252.9 213.9 252.9 213.9 233.4 235.4 
DurumWheat L14 230.4 272.4 293.4 230.4 251.4 272.4 230.4 272.4 230.4 251.4 253.5 
DurumWheat L15 246.8 291.8 314.3 246.8 269.3 291.8 246.8 291.8 246.8 269.3 271.6 
CommonWheat L1 16.4 19.4 20.9 16.4 17.9 19.4 16.4 19.4 16.4 17.9 18.0 
CommonWheat L2 32.8 38.8 41.8 32.8 35.8 38.8 32.8 38.8 32.8 35.8 36.1 
CommonWheat L3 49.2 58.2 62.7 49.2 53.7 58.2 49.2 58.2 49.2 53.7 54.1 
CommonWheat L4 65.5 77.5 83.5 65.5 71.5 77.5 65.5 77.5 65.5 71.5 72.1 
CommonWheat L5 81.9 96.9 104.4 81.9 89.4 96.9 81.9 96.9 81.9 89.4 90.2 
CommonWheat L6 98.3 116.3 125.3 98.3 107.3 116.3 98.3 116.3 98.3 107.3 108.2 
CommonWheat L7 114.7 135.7 146.2 114.7 125.2 135.7 114.7 135.7 114.7 125.2 126.2 
CommonWheat L8 131.1 155.1 167.1 131.1 143.1 155.1 131.1 155.1 131.1 143.1 144.3 
CommonWheat L9 147.5 174.5 188.0 147.5 161.0 174.5 147.5 174.5 147.5 161.0 162.3 
CommonWheat L10 163.8 193.8 208.8 163.8 178.8 193.8 163.8 193.8 163.8 178.8 180.3 
CommonWheat L11 180.2 213.2 229.7 180.2 196.7 213.2 180.2 213.2 180.2 196.7 198.4 
CommonWheat L12 196.6 232.6 250.6 196.6 214.6 232.6 196.6 232.6 196.6 214.6 216.4 
CommonWheat L13 213.0 252.0 271.5 213.0 232.5 252.0 213.0 252.0 213.0 232.5 234.4 
CommonWheat L14 229.4 271.4 292.4 229.4 250.4 271.4 229.4 271.4 229.4 250.4 252.5 
CommonWheat L15 245.8 290.8 313.3 245.8 268.3 290.8 245.8 290.8 245.8 268.3 270.5 
Letuce L10 156.7 132.9 153.6 158.4 160.4 158.1 142.5 175.3 190.5 161.4 159.0 
Onions L10 196.9 192.5 207.0 176.5 195.4 218.5 183.8 208.4 191.1 196.0 196.6 
Brocoli L10 49.0 43.8 46.7 50.8 53.1 42.4 41.1 50.3 56.8 50.3 48.4 
Melon L1 37.7 33.9 44.1 43.3 41.4 37.8 40.1 40.7 38.2 38.8 39.6 
Melon L2 69.4 61.8 82.1 80.7 76.9 69.7 74.2 75.5 70.5 71.7 73.2 
Melon L3 101.1 89.8 120.2 118.0 112.3 101.5 108.3 110.2 102.7 104.5 106.9 
Melon L4 132.8 117.7 158.3 155.3 147.7 133.3 142.4 145.0 134.9 137.3 140.5 
Melon L5 164.5 145.6 196.3 192.7 183.1 165.1 176.4 179.7 167.2 170.2 174.1 
Melon L6 196.2 173.5 234.4 230.0 218.6 197.0 210.5 214.5 199.4 203.0 207.7 
Melon L7 227.9 201.4 272.4 267.3 254.0 228.8 244.6 249.2 231.6 235.8 241.3 
Melon L8 259.6 229.4 310.5 304.7 289.4 260.6 278.7 284.0 263.9 268.7 274.9 
Melon L9 291.3 257.3 348.6 342.0 324.8 292.5 312.8 318.7 296.1 301.5 308.6 
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Melon L10 323.0 285.2 386.6 379.3 360.3 324.3 346.9 353.5 328.3 334.3 342.2 
Melon L11 354.7 313.1 424.7 416.7 395.7 356.1 381.0 388.2 360.5 367.2 375.8 
Melon L12 386.4 341.0 462.8 454.0 431.1 388.0 415.1 423.0 392.8 400.0 409.4 
Melon L13 418.1 369.0 500.8 491.3 466.5 419.8 449.2 457.7 425.0 432.8 443.0 
Melon L14 449.8 396.9 538.9 528.7 502.0 451.6 483.3 492.5 457.2 465.7 476.6 
Melon L15 481.5 424.8 577.0 566.0 537.4 483.4 517.3 527.2 489.5 498.5 510.3 
MaizeSilage L1 38.8 37.3 37.4 37.6 38.1 33.0 38.2 38.2 38.4 39.0 37.6 
MaizeSilage L2 77.6 74.6 74.7 75.3 76.2 66.0 76.5 76.4 76.7 78.0 75.2 
MaizeSilage L3 116.5 112.0 112.2 113.0 114.4 99.1 114.8 114.6 115.2 117.1 112.9 
MaizeSilage L4 155.9 149.9 150.1 151.3 153.2 132.6 153.6 158.4 154.2 156.6 151.6 
MaizeSilage L5 197.0 189.4 189.8 197.6 199.5 181.2 194.2 200.1 201.0 197.9 194.8 
MaizeSilage L6 246.5 238.2 237.8 240.4 242.7 228.6 236.2 249.9 244.4 240.7 240.5 
MaizeSilage L7 299.9 291.2 282.0 285.1 296.3 271.3 288.5 296.2 298.8 277.2 288.7 
MaizeSilage L8 345.9 335.9 325.5 338.1 350.3 313.2 332.9 341.6 344.6 329.4 335.7 
MaizeSilage L9 390.7 379.4 367.7 392.0 395.6 364.3 376.0 385.8 389.2 392.3 383.3 
MaizeSilage L10 434.1 421.5 408.5 435.5 439.6 404.8 417.8 428.7 432.5 435.9 425.9 
MaizeSilage L11 477.5 463.7 449.4 479.1 483.6 445.3 459.5 471.6 475.7 479.5 468.5 
MaizeSilage L12 520.9 505.8 490.2 522.6 527.5 485.7 501.3 514.4 519.0 523.1 511.1 
MaizeSilage L13 564.3 548.0 531.1 566.2 571.5 526.2 543.1 557.3 562.2 566.7 553.6 
MaizeSilage L14 607.7 590.1 571.9 609.7 615.4 566.7 584.9 600.2 605.5 610.3 596.2 
MaizeSilage L15 651.1 632.3 612.8 653.3 659.4 607.2 626.6 643.0 648.7 653.9 638.8 
SorghumSilage L1 36.2 34.5 34.4 34.3 35.7 31.7 34.8 33.4 35.5 34.2 34.5 
SorghumSilage L2 72.5 69.0 68.8 68.5 71.4 63.3 69.5 66.8 71.1 68.4 68.9 
SorghumSilage L3 108.9 103.8 103.4 103.0 107.3 95.2 104.5 100.4 106.8 102.8 103.6 
SorghumSilage L4 146.1 139.2 138.8 138.2 143.9 127.8 140.2 139.7 143.3 138.0 139.5 
SorghumSilage L5 183.7 175.0 174.5 173.8 175.1 160.7 176.3 181.4 180.1 173.5 175.4 
SorghumSilage L6 232.2 223.6 214.0 213.2 221.7 213.7 223.8 222.3 228.1 212.9 220.5 
SorghumSilage L7 274.5 264.5 262.1 260.8 272.4 262.1 264.6 263.0 269.7 252.0 264.6 
SorghumSilage L8 317.4 315.7 303.2 311.5 324.6 303.2 317.3 313.4 321.4 291.6 311.9 
SorghumSilage L9 359.3 357.4 343.4 363.1 367.5 343.4 359.2 354.9 363.8 358.3 357.0 
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SorghumSilage L10 399.3 397.1 381.5 403.4 408.3 381.5 399.1 394.3 404.2 398.1 396.7 
SorghumSilage L11 439.2 436.9 419.7 443.8 449.1 419.7 439.0 433.7 444.6 437.9 436.4 
SorghumSilage L12 479.1 476.6 457.8 484.1 490.0 457.8 478.9 473.2 485.1 477.7 476.0 
SorghumSilage L13 519.0 516.3 496.0 524.5 530.8 496.0 518.8 512.6 525.5 517.6 515.7 
SorghumSilage L14 559.0 556.0 534.1 564.8 571.6 534.1 558.7 552.0 565.9 557.4 555.4 
SorghumSilage L15 598.9 595.7 572.3 605.2 612.4 572.3 598.6 591.5 606.3 597.2 595.0 
Alfalfa L10 744.3 809.7 796.5 804.7 803.6 763.7 748.6 751.1 754.2 811.6 778.8 
Olivegrove L10 323.6 352.0 346.3 349.9 349.4 332.0 325.5 326.6 327.9 352.9 338.6 
Rapeseed L1 21.8 25.8 27.8 21.8 23.8 25.8 21.8 25.8 21.8 23.8 24.0 
Rapeseed L2 43.6 51.6 55.6 43.6 47.6 51.6 43.6 51.6 43.6 47.6 48.0 
Rapeseed L3 65.4 77.3 83.3 65.4 71.4 77.3 65.4 77.3 65.4 71.4 72.0 
Rapeseed L4 87.2 103.1 111.1 87.2 95.1 103.1 87.2 103.1 87.2 95.1 95.9 
Rapeseed L5 109.0 128.9 138.9 109.0 118.9 128.9 109.0 128.9 109.0 118.9 119.9 
Rapeseed L6 130.7 154.7 166.7 130.7 142.7 154.7 130.7 154.7 130.7 142.7 143.9 
Rapeseed L7 152.5 180.5 194.4 152.5 166.5 180.5 152.5 180.5 152.5 166.5 167.9 
Rapeseed L8 174.3 206.2 222.2 174.3 190.3 206.2 174.3 206.2 174.3 190.3 191.9 
Rapeseed L9 196.1 232.0 250.0 196.1 214.1 232.0 196.1 232.0 196.1 214.1 215.9 
Rapeseed L10 217.9 257.8 277.8 217.9 237.9 257.8 217.9 257.8 217.9 237.9 239.9 
Rapeseed L11 239.7 283.6 305.5 239.7 261.6 283.6 239.7 283.6 239.7 261.6 263.8 
Rapeseed L12 261.5 309.4 333.3 261.5 285.4 309.4 261.5 309.4 261.5 285.4 287.8 
Rapeseed L13 283.3 335.1 361.1 283.3 309.2 335.1 283.3 335.1 283.3 309.2 311.8 
Rapeseed L14 305.1 360.9 388.9 305.1 333.0 360.9 305.1 360.9 305.1 333.0 335.8 
Rapeseed L15 326.9 386.7 416.6 326.9 356.8 386.7 326.9 386.7 326.9 356.8 359.8 
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YIELD (Kg/ha) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2010 2015 
Rice L1 309 425 226 161 381 203 440 349 290 176 277 284 282 296 296 
Rice L2 360 477 291 213 431 254 492 1032 341 227 385 395 392 412 412 
Rice L3 482 598 423 335 593 385 614 1520 529 348 545 559 555 583 583 
Rice L4 729 835 678 571 667 615 850 2213 987 604 818 839 833 875 875 
Rice L5 1442 1052 1024 798 1364 1294 1073 2499 1293 960 1197 1227 1219 1280 1280 
Rice L6 1645 1321 2567 1669 1652 2142 1354 3033 1649 1334 1718 1761 1749 1837 1837 
Rice L7 2226 1849 3435 2677 2348 2925 1951 3731 2295 1876 2368 2426 2410 2531 2531 
Rice L8 3253 2727 4326 4014 3848 4092 3447 4752 3715 3098 3486 3573 3548 3727 3727 
Rice L9 4701 4295 5028 4961 4984 4812 4836 5530 4598 4564 4518 4631 4599 4831 4831 
Rice L10 4838 4441 5078 5039 5121 4877 4979 5593 4705 4686 4616 4731 4699 4936 4936 
Rice L11 4838 4441 5078 5039 5121 4877 4979 5593 4705 4686 4616 4731 4699 4936 4936 
Rice L12 4838 4441 5078 5039 5121 4877 4979 5593 4705 4686 4616 4731 4699 4936 4936 
Rice L13 4838 4441 5078 5039 5121 4877 4979 5593 4705 4686 4616 4731 4699 4936 4936 
Rice L14 4838 4441 5078 5039 5121 4877 4979 5593 4705 4686 4616 4731 4699 4936 4936 
Rice L15 4838 4441 5078 5039 5121 4877 4979 5593 4705 4686 4616 4731 4699 4936 4936 
OatsGrain L0 1751 1734 878 1069 1251 1038 1519 1302 1536 1019 1660 902 1405 1310 1310 
OatsViciaSilag L0 23743 24384 11451 13870 16494 13702 20754 18766 21263 13653 15684 14926 15429 17808 17808 
Potato L0 9241 9005 4614 7348 9283 7264 10036 9296 9304 4608 6417 6408 6369 8000 8000 
Potato L1 9295 9059 4668 7768 9446 7324 10089 9525 9358 4661 6512 6504 6464 8119 8119 
Potato L2 9362 9126 4735 8133 9925 7402 10156 10192 9425 4728 6672 6663 6622 8318 8318 
Potato L3 9448 9212 4821 8497 10502 7468 10242 10906 9821 4813 6876 6867 6825 8573 8573 
Potato L4 9523 9287 4896 8805 10989 7547 10317 11407 10261 4887 7052 7042 6999 8792 8792 
Potato L5 9644 9408 5017 9343 11493 7681 10438 11814 11117 4998 7295 7285 7241 9095 9095 
Potato L6 9943 9707 5316 11776 12218 7999 10737 12818 11993 5297 7845 7834 7786 9781 9781 
Potato L7 10667 10431 6040 17290 14242 8943 12181 14720 14176 6021 9201 9188 9132 11471 11471 
Potato L8 13690 13166 7733 24959 18195 11309 15253 17321 17663 7717 11791 11775 11703 14700 14700 
Potato L9 18529 18283 10666 31005 22745 16419 20053 21203 22978 15104 15800 15779 15682 19699 19699 
Potato L10 29118 27111 30554 35745 29980 23347 28569 26947 29501 28528 23212 23181 23040 28940 28940 
Potato L11 32005 30338 31917 37983 32080 24985 32403 28401 31953 30594 25077 25044 24891 31266 31266 
Potato L12 32186 30398 31977 38043 32150 25045 32463 28461 32013 30799 25148 25114 24961 31354 31354 
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Potato L13 32711 30480 32059 38125 32232 25201 32545 28543 32095 30933 25259 25226 25072 31492 31492 
Potato L14 32783 30670 32131 38197 32304 25496 32617 28615 32167 31207 25360 25327 25172 31619 31619 
Potato L15 32856 30807 32204 38270 32377 25577 32690 28688 32240 31283 25425 25391 25236 31699 31699 
SugarSpring L1 18548 17232 9081 11479 15803 10675 18620 21779 20312 9266 13459 13296 15325 15279 15279 
SugarSpring L2 18725 17409 9401 11673 16369 10867 18796 22755 21289 9474 13808 13641 15722 15676 15676 
SugarSpring L3 19193 17877 10422 11588 17521 11415 19264 26419 23514 11053 14821 14642 16876 16827 16827 
SugarSpring L4 20398 19082 12631 12944 17607 12914 21170 31133 27040 14390 16675 16473 18987 18931 18931 
SugarSpring L5 25104 22183 17975 14300 22180 17066 26532 39728 33665 21197 21134 20878 24064 23993 23993 
SugarSpring L6 33397 32981 34351 20650 33700 34532 36055 48620 43026 30436 30631 30260 34878 34775 34775 
SugarSpring L7 49293 46492 45898 38157 55594 45484 47725 59638 55122 36831 42301 41789 48165 48023 48023 
SugarSpring L8 66074 61102 57043 59040 70117 55624 63850 70675 67093 55235 55127 54460 62770 62585 62585 
SugarSpring L9 78576 74571 72648 79707 80803 69311 75048 80286 77153 72352 66984 66173 76270 76045 76045 
SugarSpring L10 85949 82486 82438 89369 87709 78024 83087 86858 83731 82369 74168 73271 84451 84202 84202 
SugarSpring L11 86995 83540 83598 90690 88666 79081 84278 87827 84756 83977 75171 74262 85593 85341 85341 
SugarSpring L12 87280 83556 83640 90707 88682 79097 84296 87844 84775 83994 75212 74302 85639 85387 85387 
SugarSpring L13 87318 83594 83680 90745 88720 79134 84333 87882 84812 84031 75246 74335 85677 85425 85425 
SugarSpring L14 87343 83673 83740 90770 88745 79159 84358 87906 84837 84056 75275 74364 85711 85459 85459 
SugarSpring L15 87376 83740 84015 90803 88778 79192 84391 87940 84870 84089 75329 74417 85772 85520 85520 
SugarWinter L1 33719 28675 12928 17026 20322 16177 26798 25444 28989 12976 19606 19382 22164 22305 22305 
SugarWinter L2 36305 30247 14537 19956 22442 17764 28479 27383 31464 14563 21371 21128 24160 24314 24314 
SugarWinter L3 39504 32690 16452 24604 25154 19724 30915 29826 34910 16495 23756 23486 26856 27028 27028 
SugarWinter L4 43889 40577 20313 32279 30818 22503 34662 33705 39577 19134 27903 27585 31544 31746 31746 
SugarWinter L5 51087 50911 25442 44772 41624 29116 49804 41257 46391 23771 35525 35121 40161 40417 40417 
SugarWinter L6 58376 61282 37570 52524 53513 42959 52451 48850 54707 30272 43289 42796 48938 49250 49250 
SugarWinter L7 67431 71741 58500 56259 65903 57496 55098 66753 66278 43792 53551 52941 60538 60925 60925 
SugarWinter L8 74129 80992 74926 77219 79901 70727 62522 76866 76251 69075 65272 64529 73789 74261 74261 
SugarWinter L9 79181 87783 86680 90298 88551 80794 67666 83857 81820 80728 72722 71893 82211 82736 82736 
SugarWinter L10 83488 93569 92674 97227 95030 88429 77878 89813 86571 91860 78802 77905 89085 89654 89654 
SugarWinter L11 86112 95800 94457 100082 97331 90498 83814 91688 88606 94499 81118 80194 91703 92289 92289 
SugarWinter L12 86593 95855 94734 100154 97385 90550 84419 91740 88659 94551 81272 80346 91877 92464 92464 
SugarWinter L13 86635 95862 94788 100161 97392 90557 84566 91758 88666 94558 81299 80373 91907 92494 92494 
SugarWinter L14 86635 95862 94790 100161 97392 90558 84567 91758 88666 94558 81299 80373 91908 92495 92495 
SugarWinter L15 86635 95862 94791 100161 97392 90558 84567 91758 88666 94558 81299 80373 91908 92495 92495 
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Barley L0 1923 1890 1011 1212 1408 1152 1633 1496 1707 1105 1622 1003 1830 1454 1454 
Sunflower L0 889 824 492 612 745 550 863 1037 927 482 669 685 683 742 742 
Sunflower L1 893 828 496 622 749 554 866 1041 930 486 674 689 687 747 747 
Sunflower L2 898 833 501 632 755 559 871 1046 935 491 679 694 692 752 752 
Sunflower L3 913 849 519 657 772 576 887 1060 950 509 694 710 707 769 769 
Sunflower L4 939 876 552 694 801 632 913 1227 975 561 737 754 752 817 817 
Sunflower L5 1003 941 623 784 873 732 990 1451 1125 675 830 849 846 920 920 
Sunflower L6 1191 1120 731 1341 1181 913 1208 1688 1344 811 1040 1064 1060 1153 1153 
Sunflower L7 1377 1304 824 1731 1444 1125 1420 1892 1573 1052 1239 1269 1264 1374 1374 
Sunflower L8 1552 1471 951 1952 1640 1311 1664 2028 1729 1443 1420 1453 1448 1574 1574 
Sunflower L9 1659 1565 1401 1978 1742 1490 1795 2104 1825 1627 1550 1586 1581 1719 1719 
Sunflower L10 1680 1603 1834 2064 1783 1567 1850 2107 1850 1706 1627 1666 1660 1804 1804 
Sunflower L11 1769 1698 1940 2183 1906 1670 1940 2202 1928 1784 1716 1756 1750 1902 1902 
Sunflower L12 1785 1714 1967 2189 1913 1678 1950 2212 1949 1790 1727 1767 1761 1915 1915 
Sunflower L13 1788 1719 1986 2192 1939 1681 1954 2215 1958 1793 1734 1775 1768 1922 1922 
Sunflower L14 1803 1724 1998 2194 1946 1684 1960 2217 1961 1795 1739 1780 1774 1928 1928 
Sunflower L15 1809 1736 2003 2197 1950 1686 1977 2220 1963 1797 1744 1785 1779 1934 1934 
Maize L1 560 440 409 152 562 303 603 912 645 164 487 505 470 475 475 
Maize L2 560 440 488 188 562 306 604 1694 709 190 588 610 568 574 574 
Maize L3 560 440 1495 1489 562 397 2042 3772 1971 298 1335 1385 1288 1303 1303 
Maize L4 1926 440 3247 3794 2672 2349 3191 5827 3933 1273 2937 3046 2834 2865 2865 
Maize L5 3623 1870 5301 4666 4553 4707 4413 7490 4841 2660 4522 4692 4364 4412 4412 
Maize L6 5796 3501 7255 6726 6177 6055 6212 9218 8727 4864 6614 6861 6382 6453 6453 
Maize L7 7260 6514 9252 9848 7926 7766 8047 10524 8629 7068 8490 8807 8192 8283 8283 
Maize L8 8703 7279 9738 10076 8809 8664 9167 11746 8531 7844 9281 9628 8956 9056 9056 
Maize L9 9594 8761 10612 10304 10034 9780 10260 12762 9809 8943 10337 10724 9974 10086 10086 
Maize L10 10668 9789 11078 11229 11182 10578 11326 13394 10566 9998 11255 11675 10859 10981 10981 
Maize L11 10692 9797 11109 11241 11182 10609 11326 13400 10575 10084 11276 11697 10880 11002 11002 
Maize L12 10726 9797 11129 11241 11182 10637 11326 13400 10575 10094 11285 11707 10889 11011 11011 
Maize L13 10731 9851 11129 11241 11182 10639 11326 13400 10575 10094 11291 11714 10895 11017 11017 
Maize L14 10731 9879 11129 11241 11182 10639 11326 13400 10575 10094 11294 11717 10898 11020 11020 
Maize L15 10731 9879 11129 11241 11182 10639 11326 13400 10575 10094 11294 11717 10898 11020 11020 
PermPast L0 1281 1248 685 624 1016 810 1261 1486 1259 653 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 
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FreshPepper L1 3490 3280 1831 2762 3477 3050 3294 3936 3542 1794 2610 2610 2632 3046 3046 
FreshPepper L2 3512 3302 1853 2825 3498 3073 3315 4205 3563 1816 2653 2653 2675 3096 3096 
FreshPepper L3 3533 3323 1874 2894 3520 3095 3337 4572 3585 1837 2705 2705 2728 3157 3157 
FreshPepper L4 3565 3355 1906 2973 3552 3127 3368 5071 3617 1869 2777 2777 2800 3240 3240 
FreshPepper L5 3599 3389 1940 3064 3586 3162 3402 5636 3651 2146 2877 2877 2901 3357 3357 
FreshPepper L6 3696 3486 2037 3428 3682 3258 3499 6125 3747 2425 3032 3032 3058 3538 3538 
FreshPepper L7 4070 3860 2411 4215 4056 3632 3873 6558 4121 3113 3420 3420 3449 3991 3991 
FreshPepper L8 5160 5396 4356 8311 5324 5142 5280 8525 6246 4959 5031 5031 5072 5870 5870 
FreshPepper L9 10361 10537 10273 8461 9966 8619 10407 12706 11037 9448 8725 8725 8798 10181 10181 
FreshPepper L10 16287 16447 14020 19584 15810 12732 17187 17870 16685 15024 13853 13853 13968 16165 16165 
FreshPepper L11 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
FreshPepper L12 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
FreshPepper L13 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
FreshPepper L14 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
FreshPepper L15 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
ProcPepper L1 3490 3280 1831 2762 3477 3050 3294 3936 3542 1794 2610 2610 2632 3046 3046 
ProcPepper L2 3512 3302 1853 2825 3498 3073 3315 4205 3563 1816 2653 2653 2675 3096 3096 
ProcPepper L3 3533 3323 1874 2894 3520 3095 3337 4572 3585 1837 2705 2705 2728 3157 3157 
ProcPepper L4 3565 3355 1906 2973 3552 3127 3368 5071 3617 1869 2777 2777 2800 3240 3240 
ProcPepper L5 3599 3389 1940 3064 3586 3162 3402 5636 3651 2146 2877 2877 2901 3357 3357 
ProcPepper L6 3696 3486 2037 3428 3682 3258 3499 6125 3747 2425 3032 3032 3058 3538 3538 
ProcPepper L7 4070 3860 2411 4215 4056 3632 3873 6558 4121 3113 3420 3420 3449 3991 3991 
ProcPepper L8 5160 5396 4356 8311 5324 5142 5280 8525 6246 4959 5031 5031 5072 5870 5870 
ProcPepper L9 10361 10537 10273 8461 9966 8619 10407 12706 11037 9448 8725 8725 8798 10181 10181 
ProcPepper L10 16287 16447 14020 19584 15810 12732 17187 17870 16685 15024 13853 13853 13968 16165 16165 
ProcPepper L11 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
ProcPepper L12 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
ProcPepper L13 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
ProcPepper L14 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
ProcPepper L15 17322 17741 14632 21221 16975 13344 18559 18541 18001 16105 14778 14778 14901 17244 17244 
TomatoFresh L1 10777 10133 5683 8663 10737 9988 10174 12147 10936 6020 8108 8108 7943 9526 9526 
TomatoFresh L2 10834 10190 5740 9041 10794 10051 10231 12503 10993 6077 8210 8210 8043 9645 9645 
TomatoFresh L3 10898 10253 5804 9403 10857 10119 10295 13411 11057 6151 8363 8363 8192 9825 9825 
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TomatoFresh L4 11003 10358 5909 10461 10962 10225 10399 14436 11162 6259 8612 8612 8436 10117 10117 
TomatoFresh L5 11121 10476 6029 12505 11080 10347 10518 15653 11280 6378 8970 8970 8788 10539 10539 
TomatoFresh L6 11401 10757 6309 14728 11361 10633 10798 17237 11560 6660 9486 9486 9293 11144 11144 
TomatoFresh L7 12443 11798 7351 17500 12402 11679 11840 19395 12602 7703 10615 10615 10399 12471 12471 
TomatoFresh L8 15206 15362 13084 24064 15185 15437 15593 25055 18343 12729 14475 14475 14180 17006 17006 
TomatoFresh L9 31199 31446 30937 34225 29364 25707 31499 38017 33297 29101 26794 26794 26248 31479 31479 
TomatoFresh L10 49999 50491 43038 60191 48532 39082 52763 54858 51224 45336 42177 42177 41317 49551 49551 
TomatoFresh L11 53189 54476 44929 65164 52125 40974 56988 56933 55274 49454 45070 45070 44152 52951 52951 
TomatoFresh L12 53189 54476 44929 65164 52125 40974 56988 56933 55274 49454 45070 45070 44152 52951 52951 
TomatoFresh L13 53189 54476 44929 65164 52125 40974 56988 56933 55274 49454 45070 45070 44152 52951 52951 
TomatoFresh L14 53189 54476 44929 65164 52125 40974 56988 56933 55274 49454 45070 45070 44152 52951 52951 
TomatoFresh L15 53189 54476 44929 65164 52125 40974 56988 56933 55274 49454 45070 45070 44152 52951 52951 
TomProcMec L1 19545 18369 10255 15466 19471 17082 18445 22043 19835 10047 14453 17342 16915 17056 17056 
TomProcMec L2 19665 18489 10375 15822 19591 17208 18565 23548 19955 10167 14692 17629 17195 17338 17338 
TomProcMec L3 19786 18610 10496 16206 19711 17332 18685 25601 20076 10288 14981 17976 17533 17679 17679 
TomProcMec L4 19964 18788 10673 16648 19889 17513 18863 28395 20254 10465 15376 18450 17995 18145 18145 
TomProcMec L5 20153 18978 10863 17158 20079 17706 19053 31564 20443 12015 15932 19117 18646 18801 18801 
TomProcMec L6 20696 19520 11406 19198 20621 18247 19595 34299 20986 13582 16791 20147 19651 19815 19815 
TomProcMec L7 22790 21614 13500 23603 22716 20337 21690 36723 23080 17432 18938 22723 22163 22348 22348 
TomProcMec L8 28898 30218 24393 46544 29817 28796 29566 47742 34977 27773 27856 33424 32600 32872 32872 
TomProcMec L9 58022 59005 57529 47384 55810 48265 58279 71154 61807 52907 48315 57973 56544 57016 57016 
TomProcMec L10 91210 92106 78515 109669 88534 71300 96249 100071 93438 84133 76707 92041 89773 90522 90522 
TomProcMec L11 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81829 98186 95767 96566 96566 
TomProcMec L12 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81829 98186 95767 96566 96566 
TomProcMec L13 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81829 98186 95767 96566 96566 
TomProcMec L14 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81829 98186 95767 96566 96566 
TomProcMec L15 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81829 98186 95767 96566 96566 
TomProcMan L1 19545 18369 10255 15466 19471 17082 18445 22043 19835 10047 14450 17532 17076 17056 17056 
TomProcMan L2 19665 18489 10375 15822 19591 17208 18565 23548 19955 10167 14689 17822 17359 17338 17338 
TomProcMan L3 19786 18610 10496 16206 19711 17332 18685 25601 20076 10288 14978 18172 17700 17679 17679 
TomProcMan L4 19964 18788 10673 16648 19889 17513 18863 28395 20254 10465 15373 18652 18167 18145 18145 
TomProcMan L5 20153 18978 10863 17158 20079 17706 19053 31564 20443 12015 15929 19326 18824 18801 18801 
TomProcMan L6 20696 19520 11406 19198 20621 18247 19595 34299 20986 13582 16787 20368 19838 19815 19815 
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TomProcMan L7 22790 21614 13500 23603 22716 20337 21690 36723 23080 17432 18934 22972 22375 22348 22348 
TomProcMan L8 28898 30218 24393 46544 29817 28796 29566 47742 34977 27773 27850 33790 32911 32872 32872 
TomProcMan L9 58022 59005 57529 47384 55810 48265 58279 71154 61807 52907 48305 58607 57084 57016 57016 
TomProcMan L10 91210 92106 78515 109669 88534 71300 96249 100071 93438 84133 76692 93049 90630 90522 90522 
TomProcMan L11 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81812 99262 96681 96566 96566 
TomProcMan L12 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81812 99262 96681 96566 96566 
TomProcMan L13 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81812 99262 96681 96566 96566 
TomProcMan L14 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81812 99262 96681 96566 96566 
TomProcMan L15 97001 99347 81938 118839 95061 74724 103930 103829 100803 90191 81812 99262 96681 96566 96566 
DurumWheat L0 2856 2956 1372 1611 2065 1599 2782 2139 2572 1916 1806 1645 1987 2187 2187 
DurumWheat L1 2997 3096 1471 1673 2128 1700 2939 2204 2638 2291 1911 1740 2102 2314 2314 
DurumWheat L2 3193 3272 1569 1778 2220 1874 3128 2295 2909 2591 2051 1867 2256 2483 2483 
DurumWheat L3 3388 3448 1667 1883 2312 2048 3316 2386 3179 2890 2190 1994 2410 2652 2652 
DurumWheat L4 3685 3791 1897 2123 2737 2628 3892 2759 3605 3141 2499 2275 2749 3026 3026 
DurumWheat L5 4016 4158 2189 2307 3200 3153 4181 3132 3970 3535 2795 2545 3075 3384 3384 
DurumWheat L6 4518 4571 2895 3917 3881 3565 4555 3676 4414 4064 3309 3012 3640 4006 4006 
DurumWheat L7 4964 4971 3649 4631 4469 4144 4745 4195 4864 4613 3738 3403 4111 4525 4525 
DurumWheat L8 5162 5223 4429 5141 4957 4579 5026 4550 5168 5007 4068 3703 4474 4924 4924 
DurumWheat L9 5256 5361 4929 5506 5278 4949 5271 4898 5316 5316 4302 3916 4732 5208 5208 
DurumWheat L10 5267 5373 5090 5537 5296 5055 5282 4911 5327 5334 4334 3946 4768 5247 5247 
DurumWheat L11 5267 5373 5090 5537 5296 5055 5282 4911 5327 5334 4334 3946 4768 5247 5247 
DurumWheat L12 5267 5373 5090 5537 5296 5055 5282 4911 5327 5334 4334 3946 4768 5247 5247 
DurumWheat L13 5267 5373 5090 5537 5296 5055 5282 4911 5327 5334 4334 3946 4768 5247 5247 
DurumWheat L14 5267 5373 5090 5537 5296 5055 5282 4911 5327 5334 4334 3946 4768 5247 5247 
DurumWheat L15 5267 5373 5090 5537 5296 5055 5282 4911 5327 5334 4334 3946 4768 5247 5247 
CommonWheat L0 3000 3060 1468 1666 2132 1682 2942 2222 2667 2007 2211 1757 2174 2285 2285 
CommonWheat L1 3181 3204 1540 1737 2197 1778 3095 2288 2739 2430 2341 1860 2301 2419 2419 
CommonWheat L2 3367 3351 1612 1828 2276 1902 3265 2362 2912 2793 2484 1974 2442 2567 2567 
CommonWheat L3 3595 3581 1750 1966 2407 2202 3478 2475 3351 2910 2682 2132 2637 2771 2771 
CommonWheat L4 3887 3914 1998 2162 2827 2726 4001 2894 3738 3279 3042 2417 2990 3143 3143 
CommonWheat L5 4242 4299 2326 2622 3206 3183 4310 3353 4127 3720 3425 2722 3367 3539 3539 
CommonWheat L6 4756 4778 3227 4247 4150 3747 4744 3951 4644 4296 4117 3272 4048 4254 4254 
CommonWheat L7 5085 5088 3939 4783 4649 4254 4885 4329 4997 4728 4524 3595 4447 4674 4674 
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CommonWheat L8 5268 5335 4531 5209 5103 4678 5164 4776 5297 5097 4884 3881 4801 5046 5046 
CommonWheat L9 5357 5460 5027 5598 5387 5048 5367 4995 5415 5414 5136 4082 5049 5307 5307 
CommonWheat L10 5367 5471 5181 5631 5399 5146 5377 5006 5424 5427 5171 4109 5084 5343 5343 
CommonWheat L11 5367 5471 5181 5631 5399 5146 5377 5006 5424 5427 5171 4109 5084 5343 5343 
CommonWheat L12 5367 5471 5181 5631 5399 5146 5377 5006 5424 5427 5171 4109 5084 5343 5343 
CommonWheat L13 5367 5471 5181 5631 5399 5146 5377 5006 5424 5427 5171 4109 5084 5343 5343 
CommonWheat L14 5367 5471 5181 5631 5399 5146 5377 5006 5424 5427 5171 4109 5084 5343 5343 
CommonWheat L15 5367 5471 5181 5631 5399 5146 5377 5006 5424 5427 5171 4109 5084 5343 5343 
Triticale L0 2172 2262 1139 1345 1616 1336 1805 1736 1941 1376 1845 1122 1697 1673 1673 
Letuce L10 28036 28421 22063 21146 21603 21240 20792 20792 20792 26323 19476 23356 24787 23121 23121 
Onions L10 47151 47799 37106 36920 38079 35684 39168 34088 37315 37315 33005 33005 30352 39063 39063 
Brocoli L10 15930 16148 12536 7016 11874 11494 13739 13723 13681 13681 12383 12383 11988 12982 12982 
Melon L0 6413 5719 3468 4105 6422 4737 6265 7910 6150 3158 4688 4688 4858 5435 5435 
Melon L1 6414 5719 3469 4122 6423 4738 6265 7910 6150 3158 4690 4690 4860 5437 5437 
Melon L2 6418 5724 3474 4128 6424 4740 6270 7915 6155 3163 4693 4693 4864 5441 5441 
Melon L3 6438 5743 3493 4148 6444 4759 6289 7934 6174 3182 4710 4710 4881 5460 5460 
Melon L4 6481 5786 3536 4205 6484 4799 6332 7977 6217 3225 4748 4748 4921 5504 5504 
Melon L5 6544 5850 3599 4270 6548 4863 6396 8041 6281 3289 4803 4803 4978 5568 5568 
Melon L6 6694 6000 3749 4421 6698 5012 6546 8191 6431 3439 4932 4932 5112 5718 5718 
Melon L7 7150 6455 4205 4879 7154 5468 7001 10295 6887 4076 5483 5483 5683 6357 6357 
Melon L8 9834 8469 5921 7956 10691 7768 9499 16470 9376 6614 7987 7987 8278 9260 9260 
Melon L9 15321 12059 8941 18191 18102 13524 15601 23143 14742 11108 13001 13001 13475 15073 15073 
Melon L10 17107 13352 18251 19603 20435 15832 17574 25689 16757 14374 15437 15437 16000 17897 17897 
Melon L11 17119 13364 18571 19698 20449 15851 17586 25704 16769 14387 15483 15483 16047 17950 17950 
Melon L12 17121 13365 18615 19699 20450 15853 17587 25705 16771 14388 15487 15487 16052 17955 17955 
Melon L13 17122 13367 18671 19701 20452 15854 17589 25706 16772 14390 15494 15494 16058 17963 17963 
Melon L14 17124 13368 18706 19702 20453 15855 17590 25708 16773 14391 15497 15497 16062 17967 17967 
Melon L15 17124 13369 18719 19702 20454 15856 17590 25708 16774 14392 15499 15499 16063 17969 17969 
RyegrassSilage L0 33838 35421 16315 21462 26143 22210 31229 29038 31856 18014 22599 22648 22631 26553 26553 
RyegrassFodd
er 
L0 4230 4428 2039 2683 3268 2776 3904 3630 3982 2252 2850 2899 2882 3319 3319 
MaizeSilage L1 17704 14912 11149 7652 13130 10163 15386 19832 15008 7899 13032 13675 12986 13283 13283 
MaizeSilage L2 17795 15003 11458 7743 13208 10244 15477 19923 15099 7991 13141 13788 13094 13394 13394 
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YIELD (Kg/ha) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2010 2015 
MaizeSilage L3 17946 15154 11919 7894 13357 10382 15628 20074 15250 8141 13318 13974 13271 13575 13575 
MaizeSilage L4 18518 15726 13012 8463 13891 10943 16201 21635 15822 8714 14022 14713 13973 14293 14293 
MaizeSilage L5 22776 18975 30156 17566 20223 22780 19504 30230 19054 15019 21219 22265 21144 21628 21628 
MaizeSilage L6 30663 26426 40635 19497 26323 35821 27230 42129 26829 20562 29051 30483 28949 29611 29611 
MaizeSilage L7 45944 41535 48498 27469 41848 44040 39681 56311 44018 24851 40635 42639 40492 41419 41419 
MaizeSilage L8 56474 50243 56512 32385 55544 47767 50064 64283 52847 29301 48604 51001 48433 49542 49542 
MaizeSilage L9 59940 53538 60130 58857 59816 58623 53272 66991 56347 53366 56988 59798 56788 58088 58088 
MaizeSilage L10 59966 53564 60156 58883 59842 59143 53298 67017 56373 53787 57101 59917 56900 58203 58203 
MaizeSilage L11 59966 53564 60156 58883 59842 59143 53298 67017 56373 53787 57101 59917 56900 58203 58203 
MaizeSilage L12 59966 53564 60156 58883 59842 59143 53298 67017 56373 53787 57101 59917 56900 58203 58203 
MaizeSilage L13 59966 53564 60156 58883 59842 59143 53298 67017 56373 53787 57101 59917 56900 58203 58203 
MaizeSilage L14 59966 53564 60156 58883 59842 59143 53298 67017 56373 53787 57101 59917 56900 58203 58203 
MaizeSilage L15 59966 53564 60156 58883 59842 59143 53298 67017 56373 53787 57101 59917 56900 58203 58203 
SorghumSilage L1 24741 21039 11697 14464 17811 13761 20586 27597 21496 10782 16074 16235 16062 18397 18397 
SorghumSilage L2 24896 21195 11852 15343 18039 13891 20742 27752 21652 10937 16277 16440 16265 18630 18630 
SorghumSilage L3 25258 21557 12215 16359 18429 14656 21104 28507 22014 11300 16723 16890 16711 19140 19140 
SorghumSilage L4 26692 22872 13650 18302 19786 17048 22419 34219 23329 12614 18429 18614 18416 21093 21093 
SorghumSilage L5 33493 28517 37952 21810 23206 24321 26445 45977 29693 19093 25382 25636 25364 29051 29051 
SorghumSilage L6 46746 39085 50274 25319 31191 47003 36614 60882 42004 25413 35344 35698 35319 40453 40453 
SorghumSilage L7 62640 53399 61221 33721 51820 60106 51567 73075 58345 33127 47095 47566 47061 53902 53902 
SorghumSilage L8 72003 63836 71206 46717 70736 68125 65607 81265 68002 41489 56702 57270 56662 64899 64899 
SorghumSilage L9 74978 66964 74913 75933 75617 73625 69149 83985 71072 67772 64131 64773 64085 73401 73401 
SorghumSilage L10 74986 66972 74922 75941 75625 73633 69157 83993 71080 68058 64162 64805 64116 73437 73437 
SorghumSilage L11 74986 66972 74922 75941 75625 73633 69157 83993 71080 68058 64162 64805 64116 73437 73437 
SorghumSilage L12 74986 66972 74922 75941 75625 73633 69157 83993 71080 68058 64162 64805 64116 73437 73437 
SorghumSilage L13 74986 66972 74922 75941 75625 73633 69157 83993 71080 68058 64162 64805 64116 73437 73437 
SorghumSilage L14 74986 66972 74922 75941 75625 73633 69157 83993 71080 68058 64162 64805 64116 73437 73437 
SorghumSilage L15 74986 66972 74922 75941 75625 73633 69157 83993 71080 68058 64162 64805 64116 73437 73437 
Alfalfa L10 12591 12906 12716 13866 13204 12360 12444 12225 13038 12716 12627 13269 12581 12807 12807 
Olivegrove L0 925 1283 589 666 783 927 792 989 797 686 692 717 699 844 844 
Olivegrove L10 1843 2557 1174 1327 1560 1847 1579 1971 1588 1367 1379 1429 1392 1681 1681 
Rapeseed L0 2700 2754 1321 1499 1919 1513 2648 2000 2400 1806 1744 1259 1886 2056 2056 
Rapeseed L1 2481 2499 1201 1355 1714 1387 2414 1784 2137 1895 1600 1155 1731 1887 1887 
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YIELD (Kg/ha) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2010 2015 
Rapeseed L2 2559 2547 1225 1389 1730 1445 2482 1795 2213 2123 1655 1194 1790 1951 1951 
Rapeseed L3 2660 2650 1295 1455 1781 1630 2573 1832 2479 2154 1740 1256 1881 2051 2051 
Rapeseed L4 2799 2818 1438 1557 2035 1963 2881 2083 2691 2361 1919 1385 2076 2263 2263 
Rapeseed L5 2970 3010 1628 1835 2244 2228 3017 2347 2889 2604 2101 1517 2272 2477 2477 
Rapeseed L6 2854 2867 1936 2548 2490 2248 2846 2370 2786 2577 2165 1563 2341 2552 2552 
Rapeseed L7 2797 2799 2167 2631 2557 2340 2687 2381 2748 2600 2181 1574 2358 2571 2571 
Rapeseed L8 2740 2774 2356 2709 2654 2433 2685 2484 2754 2651 2226 1606 2407 2624 2624 
Rapeseed L9 2678 2730 2514 2799 2693 2524 2684 2497 2707 2707 2251 1624 2434 2653 2653 
Rapeseed L10 2683 2735 2590 2815 2699 2573 2688 2503 2712 2714 2266 1635 2451 2671 2671 
Rapeseed L11 2683 2735 2590 2815 2699 2573 2688 2503 2712 2714 2266 1635 2451 2671 2671 
Rapeseed L12 2683 2735 2590 2815 2699 2573 2688 2503 2712 2714 2266 1635 2451 2671 2671 
Rapeseed L13 2683 2735 2590 2815 2699 2573 2688 2503 2712 2714 2266 1635 2451 2671 2671 
Rapeseed L14 2683 2735 2590 2815 2699 2573 2688 2503 2712 2714 2266 1635 2451 2671 2671 
Rapeseed L15 2683 2735 2590 2815 2699 2573 2688 2503 2712 2714 2266 1635 2451 2671 2671 
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APPENDIX VI – PAY-OFF MATRICES 
 
Table 24. Pay-off matrix for Cluster 1 in Caia Irrigation district 
Attribute Value 
Attribute Optimised 
Income Risk FarmLabour HiredLabour WKapital 
Income (€) 1548.09 -7445.35 -3753.40 -2711.45 -2903.25 
Risk (€
2
) 17.04 0.21 13.79 2.36 14.14 
FarmLabour (h) 336.95 167.91 0.00 182.09 157.12 
HiredLabour 0.00 0.00 454.19 0.00 144.68 
WKapital 247.45 736.83 368.90 135.77 0.00 
 
Table 25. Pay-off matrix for Cluster 2 in Caia Irrigation district 
Attribute Value 
Attribute Optimised 
Income Risk TotalLabour HiredLabour WKapital 
Income (€) 140648.48 -11873.31 -1300.15 9503.84 17043.79 
Risk (€
2
) 17791.44 425.08 428.51 1120.41 3611.95 
TotalLabour (h) 1431.20 495.29 242.41 1061.32 1391.32 
HiredLabour 1428.11 4475.58 803.71 483.71 7011.61 
WKapital 68450.26 19531.01 11951.60 8075.63 2078.33 
 
Table 26. Pay-off matrix for Cluster 3 in Caia Irrigation district 
Attribute Value 
Attribute Optimised 
Income Risk TotalLabour HiredLabour WKapital 
Income (€) 6558.93 -6341.83 -6355.49 -3966.74 -4682.18 
Risk (€
2
) 60.73 0.63 0.63 4.41 56.32 
TotalLabour (h) 475.41 12.32 7.25 187.19 510.57 
HiredLabour 114.44 1.28 0.00 0.00 764.80 
WKapital 2214.47 1415.73 1304.66 349.43 0.00 
 
Table 27. Pay-off matrix for Cluster 4 in Caia Irrigation district 
Attribute Value 
Attribute Optimised 
Income Risk TotalLabour HiredLabour WKapital 
Income (€) 38406.73 -321.81 -324.13 -237.85 4053.02 
Risk (€
2
) 999.58 2.21 2.22 2.33 35.89 
TotalLabour (h) 1345.80 38.98 13.61 38.54 143.46 
HiredLabour 575.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WKapital 25886.10 2026.95 1607.06 1529.64 435.52 
 
 334 
Table 28. Pay-off matrix for Cluster 1 in Odivelas Irrigation district 
Attribute Value 
Attribute Optimised 
Income Risk TotalLabour HiredLabour WKapital 
Income (€) 49710.70 -878.51 94.85 125.97 -1777.07 
Risk (€
2
) 1381.13 1.28 1.32 1.32 12.92 
TotalLabour (h) 1105.11 42.26 12.86 55.73 131.58 
HiredLabour 740.25 243.37 42.38 0.00 607.39 
WKapital 21521.75 1984.90 553.16 767.98 302.23 
 
Table 29. Pay-off matrix for Cluster 2 in Odivelas Irrigation district 
Attribute Value 
Attribute Optimised 
Income Risk TotalLabour HiredLabour WKapital 
Income (€) 18102.63 -2374.64 -33.00 -23.38 1931.35 
Risk (€
2
) 179.36 4.23 4.24 5.15 61.81 
TotalLabour (h) 291.57 38.18 18.79 32.44 166.82 
HiredLabour 0.00 655.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WKapital 10733.95 2992.21 1874.39 1603.02 1080.79 
 
Table 30. Pay-off matrix for Cluster 3 in Odivelas Irrigation district 
Attribute Value 
Attribute Optimised 
Income Risk TotalLabour HiredLabour WKapital 
Income (€) 88416.04 -1977.41 -6788.08 2900.46 9995.83 
Risk (€
2
) 10181.08 564.96 627.24 2677.41 3227.68 
TotalLabour (h) 1660.20 1427.66 559.45 1166.05 1224.84 
HiredLabour 680.59 11.91 0.00 0.00 124.16 
WKapital 62237.43 38615.83 43015.27 21501.66 17426.24 
 
The weights attached to each attribute are the last set of parameters that require 
estimation in order to make the MAUT function fully operational. As mentioned before, 
the weights are determined by a linear weighted goal programming method using the 
corresponding pay-off matrix values and objective values correspondent to an observed 
cropping pattern in the reference year. These weights are shown in the following tables. 
 
Table 31. Attribute weights for the farming systems in the Caia Irrigation district 
Weights Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
WMAXIncome 0.801 0.612 0.804 0.653 
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WMINRisk 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.347 
WMINTotalLabour 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.000 
WMINHiredLabour 0.177 0.000 0.134 0.000 
WMINWKapital 0.022 0.103 0.062 0.000 
 
Table 32. Attribute weights for the farming systems in the Odivelas Irrigation district 
Weights Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
WMAXIncome 0.909 0.726 0.858 
WMINRisk 0.073 0.000 0.000 
WMINTotalLabour 0.00 0.000 0.000 
WMINHiredLabour 0.00 0.000 0.000 
WMINWKapital 0.017 0.274 0.142 
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APPENDIX VII – CROP BUDGETS: TECHNICAL/ECONOMIC COEFFICIENTS  
 
Crop budgets summarise how technology and capital are combined to produce 
one hectare (or other unit) of one activity. From a technical perspective, this involves 
knowledge over the technical scheduling of agricultural operations, as well as over how 
resources (which and how many) are transformed to yield a certain amount of that 
activity. From an economic perspective, crop budgets assign dated amounts of capital 
required to finance the technical scheduling, as well as expected economic returns 
(gross margins, profit or other indicator) arising from those investments. 
The quality of model outcomes is inextricably related to how accurate and 
detailed these relationships are described in these crop budgets. For that reason, crop 
budgets produced by both private (Astrolábio - Consultores de Gestão Associados 2002; 
Coelho et al. 1998; Noéme et al. 2004; Rebocho 1995) and official sources (DRAAL 
1989; GPPAA 2001) were collected for a number of representative crops and 
technologies in the Alentejo region of Portugal. 
Technical and economic information from different sources were not 
immediately usable due to lack of comparability. On the one hand, these crop budgets 
were produced on different moments in time, with differing economic valuation of 
agricultural processes and resources.  On the technical side, different sources of data 
considered different technical coefficients for the same agricultural processes. In 
addition, crop budgets lacked sufficiently detailed information concerning irrigation 
equipments, irrigation techniques or water use, required for the modelling of water 
policy in agriculture. 
To overcome these limitations in the data, only the technical scheduling and 
timing of operations were retained from the original crop budgets, being all technical 
and economic coefficients adjusted to ensure comparability across the different sources. 
In this process, technical and economic coefficients from official sources were used 
whenever available. Technical coefficients (time per task) of agricultural machinery and 
traction operations were collected from (IHERA - MADRP 2000; IHERA - MADRP 
2004b), while economic coefficients of machinery and traction (prices, devaluation, 
maintenance, insurances and fuel consumption) were calculated using the methodology 
published by IHERA (IHERA - MADRP 2004a; IHERA - MADRP 2004b). Prices of 
inputs in general (agro-chemicals, labour, several plants and seeds) were collected from 
(DGDR - MADRP 1999) and complemented with statistical data (see Annex XXX - 
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Agricultural Production Costs). Output prices were obtained at the National Institute of 
Statistics (INE, various publications) and agricultural subsidies were provided by INGA 
– MADRP. To overcome the lack of detail concerning irrigation techniques and 
equipment, several irrigation manufacturers and dealers of irrigation equipment, in the 
Alentejo region, were contacted and asked to provide information on prices and 
technical characteristics. 
For multi-annual activities, such as olive groves and olive orchards, a weighted 
average of present value benefits and cost was used. Animal budgets are not explicitly 
considered, however, animal activities are indirectly taken into account through animal 
feeding activities (fodder/pasture/grazing activities). 
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APPENDIX VIII – ACTIVITIES: FEASIBLE CROPS-IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGIES  
 
In this modelling approach, activities (Xc,itech,ilevel,l) are defined by indexes such 
as, crop (c), irrigation technology (itech), irrigation level (ilevel) and land quality (l). The 
combination of crops and irrigation technologies simulated is listed table XXX, while 
possible combinations of irrigation methods, technologies, irrigation levels and soil 
qualities are presented in Table XXXX+1. Irrigation levels are produced during the 
computation of crop-water production function in CropSyst (L10 = full irrigation water 
supply; L1 – L9 are deficit irrigation supplies L1 = 10% of L10; L11 – L15 represent 
over-irrigation supplies (L15 = 150% of L10); no irrigation water is applied in L0.  
 
Table 33. Irrigation methods, technologies, irrigation levels and soil qualities 
Irrigation Method Irrigation Technology Irrigation Level Soil Quality 
Surface Irrigation  Gravity irrigation 
L1 to L15 Irrigated Land 
Sprinkler 
Irrigation 
 Centre pivot with 50ha 
 Centre pivot with 25ha 
 Sprinkler gun (10ha) 
 Stationary sprinkler 
irrigation – cereals 
 Stationary sprinkler 
irrigation – vegetables 
Drip Irrigation  Drip irrigation 
No Irrigation  Rain fed L0 
Irrigated and 
rain fed land 
 
 
Table 34. Combination of crops, irrigation methods and irrigation technologies 
Crop Technology 
Rice Irrigated – Flooding 
Potato 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Pivot 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Sprinkler Gun 
Irrigated – Gravity – Furrows 
Sugar Beet  Irrigated – Sprinkler – Pivot 
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Crop Technology 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Sprinkler Gun 
Irrigated – Gravity – Furrows 
Irrigated – Drip Irrigation 
Barley – Grain Rain-fed 
Sunflower  
Rain-fed 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Pivot 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Sprinkler Gun 
Irrigated – Gravity – Furrows 
Maize – Grain 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Pivot 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Sprinkler Gun 
Irrigated – Drip Irrigation 
Peppers (vegetable) Irrigated – Drip Irrigation 
Processing Peppers 
Irrigated – Drip Irrigation (manual plantation/harvest) 
Irrigated – Drip Irrigation (mechanized plantation) 
Tomatoes (vegetable) Irrigated – Drip Irrigation (manual harvest) 
Processing Tomatoes  
Irrigated – Drip Irrigation (mechanized plantation/harvest) 
Irrigated – Drip Irrigation (manual harvest) 
Durum Wheat 
Rain-fed 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Pivot 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Sprinkler Gun 
Common Wheat 
Rain-fed 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Pivot 
Irrigated – Sprinkler – Sprinkler Gun 
Triticale Rain-fed 
Lettuce Irrigated – Drip Irrigation 
Onions Irrigated – Sprinkler Irrigation – Stationary  
Broccoli Irrigated – Sprinkler Irrigation – Stationary 
Melon Irrigated – Drip Irrigation 
Melon Irrigated – Gravity – Furrows 
Olive Grove  Irrigated – Drip Irrigation 
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Crop Technology 
Rain-fed 
Cotton  Irrigated – Drip Irrigation 
Oranges Irrigated – Drip Irrigation 
Silage Rye Grass Rain-fed 
Silage Maize Irrigated – Sprinkler – Pivot 
Silage Sorghum Irrigated – Sprinkler – Pivot 
Medic Irrigated – Sprinkler – Sprinkler Gun 
Fodder Oats Rain-fed 
Oats - Grain Rain-fed 
Fodder Oats - Vicia Rain-fed 
Natural Pasture Rain-fed 
Improved Natural Pasture Rain-fed 
Permanent Pasture Rain-fed 
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APPENDIX IX - OUTLOOK FOR WORLD AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 
 
CEREALS  
 
In the last years, world grain markets have experienced supply shortfalls, due to 
adverse weather conditions, and an unprecedented demand from the biofuels industry 
(European Commission 2007b; FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007). Low stocks were 
unable to meet the increasing demand and lead to dramatic increases in cereal prices 
(FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007). Demand for feedstocks for both the biofuel 
industry and a growing livestock sector is projected to increase, pushing prices upwards 
as well (FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007). The high price is expected to stimulate 
increases in production, which should catch up with consumption in 2009/2010, and 
gradually ease prices from then on (FAPRI 2007a). Although cereal prices are expected 
to be higher in nominal terms than in the past decade, in real terms they should continue 
to decline, which indicates that supply grows faster than demand (European 
Commission 2007b). Average cereal prices in the EU-15 should reach 160€/t at the end 
of the next decade; Rye should follow the developments of wheat prices and reach 
130€/t (European Commission 2007b). 
 Projections for cereal markets within the EU are also favourable. Although 
cereal feed demand is likely to gradually decline
163
 over the next ten years, the domestic 
consumption is foreseen to increase due to the biofuel directive and, from 2010 
onwards, due to the biomass action plan and the emerging bioethanol industry 
(European Commission 2007b). On the other hand, high cereal prices and demand in 
world markets support an expansion of EU cereal exports considering the assumed 
strengthening of the USD against the Euro (European Commission 2007b) and the 
current competitiveness status of EU cereal markets (at the moment, cereal prices in the 
internal market are lower than those at international markets, allowing exports without 
recurring to export restitutions). 
The combination of low stocks, strong and increasing demand and high prices, is 
projected to provide the stimulus to allocate area from other crops, and set-aside land, 
towards cereal production (OECD and FAO 2007). Within the EU-25, cereal production 
                                                 
163
 - Livestock and meet production is projected to decline in the EU while feeding efficiency will 
continue to increase. In addition, cereals lose competitiveness for feed use as cheap protein-rich by-
products of biofuel production become increasingly available (European Commission 2007b). 
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is expected to increase just marginally as the total area is to remain stable and yield 
growth is projected to slow down considerably over the next ten years (European 
Commission 2007b). Some reallocation of land is inevitable and cereals such as barley, 
for instance, are projected to lose competitiveness, while wheat and maize areas are 
projected to expand slightly (European Commission 2007b). 
 
WHEAT 
 
World consumption of wheat per capita continues to decline (European 
Commission 2007a; FAPRI 2007a) but population growth offsets this trend (FAPRI 
2007a). Despite high wheat prices, consumption is projected to grow (European 
Commission 2007a; FAPRI 2007a) by 0.94% annually until 2016/17 (FAPRI 2007a), 
reflecting increasing human consumption as well as demand growth from the ethanol 
industry (FAPRI 2007a). Both the OECD-FAO and FAPRI estimate that productivity 
gains will suffice to meet demand over the next ten years (European Commission 
2007a). 
World wheat trade is expected to grow at a rate of 2.3% on average per annum 
until 2016/17 (FAPRI 2007a). This trade increase indicates that production and 
consumption are growing apart. In fact, the USA is expected to strengthen its position 
as the world biggest wheat exporter (European Commission 2007a) while most of the 
wheat demand is located in African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries (FAPRI 
2007a). The EU is the world largest producer and consumer of wheat (European 
Commission 2007a) but projections for the EU trade status over the next decade do not 
match; both the EC and the OECD-FAO estimate that the EU-27 net-export potential 
may increase (European Commission 2007a) while FAPRI estimates that EU (EU-25 
without Bulgaria and Romania) exports may decline (FAPRI 2007a). 
 Following major yields losses, due to adverse whether conditions in recent years, 
that contributed to high international market prices, both wheat area and production are 
expected to increase in 2007/08 (European Commission 2007b; FAPRI 2007a). 
Towards the end of the next decade, increases in worldwide production are mainly due 
to yield growth rather than area expansion (FAPRI 2007a).  
 Projections disagree once again concerning trends on world wheat prices. While 
the OECD-FAO estimates the wheat price to decline slightly, FAPRI expects a 0.2% 
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increase in the next ten years, reaching US $204.38 per mt by 2016/17  (FAPRI 2007a). 
Either way, both institutions forecast that the average price for the 2007-2017 period 
will be roughly a third higher than the past decade (OECD-FAO: 29%; FAPRI:+39%) 
(European Commission 2007a). 
 
RICE 
 
Driven by population growth the total consumption of rice is expected to 
increase slightly, despite a decline in per capita consumption (European Commission 
2007a; FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007)
164
. Over the next ten years, world per 
capita consumption of rice is forecasted to decline by 0.4% annually while total 
consumption is to increase by 0.7% (FAPRI 2007a) or 0.9% (OECD and FAO 2007) 
per year.   
Supply and demand have been following separate paths since 2000, with 
declining rice production (European Commission 2007a). Over the next decade, a 0.7% 
per annum yield productivity growth is expected to increase production by a similar 
percentage, offsetting the slight decline on the total rice area. (FAPRI 2007a). OECD-
FAO, FAPRI and the EC, all agree that rice production will increase slightly to keep up 
with consumption, but they diverge in respect to rice area estimates: FAPRI forecasts a 
decline in area (FAPRI 2007a); the OECD-FAO expects the rice area to increase, due to 
policies in developing countries promoting rice cultivation and encouraging food self-
sufficiency (OECD and FAO 2007); the EC considers that the rice area is unlikely to 
change (European Commission 2007a). 
Rice export prices have risen in the past decade (European Commission 2007a; 
OECD and FAO 2007). Particularly in the last three years, prices have increased sharply 
due to low world rice stocks and low exportable supplies (FAPRI 2007a). Trade in rice 
is expected to continue to expand
165
, with prices keeping this tendency in the short time 
followed by a gradual decline (OECD and FAO 2007). FAPRI estimates that over the 
next decade India and Thailand will account for 98% of the net volume growth in world 
                                                 
164
 - The income elasticity of rice demand is negative and therefore per capita consumption decreases as 
income increases in the „rice economies‟ (European Commission 2007a). 
165
 - The total rice trade/total rice consumption remains very low in comparison with other cereals, with 
6.7% (FAPRI 2007a), and it is not likely to represent more than 8% of production over the next ten years 
(European Commission 2007a). This indicator show that production and consumption centres of rice are 
located in the same areas. 
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rice exports (FAPRI 2007a), with Thailand alone representing about one third of global 
net-exports (European Commission 2007a).  
 The EC forecasts that total production in the EU is not likely to change 
significantly, although the rice area might decline slightly (European Commission 
2007a). Imports from developing countries are expected to increase, particularly from 
the EBA countries, to meet increasing demand for rice in the EU (European 
Commission 2007a). 
 Over the next decade, the world price of rice is estimated to strengthen at a rate 
of 0.3% per year, to reach US $331/mt in 2016 (FAPRI 2007a). During this period, the 
nominal price is, on average, expected to be 24% (FAPRI) to 35% (OECD) higher than 
during the past decade (European Commission 2007a). 
 
COARSE GRAINS 
 
Coarse grains, maize in particular, have a far more important role worldwide 
than wheat in terms of quantities consumed and produced (European Commission 
2007a). Evolution within the coarse grains sector appears to be very positive in the 
coming decade due to a thriving demand for maize for feedstock for ethanol industries 
and growth in the feed demand for the livestock industry (European Commission 2007a; 
FAPRI 2007a). In addition, increases in per capita consumption and population growth 
are projected to increase food demand (FAPRI 2007a). 
 The growth rate in both consumption and production of coarse grains should be 
comprised in between 1.4% (OECD-FAO) and 1.2% (FAPRI) (European Commission 
2007a). Production is expected to continue during the next decade, with increases in 
maize area leading this expansion, followed by sorghum and barley. World production 
is expected to increase due to growth in both area and yields (FAPRI 2007a). 
 On average, trade is estimated to grow by 2% per year during the coming decade 
(FAPRI 2007a). Again, maize trade is responsible for most of this increase with strong 
demand coming from Asian and Latin American countries (FAPRI 2007a). The USA is 
the most important producer and consumer of coarse grains (European Commission 
2007a) and their world market share within this aggregate is estimated in 70.2% in 
2016/17 (FAPRI 2007a). At the moment, the EU is a net-exporter of coarse grains and, 
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according to the EC, net exports from the EU could further increase as internal 
production is to grow faster than consumption during the next ten years (European 
Commission 2007a). OECD-FAO share EC optimism but FAPRI and the USDA both 
forecast that the EU-25 may be a net-importer of coarse grains from 2010/2011 onwards 
(European Commission 2007a). 
 Price projections from these forecasting institutions for coarse grains are very 
similar to those for wheat. FAPRI estimates that coarse grain prices will remain at very 
high levels until 2009/10 followed by a gradual decline until the end of the projection 
period, to end at around USD 150-160 $/t in 2016/17; according to the OECD-FAO the 
price may gradually drop to USD 138 $/t in the end of the next ten years (European 
Commission 2007a). When compared to the previous decade these prices represent a 
40% to 50% increase (for the OECD-FAO and FAPRI, respectively). World coarse 
grain prices in 2007/08 are estimated in USD 130.66 $/t for barley; USD 159.35 $/t for 
sorghum and in USD 159.44 $/t for maize (2007/08 year) (FAPRI 2007a). 
 
SUGAR  
 
Throughout the projection period total sugar production is estimated to increase 
by 13.9% (FAPRI 2007a). Sugarcane planted area in the world is projected to increase 
by 7.9%, and world area of sugar beet is to increase by 1.7% despite substantial 
decreases in sugar beet area in the EU (FAPRI 2007a). World sugar production is 
expected to grow in between 1.4% and 1.8% per year during the 2007-2016/2017 
period, according to FAPRI and OECD-FAO respectively (European Commission 
2007a). 
Brazil is the world most important producer and supplier of both sugar and 
ethanol from sugar-cane. Brazil alone accounts for 40% of the world sugar trade (OECD 
and FAO 2007). Demand for ethanol is projected to increase in Brazil and elsewhere 
but, in spite of that, sugar cane available it is not expected to constrain sugar production. 
In fact, sugar exports in Brazil are expected to grow vigorously (OECD and FAO 2007) 
 World sugar trade is expected to grow in line with consumption and production 
(European Commission 2007a). Total consumption increases by 20.9% until 2016/17 
and net trade increases at a slightly lower pace with 14.6% in the same period (1.5% per 
year) (FAPRI 2007a).  
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The EU sugar CMO
166
 was reformed in 2006 changing the support policy for 
sugar. (European Commission 2007a). Following this reform and the full 
implementation of the EBA agreement, the EU reverses its trading status becoming a 
net importer of sugar (European Commission 2007a; FAPRI 2007a). The EU is 
expected to remain a major net-importer (European Commission 2007a; FAPRI 2007a), 
perhaps the leading sugar importer (OECD and FAO 2007), as sugar production is 
forecasted to continue declining while imports rise to satisfy a growing demand. 
World sugar prices are increasingly “dependent on the arbitration between sugar 
and ethanol uses of sugar cane” in Brazil (European Commission 2007a). Moreover, 
given that sugar can be used to produce viable alternatives to fossil fuels, sugar prices 
and markets are increasingly influenced by oil prices (European Commission 2007a). 
FAPRI estimates the world sugar price to increase by 11.7%, to reach values close to 
USD 300$/mt by 2016/17, driven by strong demand from the ethanol industry  and the 
reduction in EU exports (FAPRI 2007a). OECD-FAO projections for sugar price are 
lower than those of FAPRI as they expect the world sugar price to remain at its current 
level, at around USD 250 $/mt, during the next decade (OECD and FAO 2007). Both 
institutions forecast that during the coming decade the average sugar price will be 11% 
(OECD-FAO) to 26% (FAPRI) higher than in the past ten years (European Commission 
2007a). In the EU, the sugar CMO reform may lead to an increasing availability of 
sugar in the domestic market from 2010 onwards shortening the gap between EU and 
world market prices (European Commission 2007b). 
 
OILSEEDS, OILMEALS AND VEGETABLE OILS  
 
                                                 
166
 - The CMO for sugar is governed by Council Regulation No. 318/2006. The first stage of the sugar 
CMO covers a four year transitional phase, from 2007/07 to 2009/10, during which the reform is actually 
implemented (European Commission 2007b). Over this period, the internal support price suffers a 
progressive cut of 36%, export restitutions are reduced to the agreed URAA limit (OECD and FAO 2007)  
(roughly an 80% reduction in volume) and in-quota tariffs are progressively phased-out within the EBA 
agreement (European Commission 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007). In addition, a quota buy-up scheme 
was implemented to encourage farmers to renounce their production quotas (FAPRI 2007a) and 
introduced two temporary but compulsory quota cuts in 2006/07 and 2007/08 to avoid oversupply of 
sugar in the internal market (FAPRI 2007a). In the second stage of the reform, from 2009/10 onwards, 
sugar exports from EBA countries are unrestricted (OECD and FAO 2007) as access to the EU sugar 
market is completely open for these countries (European Commission 2007b). The whole sugar sector in 
the EU is therefore dependent on the competitiveness of domestic production in the world market 
(without export restitutions) and on the volume of imports within the EBA agreement, ACP and Balkan 
countries (European Commission 2007b). 
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World oilseed consumption has been growing at a robust pace for the last 25 
years. Although the growth rate in the consumption of oilseeds is estimated to slow 
down in the next decade it is still expected to double that of cereals (European 
Commission 2007a). Demand for vegetable oils for human consumption is expected to 
increase at annual rates of 2.6% (FAPRI 2007a) to 2.8% (OECD and FAO 2007) until 
2016/2017, boosted by rising population and income growth (FAPRI 2007b). In the EU 
the growth rate is substantially more moderate with 0.7% per year (European 
Commission 2007a). 
World rapeseed consumption is projected to increase by 21% until 2016/17, 
driven mainly by the EU biodiesel industry (FAPRI 2007a). This should stimulate the 
demand for substitutes, such as sunflower seed and soybeans, which are to growth at a 
similar pace. The EU is to remain the most significant buyer of sunflower oil in the 
international market (FAPRI 2007a). The world oilmeal consumption trend is similar to 
that of oilseeds and the rest of the sector in the same period. Oilseed meal demand from 
the livestock sector increases at a robust pace with growth rates between 21% (OECD 
and FAO 2007) and 25% (FAPRI 2007a) during the next ten years. 
World production of oilseeds is expected to grow roughly at about 2.2% per year 
during the next decade, driven by demand (European Commission 2007a) for protein 
meals and vegetable oils (FAPRI 2007a). As productivity growth estimates will not 
suffice to meet the growing demand, acreage is projected to increase at about 0.8% 
(OECD and FAO 2007) to 1% (European Commission 2007a) per annum until 2016. 
This area expansion is also in line with estimates from FAPRI, with projections for 
world oilseed acreage to increase 11% by 2016 (FAPRI 2007a). 
Within the EU area, favourable medium-term perspectives should also lead to a 
strong increase in the oilseeds sector. Nevertheless, this expansion is constrained by 
rotational limits, in the case of rapeseed, or by water availability in the case of 
sunflower in the main producing regions (European Commission 2007b). Oilseed 
production is also estimated to increase due to rapeseed yield growth at the rate of 1.8% 
per year; sunflower yield should remain stable (European Commission 2007b).  
According to OECD-FAO, increases in the domestic demand for oilseeds will 
almost double EU imports over the next ten years (OECD and FAO 2007). EC and 
FAPRI projections also indicate a substantial increase in oilseed imports (European 
Commission 2007a). FAPRI indicates that the EU demand for rapeseed oil will outpace 
the crushing volume, forcing the EU to remain a net import of rapeseed oil (FAPRI 
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2007a). Strong demand for rapeseed will push demand for substitute oils, such as 
sunflower and soybean oils (FAPRI 2007a). The EU is the largest producer of rapeseed 
and despite increasing oilseed production it will remain a major net importer of oilseeds 
(European Commission 2007b; FAPRI 2007a). The EU-25 alone accounts for 52% of 
all sunflower seed net imports (FAPRI 2007a).. 
Trade estimates produced by FAPRI and OECD-FAO for world oilmeal differ 
substantially. Oilmeal trade potential should range in between 1.4% (OECD and FAO 
2007) and 2.8% per year (FAPRI 2007a). The share of oilmeals traded will actually 
decrease as the crushing industry locates where products and by-products are consumed 
(European Commission 2007a). In spite of this, the EU should remain the largest 
importer of oilseed meals (OECD and FAO 2007). 
OECD-FAO foresee an increase in nominal prices for the oilseed aggregate 
sector from 290$/t, in 2006/2007, to 300$/t in 2016/2017 (European Commission 
2007a). Both the OECD-FAO and FAPRI estimate nominal prices to be 20% higher on 
average in the next decade than in the past one (European Commission 2007a). These 
institutions forecast steep price increases in the near future, for all the components of 
the oil sector, followed by a downward trend towards the second part of the projection 
period (European Commission 2007a). this pattern is caused by expansion and 
contraction of growth in the demand for biofuel in the EU, In the case of rapeseed, 
(FAPRI 2007a) with sunflower and soybean prices (both seeds and oil) following 
similar trends (FAPRI 2007a). Oilmeal prices are to fall towards the end of the 
projection period as supply outpaces demand (European Commission 2007a; FAPRI 
2007a) mainly due to a steep increase in the supply of by-products from the biofuel 
industry (European Commission 2007a). 
Essentially it will be the demand for vegetable oils to push the prices for oilseeds 
up (European Commission 2007a). Oil crops with higher oil yield per ha (such as 
rapeseed and sunflower) will strengthen their competitiveness against those with lower 
oil yields (soybean) (European Commission 2007a), causing oilmeal prices to weaken 
relatively to vegetable oil prices (European Commission 2007a). 
Rapeseed oil prices reached record levels in the last two years (European 
Commission 2007b) and are bound to increase in the next few years. In fact, they are 
expected to have a similar behaviour to those of rapeseed itself (FAPRI 2007a). In the 
outer years of the forecast the decline in price is due to a demand shift to more 
economical vegetable oils (FAPRI 2007a). By 2015/16 rapeseed oil price should stay 
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close to soybean and sunflower oil prices (FAPRI 2007a). Oilmeal prices follow a 
similar pattern to the rest of the oilseed sector.  
 
BIOFUELS  
 
Profitability of biofuels is depended on crude oil prices. At the moment public 
support measures are necessary in all OECD countries for biofuels to be profitable 
(OECD and FAO 2007). The “form and substance” of these policies has necessarily 
direct implications on biofuel production and on the demand for biofuel feedstocks,  
therefore affecting their respective commodity markets (cereals, sugar, oilseeds) and 
influencing prices and land allocation of these crops (OECD and FAO 2007). Increased 
demand for cereals for ethanol production has pushed cereal prices upwards, making 
cereal feedstocks for livestock production increasingly expensive, consequently leading 
to higher meat prices (OECD and FAO 2007).  
Biofuels have worldwide a strong demand for agricultural products
167
. Sugar and 
maize are extensively used for feedstocks for ethanol production in Brazil and the USA, 
while vegetable oils and cereals are feedstocks for the biodiesel industry in the EU. 
Increased demand for bioenergy feedstocks is one of the main factors leading to steep 
increases in commodity prices in 2006 and 2007.  
At the moment, the US and Brazil are the most important ethanol producers in 
the world. Production has been growing at a fast pace and its growth rate is projected to 
slow down slightly or to remain at the constant rate in the next decade. In ten years 
time, production is expected to double in the US and more than double in Brazil, further 
increasing maize and cane acreages, respectively (OECD and FAO 2007). FAPRI 
estimates, although not as optimistic as those of OECD-FAO, suggest that consumption 
in these countries will growth faster than demand, leading to substantial increases in the 
exports of ethanol (FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 2007). World net trade should 
                                                 
167
 - Renewable energy and biofuel production have escalated to the top of political agendas in the last 
few years (OECD and FAO 2007). From a political viewpoint governments may whish to support 
biofuels for several reasons: 1) reduce the dependency on fossil fuels altogether or reduce dependency 
from less reliable suppliers of fossil fuels; 2) minimise environmental problems, such as CO2 emissions, 
and tackle climate change causes; 3) or they may whish to support biofuel production as it develops new 
market outlets and strengthens demand for agricultural products and pushes agricultural prices upwards, 
therefore increasing revenues of farmers or ensuring some extra level of protection (OECD and FAO 
2007). Bioenergy crops do have, regardless of these policy perspectives, a major potential to influence 
land use, and in fact bioenergy crops represent at the moment a renewed hope to invert the rate of decline 
of agriculture in developed countries (Nowicki et al. 2007). 
 350 
increase 26.4% in the next decade as world demand for ethanol is expected to increase 
(FAPRI 2007a), however, as the world supply is expected to increase faster than 
demand, the ethanol price should continue its downward trend over the next decade. It 
is expected to fall from USD 1.80$ per gallon in 2006 to USD 1.35$ in 2016 (FAPRI 
2007a). In the next ten years, production of ethanol in the EU-25 should grow 68.7%, 
consumption by 81.8% and net imports more than triple by 2016 (FAPRI 2007a). 
 The EU is the leading biodiesel producer and consumer in the world (FAPRI 
2007a). Biodiesel production in the EU increased 30% in 2006 alone (FAPRI 2007a) 
and biofuel use in the EU (which is mainly biodiesel from rapeseed oil) should grow 
170% between 2006 and 2010 (FAPRI 2007a). Rapeseed oil imports increased 49% in 
2006/07 (FAPRI 2007a) and are expected to increase further in the next decade. 
Rapeseed acreage in th EU is estimated to expand by 30% in the next decade (FAPRI 
2007a) constrained by rotational limits (European Commission 2007b). As crushing 
capacity is still rather limited in the EU, imports occur predominantly in the form of 
vegetable oils rather than seeds. For this reason, rapeseed oil prices increased 
dramatically in the last two years while rapeseed prices only increased modestly 
(European Commission 2007b). 
 The minimum 10% obligation for biofuel use in the EU-27 in 2020 puts the 
target at 5.75% in 2010. According to analysis of DG TREN, quoted by (European 
Commission 2007b), the current EU biofuel Directive is not expected to reach these 
incorporation rates as markets and technologies have had little time to react (European 
Commission 2007b). According to this study of DG TREN, an incorporation rate of 
6.9% may be expected by 2020 (European Commission 2007b). 
 
LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY 
 
BSE, AI and FMD have all severely affected the world meat market recently. In 
the next few years markets should recover, and per capita meat consumption is expected 
to rise in the long-term, assisted by sustained income and population growth (FAPRI 
2007a; OECD and FAO 2007). Developing countries should represent more than 80% 
of the expected world growth in meat demand, while per capita consumption in 
developed countries is expected to become marginal (OECD and FAO 2007) or to 
decrease slightly (Nowicki et al. 2007) in the next ten years. 
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 In the EU, poultry consumption fell sharply as a result of the AI scare. This 
decline was partly offset by increases in beef and veal and pork consumption, but 
resulted in an overall drop in the EU per capita consumption of meat (European 
Commission 2007b).  Medium-term perspectives are relatively optimistic as the overall 
consumption of meat in the EU is projected to increase 3.2% in the next decade 
(European Commission 2007b).  
 Driven by income and population growth, world meat production is expected to 
growth 17.1% over the next decade (FAPRI 2007a). Consumption may grow faster than 
production in many countries leading to net trade increases of 27.8% (FAPRI 2007a). 
Both FAPRI and OECD-FAO expect world beef consumption and production to grow 
in line with expansion over the past decade (1.5%) (FAPRI 2007a; OECD and FAO 
2007). The average growth in beef trade over the next ten years is estimated at 3.5% 
(FAPRI 2007a). Both institutions forecast average nominal beef prices to be 10% 
(OECD and FAO 2007) to 14% (FAPRI 2007a) higher than the past ten years (USDA: 
24%)” (European Commission 2007a). The EU became a net importer of beef since 
2003 and imports should continue to increase as domestic production is forecasted to 
decline, as a result of decoupling and high cereal feed prices (European Commission 
2007a; European Commission 2007b). 
Pig meat production and consumption are projected to increase at a slower pace 
than in the past decade (European Commission 2007b). Both the OECD and FAPRI, 
forecast that the growth of the world pigmeat sector will slow down to about 1.5-1.7% 
p.a. during the next ten years (European Commission 2007b). The EU is expected to 
lose some of its market share, from 32.6% to 24.5%, due to high feed costs and strict 
animal welfare and environmental regulations which should affect EU competitiveness 
(FAPRI 2007a). On average, nominal world pigmeat prices on the next decade should 
be 12% (FAPRI 2007a) to 17% (OECD and FAO 2007) higher than in the past decade 
(European Commission 2007a). 
The poultry sector shows signs of recovery following the AI outbreaks of recent 
years, which caused declines in price, production, consumption and trade. World 
poultry consumption/production growth rate is expected to grow at half the pace of the 
previous decade, with a 1.9% annual increase until 2016 (European Commission 
2007a). In spite of the significant slowdown this is still the highest growth rate within 
the meat aggregate, as competitive prices with respect to other meats play in favour of 
poultry (European Commission 2007b). World poultry prices are expected to grow at 
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rates around 24% (FAPRI 2007a) to 28% (OECD and FAO 2007) over the next decade 
(European Commission 2007a). According to FAPRI and the OECD-FAO, world trade 
in poultry should increase at a faster pace than consumption and production (European 
Commission 2007a). Higher feed costs, unfavourable exchange rates, strict animal 
welfare rules and other environmental legislation, should all contribute to reverse EU‟s 
trading status in poultry (from a net exporter to a net importer) during the next few 
years (European Commission 2007a; FAPRI 2007a) 
 
DAIRY 
 
According to FAPRI and OECD-FAO, the world dairy sector is expected to 
grow moderately over the next decade (European Commission 2007a). Prices of the 
four products in the dairy aggregate, butter, cheese, SMP and WMP, should remain on 
average 40% higher in the next decade than in the past decade (European Commission 
2007a; FAPRI 2007a). Income and population growth along with high feed costs are 
expected to drive dairy prices upwards (FAPRI 2007a). 
World milk production is anticipated to grow by 18.2% during the next decade 
(FAPRI 2007a), being most of this growth generated by productivity gains in 
developing countries (FAPRI 2007a). In the EU, milk per cow should increase at the 
same pace as cow numbers decline (total milk production is capped by milk quotas) 
(FAPRI 2007a)
168
. The EU milk supply has been following the milk quota except in the 
last two years in which deliveries slowed down (or fell) despite quota increases 
(European Commission 2007b).  
Consumption and production of both WMP and SMP is estimated to increase at 
a slow pace (at around 2% for WMP and in between 0.8% (OECD-FAO) and 1.7% 
(FAPRI) for SMP (European Commission 2007a). World trade in WMP and SMP 
represents a large share of production and should increase further (at least at 1.7% per 
year until 2016 (FAPRI)) as consumption is located away from production (European 
Commission 2007a). Both institutions estimate that the SMP price will remain at very 
high levels during the next ten years and that the WMP price will continue to strengthen 
and reach record marks until 2016 (European Commission 2007a). The WMP should be 
                                                 
168
 - Productivity gains allowed the EU dairy herd to shrunk by 40% during the last twenty years 
(European Commission 2007b). 
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on average in between 35% (OECD) to 37% (FAPRI) higher than the past ten year 
average (European Commission 2007a). EU market share of both WMP and SMP 
should continue to decline (European Commission 2007a). 
World butter consumption and production is expected to continue growing with 
growth rates of 2.2-2.3% per annum during the 2007-2016 period. (FAPRI 2007a; 
OECD and FAO 2007). World butter prices should follow this growth tendency during 
this period and they should on average be 24% (OECD-FAO) to 37% (FAPRI) higher 
than in the past decade (European Commission 2007a). Both FAPRI and the OECD-
FAO foresee that the EU market share will decrease substantially and the EC expects 
net exports to come close to zero (European Commission 2007a). This sharp drop in EU 
butter exports is linked to (butter) support price cuts (-25%) and decreasing production 
(European Commission 2007a; European Commission 2007b) as well as the end of 
export refunds since June 2007. On the other hand, demand for alternative dairy 
products “may outweigh the increase in milk deliveries, leading to limited availabilities 
of butter production” (European Commission 2007b).  
In the next decade, cheese production and consumption is expected to 
experience growth rates of 1.3% (FAPRI) to 1.8% (OECD-FAO) (European 
Commission 2007a). Cheese trade projections double those of consumption and 
production (European Commission 2007a). In the EU cheese production growth 15.4% 
in this period but exports remain stagnate as strong domestic demand absorbs added 
production (FAPRI 2007a). Both FAPRI and the OECD-FAO expect cheese prices to 
remain at very levels, equivalent to a 38% increase in cheese prices on average during 
the next decade (European Commission 2007a). 
 
 
 354 
APPENDIX X - AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION COSTS  
 
Input prices for agricultural production are crucial in any agricultural economics 
studies. Together with economic/policy settings and commodity prices, input prices 
contribute to determine what to produce, how much to produce and which and how 
much of each input to use. Special care was therefore taken into account for acquiring 
the most accurate, and geographically consistent as possible, information on 
productions costs.  
Disaggregated data on agricultural production factor costs were collected, at the 
national level, from various publications of the National Institute of Statistics from 1990 
until 2006 – the last year for which this statistical data has been published (INE 2001a; 
INE 2002; INE 2003; INE 2004; INE 2005; INE 2006; INE 2007).  This data covers 
disaggregated products within several aggregates such as, the cost of agricultural 
fertilisers, agricultural seeds and plants, agricultural machinery, diesel and electricity, 
and minimum labour wages. When appropriate, this raw data is directly fed into 
modelling, however, most often it is the trend of evolution in prices which provides the 
most valuable information.  
To capture that past evolution in agricultural factor costs, nominal price indexes 
were calculated. These indexes use nominal price statistical data from 1990 until 2006, 
being 1999 the base year (1999 = 100) and price estimates based on observed price 
growth for the 2007 – 2016 period (see figures 79 to 82). This forecast assumes that 
prices throughout the next decade are kept steady at the average price growth recorded 
in the 2001-2006 period. Production factors for which data was not available are 
assumed to grow at the rate of the closest aggregate, and agricultural factors not fitting 
into any of these aggregates are assumed to grow at the average rate of the entire 
agricultural production factor aggregate. The only exceptions to this are agricultural 
diesel, in which the trend of evolution for the world crude oil price is that estimated by 
OECD/FAO (OECD and FAO 2007), and agricultural labour which is assumed to grow 
at the average rate of growth in the national minimum wage recorded for the last six 
years.  
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Figure 79. Nominal price index of agricultural production costs for agricultural plants 
and seeds, energy and lubricants, agricultural fertilizers and correctives, and animal 
feedstuff aggregates for the 1990 – 2016 period, 1999 = 100. 
 
 
 
Figure 80. Nominal price index of agricultural production costs for labour, electricity 
and agricultural diesel for the 1990 – 2016 period, 1999 = 100. 
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Figure 81. Nominal price index of agricultural production costs for agricultural soil 
tillage and planting machinery, agricultural harvest and recollection machinery and for 
agricultural tractors for the 1990 – 2016 period, 1999 = 100. 
 
 
Figure 82. Nominal price index of agricultural production costs for agricultural seeds 
for the 1990 – 2016 period, 1999 = 100. 
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APPENDIX XI – MODEL RESULTS IN THE CAIA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
CLUSTER 1 – CAIA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
 
SHARE OF IRRIGATED LAND 
 
Figure 83. Share of irrigated land in Caia cluster 1 
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Figure 84. Share of irrigated land in Caia cluster 1 
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Figure 85. Pesticide load index in Caia cluster 1 
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Figure 86. Farm contribution to GDP in Caia cluster 1 
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Figure 87. Farm contribution to GDP in Caia cluster 1 
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Figure 88. Farm risk in Caia cluster 1 
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Figure 89. Utility in Caia cluster 1 
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Figure 90. Share of irrigated land in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 91. Share of irrigated land in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 92. Demand for nitrogen fertilisers in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 93. Demand for phosphorus fertilisers in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 94. Demand for potassium fertilisers in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 95. Pesticide load index in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 96. Farm contribution to GDP in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 97. Farm contribution to GDP in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 98. Farm risk in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 99. Utility in Caia cluster 2 
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Figure 100. Share of irrigated land in Caia cluster 3 
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Share of Irrigated Land Caia CL3 2010 SFP Scenario
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Figure 101. Share of irrigated land in Caia cluster 3 
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Figure 102. Demand for nitrogen fertilisers in Caia cluster 3 
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Figure 103. Demand for phosphorus fertilisers in Caia cluster 3 
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Potassium Fertilizers Caia CL3 2010
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Figure 104. Demand for potassium fertilisers in Caia cluster 3 
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Pesticide Risk (LD50) Caia CL3 2010
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Figure 105. Pesticide load index in Caia cluster 3 
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Farm DGP Caia CL3 2010
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Figure 106. Farm contribution to GDP in Caia cluster 3 
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Farm DGP Caia CL3 2010 SFP Scenario
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Figure 107. Farm contribution to GDP in Caia cluster 3 
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Figure 108. Farm risk in Caia cluster 3 
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Figure 109. Utility in Caia cluster 3 
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Caia CL4 2010 Share of Irrigated Land
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Figure 110. Share of irrigated land in Caia cluster 4 
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Share of Irrigated Land Caia CL4 2010 SFP Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage (%)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Share of Irrigated Land Caia CL4 2010 RD Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage (%)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Share of Irrigated Land Caia CL4 2010 WM Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage (%)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
Share of Irrigated Land Caia CL4 2015 SFP Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage (%)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Share of Irrigated Land Caia CL4 2015 RD Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage (%)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Share of Irrigated Land Caia CL4 2015 WM Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage (%)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
 
Figure 111. Share of irrigated land in Caia cluster 4 
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Figure 112. Demand for nitrogen fertilisers in Caia cluster 4 
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Figure 113. Demand for phosphorus fertilisers in Caia cluster 4 
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Figure 114. Demand for potassium fertilisers in Caia cluster 4 
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Figure 115. Pesticide load index in Caia cluster 4 
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Figure 116. Farm contribution to GDP in Caia cluster 4 
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Farm DGP Caia CL4 2010 SFP Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Farm DGP Caia CL4 2010 RD Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Farm DGP Caia CL4 2010 WM Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
Farm DGP Caia CL4 2015 SFP Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Farm DGP Caia CL4 2015 RD Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Farm DGP Caia CL4 2015 WM Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
 
Figure 117. Farm contribution to GDP in Caia cluster 4 
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Figure 118. Farm risk in Caia cluster 4 
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Figure 119. Utility in Caia cluster 4 
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0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Water Demand (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
Vol Price SFP
Vol Price SFP+RD
Vol Price WM
ODI CL1 2015 Water Demand
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Water Demand (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/I
r
r
 h
a
)
Flat Price SFP
Flat Price SFP+RD
Flat Price WM
ODI CL1 2015 Water Demand
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Water Demand (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 Q
u
o
ta
 (
m
3
/F
a
r
m
)
Quotas SFP
Quotas SFP+RD
Quotas WM
ODI CL1 2010 Water Demand
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Water Demand (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
Vol Price SFP
Vol Price SFP+RD
Vol Price WM
ODI CL1 2010 Water Demand
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Water Demand (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/I
r
r
 h
a
)
Flat Price SFP
Flat Price SFP+RD
Flat Price WM
ODI CL1 2010 Water Demand
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Water Demand (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 Q
u
o
ta
 (
m
3
/F
a
r
m
)
Quotas SFP
Quotas SFP+RD
Quotas WM
APPENDIX XII – MODEL RESULTS IN THE ODIVELAS IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
  
CLUSTER 1 - ODIVELAS IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
This typology accounts for 23.1% of the number of farms in the Odivelas 
irrigation scheme and for only 3% of the total agricultural area. On average all the land 
is irrigable in these farms. Vegetable and processing vegetables are the dominant crops 
types in this typology.  
 
 
DEMAND FOR WATER 
 
Figure 120. Demand for irrigation water in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 121. Demand for irrigation water in Odivelas cluster 1 
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ODI CL1 2010 Share of Irrigated Land
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Figure 122. Share of irrigated land in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 123. Share of irrigated land in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 124. Demand for nitrogen fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 125. Demand for phosphorus fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 126. Demand for potassium fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 1 
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0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Pesticide Risk (LD50 - kg/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
Vol Price SFP
Vol Price SFP+RD
Vol Price WM
ODI CL1 2015 Pesticide Risk (LD50)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Pesticide Risk (LD50 - kg/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
Vol Price SFP
Vol Price SFP+RD
Vol Price WM
ODI CL1 2010 Pesticide Risk (LD50)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Pesticide Risk (LD50 - kg/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/I
rr
 h
a
)
Flat Price SFP
Flat Price SFP+RD
Flat Price WM
ODI CL1 2015 Pesticide Risk (LD50)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Pesticide Risk (LD50 - kg/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/I
rr
 h
a
)
Flat Price SFP
Flat Price SFP+RD
Flat Price WM
ODI CL1 2010 Pesticide Risk (LD50)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Pesticide Risk (LD50 - kg/ha)
W
a
te
r 
Q
u
o
ta
 (
m
3
/F
a
rm
)
Quotas SFP
Quotas SFP+RD
Quotas WM
ODI CL1 2015 Pesticide Risk (LD50)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Pesticide Risk (LD50 - kg/ha)
W
a
te
r 
Q
u
o
ta
 (
m
3
/F
a
rm
)
Quotas SFP
Quotas SFP+RD
Quotas WM
AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDE LOAD INDEX  
 
Figure 127. Pesticide load index in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 128. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Farm Income Odivelas CL1 2010 SFP Scenario
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Figure 129. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 130. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 131. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 132. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 1 
 
 
Figure 133. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 134. Water payments in Caia cluster 1 
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Figure 136.Water payments in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 137. Farm contribution to GDP in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 138. Farm contribution to GDP in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 139. Farm risk in Odivelas cluster 4 
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Figure 140. Demand for agricultural labour in Odivelas cluster 1 
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Figure 141. Utility in Odivelas cluster 1 
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CLUSTER 2 - ODIVELAS IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
This is the most representative typology in the Odivelas irrigation district, 
accounting for 68.5% of the total number of farms and for 27.3% of the total 
agricultural area. The average area of farms included in this cluster is 31.22 ha. All the 
land is allocated to arable land uses, being cereal and oilseed crops the dominant groups. 
All the farming area is considered irrigable in these farms.  
 
 
DEMAND FOR WATER 
 
Figure 142. Demand for irrigation water in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 143. Demand for irrigation water in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 144. Share of irrigated land in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 145. Share of irrigated land in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 146. Demand for nitrogen fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 147. Demand for phosphorus fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 148. Demand for potassium fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 149. Pesticide load index in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 150. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 151. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 2 
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ODI CL2 2010 Farm Income
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 200 400 600 800
Farm Income (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
Vol Price SFP
Vol Price SFP+RD
Vol Price WM
ODI CL2 2015 Farm Income
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 200 400 600 800
Farm Income (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
Vol Price SFP
Vol Price SFP+RD
Vol Price WM
ODI CL2 2010 Farm Income
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 200 400 600 800
Farm Income (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/I
r
r
 h
a
)
Flat Price SFP
Flat Price SFP+RD
Flat Price WM
ODI CL2 2015 Farm Income
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 200 400 600 800
Farm Income (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/I
r
r
 h
a
)
Flat Price SFP
Flat Price SFP+RD
Flat Price WM
ODI CL2 2010 Farm Income
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 200 400 600 800
Farm Income (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 Q
u
o
ta
 (
m
3
/F
a
r
m
)
Quotas SFP
Quotas SFP+RD
Quotas WM
ODI CL2 2015 Farm Income
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 200 400 600 800
Farm Income (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 Q
u
o
ta
 (
m
3
/F
a
r
m
)
Quotas SFP
Quotas SFP+RD
Quotas WM
 
Figure 152. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 2 
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ODI CL2 2010 Farm Support
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Figure 153. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Farm Support Odivelas CL2 2010 SFP Scenario
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Figure 154. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 2 
 
Figure 155. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 2 
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ODI CL2 2010 Water Payments
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Figure 156. Water payments in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Water Payments Odivelas CL2 2010 WM Scenario
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Figure 157. Water payments in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Water Payments Odivelas CL2 2010 SFP Scenario
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Figure 158. Water payments in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Farm DGP Odivelas CL2 2010 RD Scenario
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Figure 159. Farm contribution to GDP in Odivelas cluster 2 
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ODI CL2 2010 Farm Risk (Variance)
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Figure 160. Farm risk in Odivelas cluster 2 
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ODI CL2 2010 Farm Labour
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Figure 161. Demand for agricultural labour in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Farm Labour Odivelas CL2 2010 SFP Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
Farm Labour (h/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Farm Labour Odivelas CL2 2010 RD Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
Farm Labour (h/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Farm Labour Odivelas CL2 2010 WM Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
Farm Labour (h/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
Farm Labour Odivelas CL2 2015 SFP Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
Farm Labour (h/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Farm Labour Odivelas CL2 2015 RD Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
Farm Labour (h/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Farm Labour Odivelas CL2 2015 WM Scenario
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
Farm Labour (h/ha)
W
a
te
r 
P
ri
c
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
Figure 162. Demand for agricultural labour in Odivelas cluster 2 
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Figure 163. Utility in Odivelas cluster 2 
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ODI CL3 2010 Water Demand
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CLUSTER 3 - ODIVELAS IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
 
Farms in this typology represent 8.4% of the number of farms in the Odivelas 
irrigation scheme and account for 69.6% of the total agricultural area. The average farm 
size in this typology is 365.7ha, being almost one quarter of this area irrigable. Slightly 
less than half of the total area is under permanent pastures, being the other half allocated 
to cereals, oilseeds and fodder crops. The most import irrigated crop is maize, 
representing 62% of all irrigated crops.  
 
 
DEMAND FOR WATER 
 
Figure 164. Demand for irrigation water in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Water Demand Odivelas CL3 2010 SFP Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 500 1000 1500
Water Quantity (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Water Demand Odivelas CL3 2010 RD Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 500 1000 1500
Water Quantity (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Water Demand Odivelas CL3 2010 WM Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 500 1000 1500
Water Quantity (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
Water Demand Odivelas CL3 2015 SFP Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 500 1000 1500
Water Quantity (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Water Demand Odivelas CL3 2015 RD Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 500 1000 1500
Water Quantity (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Water Demand Odivelas CL3 2015 WM Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 500 1000 1500
Water Quantity (m3/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
 
 
Figure 165. Demand for irrigation water in Odivelas cluster 3 
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ODI CL3 2010 Share of Irrigated Land
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Figure 166. Share of irrigated land in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 167. Share of irrigated land in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 168. Demand for nitrogen fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 3 
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ODI CL3 2010 Phosphorus Fertilizers
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Figure 169. Demand for phosphorus fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 3 
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ODI CL3 2010 Potassium Fertilizers
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Figure 170. Demand for potassium fertilisers in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 171. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Farm Income Odivelas CL3 2010 SFP Scenario
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Figure 172. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 173. Farm income in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 174. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 175. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 3 
 
 
Figure 176. Farm support in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 177. Water payments in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 178. Water payments in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 179. Water payments in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 180. Pesticide load index in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 181. Farm contribution to GDP in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Farm DGP Odivelas CL3 2010 SFP Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 100 200 300 400
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Farm DGP Odivelas CL3 2010 RD Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 100 200 300 400
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Farm DGP Odivelas CL3 2010 WM Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 100 200 300 400
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
Farm DGP Odivelas CL3 2015 SFP Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 100 200 300 400
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP
FLAT Price SFP
Quotas SFP
StatusQuo SFP
Farm DGP Odivelas CL3 2015 RD Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 100 200 300 400
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price SFP + RD
FLAT Price SFP + RD
Quotas SFP + RD
StatusQuo SFP + RD
Farm DGP Odivelas CL3 2015 WM Scenario
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 100 200 300 400
Farm DGP (€/ha)
W
a
te
r
 P
r
ic
e
 (
€
/m
3
)
VOL Price WM
FLAT Price WM
Quotas WM
StatusQuo WM
 
Figure 182. Farm contribution to GDP in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 183. Farm risk in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 184. Demand for agricultural labour in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 185. Demand for agricultural labour in Odivelas cluster 3 
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Figure 186. Utility in Odivelas cluster 3 
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